The Social Construction of Ignorance: Amory Lovins and Energy

My definition would be a real expert is someone with a thorough understanding of the field they are discussing, who accurately represents the scientific literature and the state of understanding of the scientific enterprise. - Denialism Blog

The question of who is an expert is a central one in the problem of knowledge pollution. Very often knowledge pollution occurs because fake experts are given credibility by the mainstream media and by people who should know better.

The Denialism Blog also quotes the Oxford English Language Dictionary.

One whose special knowledge or skill causes him to be regarded as an authority; a specialist. Also attrib., as in expert evidence, witness, etc.

The Denialism blog also references Federal Judicial rules of evidence and other determinants of expert status within a Court Room setting,

Luckily the justices didn't just leave it at the federal rules of evidence and Blackmun created a set of guidelines for judges to determine if the expert was "reliable". They require the theory presented by the witness to have undergone peer review, show falsifiability, empirical testing, reproducibility, and a known error rate for a scientific theory to have some validity in addition to the general acceptance rule of Frye. While the individual states remain a patchwork of Frye, Daubert, and Frye-plus rules for admissibility of evidence, at least federally this is the new requirement (although it still does suffer from being a bit vague).

The experts that present such evidence must have some credentials and/or experience with the discipline, and the evidence they present must pass these tests. It's actually not a half-bad way to identify a trusted source, in particular if the judge is intellectually honest about the witness meeting these requirements.

The Denialism Blog also points to the work of philosopher and physical chemist Janet D. Stemwedel on evaluating the credibility of scientists, and the scope and limitations of scientific expertise. Beyond the scope of the the Denialism Blog and Stemwedel's discussion of scientific credibility and expertise limitations, a retired nuclear physicist who represented the United States as a technical expert, in nuclear arms reduction verification talks with the Soviet Union, Alexander DeVolpe offers discussions of fake expertise on the topic of nuclear proliferation.

While DeVolpi makes significant contributions to answering the question, "who is an expert on nuclear proliferation," I am going to focus on a single figure who DeVolpi has singled out for criticism as a fake expert on nuclear proliferation and nuclear energy. That fake expert is anti-nuclear expert par-excelente, Amory Lovins, who DeVolpi charges engages in a charade of expertese on nuclear matters. DeVolpi

applies qualitative tests to Lovins’ 1980 predictions about (1) nuclear-power’s demise, (2) weapons-proliferation propensity, and (3) plutonium-demilitarization utility. NONE of his predictions have come to pass. His most egregious flaw is total lack of statistical context; his papers fail scientific-publication standards. Lovins has been so indifferent to scientific methodology that he should not be accorded credibility. While still adamant about nuclear power’s demise and proliferation risk, he now concedes that commercial reactors effectively demilitarize weapons materials.

DeVolpe's discussion of Lovins Charade of nuclear expertese meets the the Denialism Blog's definition of fake expertise,

a fake expert is usually somebody who is relied upon for their credentials rather than any real experience in the field at issue, who will promote arguments that are inconsistent with the literature, aren't generally accepted by those who study the field in question, and/or whose theories aren't consistent with established epistemological requirements for scientific inquiry.

It should be pointed out that Lovins has never answered DeVolpe's critique of his expertise, but then Lovens has failed to respond to many accusations regarding lapses in his expert facade. Robert Bryce and David Bradish have offered critiques of Lovins' pretended anti-nuclear expertise, and indeed his pose as an energy expert. Despite promises of comprehensive answers to the charges Bryce and Bradish made against his claim to expertise, Lovins has never responded to Bryce, and abandoned his attempt at self-defense against Bradish charges. Indeed both Bryce and Bradish, along with energy writers Vaclav Smil, Peter Huber and Mark Mills, raise fundamental doubts about Lovins claim to expertise on all energ matters. Bobert Bryce asked Smill,

In your writings, you point out how many times Amory Lovins, the energy efficiency advocate who heads the Rocky Mountain Institute, has been wrong in his predictions regarding the adoption of renewable energy. I laughed out loud when I read your line, “Inexplicably, Lovins retains his guru aura no matter how wrong he is.” Why has Lovins been wrong so often? And why does he continue to get so much fawning press coverage?

To which Smill responded

mory has become a celebrity after wholesaling his fairy-tale of “soft” decentralized small-scale energies as THE solution (with its deep countercultural, Berkeleyish appeal), and it is the first law of celebrity-hood that, right or wrong, coherent or not, you retain the status. Combine that with the just-noted mass scientific ignorance of the population and with Amory’s sleek offerings of no-pain solutions (nothing will cost anything, or as he famously put it, “abating climate change for fun and profit”) and you have new believers signing up every time he speaks. By the way, by this time we all should have been driving nothing but Lovinsian hypercars (something like 200 mpg, made like new Boeing 787s solely from carbon composites) whose conceptual design he launched more than a decade ago; have you seen any?

Bryce notes that common and largely unanswered charges made by Lovins critics include foure Lovin's claims made that have proven to be in error, Those claims are,

1. Renewables will take huge swaths of the overall energy market. (1976)
2. Electricity consumption will fall. (1984)
3. Cellulosic ethanol will solve our oil import needs. (repeatedly)
4. Efficiency will lower consumption. (repeatedly)

The first claim comes with an illustration that clearly illustrates the failure of the first Lovins' prediction. This graph shows Lovins's forecast that "soft technologies" would 50% of all energy in 2010, while natural gas and could produce a declining percentage of energy, while energy use is declining through greater efficiency. Lovens has never acknowledged the extent of his erroneous predictions, or offered an explanation of his past forecasting mistakes. Alexander DeVolpi observed,

None of Lovin’s predictions have come to pass. That’s startling in itself, except that he keeps shifting to new topics, dropping the worn out ones. He’s still flailing nuclear power, but 30 years later it keeps on going. He’s still faulting its proliferation propensity, but not a single instance can be found in 30 years. Only by the processes of uncovering omissions or directing inquiry can one find that he now realizes that commercial reactors can effectively demilitarize weapons materials, a position he adamantly and eloquently opposed for the past 30 years.
Since there are no assigned traffic cops in this business, it is left up to some of us volunteers to try to straighten things out. Nevertheless, Lovins has a strong reserve of believers for his soft-energy goals. I too share some of that optimism, but not at the sacrifice of quantitative evaluation and humble context for alternatives. However, when his enthusiasm spills over into matters of which he has no expertise — trained or acquired — everyone should be wary.

In fact the increase in energy efficiency, although real over time, has not displaced carbon-emitting technology to anything like the extent which Lovins foresaw. One of the major problems with Lovins forecast of efficiency related declines in energy use is his ignorance of Jevons Paradox. David Bradish offered a discussion of Lovins errors with respect to Javons Paradox. In the second Gristmill response to Bradish, Lovins wrote

Mr. Bradish has posted part three of his critique, claiming that RMI has overlooked Jevons Paradox, which undoes and reverses the intended energy savings from more efficient end-use. We have rebutted this invalid claim in a response to Mr. Bradish's cited primary source -- an article by Robert Bryce in his newsletter. Completion of our response was delayed by travel, but we expect to finish it shortly, and will then post it on RMI's website, in this blog, and (Mr. Bryce has assured us) on his site.

In fact the case against Lovins as an energy expert is much stronger than DeVolpi is aware. Lovins' promised response to Bryce and Bradish has never appeared.

It would thus appear that Amory Lovins is both a fake expert on nuclear power and on energy issues in general. Lovins' accounts of nuclear energy and other energy related matters must be regarded as disinformation, and is a grand source of knowledge pollution. Amory Lovins is a discredited fake expert, but word of how discredited he is has not reached the mainstream media or energy decision makers. People would like to believe that what Lovins says is true, and key political decision makers as well the media look to Lovins to reassure them about difficult energy matters. Yet among energy experts, Lovins must be considered among the living dead, one who can offer no legitimate claim to expertise, who has no credibility. Lovins is to energy expertise what Zombie are to living human beings.

Alexander DeVolpi versus Amory Lovins: Part II

This section reviews DeVolpi's assessment of Amory Lovins' reputation as an expert on nuclear proliferation and nuclear power..

Part II: DeVolpi on Amory Lovins Expert Knowledge on Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Power

Alexander DeVolpi has offered a serious critique of Amory Lovins that I believe accurately raises questions about Mr. Lovins' authority. DeVolpi, points out that

Because Lovins renders no substantive academic or acquired nuclear credentials, the analyses he presents ought to be held to a strict standard of scientific credibility, such as that described by the Daubert U.S. Supreme Court decision. . . . This is in lieu of granting him interim benefit of doubt, a courtesy often extended to individuals who have an established scientific reputation . . . In other words, I would advise treating Lovins’ renderings on nuclear issues with healthy, but not dismissive skepticism. His presentation and publications should be judged by standard scientific criteria, no more, no less.

Next Dr. DeVolpi points to Lovins' scanty educational credentials and his lack of the sort of experience that would qualify him as an expert on nuclear matters.

Although Lovins seems to have completed some courses in experimental physics at Oxford University in England, he lacks any laboratory experience in nuclear physics or engineering. His vetted degree credentials are vague enough to induce caution, caveat emptor. Such a shortcoming has not prevented him from writing numerous articles, giving many briefings, and speaking frequently about nuclear technical policy. . . . Lovins has been a widely praised proponent of the so-called “soft-energy path,” as well has having been an habitual and readily available critic of nuclear energy.

. . . expertise alleged should not be considered credible simply because of personal experience, widely publicized image, or self-declared credibility — which can be crafted as concatenating substitutes for substantive technical analysis and publication. The individual being challenged should follow the same established guidelines for scientific analysis and peer-reviewed publication as the rest of us have during our professional careers.

Having offered this preamble to the question of Lovins' authority, DeVolpi proceeded to examine Lovins' method of presentation of "what appeared to be an informative but complex analysis . . .". DeVolpi thus offers a phenological approach to Lovins presentation by placing it into brackets, which examines what it appears to be at first in light of the accepted standards of scientific evidence which DeVolpi has suggested we apply to expert testimony. DeVolpi noted Lovins use of "extremely busy tables and graphs" which he found "difficult to sort through", and then suggested

his extrapolation from laboratory model to production product is unrealistic, being deficient in practical marketplace engineering. Faulty reasoning and extrapolation often reflect a lack of hands-on construction experience. Lovins did not put into evidence anything he actually built or was responsible for constructing, other than a viewgraph of a fancy banana greenhouse situated on his Aspen, Colorado, property.

The last comment is downright funny, because Lovins allegedly unheated Aspen greenhouse in which he grows bananas, is very much a part of the Lovins mystique. The greenhouse itself plays on role in establishing Lovins expertise, or the truthfulness of the case he presents.

DeVolpe noted that Lovins' presentation

more of an evangelical tirade against nuclear power, rather than a systematic case for balanced and alternative energy sources. A key indicator of stridency is the absence of explicit statistical characterization; Lovins presents almost everything in terms of absolutes, without conceding a range of uncertainty.

DeVolpi found an absence of a probabilistic perspective not only in Lovins' oral presentation but in his papers

Take a look at his papers and try to find any treatment or awareness of statistical uncertainty. What’s notably odd is that doubt/uncertainty is part of the natural order of things; to avoid recognizing it, especially in a paper about technical issues, is quite unnatural and unusual, and more indicative of proselytization for a cause.

Thus Amory Lovuns' presentations are

more of an evangelical tirade against nuclear power, rather than a systematic case for balanced and alternative energy sources.

DeVolpi subjects Lovins work to two related tests, those of "smell" and "ripeness". The smell test is designed to determine "legitimacy" or "authenticity". while the ripeness looks at "maturity", or "development".

DeVolpi notes that during a visit to Argonne National Laboratory 30 years ago Lovins called for a shutdown of all nuclear power plants. At that time almost no electricity in Illinois was produced by reactors, at the beginning of 2009 that figure had increased to between 70% and 80& of Illinois electricity being generated by reactors. DeVolpi observed

here’s a situation that has ripened enough for comparing actual outcomes with his original counsel. . . . If Lovins had his way 30 years ago, I would be paying . . . (for) coal-produced electric power. On the basis of cost, or feasibility, or environmental benefit, electric-power utilities and the state regulators would have been ill-advised if they adopted his anti-nuclear advice (at least in Illinois).

Nuclear power is not only commercially competitive, but extremely safe (no coal miners dying), no air pollution at all, no greenhouse gas emissions (such as carbon-dioxide). Nuclear-plant lifetime is being doubled from 30 to 60 years (which utilities, investors, and ratepayers appreciate). If Lovins had his way 30 years ago, considerably more particulates and gases would have been vented to the local and regional atmosphere from coal-fired plants (aside from the greenhouse gases emitted).

Moreover, if Lovins had his way, we would not have conserved the electricity-equivalent in domestic coal, imported and domestic oil, and domestic and imported natural-gas resources and reserves that we have for 30 years. A typical nuclear power plant each year avoids consumption of 3.4 million short tons of coal, or 65.8 billion cubic feet of natural gas, or 14 billion barrels of oil. (The United States has ample uranium resources.) So Lovins was wrong in implying that nuclear had no overriding societal or environmental benefits.

DeVolpi focuses on Lovins claims about nuclear costs:

Lovins displayed complex viewgraphs that, he purports, show that nuclear is the costliest of “low-or-no-carbon resources.” Yet, in the last 30 years, nuclear has displaced half the fossil-fuel combustion in Illinois while still being competitive. Inasmuch as nuclear-power plants emit no byproduct carbon-dioxide to the atmosphere, surely his claim that it is the costliest of low-carbon-emission sources fails the smell test.

Most of Lovins’ pricing and cost/benefit comparisons are based on “new delivered electricity” which frames the cost of U.S. domestic nuclear construction in the least favorable light.

He declares nuclear power an economic failure. Can someone explain that to my bank account which has benefited from compounding competitive electric power savings for the past 30 years? His rimy claim certainly fails the ripeness test.

DeVolpi then challenges Lovins' claims about nuclear reliability.

On the issue of electrical-grid reliability, Lovins asserts that there is no such thing as a “outage-free” source of electrical power. He must think that nuclear power runs by government fiat. Nuclear is a fixture on the grid because it is more economical to operate as base-load supply, while sources less reliable, intermittent, and more costly (such as wind, solar, and gas) provide supplementary power. During the past 30 years in Illinois, I don’t recall having the electricity supply and cost problems that California has had after it prohibited nuclear-power plants from being built within its borders. By the way, average U.S. nuclear capacity factor was about 92% in 2007. That’s excellent. Lovins pitiful effort to undermine the reliability of nuclear power egregiously fails the smell test.

DeVolpi examined Lovins account of nuclear power and finds that Lovins

chronically demonizes it on the grounds of the proliferation risk

opposes subsidies for nuclear power but favors them for renewables

Calls nuclear power a failure despite the reliable production of power at competitive rates

Opposes the construction of new nukes in the United States because of proliferation risks, even though new nukes are being built in other countries.

Argues that nuclear power is anti-democratic

called attention to Lovins 1980 statement in Foreign Policy that

the global nuclear power enterprise is rapidly disappearing

for nuclear power is ... the main driving force behind proliferation...

(nuclear power) retards oil displacement by the faster, cheaper and more attractive means which new developments in energy policy now make available to all countries...

DeVolpi next points to a 1980 article which the science journal Nature published. In this article Lovins, who was after all an undergraduate physics drop-out from Harvard (twice) and Oxford posed as an expert on plutonium weapons. Lovins concluded in the Nature article that

...It is therefore incorrect to state categorically that bombs made from reactor-grade or deliberately ‘denatured’ Pu are less effective, less powerful, or less reliable than those made from weapons-grade Pu.

DeVolpi was expert enough in nuclear weapons design to qualify as an expert witness on weapons design in the famous Progressive case and who had stood up to an Energy Department's attempt to intimidate him into silence about his "politically incorrect" views on "reactor grade plutonium" and nuclear proliferation gives short shift to Lovins "expert" information. De Volpi responded to Lovins

While Lovins convinced the editors and reviewers of Nature that a neophyte had figured out nuclear weaponry enough to become an publishable expert, his inverted conclusion is not supported by theoretical or anecdotal evidence . . .

Lovins further concluded

The foregoing argument also implies that power reactors are not an implausible but are rather potentially a peculiarly convenient type of large-scale military Pu production reactor....

De Volpi remarked

Coming from a neophyte who might never have seen the inside of any of those reactors, it reflects a hoary belief system that was as untenable then as now. Just show me a civilian power reactor that has been used to make military plutonium. This published proposition of his fails the ripeness test in 2009, just as it failed the smell test back in 1980.

Lovins added

In short, the somewhat greater technical difficulty of using power-reactor Pu for effective military bombs — assuming the reactor is actually operated at high fuel burn-up — may be more than counterbalanced by the greater political and economic ease of obtaining that Pu. It should not be lightly disdained in favour of purer material from dedicated facilities.

DeVolpi scoffed

This pitiful conclusion is the foundation of Lovins’ nuclear-proliferation belief system. It too, long ago, failed both the smell and ripeness tests. Incidentally, note the absence of measures of incertitude in this so-called technical paper.

DeVolpi asks

The Nuclear Illusion or the Nuclear Illusionist?

as he "fisks" Lovins 2008 paper “The Nuclear Illusion”. Lovins once again is allowed to go beyond a credible interpretation of evidence, ignoring the constraints of uncertainty.

Dr. DeVolpi in his Knols, exhibits outstanding and sophisticated critical skills. The DeVolpi Knols deserve far wider recognition than they have received to date. They are significant contributions to public discussion on many issues related to future use of nuclear energy in our society. In addition, the DeVolpi Knols are important examples of the sort of critical thinking that ought to be encouraged in the class room. DeVolpi's Knol on Amory Lovins ought to be read by any journalist, scholar, or politician who is considering using Lovins as a source.

Alexander deVolpi's knols on nuclear non-proliferation

I have added a link on Nuclear Green to Alexander deVolpi's knols on nuclear non-proliferation. Dr DiVolpi's writings are required reading for anyone who who wants to claim expertise on nuclear proliferation. DiVolpi was a peer of the late J. Carson Mark of Los Alamos, and his knols correct the view that Mark thought reactor grade plutonium was a practical weapons materials. DeVolpi also parses statements on reactor grade plutonium from official sources, often cited by anti-nuclear experts. For example DiVolpi points to a statement by David Hafemeister of the United States DoE,

" [Advanced] nuclear-weapon states such as the United States and Russia, using modern designs, could produce weapons from reactor-grade plutonium having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons made from weapon-grade plutonium."

DeVolpi comments,

"I suggest a discriminating reader would see that the quote is limited to “advanced nuclear-weapon states,” confined to “modern designs,” and qualified by terms such as “could produce,” “reliable yields,” and “comparable characteristics.” Since official declarations (hedges) are usually the product of a careful inter-agency vetting. His statement, thus, pretty much excludes reactor-grade plutonium as source material under a number of realistic circumstances: less-advanced nuclear-weapon states, less-sophisticated designs, less-than-assured yields, and other sub-marginal situations. In other words, neither advanced weapon states, nor less-advanced weapon states, nor threshold weapon states are likely to produce weapons from reactor-grade plutonium (for reasons validated by Hafemeister’s carefully chosen omissions)."

Needless to say nuclear critics do not engage in such carful reading of the documents that they draw on to make their case. But then nuclear critics are not interested in questions of truth or accuracy. They simply mine sources for supportive quotes, and hope that no one will note important qualifications. Such selective misreading of texts, such cherry picking turns sources into sock puppets on the hands of nuclear critics like Dr Frank Barnaby, who has become the new anti-nuclear wacko on scitizen.

Banaby, a sometimes associate of the infamous Jan Storm van Leeuwen in the Oxford Research group, appears to belong, like Storm van Leeuwen, to the Club of Rome wing of the anti-nuclear movement. A successful post carbon shift to nuclear power would definately put a crmp into the goal of Club of Rome plans to kill off most of the human race and return the economic basis of society to a medieval like peasant economy. In order to bully us into accepting this extremely unattractive scenario, Barnaby has to threaten us with nuclear proliferation, as if the die off of a few billion human beings would be a preferable consequence, and thetermination of modern society woiuld be a more acceptable outcome.

I previously called Dr, Barniby to task for ignoring DeVolpi's telling views on nuclear proliferation, but he continues to do so, no doubt because DeVolpi makes it quite clear that that reactor grade plutonium is not a practical material for the building of nuclear weapons, and that the danger of nuclear proliferation is not increased by building civilian power reactors that produce reactor grade plutonium as a byproduct. Needless to say, Dr. Barnaby ignored my comments, just as he ignores Alexanger DeVolpi's writings on reactor plutonium. Dr. Barnaby copes with criticism by ignoring it. By doing so he discounts himself as a serious intellectual. A serious intellectual acknowledges his critics, and tries to answer them. If he or she makes mistakes and they are pointed out he or she acknowledges them, at least to self, and learns to not make the same mistakes again. Since Barnaby does not even acknowledge mistakes when they are brought to his attention, his is not a rational voice.