Jacobson: Beyond Cherry Picking

In a previous post I looked at Mark Z. Jacobson's decision to exclude nuclear power as an future energy source in a recent paper. In that post I reviewed Jacobson's assertions that the global spread of nuclear generated electrical power would cause nuclear proliferation and nuclear war. In the course of my investigating of actual instances of proliferation, I found that nations which lacked civilian nuclear power facilities were more likely to undertake the development of nuclear weapons than nations which possess civilian nuclear power facilities. Thus arguably the spread of nuclear power generation facilities may lead to a decline in nuclear proliferation risks.

In this post I intend to consider other arguments which Jacobson uses to justify the exclusion of nuclear power from future energy plans. A second part of Jacobson's argument for the exclusion of nuclear power claims that wind generated electricity leads to significantly lower CO2 emissions than would be the case with nuclear generated electricity. Jaacobson claims:

nuclear energy results in 9-25 times more carbon emissions than wind energy, in part due to emissions from uranium refining and transport and reactor construction (e.g., Lenzen, 2008; Sovacool, 2008), in part due to the longer time required to site, permit, and construct a nuclear plant compared with a wind farm (resulting in greater emissions from the fossil-fuel electricity sector during this period; Jacobson, 2009), and in part due to the greater loss of soil carbon due to the greater loss in vegetation resulting from covering the ground with nuclear facilities relative to wind turbine towers, which cover little ground. Although recent construction times worldwide are shorter than the 9-year median construction times in the U.S. since 1970 (Koomey and Hultman, 2007), they still averaged 6.5 years worldwide in 2007 (Ramana, 2009), and this time must be added to the site permit time (~3 years in the U.S.) and construction permit and issue time (~3 years). The overall historic and present range of nuclear planning-to-operation times for new nuclear plants has been 11-19 years, compared with an average of 2-5 years for wind and solar installations (Jacobson, 2009). Feiveson (2009) observes that “because wind turbines can be installed much faster than could nuclear, the cumulative greenhouse gas savings per capital invested appear likely to be greater for wind” (p. 67).

A careful examination of Jacobson's statement will reveal many problems. Jacobson makes claims about the relative emissions of CO2 from wind and nuclear power (9-25 times more carbon emissions). in support of this assertion Jacobson references papers by Lenzen and Sovacool. Both papers offer meta analyses of the life cycle CO2 emissions of CO2 by nuclear power. Both papers reach similar conclusions, which reflect an estimated life cycle CO2 emissions from nuclear power that is several times greater than that found by Dones. in several previous posts, most recently "Honor the Truth" (December 26, 2010), I set out the criticisms by Dones and others that studies of the lifecycle CO2 emissions associated with nuclear power reported by Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Smith contain numerous and serious flaws. Thus the "Stormsmith" CO2 emissions estimates cannot be considered reliable. Dones wrote that "Stormsmith's"

results are definitively outliers.

Yet both Lenzen and Sovacool rely heavily on "Stormsmith" for their conclusions. At any rate neither Lenzen nor Sovacool support Jacobson's claim of nuclear lifecycle emissions 25 time greater than wind lifecycle emissions, and indeed not even "Stormsmith" supports anything close to this claim. Where does the 25 times claim then come from? In his paper Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and energy security, Jacobson wrote:

In this section, the CO2-equivalent (CO2e) emissions (emissions of CO2 plus those of other greenhouse gases multiplied by their global warming potentials) of each energy technology are reviewed. We also examine CO2e emissions of each technology due to planning and construction delays relative to those from the technology with the least delays (opportunity-cost emissions), leakage from geological formations of CO2 sequestered by coal-CCS, and the emissions from the burning of cities resulting from nuclear weapons explosions potentially resulting from nuclear energy expansion.

The inclusion of carbon from burning cities ignited by nuclear weapons as nuclear power emissions, explains the 25 times carbon emission claim, but it is wacky, and needless to say utterly without scientific validity.

Even if "Stormsmith" could be considered a reliable source, Jacobson derives arguments from the Lenzen and Sovacool papers that cannot be supported from those papers. First a meta analysis is not a scientific study, and its conclusions are not scientific. Secondly, meta analysis can be manipulated to produce highly biased results. The Wikipedia observes:

The most severe weakness and abuse of meta-analysis often occurs when the person or persons doing the meta-analysis have an economic, social,or political agenda such as the passage or defeat of legislation. Those persons with these types of agenda have a high likelihood to abuse meta-analysis due to personal bias. For example, researchers favorable to the author's agenda are likely to have their studies "cherry picked" while those not favorable will be ignored or labeled as "not credible". In addition, the favored authors may themselves be biased or paid to produce results that support their overall political, social, or economic goals in ways such as selecting small favorable data sets and not incorporating larger unfavorable data sets.

If a meta-analysis is conducted by an individual or organization with a bias or predetermined desired outcome, it should be treated as highly suspect or having a high likelihood of being "junk science". From an integrity perspective, researchers with a bias should avoid meta-analysis and use a less abuse-prone (or independent) form of research.

There is abundant evidence that both the Sovacool and the Lanzen studies were biased. Both studies rely heavily on "Stormsmith" despite Dones's critique of "Stormsmith's" methods and conclusions. There is added evidence that Sovacool was engaged in cherry picking, he found fault with most of the peer reviewed studies of life cycle emissions from nuclear power, and excluded them from his analysis. Thus neither Sovacool nor Lanzen offer credible evidence on the life cycle emissions of nuclear power plants, and both studies are likely to reflect the biases of their authors. Thus Jacobson lacks credible sources for his assertions about the life cycle CO2 emissions of nuclear power plants, and therefor there are no credible data to make comparisons between the lifecycle CO2 emissions of wind and nuclear.

But what of Jacobson's claims about soil loss in connection with nuclear facilities? Uranium mines use a variety of mining technologies, and in a variety of settings, but in the United States all uranium mines use a technology called in situ leaching. In situ leaching does not disturb the soil, thus uranium mining in the United States cannot be regarded as creating a soil loss problem. Underground mines in other countries do not, for the most part create soil loss problems. New Canadian uranium mines tend to be underground. Many surface open pit uranium mines are located in desert country where soil loss to uranium mining would lead to only a very limited loss of ground covering vegetation, hence an insignificant impact on the global carbon cycle. Further, a review of recent mining practices indicates that played out open pit uranium mines are used for tailings disposal, thus limiting the impact of uranium mining tailings on ground covering vegetation and the carbon cycle. Of the world's 10 largest uranium mines only three, representing 20% of the global uranium mining total were open pit mines. Of those three, two, representing over 11% of the global uranium mining total, are located in desert environments. The number of in situ mines and their percentage of the global uranium mining total is rapidly increasing, and is currently running at 32% of the uranium mining total.

Uranium mills and uranium separation facilities occupy a tiny fraction of the global industrial infrastructure. Thus arguments attributing a displacement of ground cover so large as to impact the global carbon cycles are simply absurd. Finally reactor have small footprints. Most land dedicated to reactors constitute buffers designed to protect the public from any possible release of gaseous and volatile radioisotopes in the event of a reactor accident. The soil in reactor buffers is typically undisturbed, and and ground cover assumes natural forms. The developed area of reactor facilities is relatively small and thus the impact of even thousands of power producing reactors on the global carbon cycle through vegetation displacement would be insignificant.

Thus Jacobson's claim that nuclear power plants

nuclear energy results in 9-25 times more carbon emissions than wind energy,

is partially based on arguably unscientific and bias sources and partially based on an highly exaggerated account of the impact of the nuclear power cycle on ground cover vegetation and the global carbon cycle. Even the sources

What of Jacobson's claim that

The overall historic and present range of nuclear planning-to-operation times for new nuclear plants has been 11-19 years, . . .

Jacobson exaggerates the time scale required to build a large number of reactors. The French decision to convert its electrical system too nuclear power was made in 1973. The whole project was completed by 1992 19 years after the decision was made.

The French example is appropriate here because France was able to convert 3/4ths of its electrical industry to nuclear power very quickly. One group of 34 900 MW French reactors was completed between 1977 and 1988. A second group of 20 1300 MW reactors was completed between 1985 and 1992.

French nuclear power reactors

Class	Reactor	MWe net, each	Commercial operation
900 MWe	Blayais 1-4	910	12/81, 2/83, 11/83, 10/83
	Bugey 2-3	910	3/79, 3/79
	Bugey 4-5	880	7/79-1/80
	Chinon B 1-4	905	2/84, 8/84, 3/87, 4/88
	Cruas 1-4	915	4/84, 4/85, 9/84, 2/85
	Dampierre 1-4	890	9/80, 2/81, 5/81, 11/81
	Fessenheim 1-2	880	12/77, 3/78
	Gravelines B 1-4	910	11/80, 12/80, 6/81, 10/81
	Gravelines C 5-6	910	1/85, 10/85
	Saint-Laurent B 1-2	915	8/83, 8/83
	Tricastin 1-4	915	12/80, 12/80, 5/81, 11/81
1300 MWe	Belleville 1 & 2	1310	6/88, 1/89
	Cattenom 1-4	1300	4/87, 2/88, 2/91, 1/92
	Flamanville 1-2	1330	12/86, 3/87
	Golfech 1-2	1310	2/91, 3/94
	Nogent s/Seine 1-2	1310	2/88, 5/89
	Paluel 1-4	1330	12/85, 12/85, 2/86, 6/86
	Penly 1-2	1330	12/90, 11/92
	Saint-Alban 1-2	1335	5/86, 3/87
N4 - 1450 MWe	Chooz B 1-2	1500	12/96, 1999
	Civaux 1-2	1495	1999, 2000
	Total (58)	63,130

(Source World Nuclear Association)

it would appear then that France offers a model to any nation which wished to rapidly convert its electrical generating system to post carbon energy sources. It should be noted that French reactors are as safe as reactors anywhere in the world, so the rapid development of nuclear power in France was not accomplished at the cost of nuclear safety.

It should also be added that newer reactor construction technologies have emerged since the French Reactor building program was completed. These include factory construction of reactor modules, with field assembly of modules, and the introduction of time and labor saving construction/assembly equipment. In addition, refinements of reactor construction planning have emerged from asian countries such as South Korea and Japan. This improvement in reactor construction planning has significantly lowered reactor construction costs. China has adopted the best construction practices with a consequent decrease in construction costs of 40% compared to the construction practices of French reactor constructors. Any attempt to convert the American energy economy to post carbon nuclear power should take advantage of all possible cost and time saving technologies and techniques.

Thus Jacobson lacks objective, scientifically valid grounds for his a priori exclusion of nuclear power from consideration as a future post carbon energy source. He objects to nuclear power on the basis of

* Nuclear proliferation

* Nuclear CO2 emissions

* Nuclear effects f the Global Carbon Cycle

* The time scale of nuclear construction

My conclusions are that none of these objections have merit.

* The evidence from the study of actual instances of nuclear proliferation suggests the spread of nuclear power appears to inhibit rather than encourage nuclear proliferation.

* Jacobson uses biased and inaccurate sources in making his claims about nuclear CO2 emissions.

* Jacobson goes beyond his sources and concocts highly unscientific arguments that extend well beyond any scientific evidence, in order to justify his exaggerated carbon emissions estimate.

* Jacobson greatly exaggerates the impact of nuclear facilities on ground cover vegetation and the Global carbon cycle.

* France was able to convert 75% of its electrical industry to nuclear powered generation in the same time scale that Jacobson claims is required to build a single nuclear plant.

One must conclude that Jacobson's anti-nuclear arguments suffer from confirmation bias. Jacobson simply ignores sources that contradict his viewpoint. When supportive sources are available, Jacobson cherry picks, but his claim that

nuclear energy results in 9-25 times more carbon emissions than wind energy,

is not truly supported even by cherry picking. Thus Jacobson's exclusion from consideration of nuclear power as a post carbon energy source is not supported by judgements that can in any way be characterized as scientific and is the products of a personal bias.

Will renewable investments save more CO2

The Environment America Research & Policy Center of California has just published a report titled Generating Failure: How Building Nuclear Power Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming.

The Environment America Research & Policy Center of California is a non-profit outfit which has a mission statement which states

We are dedicated to protecting California’s air, water and open spaces. We investigate problems, craft solutions, educate the public and decision makers, and help Californians make their voices heard in local, state and national debates over the quality of our environment and our lives.

All this sounds relentlessly high-minded, but as the old saying goes

the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Ignorance and incompetence can screw up the best of intentions. So how much do the report authors know? The report is written by Travis Madsen and Tony Dutzik Frontier Group, and Bernadette Del Chiaro and Ron Sargent of the Environment America Research & Policy Center.

Well it turns out that none of the report's authors has been educated or has worked in professions that would help them to understand the technological or economic issues involved. This by itself hardly demonstrates that they are wrong, but it does show that we should carefully review their arguments before we accept their conclusions.

In order to assess how well our authors did we turn their discussion of their methods, and there we find

We use lifecycle carbon dioxide emission rates per kWh for a variety of renewable technologies and new nuclear reactors from a 2008 report by Stanford scientist Mark Jacobson.

Jacobson's assessment is flawed by the assumption that use of nuclear power will inevitably lead to a nuclear war every 30 years and that the CO2 emitted by cities torched by nuclear blasts should be included with nuclear CO2 emissions. While Jacobson's approach is imaginative, arguments in its favor are very weak. Any conclusions based on Jacobson's implausible assumptions must be taken with very large grains of salt.

If we disregard the Mark Jacobson's very dubious and controversial assertions about nuclear CO2 emissions, then we are left with an assertion that

Nuclear Power Is More Costly than Other Forms of Emission-Free Electricity.

Also

Vast amounts of clean energy are available – now – at far less cost.

Where would this energy come from? According to "Generation Failure" those sources include

* Energy Efficiency
* Combined Heat and Power generators
* The Sun and Wind

First we should note that they chose to aggregate energy efficiency, with CHPs and renewables and weigh their combined cost and CO2 savings against nuclear power. The report claims

End Use Efficiency, based on estimates by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy of 4.6 cents per kWh total resource cost, inflated to 2018 dollars...

The American Council's report concludes

These results serve to confirm that the costs of saved energy are far less than the costs of new conventional fossil fuels and alternative energy sources and remain consistent over time.

A more fair minded approach might look at aggregation energy efficiency and nuclear as well, because presumably efforts to achieve energy efficiency would continue with a nuclear investment. Thus efficiency may be cost-effective in terms of carbon savings, but carbon-free energy still needs to be generated, and efficiency will still be cost effective whether teamed with either carbon free nuclear power or with other energy sources.

A second source of supposed carbon savings would come from the use of

Combined heat and power (CHP), derived from estimates for recovered heat industrial CHP, combined cycle industrial CHP, and building-scale CHP by the Rocky Mountain Institute,

While Rocky Mountain Institute holds CHP would save CO2 emissions, CHPs, even with natural gas is not nearly effective as nuclear energy. This can be illustrated by a comparison between Denmark and France. While it is well known that Denmark uses wind power, what is less well known is that

Most electricity in Denmark is produced by large CHP plants that also supply heat to district heating systems and institutions in major cities. More than 50% of the space heating supply in Denmark comes from district heating systems. In 2000 combined heating and power facilities generated 60% of the electricity for domestic supply and approximately 75% of the heat supplied to district heating systems.

Since 80% of French electricity is produced by nuclear plants, a comparison of the French and Danish CO2 emissions would give us a clue about the relative effectiveness of Danish use of Wind plus CHP verses the French use of nuclear power, In 2008 the emissions from Nuclear powered France ran about 6.2 tons per person. in contrast Danish CO2 emissions equaled 9.9 tons per person, over 50% more than France. Thus clearly nuclear power offers a significant advantage over the CHP approach in savings CO2 emissions. Other high nuclear nations like Sweden which produces 50% of its electricity with nuclear also show superior CO2 reductions.

The case for the use of biomass in not improved by the fact that Denmark uses a significant amount of biomass in the production of its electricity.

In 2000, biomass contributed 45.1% of the energy production from renewable sources; waste combustion 35.6%; wind 18.7%.

Thus policies requiring the burning of biomass and refuse to produce electricity and heat do not appear to significantly lower Danish CO2 output.

Thus we are left with Generation Failure's assertion that vast amounts of low cost carbon free energy are available and a far lower cost than nuclear. This assertion is based on a California Energy Commission Report. While that report is not available on line, a slightly earlier version of that report, published in late 2007 is.

That report states offers a levelized cost for advanced nuclear of from 91.12 to 118.25. This tracks closely with estimated 2016 nuclear levelized costs of 107 based on Energy Information Agency 2009 data. There are however discrepancies between the California estimate of levelized cost for wind, and the EIA's estimate. The California estimate for class 5 wind was between 61.38 and 84.24. The estimate for the levelized cost for wind in 2016 based on EIA data is 141.5. The apparent discrepancy is that most wind generating facilities have a lower capacity factor than the class 5 winds the California Energy Commission noted.

Other renewable resources which which the California Energy Commission in its 2007 report include various forms of solar, which it estimated to have levelized cost far higher than those of nuclear. In this respect the California report coincides with the EIA data.

Estimations of the future costs of energy producing facilities tends to be more than a little like predictions of the future weather. The further out one goes, the more inaccurate the guess is likely to be.

It would appear then that "Generation Failure" has failed to the quality of the California environment. Instead it give us a highly distorted picture of the carbon emissions of nuclear power as well as its relative cost. "Generation Failure" should be regarded yet another product of the anti-nuclear propaganda machine.

Energy, Nuclear Power and the Future of the American Economy

I have argued since December 2007 that the future of energy lies with nuclear energy.
I have argued that this is the case even if the problem of Anthropogenic Global Warming is discounted. My argument in no small measure has rested on the limitations of renewable energy and the high costs of overcoming those limitations. Although my argument is not yet reflected in mainstream discussions of energy, there is growing recognition that the problems I point to cannot be easily solved.

I have also pointed to problems with the conventional nuclear option. I have defended the conventional nuclear option from the ritualized, mythic criticisms from anti-nuclear spokes-persons, but this does not mean that I think the the conventional nuclear option is without flaws. My view is that despite some flaws, the conventional nuclear option comes in at a lower cost than renewables, once the flaws of renewables are corrected and the corrections paid for. I have been criticised for taking this viewpoint. I have also been criticized for pointing to the flaws of conventional nuclear power, even though there is no real disagreement with my account of those flaws.

Now some of my critics, critics who would say I should not talk about the issues, are people I respect, including Rod Adams and Bill Hannahan. But they must understand that the issues that I raise are not new issues and they are not trivial issues. Nor do I view these issues as trivial in their implication. I will not shove issues-related technological progress in nuclear energy under the rug.

I have a stake in both sides of the issues I discuss. My brother David came by my apartment on Saturday. He brought with him two boxes of my father's publications which he had brought back from Oak Ridge. In one of the boxes was a letter acknowledging that my father's assignment of patent rights to the industrial process for the separation of zirconium and hafnium. This was an important patent for the development of conventional nuclear power. My father looked with satisfaction on this achievement, and his role in the development of conventional nuclear technology does give me something of a personal stake in conventional nuclear power production.

The two boxes of my father's papers contained copies of many of my father's papers documenting his Molten-Salt Reactor chemistry research. So I have another stake in that. Although my father's nearly 20-year involvement with Molten Salt research was not crowned with success my father never stopped believing in the idea and my LFTR advocacy gave him much satisfaction during the last year of his life.

My father also holds a patent for the fuel formula used in the first MSR prototype. As I have documented elsewhere in this blog, his Molten-salt research at ORNL included numerous accomplishments. Although he was proud of his accomplishment in the development of conventional reactors, even during the last year of his life, in conversations I had with him, he saw MSR/LFTR technology as the way into the energy future.

Thus even if I had no views independent of my father's views. I would still be forced to acknowledge his views, that the LFTR represents the future of nuclear technology. I simply, and in all honesty cannot keep quiet on the relative merits of the LWR and the LFTR, and it is not fair to ask me to do so.

The debate between the LFTR and the conventional reactor is far too important to be allowed to pass without noting. We are in urgent need of addressing the emissions of CO2 in energy because of global warming. The issue of peak coal was recently placed on the table. I am not convinced by the case for peak coal yet, but even without arguing either for peak coal or for Anthropogenic Global Warming, a strong case can be made for the elimination of coal use in the generation of electricity. I expect that energy concerns are very quickly going to become much more important in the public mind, and in the mind of decision makers. I also expect that there will be growing awareness of the short comings of renewables, and no small amount of dismay at the inability of renewables to cut the mustard.

Between Anthropogenic Global Warming, peak oil, and the liabilities of coal, society faces a looming energy gap. This will be no where more significant than in the United Kingdom, where the need to close reactors and old fired power plants in the next decade will almost certainly lead to significant electrical shortages. It is unlikely that the British Government's plan to build 33 GWs of wind powered generating capacity can be accomplished within the timeframe projected as a project goal. Constructing enough nuclear generating capacity to fill the gap would be a realistic alternative, if the British Government were willing to go beyond a business as usual approach, and assign the construction of nuclear power plants a war-time-like priority.

The case for urgency in resolution of the British power gap is very powerful, and it failure to do so would be a disaster for the political system. In the short run politicians who might be aware of the problem are afraid to get out ahead of the public. Thus national leaders are are failing to provide leadership. I am aware of the problem from the writings of Christopher Booker and Richard North, and discussions on the Oil Drum. A number of reports have also discussed the energy gap problem, but to date the problem has not gotten sufficient traction with the British public to become important.

But within less than a decade the British Energy Gap will begin to tell. Whatever else will happen, electricity will be in short supply in the UK. The insecurity of the British gas supply, which Mr. Putin demonstrated this winter, can potentially aggravate the problem. New electrical capacity, whether nuclear or wind, is likely to be more expensive than the old plants that are being shut down. The term "energy poverty" is beginning to pop up in discussion of the inability of the poor members of society to pay for electricity. Energy poverty is very much a life and death issue in the United Kingdom where winters, while hardly Arctic, can still be very cruel to those who cannot afford to pay for heat.

In addition, there are serious implications for the British economy. First the energy intensive industries that remain in the United Kingdom must look at the future reliability problems of the British electrical system. Chinese reactor costs are currently running between $1565 and $1760 per KW. The Chinese plan to have as many as 100 reactors under construction or completed by 2020, with the capacity to rapidly expand that number between 2020 and 2030. Yesterday I pointed out that Indian reactor costs appear to be even lower, with construction costs for Generation IV Liquid Metal Fast Breeders coming in at $1400 per KW. The Indians also possess an long term assured reactor fuel supply, and the Indian nuclear program, although complex is well thought out and technologically more advanced than the Chinese program.

Thus the British Industrialist, contemplating future energy shortages and electrical costs, might well be tempted to move his production to one of the emerging Asian superpowers. Such temptation is widely shared and acted on, would contribute to an economic decline for the United Kingdom. Even if the British government acquired the cojones needed to prevent the energy gap, the cost of a high priority nuclear solution would leave British electricity more expensive than Chinese or Indian electricity. Thus the Chinese and the Indians would possess a considerable competative advantage over the UK. Add to that advantage, the advantage of lower labor costs, and you get a formula for a long term economic decline of the UK. Of course this would not make the greens weep, not at first at least. But eventually the Greens would come to see that they did not solve the problems associated with human wealth, rather the problems would be transfered from Europe to Asia.

Unfortunately current understandings, or rather misunderstandings of American energy have distorted public thinking about our options. Renewable advocates are both dishonest and confused. I have on Nuclear Green, Energy from Thorium, and Daily Kos, explored the renewable options, and the cost of making renewable electricity dependable. Renewable advocates when confronted with the shortcomings of renewable electricity usually resort to talking about three options. They are:

1. Energy efficiency
2. the smart grid
3. energy storage

Separately, and in combination energy efficiency and a smart grid will not produce electricity if the wind stops blowing on a cold winter night. Curiously when confronted with these facts, renewables advocates fall back on the carbon emitting grid back up as if we will never dispense with it. When it comes to negative comparisons with nuclear, renewables advocates will argue that renewables electrical generation will always be supported by and will require the burning of CO2 emitting fossil fuels.

I have documented the conceptual problems involved in the claim that energy efficiency can fill the gap. Nothing about a smart grid allows it to deliver energy that is not produced or stored. I have looked at a number of proposed systems for storing electricity from wind generation under very favorable wind conditions. Even under favorable wind conditions, no wind energy storage system can make reliable West Texas wind cost competitive with conventional nuclear generated electricity. Nor will West Texas wind even with energy storage ever be as reliable or flexible as conventional nuclear. The problem then with conventional nuclear is not its cost competitiveness with renewables, rather it is the fact that both renewables and conventional nuclear cost too much.

My advocacy of the LFTR then is not simply motivated in my father's role in its development. My father never looked at the potential of the LFTR for lowering electrical costs. Thus in addition to solving the major issues of nuclear power, including outstanding safety, and largely resolving the problem of nuclear waste, cutting CO2 emissions to next to nothing, and eliminating the need to mine for nuclear fuel for thousands of years, LFTRs have the potential of being built at a fraction of the cost of renewables or conventional nuclear.

My view has always been that a rapid conversion to a post-carbon energy system that is safe, efficient, reliable and affordable is not an option. If the American economy is to have a future, and the American people are to live in relative prosperity, comfort, safety, security, and good health, then the potential of the LFTR is not an option. The only post-carbon energy source that has the potential to realize these goals is the LFTR. I believe then that it is appropriate for me to discuss the relative advantages of the LFTR over both conventional nuclear and renewable electrical sources.