Was Alvin Weinberg a Team Player?

I generally have high regard for Rod Adams work. Rod's blog posts are evidence driven, and Rod almost never jumps the track, but this morning he did in a comment on Nuclear Green. The comment was a response to my recent post on Alvin Weinberg's integrity. Rod wrote

I am not sure why you think Weinberg was so correct about his safety concerns with light water reactors. Certainly they are not "inherently safe" and they require care in design, manufacturing and operation, but the safety record of the machines that caused Weinberg so much worry has been extraordinary all around the world.

Sometimes I think that the real answer to why Weinberg was fired was that he was not a team player and was so sure of his own knowledge that he overlooked the fact that others were just as smart and just as concerned about the welfare of their fellow man.

I cut my nuclear teeth on light water reactors. One of the most intellectually difficult tasks I had every year was coming up with some kind of reasonable scenario for our annually required "reactor accident" drill. My down to earth technicians and I just could not figure out how those thick stainless steel pipes were supposed to suddenly burst open.

These comments were most unfortunate. Rod appears to have made this comment without being aware of a number of Nuclear Green posts that would have better established the relationship of the nuclear safety issues to Weinberg's firing. Since I have offered a number of reasonably well documented posts on Weinberg's firing, Rod seemingly has ignored the available evidence and has not offered other evidence in support of his contentions.

Since my discussion of the evidence regarding the major actors in the Weinberg firing is quite extensive, I will point to relevant posts rather than discuss the evidence at length. First I noted what is arguably the unconstitutional authority which Congressman Chet Holifield exercised over the AEC. Hiring and firing decisions are made by persons with executive authority in an organization, yet Alvin Weinberg was invited to the office of a member of the legislative branch of government to be told that he was hired. Constitutionally, Congressman Holifield had no right to fire Alvin Weinberg. I have tried to point out that the safety nuclear safety conflict that formed part of the back drop of Weinberg's firing was not between and Weinberg and the Holifield clique, it was between the community of National Laboratory scientists. I have tried to lay out the issues that motivated that conflict. In fact Rod Adam's comment sheds some light on the attitude of Milton Shaw who played a major role in the safety conflict. Rod argued,

One of the most intellectually difficult tasks I had every year was coming up with some kind of reasonable scenario for our annually required "reactor accident" drill. My down to earth technicians and I just could not figure out how those thick stainless steel pipes were supposed to suddenly burst open.

Robert Pool described the difference of attitudes between the national laboratory scientific community and ex-Navy reactor developer Milton Shaw,

Milton Shaw, the head of the AEC's Division of Reactor Development and Technology, was convinced that such safety research was reaching the point of diminishing returns. An old Rickover protege, Shaw saw light-water reactors as a mature technology. The key to the safety of commercial power plants, he thought, was the same thing that had worked so well for the navy reactor program: thick books of regulations specifying every detail of the reactors, coupled with careful oversight to make sure the regulations were followed to the letter.

In fact the Three Mile Island accident was to show that the civilian Light Water Reactor had not reached a level of maturity comparable to that of Naval Light Water Reactors which Shaw (and Rod Adams) assumed.

Post Three Mile Island the civilian Light Water Reactor did reach an outstanding level of safety, but at a considerable cost. As I have documented, Alvin Weinberg's conflict with Milton Shaw had to do with an experiment which involved deliberately destroying a reactor in order to find out what happened. The worse case that concerned the scientists was the China syndrome, a core melting through all containment. A reactor was being built in Idaho in order to conduct this experiment. Shaw decided that the reactor was not needed, and stopped further construction. Dozens of National Laboratory scientists objected to the scrapping of what was considered an important nuclear safety experiment, and testified before Congress. Weinberg agreed with them, but did not take his disagreement to the level of Congressional testimony. Eventually the Three Mile Island accident was to substitute for for the Idaho nuclear accident experiment.

Rod tells us,

Sometimes I think that the real answer to why Weinberg was fired was that he was not a team player and was so sure of his own knowledge that he overlooked the fact that others were just as smart and just as concerned about the welfare of their fellow man.

My evidence suggests that Holiway, Ramsey and Shaw failed to exercise proper leadership. Holiway, as I have indicated exercised executive authority over the AEC even though he was not entitled to by the constitution. Ramsey's appointment as an AEC Commissioner had been dictated to the Kennedy Administration by Holifield. Ramsey was in fact a member of Holifield's staff, and after his appointment continued to engage in the subordinate relationship with Holifield, continuing to report to him. Shaw improperly turned decision making about a personnel matter, Weinberg's status as a National Laboratory Director to Holifield.

Considering the misconduct of all of the key players, the alligation that Weinberg was not a team player does not hold true. There is more evidence. The Nixon administration appears to have decided to attack the power of the Hloifield clique. When Ramsey's appointment came up for renewal, he was not reappointed by Nixon. His replacement was Dixie Lee Ray, who was soon appointed AEC Chairman. Ray proceeded to outmannuver Shaw, who was forced to resign. Holifield was shorn of his power and decided to not run for reelection in 1974. Ray, now had a chance to right the wrong done by the Weinberg firing episode, and she did so, by arranging for Weinberg to come to Washing as the first Director of Energy Research. Weinberg's appointment, if I am not mistaken involved directly reporting to the President. Weinberg was not happy with his position, and left it after a year, but this appointment should be taken as evidence that Weinberg was viewed as a team player.

Alvin Weinberg's integrity and vision

This December 2007 post is one of the foundational posts of Nuclear Green. I am reposting it with a few revisions.

Weinberg testifies before "Judge" Louie B. Nitzer, at a 1971 mock trial of technology staged at The Rensselaerville Institute. .

My father, Dr. Charles Julian Barton, Sr., was still living when I originally wrote this post. He was one of the last of his generation of scientists in Oak Ridge. He was recruited in 1948 to do research in Oak Ridge, first at the Y-12 plant, but for most of his Oak Ridge career he worked at X-10, the main location of ORNL. For most of his Oak Ridge career, my father worked under Alvin Weinberg's direction. In particular he worked on the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion and the Molten Salt Reactor Projects. The Lab was very higherarchical, and Weinberg was the big boss.

Oak Ridge is a small place, Alvin Weinberg's son, David Weinberg, attended the same school I did, and we became friends. I visited the Weinberg home on a number of occasions. David was, like me, intelligent and sensitive. It is through my childhood friendship with David that I feel a personal bond with Alvin Weinberg and his work.

Science is based on integrity. Without integrity, there is no truth in science. My father was a man of exceptional integrity, and so was Alvin Weinberg. Weinberg was aware of both the promise and the dangers inherent in the reactor. During the 1960's Weinberg directed a series of tests at ORNL, designed to verify theoretical assumptions made about the safety of light water reactors being pushed by the AEC for the generation of electrical power. The results were disturbing to Weinberg and his staff. The standard design of light water reactors was shown to have serious safety flaws. Weinberg began to warn people within the industry about the problem.

For Weinberg superior safety was one of the most important features of the Molten Salt Reactor design. Weinberg regarded the AEC's commitment to electrical power generation through light water reactors as irrational. Not only were they less safe than other designs, but also they could not be used to breed new fissionable materials, the Molten Salt Reactor could. It was an ideal atomic breeder that could produce more fuel than it consumed. A generation after the controversy, Weinberg's brilliance is fully appreciated, but at the time, Weinberg was a thorn in the side of the AEC establishment. Powerful congressman Chet Holifield had it in for Weinberg because he saw Weinberg's reactors safety concerns as threatening the development of a nuclear power industry, which Holifield viewed himself as nurturing. In retrospective, it was a mistake to build a nuclear power industry on Light Water Reactor technology. Holifield was guiding the nuclear power industry to a disaster, the consequences of which are still with us. A misguided Holifield confronted Weinberg and said, "Alvin, if you are concerned about the safety of reactors, then I think it might be time for you to leave nuclear energy." Holifield was powerful enough to have Weinberg fired from his position as Director of ORNL, but by doing so he demonstrated how out of control his exercise of power over the American Nuclear Establishment had become.

Weinberg's reactor safety concerns were vindicated in 1979 when coolant loss in the Three Mile Island-2 power reactor, lead to a partial core meltdown. Reading the details of the accident would not have comforted Weinberg, even though he had foreseen it. Yet the Three Mile Island accident did not cause the decline of the atomic power industry. Between the year of Weinberg's firing 1973, and the year of the Three Mile Island accident, 1979, 40 planned nuclear power plants were canceled. The First Nuclear age ended with Weinberg's firing in 1973, as he knew.

When I worked at ORNL in 1970 - 1971, the scientists there spoke of Weinberg with great respect. Weinberg was a visionary who believed that cheap sustainable power could improve the lot of the world's poor. He envisioned technological complexes surrounding reactors transforming the lives of third world peoples. Weinberg was no mad scientist; he was an heir of the Enlightenment, whose vision was developed in that tradition. That tradition of vision was of a science based transformation of human life. That vision stretched back to Frances Bacon and Rene Descartes. Hopefully Weinberg was not the last of the technological optimists.

Alexander Zucker, A University of Tennessee Physics professor who knew Weinberg personally and professionally and teaches physics at UT, said,

I would say that what made him unique was his profound concern for the welfare of man. He never stopped thinking about it.

There was also a dark side to Weinberg's vision, the side that acknowledged the danger that technology posed for the Human Race. During the last years of his career, Weinberg focused on the danger posed by the carbon-based economy.

I know this. Alvin Weinberg was one of the few great men who I have had the privilege to encounter. He was a truly gifted scientist, a giant in his generation. He saw both the promise and the dangers of technology. He did not flinch from what he saw, and his integrity was such that he willingly laid his career on the alter of truth. Time after time Weinberg's judgments and his visions have been vindicated. A generation ago Weinberg warned us of the dangers of anthropogenic CO2. I worked at ORNL during 1970-71. It was there for the first time I learned about the CO2/global warming problem. Weinberg's concern about the problem was beginning to spread to other ORNL scientists. In 1977 Weinberg penned a study of the future of the coal economy titled, "Some long-range speculations about coal." Its synopsis read:

Should the world demand for energy increase sixfold within the next 50 years, largely because the underdeveloped countries industrialize, and if half this demand is met by coal, then the estimated world recoverable resource of coal of 4 x 10/sup 12/ metric tons would last at this asymptotic level about 140 years. The carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere is then estimated to increase about threefold. These two eventualities may place limits on our ultimate use of coal. The risk of a CO/sub 2/ accumulation inherent in the widespread use of coal is in a sense analogous to the risk of nuclear proliferation: both problems are global, uncertain, and could pose profound challenges to man's future.

I know of the integrity and care of Weinberg and of the scientist who first accepted Weinberg's warning. Only fools and scoundrels would ignore it. I was a witness.

Alvin Weinberg and Eugene Wegner

Honor the Truth

My point of view as a blogger has been to always honor the truth. I have sought to discover what is the truth, in the case of Nuclear Green the truth about the energy. The truth is found by seeking the answers to simple and clear questions which arise from common sense. The truth is found by obeying the rules of logic, and by testing answers through observations drawn from experience.

The questions which lead to the creation of Nuclear Green, arose innocently when I ask anti-nuclear renewables advocate, David Roberts how electricity was to be produced at night or when the wind does not blow. Roberts suggested that the answer lay with energy storage. I asked next, "How much does renewable energy plus energy storage cost?"

Roberts did not have a good answer then, and three and a half years later, he still does not have a good answer. Beyond his failure to offer good answers to my questions, Roberts failed to honor the truth. Roberts offered propositions, which he was subsequently not able to justify. For Example Roberts argued,

Nuclear power costs more than renewables.

In order to prove this assertion true, Roberts needed to show how much a nuclear power electrical system would cost, and how much a renewable electrical system would cost. Roberts was either unable or unwilling to establish the comparative costs. If Roberts honored truth, he would have backed down from his claim that

Nuclear power costs more than renewables.

Roberts did not do that. When asked to demonstrated his contention, Roberts ignored the request. I further offered Roberts well attested information that contradicted his contention.

Roberts response was to ignore my request for proof of his contention, to ignore the contradicting information, and incidentally to ignore me, since Roberts seemingly had made himself available for conversation on Grist, but had failed to respond to my attempt to engage his in a serious dialogue on Post-Carbon energy costs. Our problem did not stem from a disagreement, rather it came from Roberts failure to offer proof for his assertions, and his failure to acknowledge the existence of well attested information that simply contradicted his viewpoint.

Nuclear Green has repeatedly, during the last 3 years, set out evidence and arguments that suggest that not only would future nuclear generated electricity cost less than renewables generated electricity from a post carbon grid, but that numerous steps can be taken to lower post carbon nuclear generation costs. No similar cost lowering steps have been proposed for renewable generation sources, by the way. The case for new nuclear generation technology has been won by a slam dunk, because the supporters of renewable generation technology, have completely ignored the arguments of Generation IV nuclear power supporters.

The backers of renewable generation technology have also lost their debate with the supporters of traditional nuclear power, because the renewables backers continue to use arguments that are 30 years out of date, and have failed to answer arguments that nuclear supporters have repeatedly made. The whole approach of the anti-nuclear renewables backers, has been to ignore the weakness of the evidence for their own case, while at the the same time ignoring the strength of the evidence for the case for nuclear power.

It is astonishing that I have been able to conduct an argument about energy despite having no professional training in the field. Indeed I began to argue about energy issues after a laps of over 30 years, during which I systematically ignored them. Although I maintained a brave front on the Internet, I have during the last three years maintained that I was not well qualified to argue many of the issues I argued on Nuclear Green, but no one better qualified was publicly arguing them, so until better qualified people showed up, as inadequate as I was, I was the best qualified person available to argue the case. Fortunately better qualified people are now showing up.

Fortunately the anti-nuclear renewable advocates adopted the strategy of ignoring me early on. One is fortunate in debate, if one encounters incompetent opponents, and the anti-nuclear, pro-renewables crowd has yet to prove their competence. I initially built my case by using flawed sources. I was aware of some of the flaws, and acknowledged them. In effect I crafted better than nothing arguments. I noticed that renewables backers were using better than nothing arguments too, and that my arguments were based on more recent, and better quality sources than the sources used by the renewables crowd. I kept looking for better quality sources, and reported them whenever they emerged. Because I was attempting to construct arguments, I was in a good position to critique the argument construction of the other side, which is always a useful skill for renewables backers.

Eventually I became aware that the tactics of renewables advocates involved systematically ignoring information that supported the case for nuclear power, while relying on studies that contained well documented flaws. Perhaps no energy related research is more flawed than the sustainability research paper "Nuclear power the energy balance," by Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Smith, often referred to as "Stormsmith." The Stormsmith paper focused on the CO2 emissions associated with nuclear plants during their lifetime, as well as the sustainability of uranium as an energy source. These are serious areas of research for specialists like Roberto Dones of Paul Scherrer Institut who has coauthored several peer reviewed papers on the topic, papers that were published in respected scientific and academic journals. In contrast the "Stormsmith" paper was funded by an association of European political parties, and it has never been published in a peer reviewed journal.

Now if the association of European political parties that had commissioned the "Stormsmith" paper had wished to commission an accurate and credible account of CO2 emissions and uranium sustainability, they would have no doubt asked Roberto Dones to write it. These politicians wanted anti-nuclear, pro-renewables propaganda, not accurate information.

I should point out that the Philip Smith of this dynamic "Stormsmith" duo was dead by the time I began writing about "Stormsmith," but that Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen was very much with us. It is not clear how much Smith knew about the topic or what he contributed to the paper. Yet, what ever credibility "Stormsmith" had rested with Smith who was a professor of physics. But after Smith's death, Storm van Leeuwen appears to have assumed the mantel, with other anti-nuclear, pro-renewable advocates, such as David Fleming, relying on "Storm's" authority. Storm van Leeuwen had not enjoyed a career that would have vested him as an authority on nuclear technology. This does not mean that what Storm van Leeuwen had to say was wrong or inaccurate, but it did mean that attaching his name to a statement about nuclear technology did nothing to enhance the likelihood that the statement was truthful. And people like Roberto Dones who were real experts had raised questions about "Stormsmith's" truthfulness. In 2007, Dones wrote a note which offered some criticisms of "Stormsmith."

The estimation of energy uses and corresponding greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from the nuclear energy chain by Storm van Leeuwen J.W. and Smith P. (last available version: SvLS 2005)1 is often quoted especially by nuclear opponents who question the characteristic of nuclear energy to be near GHG-free. SvLS guesstimate relatively high to very high energy requirements and hence corresponding CO2 emissions for the electricity of nuclear origin, the highest to be found in the literature circulating in Internet,2 especially when low grade uranium ores are considered. The main explanation for SvLS’ high figures lies in their extreme assumptions (often rough guesses, as the authors admit themselves) and partially flawed methodology.

However, because of ideological connotations of the opposition to nuclear energy, often the quotation of (SvLS 2005) is not accompanied by citation of and comparison with the tens of other relevant technical studies that have been and are being produced on the subject, with different results although prevalently converging to relatively low GHG emissions. An opponent to nuclear energy likely chooses the reference that best matches his presumptions, without undergoing the process of critically analyzing and comparing its assumptions and results vs. other studies. Symmetrically, a supporter of nuclear energy may wish to refer only to those studies that conclude that nuclear energy is the best performer among electricity options with respect to GHG emissions. Correct approach would be to use transparent life cycle assessment (LCA) studies best fitting specific conditions being addressed,3 with inclusive boundaries, and compare/quote the obtained results with other likewise transparent and possibly reviewed studies to capture the likely ranges in order to account of uncertainties.

Dones's note was by no means the only serious criticism of "Stormsmith." Associate Professor Martin Sevior of the School of Physics, of the University of Melbourne, wrote a couple of popular critiques of "Stormsmith" that appeared on the well known Internet energy related site, the Oil Drum (here, and here) . The second post was in fact a somewhat revised version of the earlier post. The two post drew more than 600 comments, and comments on the first post influenced revisions that went into the second post. This post and comment process can resemble a peer review process in a scientific journal, and because it is open to anyone who wishes to express an opinion, the comments can be considered an example of the open science process. The open science process offers a path to credibility.

Sevior did not explicitly discuss the "Stormsmith" paper in his Oil Drum post, but "Stormsmith" was part of the background of his posts, and was mentioned something like 30 times in the 2 discussions. An Australian debate, earlier in the decade had drawn Australian attention to "Stormsmith. " Sevior had been on a committee of Melborne University scientists who had attempted to assess "Stormsmith's" contentions. Sevior documented his conclusions on a web site named, Nuclearinfo.net. Hidden in the bowels of this web site is the record of a debate between Storm van Leeuwen and Sevior. (Links can be found on this page.) Sevior notes that "Stormsmith" had offered a formula that predict that the Rossing uranium mine located in the African nation of Namibia,

should require 2.6 Giga-Watt-Years of energy for mining and milling. The total consumption of all forms of energy in the country of Namibia is equivalent to 1.5 GigaWatt-Years, much less than the prediction for the mine alone. Furthermore, yearly cost of supplying this energy is over 1 billion dollars, yet the value of the Uranium sold by Rossing was, until recently, less than 100 million dollars per year. Since Rossing reports it's yearly energy usage to be 0.03 GigaWatt-years, SLS overestimates the energy cost of the Rossing mine by a factor of 80.

This was one of a number of huge blunders which Sevior found in "Stormsmith's" work. Professor Sevior tells this story in an offhand fashion, but once the story is laid out "Stormsmith's" complete lack of credibility is clear.

We all make mistakes, and I have made mine. Integrity requires us to acknowledge our mistakes from time to time. Dispute the repeated telling of the story of the discrediting of Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Smith's "Stormsmith" report, misinformation in that report continues to be spread. At a certain point, once misinformation continues to be spread, the word "lie" becomes appropriate.

"Stormsmith" is not the only case in which anti-nuclear propaganda can be said to dishonor the truth. It is of course not automatically the truth that support for nuclear power is always founded on respect for truth. It is of course easier to honor the truth by criticizing the errors of others, than by acknowledging ones own errors. This makes us human, and requires that science be based on well founded criticisms of mistakes.

Nuclear Green at three years

Blogs are by their nature vehicles of personal expression. I founded Nuclear Green as a means of advancing certain ideas about energy many of which had emerged during communicati0ns with David Roberts of Grist in May and June of 2007. I cannot use the word dialogue to describe our communications, because Roberts was clearly not listening at that time. Roberts is simply incapable of listenting to information that supports the use of nuclear energy in a post carbon world. I was listening, however, and the views I expressed to Roberts, together later views which I later began to advocate began to form a post carbon energy paradigm - a conceptual system for thinking about energy in a high energy world where fossil fuels are no longer a source of energy.

I do not claim originality for most of the ideas that constitute the Nuclear Green post-carbon paradigm. I think my most original suggestion is the notion that Molten Salt Reactors can be used to provide reserve and peak generation capavity for the grid. Originally I focused on the potential for rapid spinup of Molten Salt Reactor electrical generators, pointing that a drop in electrical generation or an increase in electrical demand could automatically trigger a process that would bring electricity from MSRs online without operator intermention. Later, I suggested a second peak capacity/reserve capacity solution, which involved the storage of high temperature molten salts, that could be used to power closed cycle turbines. The electrical output of the turbines could be considerably greater than the thermal capacity of the reactor, with the heat used to power the reserve generating capacity flowing into reserve heated salts, and later retrived as electrical demand warrented. I do not claim originality for this form of MSR peak/reserve generating capacity.

Many of my ideas had their origin in Oak Ridge, at ORNL, and ORAU. My primary connection with ORNL came through my father who was a member of Warren Grimes nuclear chemistry group/division at ORNL from 1950 to 1969. Prior to July 1950 my father had been a chemist with Warren Grimes Y-12 Group. That grouo had been administratively transfered to ORNL in 1950, to serve as the core of the Oak Ridge effort to debelop MSR chemistry research. My father remained under Warren Grimes' supervision until he was loaned to the ORNL Health Physics group in 1969, later his research project was assigned to the ORNL Environmental Studies Division. During his Health Physics period, I got to work at ONNL for a year. I participated in the ORNL-NSF Environmental studies program, where I worked with people like Ralph Nader's sister Clair, and Clinton Era Presidential Science advisor John Gibbons.

Later conversations with my father, reading his papers, and ORNL and ORAU research related documents provided me with much of the picture. Other details came from the Oak Ridge newspaper, the Oak Ridger. In 2007, I picked up at the point I had dropped off when I left Oak Ridge in 1971. And indeed many of he 1971 issues remained issues in 2007.

By the time I began writting on environment/energy related issues in 2007, I had been blogging for three years. In late 2007 I decided that I had something which I regarded as important to say, and that if I wanted to be taken seriously I needed to seperate my energy/environmental blogging from other blogging concerns. this lead to my decision to launch Nuclear Green.

At the time the first Nuclear Green post appeared on the internet, Molten Salt Reactor technology was virtually unknown. Another and very unique blog, Kirk Sorensens, Energy from Thorium had been launched in 2006 as for a vehicle for advocating thorium fuel cycle Molten Salt technology, and it was beginning to make headway. Kirk's blog had a couple of interesting features that made it unique among internet energy related blogs. First it had an extensive energy related document repository, that consisted primarily of research related reports that documented MSR related research at ORNL. A second major feature was a discussion form that focused focused on scientific and technical issues related to nuclear generated electricity, Molten Salt Nuclear technology, the thorium fuel cycle and the future of carbon free energy. Many of the discussions were of a decidedly scientific nature, and thus the Energy from Thorium Discussion Forum became one of the best known examples of Open Science on the Internet. The success of the combined Energy from Thorium/Nuclear Green enterprise can be measured by the fact that when I joined the EfT discussion Forum in June of 2007, it had 33 members. There are currently 860 names on the EfT Discussion Forum Membership list.

One of those names was soon to be Daily Kos blogger David Walters who started mentioning molten salt nuclear technology a couple of months after I launched Nuclear Green.

In addition to writing Nuclear Green and making contributions to Energy from Thorium, I attempted to increase knowledge about Molten Salt Nuclear technology, by commenting on numerous internet posts.

I had been forced to retire by health problems. My health had limited my employability since 1991, and by 2006 I was simply not able to hold a job, due to heart and respatory problems. Fortunately I was still able to maintain a blog. Recently, however, continued deterioriation of my health has made regular blog posting more problematic. I am on oxygen 24 hours a day. I recently acquired a lung and respatory specialist. He has already found that half of my diaphram is paralized. My blood oxygen level with out breathing oxygen can be quite low, and would definately interfear with my normal functioning. Whether anything can be done to improved my blood oxygen level without resorting to oxygen is still not clear.

Obviously, since I am writing a post this morning, I can still write and post. It is not clear however, how much technical related posting I can produce. Thus the exact future of Nuclear Green is open to question. This becomes a good point to assess what I have accomplished. What we have accomplished may be a better thing to evaluate, because many of my readers have participated in the accomplishments.

We have, during the last three years, revived interest in what was in 2007, a virtually unknown technology, the thorium breeding molten salt reactors have entered the current energy conversation. Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors (LFTR) advocates have used a variety of social media, including blogs, discussion forums, You Tube videos, tweets, and Facebook to make molten salt nuclear technology bettwe known. We have been quite successful, exactly how sucessful might not be known for several more years, but as of yet the MSR internet pioneers of 2006-2007 have no reason to be disapointed. Our great ambitions appear to be on track toward fulfillment.

Thus Nuclear Green has fulfilled its primary purpose of making Molten Salt Reacto technology better known, and reserving potential plces for the LFTR and other Molten Salt Reactors, on the list of potentially viable energy solutions. I do believe that Nuclear Green has had other notable accomplishments, and I will plan another post to list at least some of them.

I am, however, satisfied that that even if I dever offer another post, that I will hve made a contrifution to future human well being.

Kirk Sorensen asks, "Is Nuclear Waste Really Waste?"

Monsters under the bed

One of the good things about being a nuclear blogger is that I don't have to refer to any of my colleagues as dumb. We are talking here about a bunch of really smart gals and guys. I am talking about people like Robert Stone, Gwyneth Cravens, Karen Street, Steve Aplin, Robert Hargraves, Rod Adams, Stephen Packard, Brian Wang, Dan Yurman, Jack Gamble, Eugene Preston, Peter Lang, Kirk Sorensen, Robert Steinhaus, David Walters, Ondrej Chvala, David LeBlanc, Cheryl Rofer, Craig Schumacher, David Bradish, Rick Maltese, John Kutsch, Ted Rockwell, Jason Correia, John Wheeler, Meredith Joan Angwin, Ruth Sponsler, and many others. These people should go on Santa's nice list. According to Ms. Becky, I an not always nice, so I don't belong on Santa's nice list. No doubt Amory Lovins, Joe Romm, David Roberts, and many other renewable power advocates belong on Santa's naughty list too. Of course Ms. Becky likes to tease me, and maybe when she says that I am being naughty, she is not trying to suggest that I have been acting like Roberts, Lovins and Romm.

Easily the smartest people writing about energy anywhere in the world wrute about their support for nuclear power on the internet. And Barry Bro0k comes somewhere ar the top of my list as far as intelligence is concerned. Barry and I have had our arguments, and probably still do. Barry is a devote of an over priced, over hyped and inefficient reactor project called the Integral Fast Reactor. Don't ask me why, I can only tell you that Barry has a few screws loose in an otherwise well functioning brain.

My complaints about the the IFR are that it has more safety issues than the LFTR, although I think that in absolute terms the IFR is safe. It is very likely that the IFR will cost a lot more to build than the LFTR. It is certain that the IFR will require up too 10 times as much fissionable material per unit of energy output than the LFTR will. From a political viewpoint, the proliferation prevention features of the LFTR will probably be more attractive than the IFR. The very fact that the IFR produces plutonium rather than U-233, will, I suspect, be regarded as a liability by nuclear critics.

At any rate, a topic in Barry's latest Brave New Climate post, OzEA – The second story, caught my eye. The topic title was,

The monster under the bed – how much will it cost?

The cost of post carbon energy is, of course, the monster under the bed, and while renewable advocates keep telling people that the monster is hiding under the bed marked nuclear power, it is clear that they have not looked under the bed called renewable energy, where they most assuredly will find a bigger and more frightening monster. At any rate, when I started looking at post carbon energy costs, in 2007 David Roberts assured me that the cost of nuclear power would be much higher than the the cost of renewable energy, while the cost of nuclear was rapidly getting worse, while the cost of renewables was getting better just as fast. When I looked for proof that what Roberts said was true, I found none. In short, Roberts was contradicted by a lot of credible sources, although he found support among anti-nuclear, pro-renewable propagandists, such as Mark Cooper, and Amory Lovins.

Barry Brook would encourage us to be aware of the monsters under the bed of energy costs. Those monsters appear to be labeled, "renewable energy costs." Renewable energy advocates try to distract us, by telling us the monster is called, "nuclear energy costs. But the nuclear energy "monster underneath the bed," is s not really scary when you take a good look at it.

Zero PV output in Germany today.

Photovoltaic electrical output in Germany tody has been 0 kWhs generated. That is zip people, zero, nothing, nada. How cn I make this plain to the idiots who believe in renewable energy, the billions of dollars that have been unvested in photovoltaic energy in Germany has on December 18, 2010 not yeielded the slightest amount of electricity.

Morning thoughts

I welcome NNadir back to Nuclear Green with another of his stimulating posts.

My health problems are a little worse, and this is going to interfere with my postings in the short run. I found myself yesterday attempting to write a post with my heart beating at 124 beats a minute. "This is not going to work," I thought. I had a procedure on Friday, an attempt to reset my heart rhythm, but it was unsuccessful. My doctor wants to try a couple of medications. My condition is not grave. I can live with the arrhythmia, but it does interfere with my quality of life, and my productivity.

The MSR/LFTR Beyond WASH-1222

Where is the LFTR on the product development cycle?

A proof of concept MSR prototype was built in the 1950's. It was regarded as highly successful. A more advanced MSRE prototype was built and tested between 1965 and 1969. It was, like the first prototype, considered an outstanding successes. The MSRE accomplished all experimental objectives The MSRE, tested many advanced technologies, including

* Online reactor refueling
* First single reactor to use U-235, U-233, and Pu-239 as nuclear fuel
* The longest reactor runs between shutdowns at the time
* Verified MSR safety features
* Successfully use of the liquid LiF-BeF2-UF4 fuel/coolant formula.

Several developmental problems emerged from the test:
1. Tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen, was found to have escaped the reactor. This was considered highly undesirable, but not entirely unexpected. ORNL researchers believed that a tritium control system had to be developed. They later accomplished this task.
2. Cracking on the surface of metal alloys that came in contact with liquid salts was observed. Later research identified the cause of the of the cracking, a fission product, and methods of preventing the problem.
3 Prolonged and heavy neutron radiation exposure of graphite, lead to changes of graphite internal structure. This produced swelling of the graphite moderators which also served as the inner plumbing of the reactor. The swelling of the graphite structure weakened it. This problem has not yet been solved, but it can be worked around. One work around would involve the floating of hundreds of graphite pebbles, that is small graphite balls in and out of the MSR core. The pebbles would not have any structural function, but would serve as a moderator. When the pebbles swell from excessive radiation, they can be captured sas they flote out of the reactor core, and removed from the reactor.

By the time the MSRE project was shut down, the design of a large (1000 MWe) LFTR, the MSBR was well under way. The MSBr was designed to serve as a thorium fuel cycle breeder that could produce electricity at a cost that was competitive with electricity produced by conventional Light Water Reactors. The jump from the 10MWt MSRE to a 3000t MW MSBR was in hindsight overly ambitious, but was expected by AEC. The development of the sort of small modular MSR proposed in ORN-4037: ORNL4119: ORNL4191: and ORNL-4528 was very promising, even if the graohite core presented a challenge. ORNL management, and MSBR in particular believed that the solution to the graphite problem in 2 fluid reactors was particularly unsatisfactory. A two fluid core design, that is a core design in which fuel salts and fertile blanket salts were intended to be kept separate, required a graphite core structure. Graphite swelling lead to problems with graphity 2 fluid core structures, and one solution was to periodically remove the core graphite removed and replace it. There are several less drastic alternatives, which ORNL management chose to not include. The included periodic core graphite replacement, the building of a very large graphite core, or the use od a pebble bed core graphite solutuin, with pebbles being periodically replaced, as the began to swell.

Wash-1222 listed a number of developmental issues facing the MSBR design and development team. Wash-1222 stated, "the development of these larger components along with their special handling and maintenance equipment is probably one of the most difficult and costly phases of MSBR development. However, reliable, safe, and maintainable components would need to be developed in order for any reactor system to be a success".

WASH-1222 also noted, "The salt valves for large MSBR's represent another development problem, although the freeze valve concept which was employed successfully in the MSRE could likely be scaled up in size and utilized for many MSBR applications. Mechanical throttling valves would also be needed for the MSBR salt systems, even though no throttling valve was used with the MSRE. Mechanical shutoff valves for salt systems, if required, would have to be developed". This would seem to be a simple developmental task. Further, the writer of WASH-1222 seems unaware of how the negative temperature coefficient of reactivity characteristic of good Molten Salt Reactr designs, effects throttling. As heat is extracted from a MSR core, the core fluid contracts, and more fuel carrying fluid is automatically drawn into the core, throttling a MSR up. If MSR core temperature rises, core fluid expands, and more fuel carrying fluid is expelled from the core, decreasing core reactivity.

WASH-1222 also noted that an integrated fuel reprocessing system would have to be tested, and a design for system integration for the entire MSBR was also required. But the development of MSR fuel reprocessing technology was already underway at ORNL, and the developmental tasks were well understood. It is not as if the development of fuel reprocessing technology would start from scratch.

Many of the developmental tasks listed by WASH-1222 apply primarily or entirely to the MSBR. One of the flaws of WASH-1222 was its failure to assess, how far existing ORNL technology could carry MSR design. In fact it would have required very little effort to develop a commercially viable MSR converter, using MSRE technology. Other developmental tasks intended to take MSR technology beyond the MSRE phase, although some posed significant challenges, would likely have been be routine and not likely to pose a inordinate challenge.

WASH also noted the MSBR "requirement for remote maintenance will significantly affect the ultimate design and performance of the plant system". It then pointed to one of the significant problems with the MSBR design, "the removal and replacement of core internals, such as graphite, might pose difficult maintenance problems because of the high radiation levels involved and the contamination protection which would be required whenever the primary system is opened". This pointed to one of the most significant problem of the MSBR design, the resolution of the graphite problem by periodic core removal. French MSR researchers, have recently made the choice to follow a developmental track that eliminates graphite from the core of their proposed MSR. Their analysis of the difficulties posed by the graphite core of the MSRE, lead them to conclude that despite some significant disadvantages, the a graphite free core offered more advantages. This issue is far from settled, and it is my no means certain that the graphite challenge corresponds to the worst case scenario.

But replacing graphite was hardly an impossible challenge, and MSR designers had their choice of several technologies to get the job done. We have already noted that some believe that one solution was to float graphite pebbles in and out of MSR cores.

WASH-1222 raised questions about the safety of the MSBR. Subsequent MSR safety analysis by Uri Gat, and Gat and Dodds, would seem to resolve most safety questions on a conceptual level. Recent discussions in the "Energy from Thorium" raised questions about assurances that the "salt freeze safety valve would operated in a timely fashion in the event of an emergency shut down. My rather brief review of ORNL reports did not shed light on the question. In absence of definitive evidence from ORNL reports, the proper functioning of the emergency reactor drain system including the freeze valve, should be verified, and any short comings rectified.

Thus the major MSBR developmental problems noted by WASH-1222 were the tritium problem, and the problem of core graphite. The tritium problem requires a technological fix that is clearly not impossible. Several work around ideas have been proposed for the graphite problem, and a French MSR design team has adopted one.

In addition to the developmental issues noted by WASH-1222, the problem of protactinium extraction, a problem that bedeviled my father from the late 1950's to the mid 1960's, has been the subject of continuing discussions on "Energy from Thorium". The tenor of the discussion seems to be as follows, protactinium extraction fro a single fluid reactor is difficult and probably should be avoided if possible. This was my father's view.

I mentioned alternative approaches to the graphite problem. Again some available options have been discussed on "Energy from Thorium". These include the big pot approach which has attracted french interest. The reactor core is simply a open chamber into which liquid salt coolant/fuel is poured. No moderator is used although the liquid coolant/fuel does have some moderating effect. There are disadvantages to this approach. The amount of fissionable fuel required to sustain a chain reaction would be much greater that in a moderated MSR.

As i have already mentioned several times, one interesting option would be to put graphite pebbles into the pot in order to provide a moderator. The graphite pebbles would float in the liquid salt and could be periodically removed for replacement. This system was actually suggested at ORNL in 1970.

"Jaro" suggested the use of self-cleansing carbon nanotubes as MSR moderators. Another "jaro" suggestion involved the use of heavy water being piped through the MSR core. There would probably be safety concerns about this design, although heavy water would work even better as a moderator that graphite.

It would appear then that the graphite problem was not the big MSR deal killer WASH-1222 imagined it to be. Solutions and work arounds exist for the graphite problem, but reactor developers have to decide which one to choose.

Finally, research on the tritium problem was problem was continued at ORNL into the mid 1970's. Tritium (H-3) is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that primarily is produced from lithium-6 isotopes. If pure lithium-7 is used in the fuel, then the LFTR tritium problem would be greatly reduced, but not entirely eliminated. Tritium like the other forms of hydrogen diffuse through metal barriers. Tritium is most likely to escape the MSR/LFTR through the thin walls the heat exchange. ORNL researchers in 1977 later reported that they were making progress toward a solution to the tritium problem when their funding was cut off by the United States government energy bureaucracy. Again the tritium problem seems no deal breaker. The ORNL researchers who were trying to solve the tritium problem stated:
"Although a complete understanding of the behavior of tritium in sodium fluoroborate could not be developed from this series of experiments due to the termination of the Molten-Salt Reactor- Program, the effectiveness of sodium fluoroborate to trap tritium was demonstrated. Furthermore, use of sodium fluoroborate as a secondary coolant in an MSBR would be expected t:o adequately limit the transport of tritium to the reactor steam system and environment".

The ORNL researchers further summarized their findings:

The tritium addition experiments conducted in the CSTF demonstrated sodium fluoroborate’s effectiveness for sequestering tritium. However, further experimentation and research would be required to yield a better understanding of tritium behavior in sodium fluoroborate, to better define basic parameters, and to explain some of the observed phenomena as a result
of conducting the experiments in the CSTF.

If the MSR program were to be continued, further investigation relating to the following would be desirable:
1. The chemistry of sodium fluoroborate and the trapping process by which tritium is retained by the salt,
2. Permeability values for Hastelloy N.
3. Solubility data for the dissolution of elemental hydrogen (tritium) in sodium fluoroborate.
4. Data on gas-liquid equilibria in the pump bowl in an effort to explain behavior such as that observed in experiment T4 when, upon increasing the off-gas flow rate to 4 liters/min, equilibrium conditions in the pump bowl between the gas and liquid were altered drastically.
5. Identification of the sink that required saturating before steady state conditions could be established.
6. Determination of the existence of an extraneous source of hydrogen in the off-gas system and its effect (if present) on the behavior and distribution of tritium in the CSTF".

Thus the obstacles to successful development of the MSR/LFTR mentioned by the WASH-1222, were probably significantly smaller than those which faced the LMRBR development at the same time, and significantly less than the challegens facing the high breeding ratio IFR at the current time.. Design choices and promising research avenues known since the 1970's are still available.

Currently the International Thorium Energy & Molten-Salt Technology Inc. (IThEMS) has proposed to build a MSRE size and technology single fluid prototype reactor which Dr. Furukawa argues can be developed for $300,000,000. Dr. Furukawa believes that a 200 MWe Small FUJI reactor can be ready for serial production in as little as 10 to 12 years. if the costs arew proportionate to those which he imagines for the Mini-FUJI, the FUJI would offer a very promising line of post carbom energu development.

Dr. Furukawa's estimates are very optomistic, but camnot and should not be dismissed, until they are shown t9 be based on false assumptions.

The History of Water and Thus, Life, In the Cosmos.

Pulsar Red, 1972

Victor Vasarely, Hungarian/French (1906-1997)

(The following diary has been cross posted at DailyKos with an amusing poll, but sans painting but avec an amusing poll. The link to the original is here: The History of Water and Thus, Life, In the Cosmos.)

By NNadir

I have not heard of a scientific discovery in recent years that quite excites the imagination as the announcement this week that scientists funded by NASA have discovered a bacteria that can substitute arsenic for phosphorous in the structure of its DNA. If true, it is one of the outstanding discoveries of the last decade and as exciting as the discovery of sulfur oxidizing bacteria and thermophilic organisms in deep sea volcanic vents.

Astrobiology is a fascinating field, one that, at least for me, has profound philosophical and well as scientific import, and brings to fore those exciting places where the two intersect.

Irrespecitve of the novel life forms we have discovered in the last half century on Earth I am still inclined to conjecture that liquid phase water, because of its remarkable properties, is still an essential precondition for life.

The paper from the primary scientific literature I will discuss in this diary is "Water and Astrobiology," published by Hawaiian scientists ...Chemie der Erde/Geochemistry 67 (2007) 253–282. The paper is not a research paper, but rather is a very interesting review article. The authors are Michael J. Mottla, Brian T. Glazera, Ralf I. Kaiser, Karen J. Meech, all at the University of Hawaii.

The authors begin the paper with a brief discussion of the origin of the elements, noting that in the Big Bang, the main element formed was hydrogen, with impurities of helium and lithium also being observed.

The authors, perhaps not being interested in Tesla electric cars that recently saved us all from climate change and simultaneously saved our primally important car CULTure - just kidding - don't discuss the fate of lithium in the universe, but it is nonetheless fun to note that lithium, like hydrogen is consumed in stars rather than created, although some lithium may be produced, like boron, in interstellar clouds in nuclear spallation reactions.

Anyway. The main point of the authors is that the third most common element in the universe today is oxygen, which is formed in stars as a by-product of the CNO cycle, that is a mechanism for fusion that is commonly found in many types of stars, particularly those responsible for supernovae, of which we are all clearly the ashes.

Before the evolution of oxygen, water was an unknown compound in the universe. Today, water is commonly distributed not only on earth, but widely in the universe as a whole. According to a paper cited by the authors, about 10% of interstellar matter, generally referred to as "dust," is water ice. Because interstellar space has a fairly constant, and sometimes intense radiation flux, unless it is shielded water can be quite unstable in deep space and often reacts with other molecules. The authors reference the website of the National Radio Astronomy Laboratory, writing that "over 130" molecules have been found in interstellar space, although as of this writing, the website actually lists
129 molecules found in interstellar and circumstellar space. Interestingly enough, glycoaldehyde, the simplest possible sugar is among these, and other protobiotic molecules such as acetic acid, a precursor of the simplest amino acid, glycine, have been observed. Molecular clouds also contain significant quantities of methanol, hydrogen cyanide, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and ammonia, all of which can give rise to molecules of biological importance.

The fact that amino acids are not detected in interstellar clouds does not, in fact, imply that they are not there, but only that they are not dectectable by current technology. Amino acids are seen in some meteorites, most famously in the Murchinson meteorite which fell in Australia in 1969. Amino acids on earth have, with the exception of glycine, the property that they are asymmetric, or chiral. Chirality is the property people observe with their two hands, assuming one has two hands; their hands are mirror images of one another, but cannot be superimposed upon one another - placed on top of one another, the thumb and pinkie will be on opposite sides. All amino acids, again, except glycine, have this three dimensional property, but in living things only one of the two possible mirror images is observed, the "L" isomer which for every amino acid except cysteine is also designated as the "S" isomer. ("L" refers to a physical effect on certain kinds of light, and "S" refers to a set of formalistic rules designed to help chemists understand one another.) If both mirror images - called "enantiomers" - are present the mixture will be said to be "racemic." The origins of chirality is something of a mystery - just as the source of energy for the sun and other stars was a mystery until the mid twentieth century - since unless someone has something chiral to begin with in a chemical reactor, one will always get a mixture of both enatiomers, in other words, a racemic mixture, containing both L and D (S and R) isomers in exactly equal proportions.

In the famous Miller-Urey experiment, in which electrical discharges in a mixture of supposed prebiotic inorganic gases produced amino acids - leading to an number of theories on the origin of terrestrial life - all of the amino acids were racemic, since there were no sources of chirality in the reactor. Since life on earth is asymmetric, a fundemental question about the Miller-Urey remained. One would also expect that in outer space, where amino acids are not expected to be in a a chiral environment - such an environment is generally associated with living things - but in fact, in the Murchinson meteorite an excess of the S enantiomer (generally referred to as the L-isomer because of its effect on the rotation of plane polarized light is to rotate the light to the left) which is, in fact, the enantiomer that is observed in living things.

Initially, this lead many scientists to expect that the meteorite had been contaminated with amino acids found on earth. However, it was discovered that the isotopic signature of the nitrogen species in the meteorite, that the excess of the L-isomer, and in fact, all of the amino acids present, have a distribution of nitrogen isotopes that is more indicative of interstellar origins. A discussion of a sample of this work is found in the prestigious scientific journal Nature in a paper published in 1997. (NATURE VOL 389 ,18 SEPTEMBER 1997 pp 265-268.)

The authors of the 1997 Nature paper, M. H. Engel of the University of Oklahoma & S. A. Macko of the University of Virginia, write as follows:

Our report of non-racemic amino acids is in conflict with the
initial report of higher amino-acid D/L values for the Murchison meteorite10. However, we emphasize that our amino-acid distributions and relative abundances for all three stones are in general agreement with those initial and subsequent findings26. This would not be expected if contamination occurred. It is also important to recognize that the amino acids present in the Murchison meteorite stones may not reflect the distribution at the initial time of synthesis. Organic and inorganic reactions may have altered amino-acid distributions over a period of unknown duration when the meteorite parent body (from which Murchison was derived) probably retained an aqueous phase9. Given this caveat, it is possible that different stones may contain components that do not reflect identical alteration histories. But although previous authors have attributed an apparently slight L-excess to biological contamination10, we believe, as will be discussed below, that the stable-isotope values point to an alternative explanation. The moderate-to-extreme ¹⁵N enrichments observed for amino acids in the Murchison meteorite establish their indigenous nature and, as previously suggested, point to a possible interstellar source for their precursors if not for some of the compounds themselves. Given the current hypotheses that (1) an enantiomeric excess is likely to have been a precondition for the origin of life on Earth (for example, refs 1, 2) and (2) the Earth’s initial inventory of organic matter was derived from meteorite and comet bombardment6, the occurrence of an excess of the L-enantiomers in the Murchison meteorite provides the first evidence for a source of this chirality deemed essential for life’s origin. The origins of the excess in the L-enantiomers presently remains unclear. The excess may have resulted from the alteration of initially abiotic, racemic mixtures by a process such as preferential decomposition by exposure to circularly polarized light1. The extent to which such processes would have altered the stereochemistry of amino acids during the billion years preceding the first fossil evidence of life on Earth is unknown. But if amino-acid precursors (and perhaps some amino acids themselves) are probably interstellar9, this would certainly increase the time for exposure of organics to circularly polarized light before the formation of our Solar System.

In other words, the authors of the Nature paper would like to suggest that is possible that the materials from which life evolved may not have originated on Earth, but may have originated in space, and that without having been in space, may have been unsuitable for the evolution of life.

One possible source of intense radiation that may produce chiral radiation of great intensity, if I remember correctly - I'll check with my youngest son on this because his Junior High School Science project will have to do with Stellar Evolution, and, frankly, he knows more about the niceties of stellar nuclear physics than I do, as my interest in nuclear physics sort of stops at neutrons, and his, um, doesn't - is circularly polarized radiation from pulsars. Pulsars are the corpses of supernovae, and, as indicated earlier, we are the ashes of supernovae. The closest known pulsar, thought to be PSR J0437-4715, however is rather far away, some 400 light years away.

Is this pulsar close enough to be, um, "yo' momma?"

The radial velocity of the sun in the galaxy is thought to be on the order of 13 ms^-1, which translates into 47,000 km/hr or using dumber units, 29,000 mph. (Ref: Nidever et al The Astrophysical Journal Supplement Series, 141:503–522, 2002 August) The earth is thought to be about 4.5 billion years old. I will spare you any "back of the envelope calculations" involving ²⁴⁴Pu/²³⁸U ratios concerning the time that may have passed between the accretion of the earth and the time of the last supernova to have provided elements for it, and limit myself to a "back of the envelope" calculation about how fast, relative to the sun, PSR J0437-4715 had to travel from the time the earth formed until the present day to be where it is. A light year is 9.4605284 × 10¹⁵ meters and a year contains 31,556,926 seconds. It follows that over a period of 4.5 billion years, that the pulsar would need to have traveled about 27 ms^-1 to have traveled that far away from earth by now. This is on the same order of magnitude as the velocity of the sun and is thus reasonable, if in fact, pulsars pulse for 4.5 billion years. I'll ask my son. He might know.

But, um, I was talking about, um, water, wasn't I?

The authors of the Chemie der Erde paper have something interesting to say about the presence of glycoaldehyde in space, to wit:

The recent identification of HOCH2CHO in Sgr B2 is a significant milestone from an astrobiological viewpoint. Glycoaldehyde represents the first member of monosaccharide sugar – a hydroxyaldehyde diose – and denotes an important biomarker that can react to HOCH2CHO phosphates (Krishnamurthy et al., 1999) and complex sugars such as ribose. The latter is the building block of ribonucleic acid, which carries genetic information in living organisms. Carbon hydrates such as HOCH2CHO also play a role in vital chemical reactions (Weber, 1998).

(Sgr B2 refers to interstellar matter near a hot core source in the constellation Sagittarius.)

A recent idea in the scholarship on the origins of life is that of an "RNA world," an idea that, um, evolved with the discovery that RNA, just like proteins, could catalyze reactions, specifically reactions involving phosphate ester bonds that are associated with, well, um, the formation of RNA. Thomas Cech and Sydney Altman, working independently were awarded the Nobel Prize for this discovery in 1989. (Altman's catalytic RNA contained a protein segment bonded to the RNA, which is itself suggestive.)

Nucleotide bases have been found extraterrestrially, specifically in the Murchison meteorite, making the meteorite a kind of Rosetta stone of extraterrestrial formation of life. (See for instance, Earth and Planetary Science Letters 270 (2008) 130–136). These almost certainly arose from interstellar cyanides and formamides. The latter may arise from the hydration of hydrogen cyanide, a known constitutent of interstellar clouds and a known precursor to pyrimidines, although both guanine and adenine may be synthesized from hydrogen cyanide directly. (The reverse process, which is endothermic is the basis of the industrial Shawinigan Process, in which hydrogen cyanide is formed via the dehydration of formamide.) Thus the chemistry of water may be involved intimately with the formation of nucleotide bases in outer space.

Returning to the Chemie der Erde paper, the authors suggest that earth based laboratory studies suggest that much of the chemistry associated with formation of prebiotic complex molecules not in the gas phase, but on the surface of ice particles. In this case, water is is not limited to being a reactant, but also works as a surface on which chemistry can be performed. I have written many diaries in this space referring to the wonder fuel DME, dimethylether. This molecule is found in space, which is not to say that we could collect it to run diesel engines - may that be forbidden - but the interesting thing is that under simulated extraterrestrial conditions, this molecule is not formed from methanol in the gas phase, but is observed under slow warming of ice crystals containing methanol.

One could imagine - and I am merely speculating here - that water ice may orbit a large hot object, maybe even a pulsar having circularly polarized light, which warms slowly during its rotation around the neutron star. Over long periods, maybe measuring in the billions of years, sufficient chirality might arise to support the evolution of RNA and then, ultimately, life itself.

This does not mean to imply that life didn't arise on a planetary surface, the surface of Earth, or the surfaces of planets we know once had oceans and are neighbors, Venus and Mars - the case for the latter is becoming stronger all the time, even though it is by no means certain that it will ever be proved since it may not be true.

Still, it is true that the building blocks, even primitive building blocks are routinely distributed throughout the interstellar regions, near stellar regions and maybe even intergalactic regions. The earth, and hopefully many other planets may merely represent a patch of wet fertile soil in which life realize its most remarkable potential.

Be that as it may, the situation that has evolved on this planet whereby one species on the planet is placing all other species at risk, in the sense that even if they were once alive, Mars and Venus now seem to be dead, proving that planets, whole planets, can be killed. Even if that one species, us is merely creating a catastropic selective pressure on life - perhaps such selective pressure as to eliminate sentient life, the work described here seems to suggest that it is almost a certainty that life exists somewhere else.

Take solace wherever one can.

That said, the authors note that the Earth has most likely been destroyed several times before now and sentient life had very little to do with that outcome. They write:

The problem of the origin of H₂O on Earth and its distribution and history has remained one of the most intractable problems in geochemistry, because it is inextricably bound to three equally difficult problems: The origin of the Earth; its chemical differentiation into core, mantle, and crust; and the heterogeneity of its
mantle (Martin et al., 2006). The pioneering calculations of Safranov (1969) and Wetherill (1985) on orbital evolution and the dynamics of planetary accretion first showed that planets such as Earth were probably assembled stepwise. Rather than growing by gradual accretion of small fragments to a much larger body, it is now thought that the final assembly of Earth and Venus took place catastrophically, by sequential collision of a few dozen Moon- to Mars-sized planetary embryos (Canup and Righter, 2000; Chambers, 2004) which themselves had assembled by runaway growth within only a million years after the Solar nebula began to condense (Yang et al., 2007), 4.567 billion years ago (Ga) (Amelin et al., 2002). Earth was assembled in this violent fashion over a period probably no longer than 30–50 Myr following the onset of nebular condensation, based on Hf-W isotopic evidence that Earth’s core had formed by this time (Schoenberg et al., 2002; Yin et al., 2002; Kleine et al., 2002; Jacobsen, 2005, Halliday and Kleine, 2006; Halliday, 2006). The final episode in core formation is believed to be the giant impact that formed the Moon, by which Earth gained the last 10% of its mass in collision with a Mars-sized body that has been named Theia (Canup and Asphaug, 2001; Canup, 2004; Kleine et al., 2005). This new scenario has important implications for the origin and history of H₂O on Earth because (1) modeling indicates that embryos that collided to form Earth could have come from considerable radial distances within the inner Solar System and thus may have contained widely variable amounts of water and other volatiles

The earth has always been a fragile place.

To wit:

There is no doubt that Earth suffered at least one and probably several episodes of massive atmospheric loss early in its history. Earth’s present component of volatiles is therefore the small remnant of what was once present. The early atmosphere could have been eroded by intense UV radiation and winds during the million-year-long T- auri phase of the young Sun as well as by large impacts. UV radiation and winds would effect the lighter H atom most, but as the likely major constituent of an early Solar nebular atmosphere, produced in additional quantities by radiative splitting of H2O (Zahnle, 2006), H streaming into space would pull heavier atoms such as Ne and molecules such as N2 with it, in the thermally induced process known as hydrodynamic escape.

For the record, as I have noted elsewhere, because of N₂O release because of the use of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers, the Montreal Protocols did not make the ozone depletion problem go away. UV radiation is believed to be a mechanism for stripping rocky planets near stars of their water, since it creates equilibrium quantities of hydrogen gas. Earth's gravity is too weak to hold hydrogen gas in its atmosphere, as can be shown by appeal to Maxwell Boltzman distribution calculations. It is possible that without the addition of oxygen to our atmosphere by early plants, our water would now be long gone. Nonetheless, I very much doubt that any one here will live long enough to observe much effect on the planetary inventory of water from UV radiation. It is far more likely that some car CULTure scheme will boil off our hydrogen way faster than that might have happened if we only destroyed the ozone layer.

If, however, hydrogen does begin to escape from the earth, we can count on Jim Inhofe types to blame it on the sun.

Blame it all on the sun, or blame it all on pulsar PSR J0437-4715. Were it not for pulsar PSR J0437-4715, there might be no one here to learn from Cenk Ugyar that Barack Obama is, um, what was the polite word he used, oh yes, "stupid."

With or without a pulsar, with or without a pulse, get a life.

For the record, I came across this paper not because of a particular interest in the origins of the light elements like oxygen in the universe - although I find the paper fascinating - but because of my interest in the accretion of the heaviest element found in the protoearth, ²⁴⁴Pu, plutonium-244, which is known to have been present in the early history of this planet. With a half-life of only 82 million years, all of the ²⁴⁴Pu originally on the earth (and in many meteorites) has now all decayed essentially to thorium-232 and its daughter elements.

Having opened the paper up and having read a little of it, I have felt compelled to look further into the history of the universe, of water, of life and of us. I've now collected and read lots of papers on this stuff. It's cool, especially because it diverts my attention from more contemporary, and more depressing issues.

A discussion of ²⁴⁴Pu is relevant to discussions of the earth's atmosphere, geology, and the hydrosphere on this planet, because natural spontaneous fission of ²⁴⁴Pu has left a signature in earth's atmosphere via the distribution of Xenon isotopes in the atmosphere. If we did not, in fact, know the nuclear properties of ²⁴⁴Pu, we wouldn't understand terrestrial rocks, or the extraterrestrial rocks we have collected in the form of meteorites and moon samples. The xenon signature in rocks and the atmosphere, and differences between the two forms can tell us a great deal about how the earth's atmosphere formed and how it disappeared and then came back again.

This diary is too long, and too much time has been wasted writing it.

A few more remarks.

This is an NNadir diary, and so a remark on the long half life of ²⁴⁴Pu and its relation to commercial nuclear energy is almost as tightly required as a poll question about lutefisk. Often you will hear people claim that nuclear energy is unacceptable because, using their words, not mine, "the waste lasts for millions of years." This rote response is illiterate in many ways not the least of which is to assume that coal wastes, for instance, are not eternal, because they do not decay, at least when one refers to coal wastes that are heavy metals. I note that the major chemical that corresponds to the most worrisome coal waste, carbon dioxide, has been present on Venus for billions of years, and it will not go away until Venus itself is swallowed by the sun.

Nuclear energy need not be perfect to be better than everything else. It only needs to be better than everything else, which it is.

It can be shown that under certain modes of handling, nuclear fuel can be used to reduce the overall radioactivity of the Earth, although I'm not entirely convinced that this would be a good thing.

It is, nonetheless, easy to accumulate all of the plutonium isotopes in spent nuclear fuel except ^243,244Pu, ²⁴⁴Pu is the only isotope of plutonium that lasts for "millions of years,”and ²⁴³Pu lasts only a matter of hours before decaying into ²⁴³Am. Thus used nuclear fuel contains no appreciable plutonium isotopes that will last for "millions of years." Because the half-life of ²⁴³Pu is so short, and its fission cross section relatively large compared to its capture cross section, it doesn't hang around long enough to become ²⁴⁴Pu. Very tiny amounts are formed from the low branching ratio positron emission in the decay of ²⁴⁴Am (the majority decays by beta decay to ²⁴⁴Cm) formed via neutron capture by ²⁴³Am, but this is trivial, but truth be told, there is very little ²⁴³Am in the types of reactors operated today.

In a way, this is unfortunate because for certain reasons it would be cool to have macroscopic quantities, a few hundred of kg at least, of ²⁴⁴Pu, but its very unlikely that will ever happen.

I don't believe in dumping plutonium in any case. I regard plutonium, all of it, as a valuable resource. I similarly regard neptunium, amercium, curium, berkelium and californium as valuable resources. In fact, to steal a phrase, I regard these elements as the last, best hope of the human race.


In fact, in used nuclear fuel, the vast majority of radioactive substances do not persist for "millions of years" and overall, including the few that do, it is relatively easy to arrange things so that the overall radioactivity of all used fuel can be made to be lower than the overall radioactivity of natural uranium ores. Many isotopes in used nuclear fuel become non-radioactive within days, some within hours. Moreover, the radioactivity, and in most cases, the risk of radisotopes is inversely proportional to the half life of isotopes. In fact the use of nuclear energy is a way - within several centuries - of actually reducing the radioactivity of the planet as a whole. The radioactive uranium on this planet, almost in its entirely, formed in the very same stars that, as I have argued, are responsible for the existance of life itself, and indeed, the water it contains and on which it so clearly depends. Given that life evolved in the presence of radioactivity, it is reasonable to ask whether in fact life depends in subtle ways upon having radioactivity. Thus the potential risk that bothers me the most about nuclear energy is that it will reduce the overall activity, although the radioactivity of potassium and rubidium, a substantial portion of the planetary radioactivity will be totally unaffected by what happens to uranium and thorium.

Anyway, my point, which is as consistent as Cato's remarks on Carthage, although Cato was a pernicious representative of a barbarian degenerate culture, and I believe I only sound so:

Nuclear science, the science that is so widely despised by people who know nothing at all about it - just as evolutionary molecular biology is despised by people who know no evolutionary molecular biology - has proved to be essential to understand whence we came, and whence we may go, and who or what may come before or after us or who are what may even be with us now, albeit across a universe. Technology aside, these things are yet other reasons why nuclear science is beautiful and why this essential science deserves not censure, but rather deserves respect.

Have a nice evening.

Jane Speaks about the Scientific Method and Wind Energy

Vermont Yankee Explained

A video dialogue on the Vermont effort to close Vermont Yankee.

The Devil has a New Scheme

According to old legends, the Devil used to tempt violinists into selling their soul for the ability to play the violin with great skill.

The violinist Paganini was said to have not only sold his soul, but actually had the Devil stand beside him to direct his arm movements.

Paganini discovered that having the Devil on your side was exciting to women.

Not only is "Steve Jobs" another name for the Devil, but he now reveals his latest scheme to trap millions of souls in Hell. No more retail purchase of violinist souls one at a time, when iPads can be mass marketed.

It all gives Black Friday a new meaning.


God's only hope is that "Steve Jobs" has not suggested that owning an iPad will make men more attractive to women.

WASH-1222 a Revised Review

Following a three part blog post on 1960's AEC reactor Research Director Milton Shaw's career, Kirk Sorensen suggested that I review WASH-1222, a document by which Shaw attempted to exclude Molten Salt Reactor technology from future development. The purpose of this review will be to assess the extent to which the decision to shut down the development of the MSR in the early 1970's was an irrational political decision. I have included the text of WASH-1222 in this review so that the reader can see exactly what it stated. I originally wrote this review as a multi-post study, but I believe that it should be read in one sitting. In order to facilitate a one sitting reading, I have combined separate posts into a continuous text. I have also added an appendix. - CB

AN EVALUATION OF THE MOLTEN SALT BREEDER REACTOR

I. INTRODUCTION

The Division of Reactor Development and Technology, USAEC, was assigned the responsibility of assessing the status of the technology of the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) as part of the Federal Council of Science and Technology Research and Development Goals Study. In conducting this review, the attractive features and problem areas associated with the concept have been examined; but more importantly, the assessment has been directed to provide a view of the technology and engineering development efforts and the associated government and industrial commitments which would be required to develop the MSBR into a safe, reliable and economic power source for central station application.

The MSBR concept, currently under study at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), is based on use of a circulating fluid fuel reactor coupled with on-line continuous fuel processing. As presently envisioned, it would operate as a thermal spectrum reactor system utilizing a thorium-uranium fuel cycle. Thus, the concept would offer the potential for broadened utilization of the nation's natural resources through operation of a breeder system employing another fertile material (thorium instead of uranium).

The long-term objective of any new reactor concept and the incentive for the government to support its development are to help provide a self-sustaining, competitive industrial capability for producing economical power in a reliable and safe manner. A basic part of achievement of this objective is to gain public acceptance of a new form of power production. Success in such an endeavor is required to permit the utilities and others to consider the concept as a viable option for generating electrical power in the future and to consider making the heavy, long-term commitments of resources in funds, facilities and personnel needed to provide the transition from the early experimental facilities and demonstration plants to full-scale commercial reactor power plant systems.

Consistent with the policy established for all power reactor development programs, the MSBR would require the successful accomplishment of three basic research and development phases:

• An initial research and development phase in which the basic technical aspects of the MSBR concept are confirmed, involving exploratory development, laboratory experiment, and conceptual engineering. 

  
• A second phase in which the engineering and manufacturing capabilities are developed. This includes the conduct of in-depth engineering and proof testing of first-of-a-kind components, equipment and systems. These would then be incorporated into experimental installations and supporting test facilities to assure adequate understanding of design and performance characteristics, as well as to gain overall experience associated with major operational, economic and environmental parameters. As these research and development efforts progress, the technological uncertainties would need to be resolved and decision points reached that would permit development to proceed with necessary confidence. When the technology is sufficiently developed and confidence in the system was attained, the next stage would be the construction of large demonstration plants. 

  
• A third phase in which the utilities make large-scale commitments to electric generating plants by developing the capability to manage the design, construction, test and operation of these power plants in a safe, reliable, economic, and environmentally acceptable manner.

Significant experience with the Light Water Reactor (LWR), the High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) and the Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) has been gained over the past two decades pertaining to the efforts that are required to develop and advance nuclear reactors to the point of public and commercial acceptance. This experience has clearly demonstrated that the phases of development and demonstration should be similar regardless of the energy concept being explored; that the logical progression through each of the phases is essential; and that completing the work through the three phases is an extremely difficult, time consuming and costly undertaking, requiring the highest level of technical management, professional competence and organizational skills. This has again been demonstrated by the recent experience in the expanding LWR design, construction and licensing activities which emphasize clearly the need for even stronger technology and engineering efforts than were initially provided, although these were satisfactory in many cases for the first experiments and demonstration plants. The LMFBR program, which is relatively well advanced in its development, tracks closely this LWR experience and has further reinforced this need as it applies to the technology, development and engineering application areas.

[This paragraph reflects Milton Shaw's views, but Shaw clearly over-estimated the relative maturity of the reactor technologies referred to by the paragraph. Developmental problems with light water reactor reactor technology were to cost reactor owners tens of billions of dollars during the next two decades. Reactor scientists had told Shaw about the problems, but Shaw discounted the warnings. Again Shaw's belief that the LMFBR had reached an advanced stage of development was far from reality in 1972, and remains questionable in 2008. Shaw's demonstrably mistaken beliefs thus appear to lie at the heart of the WASH-1222 assessment of the potential of MSR technology.

It should be pointed out that the AEC initially endorsed the development of the Molten Salt Reactor upon the recommendation of the Fluid Fuel Reactor Task Force. The Report found that the Molten Salt reactor was the most likely to be successful of the three reactor types evaluated. The report had found that there were significant developmental tasks before a MiThe subsequent history of MSR. In no respect had the subsequent 13 years of MSR development at ORNL disappointed the expectations of the Task Force evaluators. During the 14 year period from the task force evaluation the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment had been devised and successfully conducted. The MSRE had been considered entirely successful, and that success had been acknowledged by WASH-1222. By the beginning of 1972 there was considerable commercial interest in the development of large (1000 MWe) Molten Salt Breeder Reactors for electric power generation and 15 companies including 9 utilities and Ebasco Services Inc. (a utility Industries consultant group), together with five industrial companies. These companies had organized a Molten Salt Reactor task force under the supervision of Ebasco, and the task force had initiated planning for the construction of a 1000 MWe power generation MSR. Despite this industrial interest, the AEC and in particular Milton Shaw had decided to withdraw support from ORNL and from Molten Salt Reactor. The withdrawal of funds from ORNL was devastating, and during the late 1960's and early 1970's as many as 1700 ORNL staff positions were eliminated. Whole ORNL divisions, long associated with the MSR project were dissolved, and if no work could be found for their scientists and engineers in the greatly diminished ORNL establishment, they were terminated from ORNL employment. Once this background is understood, the irony of the next sentence of WASH-1222 becomes apparent.]

It should also be kept in mind that the large backlog of commitments and the shortage of qualified engineering and technical management personnel and proof-test facilities in the government, in industry and in the utilities make it even more necessary that all the reactor systems be thoroughly designed and tested before additional significant commitment to and construction of, commercial power plants are initiated.

[As we have seen "the shortage of qualified engineering and technical management personnel and proof-test facilities" was a problem which Milton Shaw himself had created. Thus as we shall see, not only does WASH-1222 commit egregious errors in logic, as well as misstatement of facts, it covers up the fact that Shaw himself had destroyed the resources that were required to complete the development of the MSR. Statements like this must be counted as duplicitous. - CB]

With regard to the MSBR, preliminary reactor designs were evaluated in WASH-1097 (“The Use of Thorium in Nuclear Power Reactors”) based upon the information supplied by ORNL. Two reactor design concepts were considered—a two-fluid reactor in which the fissile and fertile salts were separated by graphite and a single fluid concept in which the fissile and fertile salts were completely mixed. This evaluation identified problem areas requiring resolution through conduct of an intensive research and development program.

[The two fluid MSR was an auto breeder. That meant it was intended to produced at least enough U233 to keep working until it ran out of thorium to breed. As long as a reactor produces as much fuel as it consumes, it is a successful breeder. Thus WASH-1222 should have considered the advantages of 2 fluid MSRs. - CB]

Since the publication of WASH-1097, all efforts related to the two-fluid system have been discontinued because of mechanical design problems and the development of processes which would, if developed into engineering systems, permit the on-line reprocessing of fuel from single fluid reactors. At present, the MSBR concept is essentially in the initial research and development phase, with emphasis on the development of basic MSBR technology. The technology program is centered at ORNL where essentially all research and development on molten salt reactors has been performed to date. The program is currently funded at a level of $5 million per year. Expenditures to date on molten salt reactor technology both for military and civilian power applications have amounted to approximately $150 million of which approximately $70 million has been in support of central station power plants. These efforts date back to the 1940's.

[ORNL chose a one fluid approach, for technical reasons, however there were advantages to a two fluid approach, and ORNL scientists like my father believed that the problems of the two fluid approach were not serious, while the single fluid approach created its own set of difficulties. These sums of $150 million and $70 million seem quite paltry by the standards of 2010. Even when inflation is factored in, we are talking about an investment of no more than 1 billion 2010 dollars, far less than the United States was to spend on Shaw's preferred but ultimately unsuccessful breeder project, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. Thus even if dollars from the 1950’s and 1960’s are translated into 2010 terms, the amount spent seems trivial in comparison to say the cost of military weapons systems. In retrospect we can say that ORNL provided a whole lot of information about a promising technology very inexpensively. - CB]

In considering the MSBR for central station power plant application, it is noted that this concept has several unique and desirable features; at the same time, it is characterized by both complex technological and practical engineering problems which are specific to fluid-fueled reactors and for which solutions have not been developed. Thus, this concept introduced major concerns that are different in kind and magnitude from those commonly associated with solid fuel breeder reactors. The development of satisfactory experimental units and further consideration of this concept for use as a commercial power plant will require resolution of these as well as other problems which are common to all reactor concepts.

[This paragraph shifts from obvious facts, to unwarranted conclusions. The facts involve “complex technological,” and “practical engineering problems” for which “solutions have not been developed.” In fact ORNL scientists and engineers had developed solutions to most of the complex problems by 1972 - they had to do so in order for the MSRE to be successful - but if solutions for all of the complex problems had already been developed, then there would be no need or purpose for the MSBR development program which has been proposed. The next statement does not follow from the stated issues. “Thus, this concept introduced major concerns that are different in kind and magnitude from those commonly associated with solid fuel breeder reactors.” Why are concerns about the developmental problems of the MSR different in kind and magnitude?” WASH-1222 had not shown that the development problems associated with Molten Salt Breeder Reactors were not different "in kind and magnitude" from those associated with the Light Water Reactor. Further, the developmental difficulties associated with the LMFBR differed in kind and magnitude from those of the Light Water Reactor and the Molten Salt Nreeder Reactor. Given what we know today, the AEC had not only underestimated the problems associated with the development of the LMFBR, they had seriously underestimated the developmental problems associated with the LWR, a technology which Shaw and the AEC in 1972 incorrectly believed to be mature. - CB]

As part of the AEC's Systems Analysis Task Force (AEC report WASH-1098) and the "Cost-Benefit Analysis of the U.S. Breeder Reactor Program" (AEC reports WASH-1126 and WASH-1184), studies were conducted on the cost and benefit of developing another breeder system, "parallel" to the LMFBR. The consistent conclusion reached in these studies is that sufficient information is available to indicate that the projected benefits from the LMFBR program can support a parallel breeder program. However, these results are highly sensitive to the assumptions on plant capital costs with the recognition, even among concepts in which ample experience exists, that capital costs and especially small estimated differences in costs are highly speculative for plants to be built 15 or 20 years from now. Therefore, it is questionable whether analyses based upon such costs should constitute a major basis for making decisions relative to the desirability of a parallel breeder effort. Experience in reactor development programs in this country and abroad has demonstrated that different organizations, in evaluating the projected costs of introducing a reactor development program and carrying it forward to the point of large-scale commercial utilization, would arrive at different estimates of the methods, scope of development and engineering efforts, and the costs and time required to bring that program to a stage of successful large scale application and public acceptance.

[The statement of risk considerations in the proceeding paragraph is sound. Future cost estimates for projects in developmental stages represent risky conjectures. This would seem to be an argument for rather than against parallel programs. Given the cost uncertainties attendant to taking a single line approach to a technological development, it is always wise to have an alternative solution at hand, in case costs start to run away. Developmental costs for the LMFRB “Clinch River Breeder Reactor” project did run away in the 1970’s and early 1980’s. Since all of the contentions about cost risk apply equally to both the LMFBR and the MSR, the argument in the last paragraph is incoherent. That is, it supports contradictory conclusions. We are being set up by this paragraph for an attempt to block further development of the MSR on the basis of cost. WASH-1222 has already made the judgment that development of the LMFBR would proceed. It appears to have assessed that the AEC’s 1970’s LMFB project could fail, as it did. The possibility of project failure is a risk. Any comparative cost/benefits study, should assess relative risks of failure. - CB]

Based upon the AEC's experience with other complex reactor development programs, it is estimated that a total government investment up to about 2 billion dollars in undiscounted direct costs could be required to bring the molten salt breeder or any parallel breeder to fruition as a viable, commercial power reactor. A magnitude of funding up to this level could be needed to establish the necessary technology and engineering bases, obtain the required industrial capability, and advance through a series of test facilities, reactor experiments, and demonstration plants to a commercial MSBR, safe and suitable to serve as a major energy option for central station power generation in the utility environment.

[Looking at this statement today with the benefit of hindsight, I would have to say that a development cost of $2 billion 1972 dollars was trivial. The Apollo Moon program cost $25.4 Billion 1969 dollars, arguably the nation would have been far better off if 10% of that money had been diverted to MSR development. In 1984 the GAO reviewed the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project, which was the sucessor of the AEC’s LMFBR project. In 1971 the AEC had estimated that the project would cost $400 million, of which $257 was to have come from private sources. By 1972, when WASH-1222 was written the cost estimate had risen to $700 million. By 1981 after $1 billion had been spent, the estimated cost of completion was 3 to 3.2 Billion more, with an estimated further project cost of $1 billion for a plutonium processing facility. By 1984 project cost had risen to $8 billion. And this was only a proof of concept reactor. Other LMFBR proof of concept reactors have had a very mixed history. Even today, a case can be made that LMFBT technology has not been proven either safe, reliable or cost effective. -

Introduction: I have, in three posts on Nuclear Green discussed the effects that Milton Shaw's beliefs, managerial style, and policies had both on nuclear research at some and probably all National Laboratories. Shaw's ruthless methods of imposing his views even led to the firing of Alvin Weinberg over disagreements about nuclear safety. In my last post, on the introduction to WASH-1222, I suggested that not only did Shaw have mistaken beliefs about the maturity of Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor and Light Water Reactor technology, but that these beliefs cost Light Water Reactor owners tens of billions of dollars. I may elaborate on this at a further time. I also argued that Shaw's mistakes about technology extended to breeder reactors, He held the mistaken belief that the maturity of LMFBR's had reached a level of maturity similar to that of LWRs.

In my Earlier comments, I began a review of a WASH-1222, a document prepared under Shaw's direction. In the introduction to the document I found evidence that Shaw's mistaken beliefs, coupled with the consequences of his own bureaucratic decisions, decisions for which he failed to acknowledge responsibility, and shocking errors in logic, led Shaw to discount a promising new reactor technology, the Molten Salt Reactor. At the same time, Shaw was implicitly pushing other technologies, even though they shared many of the problems of Molten Salt Reactor technology, while for other problems with technology Shaw favored, were solved by using the molten salt approach. Shaw claimed that unanticipated costs might be incurred during the course of development.

AN EVALUATION OF THE MOLTEN SALT BREEDER REACTOR

II. SUMMARY

The MSBR concept is a thermal spectrum, fluid-fuel reactor which operates on the thorium-uranium fuel cycle and when coupled with on-line fuel processing, has the potential for breeding at a meaningful level. The marked differences in the concept as compared to solid-fueled reactors make the MSBR a distinctive alternate. Although the concept has attractive features, there are a number of difficult development problems that must be resolved; many of these are unique to the MSBR while others are pertinent to any complex reactor system.

The technical effort accomplished since the publication of WASH-1097 and WASH-1098 has identified and further defined the problem areas; however, this work has not advanced the program beyond the initial phase of research and development. Although progress has been made in several areas (e.g., reprocessing and improved graphite), new problems not addressed in WASH-1097 have arisen which could affect the practicality of designing and operating a MSBR. Examples of major uncertainties relate to materials of construction, methods for control of tritium, and the design of components and systems along with their special handling, inspection and maintenance equipment. Considerable research and development efforts are required in order to obtain the data necessary to resolve the uncertainties.

Assuming that practical solutions to these problems can be found, a further assessment would have to be made as to the advisability of proceeding to the next stage of the development program. In advancing to the next phase, it would be necessary to develop a greatly expanded industrial and utility participation and commitment along with a substantial increase in government support. Such broadened involvement would require an evaluation of the MSBR in terms of already existing commitments to other nuclear power and high priority energy development efforts.

III. RESOURCE UTILIZATION

It has long been recognized that the importance of nuclear fuels for power production depends initially on the utilization of the naturally occurring fissile 235U; but it is the more abundant fertile materials, 238U and 232Th, which will be the major source of nuclear power generated in the future. The basic physics characteristics of fissile plutonium produced from 238U offer the potential for high breeding gains in fast reactors, and the potential to expand greatly the utilization of uranium resources by making feasible the utilization of additional vast quantities of otherwise uneconomic low grade ore. In a similar manner, the basic physics characteristics of the thorium cycle will permit full utilization of the nation's thorium resources while at the same time offering the potential for breeding in thermal reactors.

The estimated thorium reserves are sufficient to supply the world's electric energy needs for many hundreds of years if the thorium is used in a high-gain breeder reactor. It is projected that if this quantity of thorium were used in a breeder reactor, approximately 1,000,000 quad (1 quad = 1 quadrillion Btu) would be realized from this fertile material. It is estimated that the uranium reserves would also supply 1,000,000 quads of energy if the uranium were used in LMFBRs. In contrast, only 20,000 quads would be available if thorium were used as the fertile material in an advanced converter reactor because the reactor would be dependent upon 235U availability for fissile inventory make-up. (Note: a conservative estimate is that between 20,000 and 30,000 quads will be used for electric power generation between now and the year 2100.)

IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MOLTEN SALT REACTORS

The investigation of molten salt reactors began in the late 1940's as part of the U.S. Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) Program. Subsequently, the Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) was built at Oak Ridge and in 1954 it was operated successfully for nine days at power levels up to 2.5 MWt and fuel outlet temperatures up to 1580ºF (1133 K). The ARE fuel was a mixture of NaF, ZrF4, and UF4. The moderator was beryllium oxide and the piping and vessel were constructed of Inconel.

In 1956, ORNL began to study molten salt reactors for application as central station converters and breeders. These studies concluded that graphite moderated, thermal spectrum reactors operating on a thorium-uranium cycle were most attractive for economic power production. Based on the technology at that time, it was thought that a two-fluid reactor in which the fertile and fissile salts were kept separate was required in order to have a breeder system. The single-fluid reactor, while not a breeder, appeared simpler in design and also seemed to have the potential for low power costs.

Over the next few years, ORNL continued to study both the two-fluid and single-fluid concepts, and in 1960 the design of the single-fluid 8 MWt Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) was begun. The MSRE was completed in 1965 and operated successfully during the period 1965-1969. The MSRE experience is treated in more detail in a later section.

Concurrent with the construction of the MSRE, ORNL performed research and development on means for processing molten salt fuels. In 1967 new discoveries were made which suggested that a single-fluid reactor could be combined with continuous on-line fuel processing to become a breeder system. Because of the mechanical design problems of the two-fluid concept and the laboratory-scale development of processes which would permit on-line reprocessing, it was determined that a shift in emphasis to the single-fluid breeder concept should be made; this system is being studied at the present.

[I have pointed to evidence that Milton Shaw's mistaken beliefs about the maturity and developmental costs of solid core nuclear reactor technology, coupled with the consequences of his own bureaucratic decisions for which he failed to acknowledge responsibility, and errors in logic, led Shaw to discount a promising new reactor technology, the Molten Salt Reactor. At the same time, Shaw was pushing the development of other technologies, even though they shared many of the problems he alleged that Molten Salt Reactor technology suffered from.]

AN EVALUATION OF THE MOLTEN SALT BREEDER REACTOR

I. SUMMARY

The MSBR concept is a thermal spectrum, fluid-fuel reactor which operates on the thorium-uranium fuel cycle and when coupled with on-line fuel processing, has the potential for breeding at a meaningful level. The marked differences in the concept as compared to solid-fueled reactors make the MSBR a distinctive alternate. Although the concept has attractive features, there are a number of difficult development problems that must be resolved; many of these are unique to the MSBR while others are pertinent to any complex reactor system.

The technical effort accomplished since the publication of WASH-1097 and WASH-1098 has identified and further defined the problem areas; however, this work has not advanced the program beyond the initial phase of research and development. Although progress has been made in several areas (e.g., reprocessing and improved graphite), new problems not addressed in WASH-1097 have arisen which could affect the practicality of designing and operating a MSBR. Examples of major uncertainties relate to materials of construction, methods for control of tritium, and the design of components and systems along with their special handling, inspection and maintenance equipment. Considerable research and development efforts are required in order to obtain the data necessary to resolve the uncertainties.

Assuming that practical solutions to these problems can be found, a further assessment would have to be made as to the advisability of proceeding to the next stage of the development program. In advancing to the next phase, it would be necessary to develop a greatly expanded industrial and utility participation and commitment along with a substantial increase in government support. Such broadened involvement would require an evaluation of the MSBR in terms of already existing commitments to other nuclear power and high priority energy development efforts.

III. RESOURCE UTILIZATION

It has long been recognized that the importance of nuclear fuels for power production depends initially on the utilization of the naturally occurring fissile 235U; but it is the more abundant fertile materials, 238U and 232Th, which will be the major source of nuclear power generated in the future. The basic physics characteristics of fissile plutonium produced from 238U offer the potential for high breeding gains in fast reactors, and the potential to expand greatly the utilization of uranium resources by making feasible the utilization of additional vast quantities of otherwise uneconomic low grade ore. In a similar manner, the basic physics characteristics of the thorium cycle will permit full utilization of the nation's thorium resources while at the same time offering the potential for breeding in thermal reactors.

The estimated thorium reserves are sufficient to supply the world's electric energy needs for many hundreds of years if the thorium is used in a high-gain breeder reactor. It is projected that if this quantity of thorium were used in a breeder reactor, approximately 1,000,000 quad (1 quad = 1 quadrillion Btu) would be realized from this fertile material. It is estimated that the uranium reserves would also supply 1,000,000 quads of energy if the uranium were used in LMFBRs. In contrast, only 20,000 quads would be available if thorium were used as the fertile material in an advanced converter reactor because the reactor would be dependent upon 235U availability for fissile inventory make-up. (Note: a conservative estimate is that between 20,000 and 30,000 quads will be used for electric power generation between now and the year 2100.)

IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MOLTEN SALT REACTORS

The investigation of molten salt reactors began in the late 1940's as part of the U.S. Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) Program. Subsequently, the Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) was built at Oak Ridge and in 1954 it was operated successfully for nine days at power levels up to 2.5 MWt and fuel outlet temperatures up to 1580ºF (1133 K). The ARE fuel was a mixture of NaF, ZrF4, and UF4. The moderator was beryllium oxide and the piping and vessel were constructed of Inconel.

In 1956, ORNL began to study molten salt reactors for application as central station converters and breeders. These studies concluded that graphite moderated, thermal spectrum reactors operating on a thorium-uranium cycle were most attractive for economic power production. Based on the technology at that time, it was thought that a two-fluid reactor in which the fertile and fissile salts were kept separate was required in order to have a breeder system. The single-fluid reactor, while not a breeder, appeared simpler in design and also seemed to have the potential for low power costs.

Over the next few years, ORNL continued to study both the two-fluid and single-fluid concepts, and in 1960 the design of the single-fluid 8 MWt Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) was begun. The MSRE was completed in 1965 and operated successfully during the period 1965-1969. The MSRE experience is treated in more detail in a later section.

Concurrent with the construction of the MSRE, ORNL performed research and development on means for processing molten salt fuels. In 1967 new discoveries were made which suggested that a single-fluid reactor could be combined with continuous on-line fuel processing to become a breeder system. Because of the mechanical design problems of the two-fluid concept and the laboratory-scale development of processes which would permit on-line reprocessing, it was determined that a shift in emphasis to the single-fluid breeder concept should be made; this system is being studied at the present.

[The above statements are factually accurate and for the most part can be passed over without further comment, however, it should be noted that ORNL scientists had proposed solutions to the problem of the two fluid approach, and that there were significant problems with the one fluid approach. Current evaluations of MSR technology, have still not settled on which is the more desirable approach.]

Part III

Introduction: In the first section of my exploration of WASH-1222, I pointed to what might be considered errors in logic or reasoning, in which argument went from true assumptions to false conclusions. But in the WASH-1222 discussion of the actual state of Molten Salt Reactor technology, we clearly encounter repeated and dishonest statements of facts. I will presently demonstrate the depth of this dishonesty.

V. MOLTEN SALT BREEDER REACTOR CONCEPT DESCRIPTION

The breeding reactions of the thorium cycle are:

232Th +n --> 233Th --> 233 Pa --> 233U

Because of the number of neutrons produced perneutron absorbed and the small fast-fission bonus associated with 233U and 232Th in the thermal spectrum, a breeding ratio only slightly greater than unity is achievable. In order to realize breeding with the thorium cycle it is necessary to remove the bred 233Pa and the various nuclear poisons produced by the fission process from the high-flux region as quickly as possible. The Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor concept permits rapid removal of 233Pa and the nuclear poisons (e.g. 135Xe and the rare earth elements). The reactor is a fluid-fueled system containing UF4 and ThF4 dissolved in LiF - BeF2. The molten fuel salt flows through a graphite moderator where the nuclear reactions take place. A side stream is continuously processed to remove the Pa and rare earth elements, thereby permitting the achievement of a calculated breeding ratio of about 1.06.

The MSBR is attractive because of the following:

1. Use of a fluid fuel and on-site processing would eliminate the problems of solid fuel fabrication and the handling and shipping and reprocessing of spent fuel elements which are associated with all other reactor types under active consideration. 

   
2. MSBR operation on the thorium-uranium fuel cycle would help conserve uranium and thorium resources by utilizing thorium reserves with high efficiency. 

   
3. The MSBR is projected to have attractive fuel cycle costs. The major uncertainty in the fuel cycle cost is associated with the continuous fuel processing plant which has not been developed.
   
4. The safety issues associated with the MSBR are generally different from those of solid fuel reactors. Thus, there might be safety advantages for the MSBR when considering major accidents. An accurate assessment of MSBR safety is not possible today because of the early state of development. 

   
5. Like other advanced reactor systems such as the LMFBR and HTGR, the MSBR would employ modem steam technology for power generation with high thermal efficiencies. This would reduce the amount of waste heat to be discharged to the environment.

[Statement 4 is particularly egregious because safety is one of the towering strengths of the MSR. By 1972 safety issues involving the MSR had been well thought out, and solutions identified. The characteristic features of the MSR, its molten core, and salt fluid, conferred enormous safety advantages on the MSR concept. Statement 4. simply overlooks what was known about the safety advantages of MSR technology in 1972.

To give an idea of the extent to which Statement 4 subverts the truth I will compare it with Eric H. Ottewitte's sometime later listing of the safety advantages of the MSR:

1. Already being a molten fuel, further "meltdown" cannot occur
2. Fluid fuel has inherently a strong negative temperature coefficient of reactivity due to expansion, greatly inhibiting boiling
3. Elimination of pressurized and pressure-evolving components inside the containment
4. Elimination of the possibility of gas and vapor evolution, especially the release of free hydrogen and attendant fire hazard
5. Reduced risk of radioactivity release outside the containment due to
    a. reduced risk of failure of the containment, and
    b. two orders of magnitude reduction in the FP decay heat source relative to
    conventional solid-fuel reactors, due to continuous on-site chemical processing
6. Reduced FP inventory improves the capability for emergency heat removal by natural
convection, thereby greatly reducing the designated evacuation area
7. Fluidity facilitates removal from the reactor to ever-safe containers
8. High heat capacity of fuel restricts temperature rise on loss of normal cooling
9. Low salt vapor pressure minimizes the effect of any temperature rise

Ottewitte's list would have been based on knowledge that the writers of WASH-1222 in 1972. The list should not be regarded as comprehensive. Thus WASH-1222 appears to be deliberately minimizing the numerous and well-established safety advantages of the MSR.

- CB]

Selected conceptual design data for a large MSBR, based primarily on design studies performed at ORNL, are given in Table I.

There are, however, problem areas associated with the MSBR which must be overcome before the potential of the concept could be attained. These include development of continuous fuel processing, reactor and processing structural materials, tritium control methods, reactor equipment and systems, maintenance techniques, safety technology, and MSBR codes and standards. Each of these problem areas will now be evaluated in some detail, using as a reference point the technology which was demonstrated by the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) during its design, construction and operation at Oak Ridge and the conceptual design parameters presented in Table I and in Appendix A. A conceptual flowsheet for this system is shown in Figure 1.

[I will comment on the problems alluded to in this paragraph as WASH-1222 discusses them in greater detail. - CB]

[Assessments of technologies under development are problematic. At best they are like a snapshot of where the technology is, coupled with some educated guesses about where it might be headed. It is the educated guess, that create the biggest problems. Overly optimistic assessments of the potential for progress, may be based on unrealistic expectations for program progress. This was most certainly the case with the AEC's assessment of LMFBR technology in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Milton Shaw and other members of the AEC establishment including Glenn T Seaborg, and Congressman Chet Holifield, as well as the AEC staff had greatly underestimated the degree of difficulty involved in the development of a commercial LMFBR. Conversely, bureaucratic manipulators like Shaw, could use the assessments to kill promising technologies that competed with pet projects.

It should be understood that the purpose of any technological research and development program is to identify and fix problems related to the implementation of a new technology. Considering the radical and daring nature of the Molten Salt Reactor concept, and the extreme conditions the reactor was expected to operate under, developmental problems were to be expected. The point of the 1965 to 1969 Molten Salt Reactor experiment was to explore potential problems and fixes for them before the MSR went into development for commercial use. – CB]

AN EVALUATION OF THE MOLTEN SALT BREEDER REACTOR

VI. STATUS OF MSBR TECHNOLOGY

A. MSRE - The Reference Point for Current Technology

The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) was begun in 1960 at ORNL as part of the Civilian Nuclear Power Program. The purpose of the experiment was to demonstrate the basic feasibility of molten salt power reactors. All objectives of the experiment were achieved during its successful operation from June 1965 to December 1969. These included the distinction of becoming the first reactor in the world to operate solely on 233U. Some of the more significant dates and statistics pertinent to the MSRE are given in Table II.

In spite of the success of the MSRE, there are many areas of molten salt technology which must be expanded and developed in order to proceed from this small non-breeding experiment to a safe, reliable, and economic 1000 MWe MSBR with a 30-year life. To illustrate this point, some of the most important differences in basic design and performance characteristics between the MSRE and a conceptual 1000 MWe MSBR are given in Table III. Scale-up would logically be accomplished through development of reactor plants of increasing size. Examination of Table III provides an appreciation of the scale-up requirements in going from the MSRE to a large MSBR. Some problems associated with progressing from a small experiment to a commercial, high performance power plant are not adequately represented by the comparison presented in the Table. Therefore it is useful to examine additional facets of MSBR technology in more detail.

[This statement says nothing more than that the MSR is under development, and that problems have been identified and steps to identify and implement solutions are underway. – CB]

B. Continuous Fuel Processing: The Key to Breeding

In order to achieve nuclear breeding in the single-fluid MSBR it is necessary to have an on-line continuous fuel processing system. This would accomplish the following:

1. Isolate protactinium-233 from the reactor environment so it can decay into the fissile fuel isotope uranium-233 before being transmuted into other isotopes by neutron irradiation.
   
2. Remove undesirable neutron poisons from the fuel salt and thus improve the neutron economy and breeding performance of the system. 

   
3. Control the fuel chemistry and remove excess uranium-233 which is to be exported from the breeder system.

1. Chemical Process Development

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory has proposed a fuel processing scheme to accomplish breeding in the MSBR, and the flowsheet processes involve:

• Fluorination of the fuel salt to remove uranium as UF6. 

  
• Reductive extraction of protactinium by contacting the salt with a mixture of lithium and bismuth. 

  
• Metal transfer processing to preferentially remove the rare earth fission product poisons which would otherwise hinder breeding performance.

The fuel processing system shown in Fig. 2 is in an early stage of development at present and this type of system has not been demonstrated on an operating reactor. By comparison, the MSRE required only off-line, batch fluorination to recover uranium from fuel salt.

At this time, the basic chemistry involved in the MSBR processing scheme has been demonstrated in laboratory-scale experiments. Current efforts at Oak Ridge are being directed toward development of subsystems incorporating many of the required processing steps. Ultimately a complete breeder processing experiment would be required to demonstrate the system with all the chemical conditions and operational requirements which would be encountered with any MSBR.

Not shown on the flowsheet is a separate processing system which would require injecting helium bubbles into the fuel salt, allowing them to circulate in the reactor system until they collect fission product xenon, and then removing the bubbles and xenon from the reactor system. Xenon is a highly undesirable neutron poison which will hamper breeding performance by capturing neutrons which would otherwise breed new fuel. This concept for xenon stripping was demonstrated in principle by the MSRE, although more efficient and controllable stripping systems will be desirable for the MSBR. The xenon poisoning in the MSRE was reduced by a factor of six by xenon stripping; the goal for the MSBR is a factor of ten reduction.

[Xenon is the Achilles' heel of reactor physics. Xenon-135, both a direct and indirect (through I-135 decay) fission product, is a noble radioactive gas. It has a high neutron cross section, which means that it captures neutrons which could better be used in promoting chain reactions, or in breeding new fuel. In solid fuel reactors, Xenon remains inside fuel capsules where it poisoned the nuclear process. The presence of Xenon inside solid fueled reactors created control issues, and attempts to compensate for Xenon poisoning, could make reactors unstable and potentially dangerous. However in fluid fueled reactors, Xenon can be removed or stripped. The ability to strip Xenon from reactor fuel was a major accomplishment of ORNL, and clearly demonstrated the importance of the MSR concept. – CB]

2. Fuel Processing Structural Materials

Aside from the chemical processes themselves, there are also development requirements associated with containment materials for the fuel processing systems. In particular, liquid bismuth presents difficult compatibility problems with most structural metals, and present efforts are concentrated on using molybdenum and graphite for containing bismuth. Unfortunately, both molybdenum and graphite are difficult to use for such engineering applications. Thus, it will be necessary to develop improved techniques for fabrication and joining before their use is possible in the reprocessing system.

[This is simply a development issue, but one which does not appear to pose exceptional challenges. The liquid bismuth problem is one of the reasons why many ORNL scientists continued to favor the two fluid approach.- CB]

A second materials problem of the current fuel processing system is the containment for the fluorination step in which uranium is volatilized from the fuel salt. The fluorine and fluoride salt mixture is corrosive to most structural materials, including graphite, and present ORNL flowsheets show a “frozen wall” fluorinator which operates with a protective layer of frozen fuel salt covering a Hastelloy-N vessel wall. This component would require considerable engineering development before it is truly practical for use in on-line, full processing systems.

[Considering the extreme conditions that the fuel processing system operated under, engineering challenges were to be expected. By 1972, ORNL scientists and engineers had made considerable progress in overcoming these challenges, and there were reasons to be optimistic about further progress. – CB]

C. Molten Salt Reactor Design - Materials Requirements

In concept, the molten salt reactor core is a comparatively uncomplicated type of heat source. The MSRE reactor core, for example, consisted of a prismatic structure of unclad graphite moderator through which fuel salt flowed to be heated by the self-sustaining chain reaction which took place as long as the salt was in the graphite. The entire reactor internals and fuel salt were contained in vessels and piping made of Hastelloy-N, a high-strength nickel-base alloy which was developed under the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program. Over the four-year lifetime of the MSRE, the reactor structural materials performed satisfactorily for the purposes of the experiments although operation of the MSRE revealed possible problems with long term use of Hastelloy-N in contact with fuel salts containing fission products.

The MSBR application is more demanding in many respects than the MSRE, and additional development work would be required in several areas of materials technology before suitable materials could become available.

1. Fuel and Coolant Salts

The MSRE fuel salt was a mixture of 7LiF–BeF2–ZrF4–UF4 in proportions of 65.0-29.1-5.0-0.9 mole %, respectively. Zirconium fluoride was included as protection against UO2 precipitation should inadvertent oxide contamination of the system occur. MSRE operation indicated that control of oxides was not a major problem and thus it is not considered necessary to include zirconium in future molten salt reactor fuels. It should also be noted that the MSRE fuel contained no thorium whereas the proposed MSBR fuels would include thorium as the fertile material for breeding. With the possible exception of incompatibilities with Hastelloy-N, the MSRE fuel salt performed satisfactorily throughout the life of the reactor.

The MSBR fuel salt, as currently proposed by ORNL, would be a mixture of 7LiF–BeF2–ThF4–UF4 in proportions of 71.7–16–12–0.3 mole %, respectively. This salt has a melting point of about 930°F (772 K) and a vapor pressure of less then 0.1 mm Hg (13 Pa) at the mean operating temperature of 1150°F (895 K). It also has about 3.3 times the density and 10 times the viscosity of water. Its thermal conductivity and volumetric heat capacity are comparable to water.

The high melting temperature is an obvious limitation for a system using this salt, and the MSBR is limited to high temperature operation. In addition, the lithium component must be enriched in 7Li in order to allow nuclear breeding, since naturally occurring lithium contains about 7.5% 6Li. 6Li is undesirable in the MSBR because of its tendency to capture neutrons, thus penalizing breeding performance.

[The statement about the high melting temperature of salt, is exceedingly strange. One of the disadvantages of water as a reactor coolant is its low boiling point and the high pressure created by heating steam above the boiling point of water. Steam pressure causes major safety problems for light water reactors. In contrast molten salts have extremely high boiling points and vapor pressure is no problem in MSRs. Hence a major safety problem of LWRs is eliminated by using hot molten salt as a coolant. The two MSR prototypes had demonstrated that the high melting temperature of liquid salts was not a serious problem for MSR operations. This comment is thus a sort of Swift-Boating: an attempt to point to major strength and argue that it is really a weakness. – CB]

The chemical and physical characteristics of the proposed MSBR fuel mixture have been and are being investigated, and they are reasonably well known for unirradiated salts. The major unknowns are associated with the reactor fuel after it has been irradiated. For example, not enough is known about the behavior of fission products. The ability to predict fission product behavior is important to plant safety, operation, and maintenance. While the MSRE provided much useful information, there is still a need for more information, particularly with regard to the fate of the so-called "noble-metal" fission products such as molybdenum, niobium and others which are generated in substantial quantities and whose behavior in the system is not well understood.

[Here we have more of the same. The MSRE explored numerous issues including the effects of radiation on molten salts, and the behavior of fission products in the circulating reactor salt fuel mixture. ORNL scientist wanted to know more. The desirability of conducting more research is regarded as a liability by WASH-1222. – CB]

A more complete understanding of the physical/chemical characteristics of the irradiated fuel salt is also needed. As an illustration of this point, anomalous power pulses were observed during early operation of the MSRE with 233U fuel which were attributed to unusual behavior of helium gas bubbles as they circulated through the reactor. This behavior is believed to have been due to some physical and/or chemical characteristics of the fuel salt which were never fully understood. Out-of-reactor work on molten fuel salt fission product chemistry is currently under way. Eventually, the behavior of the fuel salt would need to be confirmed in an operating reactor.

[This statement asserts, "Research is being conducted, but some answers will only come by trying the idea out." - CB]

The coolant salt in the secondary system of the MSRE was of molar composition 66% 7LiF - 34% BeF2. While this coolant performed satisfactorily (no detectable corrosion or reaction could be observed in the secondary svstem), the salt has a high melting temperature (850°F / 728 K) and is relatively expensive. Thus, it may not be the appropriate choice for power reactors for two reasons: (1) larger volumes of coolant salt will be used to generate steam in the MSBR, and (2) salt temperatures in the steam generator should be low enough, if possible, to utilize conventional steam system technology with feedwater temperatures up to about 550°F. The operation of MSRE was less affected by the coolant salt melting temperature since it dumped the 8 MWt of heat via an air-cooled radiator. The high melting temperatures of potential coolant salts remain a problem. The current choice is a eutectic mixture of sodium fluoride and sodium fluoroborate with a molar composition of 8% NaF - 92% NaBF4; this salt melts at 725°F (658 K). It is comparatively inexpensive and has satisfactory heat transfer properties.

However, the effects of heat exchanger leaks between the coolant and fuel salts, and between the coolant salt and steam systems, must be shown to be tolerable. The fluoroborate salt is currently being studied with respect to both its chemistry and compatibility with Hastelloy-N.

[Heat exchange leaks have been a major problem with all liquid cooled reactors. Given the endemic problem, molten salt has several advantages over other coolants. MSRs operate under low pressure. High pressure will increase the likelihood of leaks. The molten salts used in the reactor do not interact chemically with some metals. Electro-chemical interactions can be controlled. Finally Hastelloy-N had by 1972, a considerable history of use in molten salt reactors. It was known to perform well under the very hot conditions found in heat exchangers. – CB]

2. Reactor Fuel Containment Materials

A prerequisite to success for the MSBR would be the ability to assure reliable and safe containment and handling of molten fuel salts at all times during the life of the reactor. It would be necessary, therefore, to develop suitable containment materials for MSBR application before plants could be constructed.

A serious question concerning compatibility of Hastelloy-N with the constituents of irradiated fuel salt was raised by the post-operation examination of the MSRE in 1971. Although the MSRE materials performed satisfactorily for that system during its operation, subsequent examination of metal which was exposed to MSRE fuel salt revealed that the alloy had experienced intergranular attack to depths of about 0.007 inch (0.2 mm). The attack was not obvious until metal specimens were tensile-tested, at which time cracks opened up as the metal was strained. Further examination revealed that several fission products, including tellurium, had penetrated the metal to depths comparable to those of the cracks. At the present time, it is thought that the intergranular attack was due to the presence of tellurium. Subsequent laboratory tests have verified that tellurium can produce, under certain conditions, intergranular cracking in Hastelloy-N.

Although the limited penetration of cracks presented no problems for the MSRE, concern now exists with respect to the chemical compatibility of Hastelloy-N and MSBR fuel salts when subjected to the more stringent MSBR requirements of higher power density and 30-year life. If the observed intergranular attack was indeed due to fission product attack of the Hastelloy-N, then this material may not be suitable for either the piping or the vessels which would be exposed to much higher fission product concentrations for longer periods of time. Efforts are under way to understand and explain the cracking problem, and to determine whether alternate reactor containment materials should be actively considered.

In addition to the intergranular corrosion problem, the standard Hastelloy-N used in the MSRE is not suitable for use in the MSBR because its mechanical properties deteriorate to an unacceptable level when subjected to the higher neutron doses which would occur in the higher power density, longer-life MSBR. The problem is thought to be due mainly to impurities in the metal which are transmuted to helium when exposed to thermal neutrons. The helium is believed to cause a deterioration of mechanical properties by its presence at grain boundaries within the alloy. It would be necessary to develop a modified Hastelloy-N with improved irradiation resistance for the MSBR, and some progress is being made in that direction. It appears at this time that small additions of certain elements, such as titanium, improve the irradiation performance of Hastelloy-N substantially. Development work on modified alloys with improved irradiation resistance is currently under way.

[Some problems with Hastelloy-N were identified during the course of the MSRE. Their sources were identified, and work on fixing the problem is underway. – The problems would be routine for R&D, and fixing them posed no significant challenge. Indeed two potential solutions were found by ORNL researchers shortly after WASH-1222 was written. – CB]

3 Graphite

Additional developmental effort on two problems is required to produce graphites suitable for MSBR application. The first is associated with irradiation damage to graphite structures which results from fast neutrons. Under high neutron doses, of the order of 10^22 neutrons/cm2, most graphites tend to become dimensionally unstable and gross swelling of the material occurs.

Based on tests of small graphite samples at ORNL, the best commercially available graphites at this time may be usable to about 3 x 10^21 neutrons/cm2, before the core graphite would have to be replaced. This corresponds to roughly a four-year graphite lifetime for the ORNL reference design. While this might be acceptable, there are still uncertainties about the fabrication and performance of large graphite pieces, and additional work would be required before a four-year life could be assured at the higher MSBR power densities now being. considered. In any event, there would be an obvious economic incentive to develop longer-lived graphites for MSBR application since a four-year life for graphite is estimated to represent a fuel cycle cost penalty of about 0.2 mills/kW-hr relative to a system with 30-year graphite life.

The second major problem associated with graphites for MSBR application is the development of a sealing technique which will keep xenon, an undesirable neutron poison, from diffusing into the core graphite where it can capture neutrons to the detriment of breeding performance. While graphite sealing may not be necessary to achieve nuclear breeding in the MSBR, the use of sealed graphite would certainly enhance breeding performance. The economic incentives or penalties of graphite sealing cannot be assessed until a suitable sealing process is developed.

Sealing methods which have been investigated to date include pyrolytic carbon coating and carbon impregnation. Thus far, however, no sealed graphite that has been tested remained sufficiently impermeable to gas at MSBR design irradiation doses, and research and development in this area is continuing.

[Graphite is a form of carbon used in pencils. It has many other uses and can serve as a reactor moderator, as well as a core structural material. Most molten salt concepts envision the use of graphite in cores. However, there are some drawbacks to graphite. Under the high radiation conditions found inside the MSR, graphite is expected to deteriorate. Readers of the discussion forum of Kirk Sorensen’s blog will find extensive discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of graphite, and proposed methods of solving the graphite problem. The use of graphite as a moderator and structural material inside MSRs is not strictly speaking absolutely required, and other approaches have been explored. It is possible to use heavy water as a moderator, and even unmoderated designs are possible. One approach would be to avoid structural uses of graphite, but moderate the reactor with small graphite pebbles that float in the fuel salts. The graphite balls could be floated out of the reactor as they aged, and replaced with new pebbles. The graphite related issues are perhaps the most difficult material concerns, but since it is possible to forgo using graphite entirely, the graphite problems are hardly fatal for molten salt reactor technology. - CB]

4. Other Structural Materials

In addition to the structural materials requirements for the reactor and fuel processing systems proper, there are other components and systems which have special materials requirements. Such components as the primary heat exchangers and steam generators must function while in contact with two, different working fluids.

At the present time, Hastelloy-N is considered to be the most promising material for use in all salt containment systems, including the secondary piping and components. Research to date indicates that sodium fluoroborate and Hastelloy-N are compatible as long as the water content of the fluoroborate is kept low; otherwise, accelerated corrosion can occur. Additional testing would be needed and is underway.

Hastelloy-N has not been adequately evaluated for service under a range of steam conditions and whether it will be a suitable material for use in steam generators is still not known.

[Here WASH-1222 does not point to significant problems, but to a need for more research and testing. That would be normal for a research & development projects. - CB]

AN EVALUATION OF THE MOLTEN SALT BREEDER REACTOR

VI. STATUS OF MSBR TECHNOLOGY

H. Codes, Standards, and High Temperature Design Methods

Codes and standards for MSBR equipment and systems must be developed in conjunction with other research and development before large MSBR's can be built. In particular, the materials of construction which are currently being developed and tested would have to be certified for use in nuclear power plant applications.

The need for high-temperature design technology is a problem for the MSBR as well as for other high temperature systems. The AEC currently has under way a program in support of the LMFBR which is providing materials data and structural analysis methods for design of systems employing various steel alloys at temperatures up to 1200ºF (920 K). This program would need to be broadened to include MSBR structural materials such as Hastelloy-N and to include temperatures as high as 1400ºF (1030 K) to provide the design technology applicable to high-temperature, long-term operating conditions which would be expected for MSBR vessels, components, and core structures.

[No comment. – CB]

VII. INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE MSBR PROGRAM

Privately funded conceptual design studies and evaluations of MSBR technology were performed in 1970 by the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor Associates (MSBRA), a study group headed by the engineering firm of Black & Veatch and including five midwest utilities. The MSBRA concluded that the economic potential of the MSBR is attractive relative to light-water reactors, but they recognized a number of problems which must be resolved in order to realize this potential. Since that time the MSBRA has been relatively inactive.

A second privately funded organization, the Molten Salt Group, is headed by Ebasco Services, Incorporated and includes five other industrial firms and fifteen utilities. In 1971 the Group completed an evaluation of the MSBR concept and technology and concluded that existing technology is sufficient to justify construction of an MSBR demonstration plant although the performance characteristics could not be predicted with confidence. Additional support for further studies has recently been committed by the members of this group.

In addition to these studies, manufacturers of graphite and Hastelloy-N have been cooperating with ORNL to develop improved materials.

There has been little other industrial participation in the MSBR Program aside from ORNL subcontractors. At the present time, there are two ORNL subcontracts in effect. Ebasco Services, Inc., utilizing the industrial firms who are participants in the Molten Salt Group is performing a design and evaluation study. Foster-Wheeler Corporation is currently performing design studies on steam generators for MSBR application.

[Another disingenuous argument. We are pointed to evidence of industrial interest in the MSR concept. Then we are told that there is little industrial participation in MSR beyond ORNL contractors. In fact, interested industries in the early 1970's included, Babcock & Wilcox, Byron Jackson, Cabot Corp., Continental Oil, and Union Carbide. Other industries had approached ORNL informally. Because the viability of the MSR concept had not been established prior to the MSRE, industrial interest was premature prior to the late 1960’s. The MSRE had changed that. The Black & Veatch study had demonstrated that the MSR was potentially economically attractive to utilities relative to light-water reactors. There is little doubt that Shaw would have regarded this as a threat to his intention to direct US nuclear development towards the light water reactor. The LMFBR would have complimented the LWR, while the MSR had the potential of competing successfully against it. – CB]

A number of factors can be identified which tend to limit further industrial involvement at this time, namely:
1. The existing major industrial and utility commitments to the LWR, HTGR, and LMFBR. 

2. The lack of incentive attractive relative to light-water reactors, for industrial investment in supplying fuel cycle services such as those required for solid-fuel reactors. 

3. The overwhelming manufacturing and operating experience with solid-fuel reactors in contrast with the very limited involvement with fluid-fueled reactors. 

4. The less advanced state of MSBR technology and the lack of demonstrated solutions to the major technical problems associated with the MSBR concept.

[This argument rests on assumptions by the Shaw and other members of the AEC staff, that are at least in retrospective mistaken. First is the issue of cost containment. During the next decade the cost of LWRs was to rise dramatically. Eventually this reactor cost inflation was to put an end to the first nuclear era. The MSR had the potential to better control power reactor inflation, and thus offered a potential cost advantage over LWRs. Secondly, LWRs offered the same high temperature advantage as gas cooled reactors, but were more compact, and thus potentially lower costs. Gas cooled reactors were never attractive to the American electrical utility industries. The point about the relative experience of manufacturers in building LWRs and MSRs is strange and probably silly. Manufactures never have experience with the manufacture of new technologies when they are introduced, but that has not prevented the repeated introduction of new technologies in the market. The formula of industrial involvement is used to object to the MSR project. Here the term refers to manufacturer involvement. No one is yet interested in building a commercial MSR. Yet the AEC has not encouraged manufactures to do so, indeed as WASH-1222 demonstrates, quite the opposite was the case. Because the AEC was in effect discouraging manufacturer interest in the MSR, manufactures were largely withholding interest. The lack of manufacture interest was then used to justify the AEC’s attempt to suppress MSR technology.

Yet if there was customer interest in MSR technology, as an earlier paragraph of this section reports, there was potentially manufacturer interest.

The second point of this argument at first seem to be obvious. The MSR, by using fuel far more efficiently would seem to create disincentives for industrial investment in supplying fuel cycle services. But this could be a case of Jevons’ paradox. By greatly increasing the efficiency of nuclear fuel use, the MSR might actually create as situation in which more rather than less fuel was in demand. Thus the objection is short-sighted, and assumes shortsightedness on the part of suppliers as well.

The third objection could be raised against any new technology. In 1952 manufacturers had had very limited involvement Light Water Reactors. Demand had led them to explore the new technology.

The fourth objection is circular. In effect, “the less advanced state of MSBR technology and the lack of demonstrated solutions to the major technical problems associated with the MSBR concept,” is used as an argument against advancing the state of MSBR technology, and finding solutions to the major technical problems. – CB]

It should be noted that these factors are also relevant considerations in establishing the level of governmental support for the MSBR program which in turn, to some extent, affects the interest of the manufacturing and utility industries.

[False premises lead to false conclusions. This is the money statement as far as Milton Shaw was concerned. Given the weakness and contradictions of the arguments WASH-1222 offered against “industrial interest” in the development of MSR technology, the case most certainly had not been made against continuing government support of research directed at the development of MSR technology. Milton Shaw had thus erected his case in favor of discontinuing development of MSR technology of the most insubstantial grounds. – CB]

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The Molten Salt Breeder Reactor, if successfully developed and marketed, could provide a useful supplement to the currently developing uranium-plutonium reactor economy. This concept offers the potential for:

1. Breeding in a thermal spectrum reactor;
2. Efficient use of thorium as a fertile material;
3. Elimination of fuel fabrication and spent fuel shipping;
4. High thermal efficiencies.

[Although WASH-1222 slights the advantages of MSR technology, it points to a singular advantage of Molten Salt Reactor technology, the elimination of the problem of “nuclear waste.” The problem of spent fuel was one of the aspects of the LWR that Milton Shaw was trying to sweep under the rug in 1972.

H. G. MacPherson listed the advantages of the MSR as:

1. The fuel handling system will be much simpler.
2. The molten salts have a much higher heat capacity per unit volume than sodium, so that the physical size of pumps and piping will be smaller.
3. There is no threat of a "core disruptive accident" with the MSCR, so that safety-related equipment can be simpler.
4. The molten salts have a much lower thermal conductivity than sodium, so that sudden coolant temperature changes will provide less thermal shock to system components.
5. The coolant is more compatible with water than is sodium, so that there should be fewer problems in the design and maintenance of steam generators.

MacPherson did what WASH-1222 did not do. He compaired the MSR to the LMFBR and demonstrated that the MSR had decided advantages in a number of areas. MacPherson's comments are very brief, and are his comparison is far from exhaustive.

Eric Ottewitte listed some salient advantages of an unusual type of MSR, the Molten Chloride Fast Reactor (MCFR) as:

1. Simplicity: no control rods, fuel handling mechanisms, fuel elements or associated structures. Very uncluttered: should maximize test space and facilitate access thereto. Fluid fuel can be transferred remotely by pumping through pipes connecting storage and reactor. 

2. MSRs don't refuel or reprocess, just add fuel and process out wastes. Continuous processing and refueling would minimize reactor downtime. Can usefully consume all fuel forms, simplifying fuel supply while simultaneously solving other people's problems. 

3. MSR is the safest concept of all due to very strong negative temperature coefficient. No gaseous hydrogen can possibly evolve from fuel or primary coolant. Fuel already molten and handled by system. Simple design technique makes boiling impossible. Continuous removal of fission products reduces their heat source by two orders of magnitude; consequently, natural circulation suffices for emergency cooling, thereby greatly reducing the designated evacuation area. Also, under any off-normal conditions, the liquid fuel can be channeled to a continuously cooled drain tank, in a short time. 

4. Very fast neutron spectrum in an annular core engenders high neutron fluxes, driving inner and outer thermal neutron flux traps, each variable in size and neutron energy spectrum by means of molten salt composition. Elimination of fuel cladding and structural material significantly improves the neutron economy of the reactor: more neutrons are available for applications. 

5. Elimination of pressurized and pressure-evolving components inside the containment, reducing risk of containment failure. 

6. Potential additional missions for an MCFR BATR could include
    A. Sr and Cs waste transmutation because of very high neutron flux
    B. Useful consumption of fissile fuel from dismantled weapons because of the flexibility in fuel form
    C. Process heat R&D due to high temperature capability
    D. A 6LiD or 6LiOD shell for generation of a 14 MeV fusion neutron trap.

Ottewitte also notes some disadvantages of MSRs and MCFRs. - CB]

Notwithstanding these attractive features, this assessment has reconfirmed the existence of major technological and engineering problems affecting feasibility of the concept as a reliable and economic breeder for the utility industry. The principal concerns include uncertainties with materials, with methods of controlling tritium, and with the design of components and systems along with their special handling, inspection and maintenance equipment. Many of these problems are compounded by the use of a fluid fuel in which fission products and delayed neutrons are distributed throughout the primary reactor and reprocessing systems.

[Here we have Shaw's attempt to nail the lid on the coffin of the MSR. The claim that "this assessment has reconfirmed the existence of major technological and engineering problems affecting feasibility of the concept as a reliable and economic breeder for the utility industry" is simply untrue. The assessment had not established anything other than MSR technology requires further development before it can be commercialized. WASH-1222 does not established that MSR developmental problems are unusually difficult and certainly has not established that developmental problems are in any way insurmountable. Some of the so called principal concerns were close to resolution when WASH-1222 was written, as the author must have known. The final sentence provides us with yet another example of Swift-boating, turning the MSR's primary strength—its fluid core, into a weakness. - CB]

The resolution of the problems of the MSBR will require the conduct of an intensive research and development program. Included among the major efforts that would have to be accomplished are:

1. Proof testing of an integrated reprocessing system;
2. Development of a suitable containment material;
3. Development of a satisfactory method for the control and retention of tritium;
4. Attainment of a thorough understanding of the behavior of fission products in a molten-salt system;
5. Development of long-life moderator graphite, suitable for breeder application;
6. Conceptual definition of the engineering features of the many components and systems;
7. Development of adequate methods and equipment for remote inspection, handling, and maintenance of the plant.

[The argument here begins with some partially true statements of premises. But the resolution of 2 and 3 was already well in hand, which Milton Shaw and the author of WASH-1222 must have known. A more honest assessment might have taken note of progress in some area. Milton Shaw was not interested in an honest assessment. The other problems were what could be considered a normal part of research and development. Problem 5 was the most difficult, but in fact graphite could be dispensed with entirely without compromising the MSR’s safety, stability and ability to breed. The basic argument continues to be that the MSR is in the development stage, therefore the MSR should not be developed.

But not all of the premises to the argument are stated, and unstated premises are false. WASH-1222 has already told us that other nuclear technologies, including the LWR and the LMFBR, are so mature that they were beyond the research and development stage requirements which are outlined above. In 1972 this was disputed by scientists at AEC Labs, who correctly argued that LWR safety issues had not been adequately addressed. Many scientists at AEC facilities had well-founded doubts about the maturity of LMFBR technology. In addition, in 1972 there was growing public concern about both the problems of “nuclear waste,” and “nuclear proliferation.” Both of these issues were unresolved problems for LWR technology. “Nuclear proliferation,” was and is a significant issue for LMFNR technology. In contrast, the MSR offers attractive solutions to both the “nuclear waste,” and “nuclear proliferation” issues. Thus the hidden premises of the conclusions reached by WASH-1222 were basically false. False assumptions lead to false conclusions, and this was most certainly the case with WASH-1222. – CB]

The major problems associated with the MSBR are rather difficult in nature and many are unique to this concept. Continuing support of the research and development effort will be required to obtain satisfactory solutions to the problems. When significant evidence is available that demonstrates realistic solutions are practical, a further assessment could then be made as to the advisability of advancing into the detailed design and engineering phase of the development process including that of industrial involvement. Proceeding with this next step would also be contingent upon obtaining a firm demonstration of interest and commitment to the concept by the power industry and the utilities and reasonable assurances that large-scale government and industrial resources can be made available on a continuing basis to this program in light of other commitments to the commercial nuclear power program and higher priority energy development efforts.

[This last paragraph requires very careful examination:

1. “The major problems associated with the MSBR are rather difficult in nature and many are unique to this concept.” In fact WASH-1222 has not shown that there were exceptional difficulties involved in the development of MSR technology.
2. “Continuing support of the research and development effort will be required to obtain satisfactory solutions to the problems.” This is to state the obvious.
3. “When significant evidence is available that demonstrates realistic solutions are practical, a further assessment could then be made as to the advisability of advancing into the detailed design and engineering phase of the development process including that of industrial involvement.” Which would have been the case had not WASH-1222 not been used to justify curtailing of MSR research.
4. “Proceeding with this next step would also be contingent upon obtaining a firm demonstration of interest and commitment to the concept by the power industry and the utilities and reasonable assurances that large-scale government and industrial resources can be made available on a continuing basis to this program in light of other commitments to the commercial nuclear power program and higher priority energy development efforts.”

This last statement is the crowning hypocrisy of WASH-1222, a document intended to discourage further industrial interest in the MSR concept, and to lay down a smokescreen for Shaw’s move to destroy the MSR project. - CB]
IX. REFERENCES
1. US Atomic Energy Commission, “The 1967 Supplement to the 1962 Report to the President on Civilian Nuclear Power” USAEC Report, February 1967. 

2. US Atomic Energy Commission, “The Use of Thorium in Nuclear Power Reactors” USAEC Report WASH-1097, 1969. 

3. US Atomic Energy Commission, “Potential Nuclear Power Growth Patterns,” USAEC Report WASH-1098, December 1970. 

4. US Atomic Energy Commission, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of the US Breeder Reactor Program,” USAEC Report WASH-1126, 1969. 

5. US Atomic Energy Commission, “Updated (1970) Cost-Benefit Analysis of the US Breeder Reactor Program,” USAEC Report WASH-1184, January 1972. 

6. Edison Electric Institute, “Report on the EEI Reactor Assessment Panel,” EEI Publication No. 70-30, 1970. 

7. Annual Hearings on Reactor Development Program, US Atomic Energy Commission FY 1972 Authorizing Legislation, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States p. 820-830, US Government Printing Office 

8. Nuclear Applications and Technology, Volume 8, February 1970. 

9. Robertson, R. D. (ed) “Conceptual Design Study of a Single-Fluid Molten Salt Breeder Reactor,” ORNL-4541, June 1971. 

10. Rosenthal, M. W., et al.; “Advances in the Development of Molten-Salt Breeder Reactors,” A/CONF-49/P-048, Fourth United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, September 6 - 16, 1971. 

11. Trinko, J. R. (ed.), “Molten-Salt Reactor Technology,” Technical Report of the Molten-Salt Group, Part I, December 1971. 

12. Trinko, J. R. (ed), “Evaluation of a 1000 MWe Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor," Technical Report of the Molten Salt Group, Part II, November 1971. 

13. Ebasco Services Inc., “1000 MWe Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor Conceptual Design Study,” Final Report Task I, Prepared under ORNL subcontract 3560, February 1972. 

14. “Project for Investigation of Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor,” Final Report, Phase I Study for Molten Salt Breeder Reactor Associates, September 1970. 

15. Cardwell, D. W. and Haubenreich, P. N., “Indexed Abstracts of Selected References on Molten-Salt Reactor Technology,” ORNL-TM-3595, December 1971. 

16. Kasten, P. R., Bettis, E. S. and Robertson, R. C., “Design Studies of 1000 MWe Molten-Salt Breeder Reactors,” ORNL-3996, August 1966. 

17. Molten Salt Reactor Program Semiannual Reports beginning in February 1962.

Concluding Remarks about WASH-1222

I have argued that WASH-1222 was a bureaucratic hatchet job. It was designed as part of Milton's Shaw's concerted program to kill off the Molten Salt Reactor. I would also like to note that WASH-1222 should be read in light of a closely-related event, the firing of Alvin Weinberg as Director of ORNL. I believe that the WASH-1222 and the firing of Weinberg were part of a single bureaucratic move by Shaw and a few associates to gain control of the American nuclear establishment, and to control the future direction of nuclear technology and of the nuclear industry in the United States. Indeed I believe that despite his 1973 forced departure from the AEC by Dixie Lee Ray, Shaw largely achieved his objectives. The United States Nuclear Industry still largely carries Milton Shaw's imprint. Unfortunately the legacy of problems left by Shaw's fundamentally flawed vision is still with us. The mistrust of nuclear safety and of the governmental regulation of the nuclear industry is still widespread in American society, and represents a significant handicap in the fight against global warming.

The 1970 Bureau of Mines Mineral Yearbook reported:

"[The] AEC also requested proposals for a design study of a 1,000-megawatt molten-salt
breeder reactor (MSBR). There was also a significant increase in private efforts involving this concept. The Molten Salt Breeder Reactor Associates, an association of five electric utility companies and a consulting engineering firm, completed Phase I of their study of the MSBR. In addition, 15 utility companies and six major industrial companies formed the Molten Salt Group, which will jointly study MSBR technology, including the feasibility of thorium as a fuel.12"

The footnote cited "Wall Street Journal. V. 176, No. 29, Aug. 10, 1970, p. 17."

Contrary to WASH-1222 there was by 1970 considerable industrial interest in MSR technology.

Among the reports on the MSR by private industrial groups and their consultants were:

Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor Associates Staff, Final Report, Phase I Study—Project for
Investigation of Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor, Black & Veatch Consulting Engineers,
Kansas City, Mo. (1970).

Evaluation of a 1000-MWe Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor, Technical Report of the
Molten-Salt Group, Part II, Ebasco Services, Inc., October 1971.

Molten-Salt Reactor Technology, Technical Report of the Molten-Salt Group, Part I,
Ebasco Services, Inc., December 1971.

1000-MW(e) Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor Conceptual Design Study, Final Report—
Task I, Ebasco Services, Inc., New York, February 1972.

Shaw had managed to abort an important industrial development and his destructive action had profoundly negative implications for the energy future of the United States.

Shaw's vision was also flawed by his failure to recognize that problems like "nuclear waste" and "nuclear proliferation" could and should be solved by a radical change in reactor design. The MSR possessed the potential to resolve these issues. Failure to move forward on MSR technology meant that the best chance to address major public concerns about nuclear technology was ignored.

In 2008 MSR technology remains potentially the best single tool for responding to the challenge posed by anthropogenic global warming, and peak fossil fuel energy. Yet the Molten Salt Reactor is today little known and almost entirely ignored by decision makers. This should not be its fate, considering the potential that it brings.

Appendix I, The AEC case for the Fast Breeder

WASH-1184 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. BREEDER REACTOR PROGRAM. Updated (1970) played an important role in supporting the decision by the Nixon administration to support the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor development, while abandoning the alternative Molten Salt Breeder Reactor concept developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. WASH-1184 was a revision of WASH-1126 which in turn was a product of cost-benefit analyses of the long term nuclear power options which the AEC believed were available to the United States in the late 1960's. These cost-benefit assessments would have been conducted under the supervision of Milton Shaw who was the Director of the AECs’ Division of Reactor Development and Technology. The text of WASH-1184 strongly suggested that the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor had not been included in the USAEC's on-going breeder cost benefit analysis despite a vigorous championing of that technology by ORNL Director and famed reactor scientist, Alvin Weinberg, who had invented the Light Water Reactor, and had suggested his invention to Hyman Rickover as a means of powering Navy submarines. Shaw, and Rickover had himself been trained in reactor technology at Oak Ridge in a program that Weinberg had supervised.

Weinberg's contentions about the MSBR were supported by a large body of research which indicated that the MSBR was viable, and likely to be a safe and cost-effective source of future electricity. Thus Shaw appears to have chosen to ignore questions about the cost-effectiveness of the MSBR in AEC breeder cost-effectiveness studies which he directed. This choice has never been fully explained.

It appears likely that Milton Shaw was pushing LMFBR development, perhaps, it was alleged at the time, even to the extent of diverting money meant for Light Water Reactor safety research, to LMFBR development.

A study of AEC/DoE LMFBR cost assessments made between the late 1960's and mid-1970's found steadily rising estimated costs for the LMFBR. It would appear that the late 1960's LMFBR cost estimate, which would have been referenced by the Nixon administration in its choice to support LMFB technology involved a direct cost of $2.2 billion. The total breeder program development cost of was estimated to run to $4.4 billion. WASH-1184 estimated direct costs for a LMFBR development program to run to $2.5 billion with total breeder development costs dropping to $3.8 billion. This drop was largely due to a drop in support of alternative breeder technology from $0.8 billion to $100 million. This accounting ploy allowed WASH-1184 to claim an overall program cost drop at a time when LMFBR cost estimates were rising.

In the WASH-1535, DRAFT EIS (1973-74) LMFBR cost estimates had risen to $4.0 billion, while in WASH-1535, PFEIS, LMFBR cost estimates had risen to $6.5 billion.

The 1975 Natural Resources Defense Council, paper Bypassing the Breeder, reported that the initial estimate for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor was around $400 million,

In a 1972 Memorandum of Understanding its cost was estimated at $700 million, two-thirds coming from the AEC and with the AEC (now ERDA) assuming an open-ended risk (i.e., all the cost overruns). This estimate was $150 ao $200 million higher than an AEC estimate only six months previous. In March 1974, it was reported that CRBR project officials are "focusing on some major steps that they hope will hold the total costs for the plant will be under 1.0 billion".
In July (1974) it was reported that the CRBR project would cost $1.6 - $2.0 billion,-- and in September it was pegged at $1.736 billion.

In 1983, shortly before the plug on the Clinch River Breeder was pulled by Congress, the GAO estimated its cost at $8.0 billion.

The LMFBR made an easy target for nuclear critics like the Natural Resources Defense Council. All they had to do was lay out the facts. President Nixon had admitted,

all this business about breeder reactors and nuclear energy is over my head

Bypassing the Breeder stated,

the LMFBR has been oversold by its proponents to the point that it is now one of the great white elephants of the day.

Indeed it was. Part of that overselling was of course the invidious comparison of the of the MSBR to the LMFBR found in WASH-1222, which states,

Significant experience with the Light Water Reactor (LWR), the High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR)and the Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) has been gained over the past two decades pertaining to the efforts that are required to develop and advance nuclear reactors to the point of public and commercial acceptance.

In light of the subsequent history of the LMFBR Milton Shaw's WASH-1184 laid out claims that were to not prove true:

The substantial benefits to be realized from the breeder were clearly brought out in a 1968 AEC Study entitled "Cost-Benefit Analysis of the U.S. Breeder Program" subsequently published as WASH 1126. This Study indicated that the readily quantifiable benefits of a successful commercial breeder in the form of reduced cost of electrical energy, reductions in uranium ore requirements and separative work demand, increased Plutonium production, and use of the depleted uranium byproduct from the diffusion plants would exceed the development costs of the breeder by a significant amount. Other benefits, quantifiable and non-quantifiable, such as those associated with reductions in air pollution and enhanced social values through the availability of low-cost electricity were noted. It is apparent that the results of this Study in combination with other important national studies on alternative energy production systems contributed in a major way to achieving the consensus of support which this developed for the breeder program.

WASH-1184 certainly did not demonstrate what it claimed: that it was possible, by use of LMFBR reactors, to lower electrical costs. Indeed even recent Indian FBR developments have shown that LMFBRs are not capable of producing electricity at a lower cost than PHWRs. Shaw's preposterous overselling of LMFBR technology is further illustrated by this statement:

Recognizing the rapidly changing nature of the U.S. energy program, it was decided to update the 1968 Study. The updating, started in 1970, which is reported in this document, indicates that the anticipated benefits are about twice as large as reported in the 1968 Study. This is attributable primarily to the greater electrical energy demands that are now being projected, the increase in the cost of fossil fuels since performing the last study, and the increased cost of uranium separative work which tends to improve the competitive position of the breeder over light water reactors.

It is quite clear that the AEC's late 1960's early to mid 1970's attempt to establish a case for the LMFBR was very poorly executed. In addition the AEC, under the direction of reactor research czar Milton Shaw, made a deliberate attempt to exclude the potentially far more viable MSBR from serious consideration as a future American breeder reactor. Even worse is the role that these early assessments have played in creating the continuing illusion that liquid sodium cooled breeder reactors such as the Integral Fast Reactor have some sort of inside track as a future low cost energy source. The world and the American people clearly need other less-problematic long-term nuclear choices.