Black and Veach on the future cost of energy

I recently called attention to Breakthrough Institute's report, How to Make Nuclear Power Cheap.This report called attention to the potential use of advanced nuclear technology to lower and even dramatically lower nuclear costs.  This point has been repeatedly argued in Nuclear Green since 2008.  Thus it should not be assumed that nuclear costs will remain constant over the next 35 years.   My findings which are based on the Research of Dr. Per Petersen, other nuclear engineers and scientists, ORNL, MIT, and UC Berkley, is that advanced nuclear technology, using liquid salts holds great promise for lowering nuclear costs, even with a modest investment in research and development.

Black and Veach also touched on Nuclear costs in a Report titled,  Cost and performance Data for power generation technologies. The report was prepaired for of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's as a supporting document to the NREL's report: Renewables Electricity Futures Study

There are several flaws to the B&V cost study.  First only one type of Reactor is mentioned, the Westinghouse AP-1000.  At least one other type of reactor, the B&W mPower is planned to come online within 5 years.  The mPower has several advanced features, including factory construction of the core, and a construction cycle of as little as 18 months.  Other factors including the mPower's small size, could potentially contribute to mPower construction lowering nuclear cost.  The mPower is ignored in the B&V report, despite its potential for lowering nuclear costs.  Even given the limited nuclear technology options in the B&V report, that report failed to mention the effects of serial manufacture on costs.  Thus producijng 100 AP-1000 units will cost less per unit than 10 units would.

In addition, the study fails to recognize that future energy costs are estimates, guesses with considerable cost ranges.  Cost ranges ought to be reported in any future costs reports, if those ranges are known.  This is true for both nuclear power and renewable energy, but not the case in this report.

Thus we must conclude that the the B&V future energy costs report cannot serve as an accurate basis for determining future energy costs.  This raises questions in turn about NREL research standards, and the reliability of the NREL's future energy study.  Due to my vision problems, I cannot explor the problem further.  I can only point to it and rely on others to explore the question.

Michael Hogan's weak case for renewables

Michael Hogan Added a couple of comments to my Breakthrough Institute post on The Energy Collective.

Mark Jacobson's work at Stanford is not particularly credible and I would not recommend it. The two most robust system analyses I would point to are:
Roadmap 2050: A practical guide to a prosperous, low-carbon Europe (first phase published 2010, phase 2 published 2011 and phase 3 due to be published later this year), carried out by KEMA, Imperial College London, McKinsey & Co. and Oxford Economics under the sponsorship of the European Climate Foundation and in close coordination with the European Commission, with active involvement from a broad group of industry, academic and NGO stakeholders. This study analysed objectively a full range of decarbonization scenarios, from one that relied on a relatively limited role for renewables to one in which renewable provided 80% of Europe's annual electricity production.

Renewable Energy Futures (October 2012), carried out under the auspices of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory by an extended team of stellar national laboratories, respected expert consultancies and in consultation with a broad swath of industry, academia and NGOs.

These are serious and robust studies. They do not claim that any of this is easy - to paraphrase one of my favorite lines from "The Princess Bride", anyone who tells you any part of this is easy is selling something - but they do demonstrate that various pathways, including pathways involving high shares of variable renewable production, are entirely feasible and affordable without the need for dramatic technological advances, as desireable as such advances might prove to be. Each of them has self-acknowledged gaps and further work that should be done, but that is simply to be expected. It does not negate the fundamental insights they provide.

Note that Hogan is dependent upon black boxes to back up his arguments.  Note that the topic under discussion is the potential of Advanced Nuclear Technology for lowering nuclear costs.  Hogan offers us a series of reports that have nothing at all to do with nuclear technology.  Do the Reports even tell us how much the 80# renewables scheme will cost?  If not we have no basis for judging whether renewables will cost less than nuclear power, what is the point of talking about renewables?

Once again we have a renewables advocate diverting attention from the case for nuclear power, while not offering any factual evidence.

Self-embellished Prophecies from Amory Lovins, By Alex DeVolpi

Dr. Alex DeVolpi is a retired Argonne National Laboratory scientist.  During the Cold War, Dr. DeVolpi participated  in talks with Soviet scientists about nuclear weapons control issues.  These talks were in support of nuclear arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dr DeVolpi has written about numerous topics since his retirement.

The March/April/ issue of The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists contained an anti-nuclear essay 

“The economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-out,” by the notorious Harvard Physics drop out, Amory Lovins.  Dr. DeVolpi wrote a critical Letter and submitted it to the editor of the Bulletin for publication.  The Bulletin did not responded to Dr. DeVolpi's letter.  He commented:

"Although this letter was submitted in May 2013 to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, it has been utterly ignored by its Editors. The letter was in partial response to the article they had highlighted."

 

“Years ago, two of us who were subscribers and contributors since the late 1950s/early 1960s discontinued our association with the Bulletin. Both George Stanford — a highly respected colleague who passed away in early October — and I had found the Bulletin no longer presented balanced nor objective treatment of nuclear power and proliferation.”

Dr. DeVolpi then contacted me, and I offered to publish his letter:

Self-embellished Prophecies from Amory Lovins 

Amory B. Lovins’ recent article, “The economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-out,” (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2013 vol. 69 no. 2 44-65), continues his decades of predicting nuclear power’s demise and proliferation dangers. However, his forecasting has been exceedingly inaccurate and self-promotional.

In a widely distributed 1980 article,1 Lovins advised that “In fact, the global nuclear power enterprise is rapidly disappearing... [N]uclear power is not commercially viable, and questions of how to regulate an inexorably expanding world nuclear regime are moot. 

This is far from the actual record of nuclear-power growth and regulation. Moreover, he declared without reservation in that article 33 years ago that “The nuclear proliferation problem, as posed, is insoluble.”

That same year, in a prestigious scientific journal,2 Lovins asserted that “Power reactors are not implausible but rather attractive as military production reactors,” amplifying the claim with the allegation that “Power reactors are ... rather potentially a peculiarly convenient type of large-scale military Pu production reactor.” None of these predictions have come true. 

These were not passing aberrations; nor were they since corrected with updates or revisions based on evolving realistic experience. Instead, the allegations stand as deliberate and unfounded efforts to influence national and international nuclear policy, irrespective of factual circumstances and

evolving data.

Posted on the Internet since 20083 has been a declaration by Lovins that “nuclear power is continuing its decades-long collapse in the global marketplace because it's grossly uncompetitive, unneeded, and obsolete — so hopelessly uneconomic that one needn’t debate whether it's clean and safe; it weakens electric reliability and national security; and it worsens climate change compared with devoting the same money and time to more effective options.”

While prolific repetition -- with distractive writing, citations, discourse, and lectures – might be financially rewarding to Lovins and his Institute, it should not be tolerated by conscientious publications and institutions.

In-depth refutation can be found on a critical-analysis blog4 that examines his edifice of seemingly authoritative papers, including the aforementioned 52-pp manifesto posted by Lovins.

Citations
1. Amory B. Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins and Leonard Ross, “Nuclear Power and Nuclear Bombs,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1980).
2. Amory B. Lovins, “Nuclear weapons and power-reactor plutonium,” Nature 283, 817-823 (1980). 3. Amory B. Lovins and Imran Sheikh, “The Nuclear Illusion,” preprint “dr 18, 27 May 2008, DRAFT subject to further peer review/editing” Ambio (Nov. 2008; unpublished as of mid-May

2013).
4. A. DeVolpi, “NUCLEAR EXPERTISE: The Amory Lovins Charade: Applying Smell and Ripeness Tests to (30-year-old) Predictions,” http://sciencetechnologyhistory.wordpress.com.

Dr. DeVolpi also noted a change of address for his Internet writings on Nuclear Disarmament.  Google Knol (has been shut down), DeVolpi's Internet postings have migrated to WordPress; http://sciencetechnologyhistory.wordpress.com, 

I also wish to express my regret at the passing og Dr. George S. Sandford, who I knew mainly from LFTR/IFR debates on BraveNewClimate and elsewhere.  George was rational, and willing to acknowledgev when a debate opponent used documented evidence to make strong points against him.  I liked George and admired him.

Rod Adams offers a correction

My Breakthrough Institute post got picked up; by The Energy Collective and to date has drawn 19 comments.  Among the comments was one by Rod Adams:

@Charles Barton
I have not yet finished your piece, but I needed to take a break and respond to the following statement:
The Pebble Bed Reactor is often pointed to as an example of Generation IV Inherent Safety, but part of that safety requires a very large core.  In fact a core that is larger than the core of commercial Light Water Reactors.  The Pebble Bed core costs as much to build as a LWR and thus no one seems to be moving forward with conventional Pebble Bed Reactor projects.  
You and I have had this discussion before; claiming that pebble bed reactors cost as much to build as an LWR because they have large cores exposes the simplistic nature of your understanding of cost drivers. Big structures are not necessarily more costly than smaller structures; there are many factors included in cost computations in addition to physical size. For example, an NFL football stadium is a much larger structure than the "nuclear island" of a large, 1000+ MWe class nuclear reactor, but even with all of the bells and whistles of modern stadiums, stadiums are considerably less expensive.
Your statement that "no one seems to be moving forward with conventional Pebble Bed Reactor projects" is a little exaggerated; there are two commercial pebble bed reactors under construction in China as part of their continuing methodical development of the technology. Those two reactors build on the lessons learned by ten years of operating the 10 MW experimental HTR-10.

Designated as HTR-PM, those two reactor cores are going to both provide the heat and steam for a single 210 MWe turbine. The choice to use two reactors to heat a single turbine helps to expose the complex nature of cost computations when you make a complete paradigm shift from a pressurized water cooled reactor to one that uses pressurized helium as the heat transfer mechanism.

Rob is quite correct that I had written of the Chinese PBMR in error, as I fpund when I looked it up on the Internet.  The Chinese are building two comercialo prototype PBMRs,that will ge cooled by Hellium, and superheated water as a secondary heat transfer media.  This project has been in the works for some years, and I simply assumed that it had been shut down.  I was wrong as Rod pointed out.  It is however still questionable whether the Chinese PBMR will ever go into commercial production.

Thank you Rod for pointing out my mistake.

Breakthrough Institute on Cheap Nuclear Power

Low cost, abundant, carbon free energy that can be quickly available is the key to averting a climate disaster.  Wind and solar energy are unreliable and lack the capacity to be produced on demand.  Energy storage technology is expensive and may not be ready in the large amounts required to overcome the flaws of wind and solar power.  Clearly then, massive amounts of carbon free energy may not be available within the next 40 years, yet the power companies worry about nuclear costs.

The Breakthrough Institution has firmly joined the nuclear side of the energy debate and is paying attention to Generation IV reactor technology.  In 2008 Nuclear Green did a case study of the cost lowering potential of Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) technology.  I noted strategies for lowering nuclear cost.  Breakthrough Institute has now performed a much more comprehensive study of nuclear energy cost lowering strategies.

By nuclear costs, I am referring to two different sorts of costs, the up front capitol costs owed by the owner of a new nuclear power plant, and the cost payed by the consumer for electricity produced by Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).   In Nuclear Green, I offered a case study of what I could call the full court press approach to lowering MSR investment costs.  I do not claim originality for all my ideas.  The purpose of my case study was to demonstrate that nuclear costs could be substantially lowered.

Fast forward to Summer of 2013, when Breakthrough Institute produced a report, How to Make Nuclear Power Cheap.  At first, I expected extensive borrowing from my ideas, but this was not the case.  The Breakthrough report is quite original and stands on its own as a major contribution to our understanding of the future of nuclear power.  At the same time, the Breakthrough report contains a number of errors and fails to realize the full potential of nuclear power in the Second Nuclear Era.

Breakthrough Institute suggests that four factors effect nuclear costs.   The Factors are Inherent Safety, Modular Design, Thermal Efficiency, and Readiness.  Since I have been writing about cheap nuclear power for over 6 years, I do have a number of comments to make about the potential for cost saving of these standards.

Let us begin with Inherent Safety.  While Inherent Safety is often good, it is not inevitably the best form of nuclear safety.  The oldest form of nuclear safety involved the concept of barriers.  Barriers can be improved and their cost lowered significantly.  It may be desirable to retain one or more barriers, while lowering its cost.  For example locating a reactor in an old salt mine might provide a substitute for the concrete and steel reactor dome at a fraction of the cost.

Removing radioactive fission products and undesirable Trans Uranium Elements (TRU) would improve reactor safety and is quite possible at a low price with MSR technology.  By removing at least radioactive gases and volatile fission products, together with TRUs, we could improve safety in the event of a nuclear accident. The salt cleaning would offer a large safety advantage over traditional solid fuel reactors, even in a mine located MSR, with significant cost advantages.

At the same time, Inherent Safety features may sometimes create disadvantages for Generation IV Nuclear technology.  Sodium is a fire hazard in air, as is plutonium.  One would expect sodium fires to be rare in Liquid Sodium Fast Breeder Reactors such as the the Integral Fast Reactor.  A large tank of liquid sodium acts as a heat sink in the case of an accident without coolant circulation.  However in the rare event of a core breech and sodium fire, the tank would potentially contribute to a safety problem.  The Pebble Bed Reactor is often pointed to as an example of Generation IV Inherent Safety, but part of that safety requires a very large core.  In fact a core that is larger than the core of commercial Light Water Reactors.  The Pebble Bed core costs as much to build as a LWR and thus no one seems to be moving forward with conventional Pebble Bed Reactor projects. 

 Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) made considerable progress on developing technology suitable for low cost removal of the most dangerous fission products and TRU elements from MSR core salts.  I am not trying to criticize the Breakthrough Institute here.  I have just been in the cheap nuclear power game longer than they have and have learned a few tricks they do not know yet.

The second factor which Breakthrough Institute suggests is Modularity.  But there is more to the story than manufacturing modules for factory or field assembly. There are several other factors that may contribute to lowering the cost of production.  Factory labor is a lot cheaper and more efficient than labor in the field.  Some Multi-module reactors still require a great deal of field labor.  This would even be the case for small mPower reactors.  Some expensive materials can be replaced with cheaper materials.  Finally some reactor designs are far simpler than others.  Also, it is cheaper per unit to produce large numbers of identical modules, than to produce small numbers.  One-off modules will be even more expensive.

The advantages of mass production may outweigh the advantages of thermal efficiency.   For example, David LeBlanc notes that the cost of Molten Salt Reactors can be reduced by replacing expensive Nickel alloy with a inexpensive steel.  The steel MSR will carry significantly less material costs, 100 C in cost of thermal efficiency.  Since fuel costs are a minor factor in the capitol cost of nuclear power, material savings at the cost of 100 C of reactor heat (600 C of heat rather than 700C) might offer advantages.   Coolants serve as heat carriers.  The least efficient is helium used in gas cooled reactors. The most efficient coolants are found among the molten salts proposed for use in MSRs.

Mass production requires more than building a large number of reactor cores, heat exchanges and generation units.  Land must be acquired and appropriate housing constructed.  In addition, there must be hookup to the grid and appropriate means of transportation between the factory and the reactor's home.  Transportation issues may contribute to decisions about the reactor module's size and weight. 

Breakthrough Institute's third factor is Thermal Efficiency.  There are, in fact, two different Thermal Efficiencies that can lower nuclear costs.  The first is a measure of the reactor system in transforming core heat into electricity.  A second Thermal Efficiency would be a measure of the reactor coolant's ability to transfer heat from the core to a heat exchange, or to provide emergency cooling.  Heat transfer efficiency will lead to smaller cores, which in turn require fewer materials and less labor to construct.  Helium is the least efficient coolant, while molten salts, for example FLiBe
(lithium fluoride (LiF) and beryllium fluoride.  FLiBe is expensive, but it offers many advantages over lower cost salts, especially if your goal is to build LFTRs.  However for other MSRs, David LeBlanc tells us that lower cost salts will do nearly as well.  Low cost salts with good heat transfer characteristics would seem to be the way to go if you want to build low cost reactors.

The fourth Breakthrough Institute cost factor that could lower nuclear costs is labeled "Readiness."  Exactly what Readiness is, may be open to question.  For example, technology that has been already tested is ready.   Material and parts that have been tested and certified are ready.  But what about parts and technology that require more research and development, but which will be ready in five years given a "business as usual" approach and much sooner given a Manhattan Project approach.  Given a Manhattan Project style approach, the most advanced technologies, the LFTR and The IFR breeder could be ready for production in five years.   Manhattan Projects are the products of societies operating in a crisis mode.  We are not there yet.  The public is not yet alarmed about greenhouse gases, but we are beginning to get there.  Thus the standard for readiness may be about to shift.

There are several other factors which I have identified on Nuclear Green as offering potentials for lowering nuclear cost.  These include the cost of land and reactor housing, the cost of grid connection,  and the cost of interest paid for the financial costs of reactor construction.  Finally, Breakthrough Institute failed to note the effect of economies of scale on reactor cost.

I have discussed an idea that is not original with me, that the sites of coal fired electrical generating facilities be recycled to house nuclear power plants.  Rather than be built on the surface, reactors could be placed in underground silos.  The silo would protect the reactor from attacks by aircraft and truck bombs and would cost significantly less to build than above ground concrete and steel protection domes.

Even better than digging a hole in the ground to house reactors, is to find a hole some one else dug and use it for reactor housing.  There are a lot of old, abandoned salt mines scattered around the countryside.  Many old salt mines might be inappropriate for reactor housing, but some might work.

Simplicity of reactor design, easy to work with and familiar materials, limited material demands all lead to rapid manufacture and final construction.  The goal of such a manufacturing process would be to bring the power produced by the reactor system online as quickly as possible.  This is highly desirable because interest on money borrowed during the construction period becomes part of the capitol cost of the project.  Building cheap reactors means lowering capitol costs any way possible.  Quick construction lowers capitol costs.    

One final factor that is almost completely ignored in the discussion of lowering nuclear cost is the fuel factor in technology scalability.  The Scalability Factor would include the capacity to fuel a large number of reactors quickly.  Plutonium fuel for plutonium fueled Fast Reactors represents a bottle neck.  There is a limited amount of plutonium available, far less than would be needed to fuel a massive deployment of Fast Reactors.  Fast Reactors are excellent plutonium burners and that could serve as a useful role for a limited number of them. Thermal reactors require far less fuel for rated power production. Thus, a Fast Reactor might require 18 tons of reactor grade plutonium if it is rated at 1GW of electrical output while a graphite moderated Molten Salt Reactor might require 1 ton of U-235 or U-233 or even less per GW of output. Plutonium is expensive. Eighteen tons of reactor grade plutonium would cost one billion dollars while one ton of U-235 would cost far less.

All in all, Breakthrough Institute seems to be moving in the right direction towards understanding the control of  nuclear costs.  My comments suggest that they still have a ways to go.  We are learning and I would include myself in the "we".  We still have a way to go, but with the dawning of the second nuclear era, comes the realization that nuclear costs can be made cheaper; perhaps much cheaper.