DV82XL on Proliferation II: Debates with Axil

I previously have called attention to views on nuclear proliferation offered by Axil and DV82XL. The initial views were expressed in a thread devoted to recent diplomacy directed toward an improved international anti-proliferation agreement. Comments at the end of this post come from another thread that was triggered by an Internet drive-by that occurred on the Discussion Forum. As the reader will quickly discover the discussion between Axil and DV82XL was quite lively and sometimes acrimonious.
DV62XL:

This is a subject that has always made me see red, I guess because coming from a nation that has a lively nuclear sector and doesn't have a weapons program, I can hardly believe it when my own countrymen blithely offer this worn out adage that nuclear power leads inevitably to nuclear weapons. I have had several very animated discussions on this subject over the years, to the point where now I can feel my long-suffering wife's stare boring into the back of my head from across a room full of people if the conversation strays into that territory.

What set me off was the unquestioned belief that India used their CANDU power reactors to breed Pu for their weapons program, and calls from Canadian antinuclear groups to stop export of this technology, claiming Canada was 'one of the worse proliferators on the planet'. Worse this lie about CANDUs was circulating outside Canada, and being repeated as an unquestioned truth.

The truth is that India used a pool type reactor based on AECL's NRU, with enriched uranium and heavy water from other sources to breed. And of course Canada cut all nuclear commerce with India after their first test, because the reactor had been sold with a no weapons clause that predated the NPT.

The unfortunate thing is this myth of nuclear energy being the handmaiden of nuclear weapons,not just in reference to Canada, but as a generally accepted truth has become so entrenched that it is now assumed to be a given even by most on the pronuclear side. What I try to show, (what I've tried to show in this thread) is that any critical examination of the available evidence shows that this is certainly not the case among the Secondary Nuclear States, and that the situation is a good deal more complex than many on both sides want to believe.

A State arming itself with nuclear weapons is not a trivial matter, not for the State in question, not for the rest of the world, consequently it cannot be addressed with trivial solutions.

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DV82XL wrote:

Axil wrote: In summary, the key advantage of the Thorium fuel cycle is that it allows for nuclear fuel breeding without the need to ever isolate a pure fissile bomb capable product to come into existence.

Would this work?

OK fine, we have a solution - to a problem that I have tried to show doesn't exist. In all honesty I have to ask if I have not make the point clear that the evidence indicates that proliferation is not driven by the adoption of nuclear power? That even if a proliferation-proof power generating technology were adopted, without the meaningful threat of military intervention, nations that want to, and are capable of mounting a weapons program will do so?

Events in the world have also moved past the point where it is possible to dictate terms on the use of nuclear energy, and at any rate as the clipping I posted up thread indicates, anti-proliferation is seen now more as an attempt by large nations to maintain hegemony by the size of their conventional forces.

I contend that efforts to control the technology or the traffic in materials, or the actions of sovereign nations within their own borders will fail unless backed up by force, and if this is the case it matters little what technology is being interdicted.

Can anyone show me why this is wrong?

Axil responded to DV82XL

In your version of the world, weapons proliferation is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. In your view, the real intent of the big 5, is to further their national interest in the maintenance of national power through an unspoken agenda of power projection. I personally have trouble addressing an argument on multiple levels especially when the motivation “the unspoken agenda” is a metaphysical musing that must be deduced to facilitate the formation of an opinion from an analysis of actions and reactions of geopolitical players that may or may not be true in a given point in history.

All this unspoken maneuvering is the stuff of conjecture and tremendously complicates and obscures the proliferation question. Keep things simple. Your argument is an exercise in a speculative projection of all the possible future outcomes that might occur derived from an opinion of the current state of history.

The golden rule of diplomacy is “Say what you mean and mean what you say.” I want to just address the “riddle” of weapons proliferation and leave the "mystery" and the "enigma" aspects of this question to the march of history. Solve one thing at a time; address the visible aspect of the problem, and wait for the invisible aspect to surface of its own accord and at its own pace.

DV82XL responded:

Axil wrote: In your version of the world, weapons proliferation is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. In your view, the real intent of the big 5, is to further their national interest in the maintenance of national power through an unspoken agenda of power projection. I personally have trouble addressing an argument on multiple levels especially when the motivation “the unspoken agenda” is a metaphysical musing that must be deduced to facilitate the formation of an opinion from an analysis of actions and reactions of geopolitical players that may or may not be true in a given point in history. [/quote]

There are no metaphysical musings involved in my arguments at all, and there is no mystery, I have not conjectured here, but shown that events have unfolded in such a way as to indicate clearly that generally accepted wisdom on proliferation is categorically wrong, and continuing to pursue policy based on it is counterproductive.

Frankly I don't see how any rational study of history can be anything but an analysis of actions and reactions of geopolitical players, or that ignoring these and depending on inductive analysis can yield better results. Herman Kahn, the most celebrated and controversial nuclear strategist of his day can be excused for taking this path, simply because there was no history to draw on. We need not take that route, we have half a century of experience behind us.

The fact is none of the scenarios predicting the proliferation made at that time has come to pass despite the almost laughably porous security of 'nuclear secrets' in West at least, and what amounts to open trade in uranium. This is a matter of record, not speculation.

The revised view, extended by people like Stuart Slade ex-RAND (you can find links to his seminal essay on this matter up thread) again supported by fact, and analysts like Mark Hibbs a twenty-year veteran writing for the Platts' publications [i]Nucleonics Week[/i] and[i] Nuclear Fuel[/i], (two publications with ultra-high subscription rates and correspondingly low circulations), have shown that events have unfolded very differently. To ignore these observations and cling to old shibboleths does not advance the cause of nuclear power or nuclear disarmament.

Axil wrote: All this unspoken maneuvering is the stuff of conjecture and tremendously complicates and obscures the proliferation question. Keep things simple. Your argument is an exercise in a speculative projection of all the possible future outcomes that might occur derived from an opinion of the current state of history.

Rubbish. The proliferation issue is not a theoretical exercise, it is a practical one that is playing out in real-time as we debate. It cannot be simplified anymore than prosecution of any conflict between nations can, where this the case the Middle East would be at peace, Africa wouldn't still be in the Dark Ages, and the two Koreas would have a open border. Simple answers to big geopolitical issues belong in pubs after several beers, not in any rational debate.

As far as making speculative projections, I have limited myself to reporting fact and avoiding opinion as much as possible, at least on the subject of proliferation, if there is any speculation being done in that area it is implied. Again, if we cannot make objective predictions of possible future outcomes based on the current state of history what is left?

Axil wrote: The golden rule of diplomacy is “Say what you mean and mean what you say.” I want to just address the “riddle” of weapons proliferation and leave the "mystery" and the "enigma" aspects of this question to the march of history. Solve one thing at a time; address the visible aspect of the problem, and wait for the invisible aspect to surface of its own accord and at its own pace.

Well good luck with that although for the life of me I cannot see, based on what is actually happening and the dynamics at work, that this issue is can be solved with that approach. To reiterate, facts show that nuclear power has not contributed to the problem to the degree that the antinuclear community or the disarmament community is convinced it has.

To address my contentions, to make me see that this route of passing international law and mandating only certain power generating technologies will have an impact on this issue, you have to show where my facts are in error, and others exist to support your position.

I'm afraid you haven't done that here,

Axil wrote in response:

DV82XL wrote:To address my contentions, to make me see that this route of passing international law and mandating only certain power generating technologies will have an impact on this issue, you have to show where my facts are in error, and others exist to support your position.

Under your view of the world, the realistic and prevailing view, you always assume the worse case when an unfriendly country undertakes any nuclear project.

In Iran, legal and NPT authorized uranium fuel reprocessing could lead to weapons development, so impose global economy killing sanctions.

No country can have Highly Enriched Uranium because that is a bomb waiting to happen so abolish HEU.

If Syria buys a reactor, bomb it, because this reactor may eventually be used for bomb production.

Only the big 5 can have the power, the ultimate defense.

If Iraq just says it has the ability to produce a weapon it is invaded even though absolutely no weapons capability is subsequently found; even when international inspectors continually and confidently assert that no nuclear capability was possible. Destroy the country in the off chance that it might some day decide to go nuclear.

It is preferable to supply the nations of the world both friends and foes with a trusted nuclear technology that can be deployed without assuming the absolute worse case vis'-à-vis' unfriendly country or a friendly country that may someday go rogue and turn into a foe; a technology that won’t be bombed, or result in sanctions, or cause an invasion.

If such a technology can be fashioned, it won’t stop the possibility of weapons production; but it would be a good first step in the right direction. It might not clean the evil from the hearts of men, but at least it will allow nuclear power to expand in an equable and fair handed way throughout the world. It might stop the sanctions, the bombings and the invasions, which would be a small step in the right direction.

DV82XL wrote:

Axil wrote: Under your view of the world, the realistic and prevailing view, you always assume the worse case when an unfriendly country undertakes any nuclear project.

No, if you look back on what I have written I have on more than one occasion stated that the expense of a nuclear weapons program is such that no country embarks on one without solid reasons. This is just the opposite to the standard view that access to any uncontrolled nuclear technology will inevitably lead to bomb-making.

Axil wrote: In Iran, legal and NPT authorized uranium fuel reprocessing could lead to weapons development, so impose global economy killing sanctions.

Again that is a restatement of the standard position, which I do not support. I have pointed out that Iran continues to work on enrichment despite the imposition of sanctions, indicating that this method is ineffectual, and not likely to generate the mood of trust that would make Iran feel they need not have nuclear weapons.

Axil wrote: No country can have Highly Enriched Uranium because that is a bomb waiting to happen so abolish HEU.

Categorically not, in fact this whole thread started because I objected to plans by the Conference on Disarmament to suggest a full ban on production of highly enriched uranium. If you look back you will see that I object to this because it means the end of the possibility of small reactors.

Axil wrote: If Syria buys a reactor, bomb it, because this reactor may eventually be used for bomb production.[

I don't like it, I don't even agree with it, but it would seem that this is the only effective way to interdict. Sanctions applied to India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea, have been abject failures.

This being the case there is no need for regulations that will limit the [i]legitimate[/i] use fissile materials. As Jaro pointed out not permitting Canada to buy HEU for commercial isotope production due to fears about proliferation is ludicrous.

Axil wrote: Only the big 5 can have the power, the ultimate defense.

That seems to the position of the NPT, is it not? I am no fan of that treaty to begin with and I'm not supporting it per se, I'm only saying that it cannot be strengthened by imposing more restrictions on [i]compliant states[/i] which seems to be what the Conference on Disarmament wants to do.

Axil wrote: If Iraq just says it has the ability to produce a weapon it is invaded even though absolutely no weapons capability is subsequently found; even when international inspectors continually and confidently assert that no nuclear capability was possible. Destroy the country in the off chance that it might some day decide to go nuclear.

First it is naïve in the extreme to believe that Iraq was not developing nuclear weapons, in fact given their current position they would have been stupid not to. Nevertheless [b]IF[/b] a decision was made to put a halt to their efforts, it is clear that sanctions did not work. Now I think they would only keep an arsenal as a defensive deterrent, but it would seem others do not, so what other options are there? You seem to be suggesting that should they have had proliferation-proof reactors all would be well. I'm saying that wouldn't change their conceived need of nuclear weapons, and we are back to square one.

Axil wrote: It is preferable to supply the nations of the world both friends and foes with a trusted nuclear technology that can be deployed without assuming the absolute worse case vis'-à-vis' unfriendly country or a friendly country that may someday go rogue and turn into a foe; a technology that won’t be bombed, or result in sanctions, or cause an invasion.

If such a technology can be fashioned, it won’t stop the possibility of weapons production; but it would be a good first step in the right direction. It might not clean the evil from the hearts of men, but at least it will allow nuclear power to expand in an equable and fair handed way throughout the world. It might stop the sanctions, the bombings and the invasions, which would be a small step in the right direction.

Well obviously I don't share your idealism. I believe I have shown that it is not the retasking of nuclear power technology which enables weapon production to begin with, so I cannot see that your prescription will have any real impact on the issue.

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In another thread the discussions turned to the anti-proliferation concerns of policy makers.

Dv82XL wrote

The only concern that policy-makers have is getting re-elected. To that end they need money and votes.

They get wads of money from fossil-fuel interests who are not likely to see any good from any nuclear powered future for themselves. They get voyes from a population that is by in large ignorant of the ins and outs of nuclear energy.

Our side can't afford to buy politicians, but we can outreach to the public. But not the public represented by the Greens because they will never be converted to nuclear energy because they want to see less energy usage not more. We have to get the message to the others, the ones that want to see progress, but understand that the current supplies of energy are not going to get us there. They are the only ones that can put enough pressure on the government to change.

But you can't do this by pandering to irrational fear. I said it up thread, and I will say it again: dwelling on this issue plays right into the hand of our opponents by giving it the cachet of legitimacy. They are going to take it and drive it right up our rear-ends, because you just can't make these guarantees, and they know it.

Nuclear energy has beaten itself up for the past thirty years because the geeks and nerds can't get it through their heads you can't fight rhetoric with reason unless you have the masses behind you. And we're not going to get them dancing to the tune of of our opponents.

We will not 'end up doing trade-off studies' anymore than they did it for wind and solar that are getting their way right now. That's because this is a game with winners and losers, not right and wrong.

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Axil wrote

Enforcement is the key to eliminating proliferation; strict, uncompromising, ever vigilant, air tight enforcement.

DV82XL responded

"If the Dutch put A. Q. Khan is jail for life when he first showed sighs of rogue behavior, no proliferation in Iran, North Korea, and Libya would have resulted. THEY could have snatched him out of Pakistan on a Rendition. They could have done the same thing with his European supply network operatives.

These people are terrorists in the worst sense of the word. There should be no duel use excuse for selling enrichment equipment.

You have stopped making any sort of sense. Stand back and take a deep breath.

You say:[i]"Enforcement is the key to eliminating proliferation; strict, uncompromising, ever vigilant, air tight enforcement.[/i]

I agree. Now if this were possible, if this was the certain outcome every time someone tried to make a nuclear weapon, or even as A. Q. Khan did in the Netherlands, write his own government volunteering his services after the Indian test. If this person was thrown in jail for life, and the world was OK with these sorts of draconian measures, I ask the question: why would you need proliferation proof reactors?

Axil wrote

The inability to control nuclear technology leads many policy-makers to desire its elimination.

DV82XL responded

Nuclear technologists need to give them better tools to make control possible.

Even if this was true - and it is not - you still haven't given them the means to stop someone else from using other technologies in another country have you?

Axil wrote

"…..I agree. Now if this were possible,"

I see the anti-proliferation effort as a product of both enforcement and anti-proliferation technology. If one is strong the other can be weak. But both cannot be weak.

Since enforcement has been oftentimes weak in the past, anti-proliferation technology must be correspondingly strong.

Like money in the bank, if the police are lax and corrupt, the safe in the bank must be strong. But if the police always get their man, then there is no need for a bank vault.

If neither the police are effective nor the bank has a good vault, you will be well advised to keep your money under your mattress. Kill the uranium fuel cycle and replace it with the thorium fuel cycle.

In terms of enforcement, you remember the case of the spies Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Greenglass Rosenberg. If life terms were dispensed to the proliferators, there would be a decidedly deterrent effect to counter the proliferation profit motive. People would think twice before they risk the consequence of making a quick profit on proliferation. They might think about robbing banks instead.

"Even if this was true - and it is not - you still haven't given them the means to stop someone else from using other technologies in another country have you?"

You kill those other technologies the best that you can and provide a proliferation proof technology in its place so that at the end of the day all nuclear power throughout the world is highly proliferation resistant.

You kill the uranium fuel cycle and replace it with the thorium fuel cycle.

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DV82XL wrote

"It is ironic in a thread devoted to ridiculing a demagogue from the antinuclear side I find myself arguing with a demagogue from the pronuclear side."

Axil -

You are demonstrating that you have absolutely no understanding of realpolitik, or awareness of current events, or recent history.

You are on a crusade based on faith, faith that your way will lead to the outcome you desire and nothing - certainly not fact or reason - will dissuade you from this path. Unfortunately you and those that agree with you, blinkered campaign to apply your solution to this issue will not only end in bitter failure, but will be likely used as an argument against the very thing you desire.

Years of watching the broader nuclear debate has made one thing crystal clear to me: the antinuclear movement in all its various denominations is by several orders of magnitude, better at influencing popular attitudes and social behavior on a large scale, framing, propaganda, public relations and every other aspect of social engineering.

[color=#FF0080]Until we come to grips with the fact that all of the 'problems' with nuclear power are just bait that the other side is using to get us to fight on ground of their choosing and that they have framed these issues in such a manner that they can claim they cannot be solved to their satisfaction, we are going find ourselves working against our own cause.[/color]

Being right just isn't enough.

Now obviously I have not made any inroads here on this board convincing anyone that proliferation is not a thorium issue and not a MSR issue in any meaningful way, so I will leave you to polish this idea to your hearts content, but I am not going to waste anymore time on this topic.

I have refrained from taking sides in this debate, but I have noted that nuclear technology that already is regarded as "proliferation resistant" should not be crippled by unrealistic anti-proliferation concerns. Sophisticated nuclear technology that is designed, built and deployed in the United States is not going to contribute in any meaningful way to a North Korean Nuclear Weapons program. Proliferation becomes a concern only if nuclear technology is sold to nations that are not nuclear capable. I am also in agreement with DV82XL that would be proliferators should be assumed to be motivated by rational concerns.

DV82XL On Nuclear Proliferation I

DV82XL is another outstanding participant in the EfT Discussion Forum debate on nuclear proliferation/non-proliferation. I have already recorded Axil's views. DV82XL has taken strong exception to Axil's views.

The current round of debate began when DV82XL commented on new anti-proliferation negoruations:

Arms body breaks 12 years of deadlock on nukes
The 65-nation Conference on Disarmament broke a dozen years of deadlock Friday and opened the way to negotiate a new nuclear arms control treaty.....a top candidate for a new treaty is one to ban production of so-called "fissile materials" — highly enriched uranium and plutonium — needed to create atomic weapons

.http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iG7WhUdeF49qBeiz4r7im3oF04aAD98G1V3G1

I can't see much good coming out of that idea.

Kirk Sorensen commented:

This will be used to attempt to prevent the creation and use of U-233, thus slowing the development of LFTR, thus leading to more and bloody wars over energy.,

DV82XL responded:

Of course this is what it is all about, not just for LFTR but any of the several small reactor designs that hope to use HEU fuel, and it will probably put hobbles on reprocessing as well.

After twelve years one has to ask why suddenly this idea shows up out of nowhere, and the unfortunate truth is it looks like someone dropped this in with the objective of making life difficult for nuclear energy more than any practical insinuative to reduce nuclear weapons. I mean really most of tyhe big players have more weapons-grade PU than they know what to do with. How is this going to shrink their arsenals?

Axil commented:

]In order to entice non unclear nations to abide by these restrictions, these nations are provided nuclear fuel or even small sealed reactors at no or low cost in exchange for spent fuel or decommissioned small reactors. This is guarantied to all signatories to the non proliferation treaty by an international fuel agency that can not use access to nuclear power as leverage in political situations.

DV82XL responded

Ya right.

I mean the NPT provided for technology transfer too, and access to fuel among its litany of failed clauses, why is it going to be any different this time?

And as for an 'international fuel agency that can not use access to nuclear power as leverage in political situations' I take it you mean some organization like the IMF, which was supposed be the same thing for money. Their record as an apolitical player is well documented...not! There are several Third-World countries in penury because of the 'unbiased' attention of that agency.

The day that any international trafficking in energy is not used as diplomatic chip is not coming soon.

DV82XL argued:

Nuclear weapons are not going away, and those that own them are not going to give them up. This is a given and any realistic look at the situation yields that conclusion. Nor, at this point, is any nuclear power nation going to place their energy security in the hands of some international body that they don't control outright making the whole plan a transparent farce from the outset. As was said previously at best this is a bald attempt to deny an other nation the right to enrich or reprocess nuclear fuel and this can only have a chilling effect on the growth of nuclear energy should it be adopted. I still think this is the real purpose of this plan, because it has come out of left field at a very opportune time on the heels of the DPRK's latest test. The whole thing smells contrived.

DV82XL observed:

We have got to get rid of this simplistic idea that if this technology isn't controlled nations will be 'tempted' to make nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapons program is a unbelievably expensive undertaking ("we were eating grass" as they said in Pakistan) and no nation decides to engage in such a project lightly.

It is a misnomer to talk about nuclear weapons as “weapons” in any meaningful sense. When a country first acquires nuclear weapons it does so out of a very accurate perception that possession fundamentally changes it relationships with other powers. What nuclear weapons buy is the fact that once the country in question has nuclear weapons, it cannot be beaten - it can be defeated, that is it can be prevented from achieving certain goals or stopped from following certain courses of action - but it cannot be beaten. It will never have enemy tanks moving down the streets of its capital, it will never have its national treasures looted and its citizens forced into servitude. The enemy will be destroyed by nuclear attack first. A potential enemy knows that so will not push the situation. The effect of acquiring nuclear weapons is that the owning country has drawn a line in the sand in any conflict in which it is involved.

When 181 nations signed the 1968 NPT they thought they were taking the first step toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. In short, they took the Treaty seriously. Article VI of the NPT, for instance, states: “Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measure relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international controls.”

This was the heart of the NPT. The smaller countries agreed to forgo nuclear weapons only because the nuclear powers agreed to scrap theirs and, further, disarm their conventional forces. Instead, the Big Five increased the number of warheads in their arsenals and raised their military budgets.

Finally, they have invaded non-nuclear countries such as Iraq, and Afghanistan among others. Then in 2006, former French President Jacques Chirac warned “states who would use terrorist means” risk a “measured” response, but “of a different kind,” and it was clear from the context that he meant by nuclear weapons.

As long as the great powers maintain the ability to invade countries, overthrow regimes, and bomb nations into subservience, weaker countries will inevitably try to offset those advantages. The quickest and cheapest way to do that is to develop nuclear weapons.

In simple terms nuclear weapons will not disappear until the weak need no longer fear the strong. Sanctimoniously trying to prevent small nations from doing so by what amounts to controlled market operations, is laughably infective and will only have the effect of limiting the adoption of clean nuclear energy, without making the world one wit safer.

Clearly this current idea that the processing of fissionable material could be controlled will have more of an impact on the growth of nuclear power. It will do nothing to inhibit any minor Power that feels threatened enough to build weapons.

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Nuclear energy is in and of itself, not a proliferation risk. No more than a fertilizer production industry necessarily means that a nation also has artillery shell industry. The conceived need for the latter, does not depend on the existence of the former, which is in essence what is implied by this scheme under discussion.

Within that context, no thorium based alternative is going get any traction, because one is still left with the problem of enforcing controls against uranium based activities inside a sovereign country, which is the issue right now with stopping a nation from mounting a nuclear weapons program.

Ultimately, the only effective measures that can be taken are those that the Israelis have on those occasions when they wished to stop the development of nuclear weapons in a perceived enemy: military intervention. The only way any plan to stop the spread of nuclear weapons can be effective is by enforcing it by the projection of might and once that has been decided it matters little what nuclear power technology is being forbidden.

Furthermore I am saying that this move to to ban production of fissile materials is a naïve idea that is being pushed for secondary reasons, because it also implies surrendering energy security to some extranational body, which is unlikely to meet the realities of domestic realpolitik in any independent country. Therefor I am drawing the conclusion that this idea has been put forward more to inhibit the adoption of nuclear energy than prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, which at any rate it will not.

In responce to "arcs_n_sparks" DV82XL wrote:

Why am I having a hard time getting the point across that no country has ever proceeded with a nuclear weapons program, just because it was able to? There has to be a really strong perceived need for this capability, that when present is enough to carry the task through as much international pressure as can be applied short of military.

Look at those countries that have acquired the Bomb after the US did, even England and France were under a great deal of pressure not to arm, but did so despite both being very economically and politically in debt to the US at the time, and both were rebuilding after having been damned near burnt to the ground. Much of the friction between DeGaul and the Americans was rooted in the French pursuing nuclear weapons against American pressure not to.

Israel and South Africa mounted programs because they recognized they were vulnerable to invasion, India needed a deterrent against Chinese incursions into Kashmir and to draw a line in the sand with Pakistan, who in turn looked at India to the East, Communists to the North, and Fundamentalists to the West and knew their armed forces could not successfully defend the country with conventional weapons alone. All of these States faced sanctions, that truly hurt domestically, India in particular was desperate for more nuclear energy, and found itself cut off from the world in this matter at a very critical time. Even North Korea's program is motivated more by fear than by self aggrandizement, irregardless of propaganda to the contrary.

Meanwhile countries like Canada, Japan, Germany, Brazil, South Korea could build a deliverable weapon inside a year should they want to, and Australia, and several European nations could mount programs which could do the same within five if pushed, yet they don't. Even South Africa dismantled their weapons as soon as the threat diminished. The reason is because this is a cripplingly expensive capability to acquire and maintain and no nation will do so without its back to the wall. Even the Big Five are effected by this and most of the push for nuclear arms reduction is motivated by financial pressure more than ideological.

The point here is that the pursuit of these programs, if there is a perceived need, will be carried out with or without the existence of proliferation proof reactors. A.Q. Khan did not depend on the domestic nuclear program, its two nuclear power reactors were under international safeguards during the time Khan was building Pakistan's weapon capability. Had those two power reactors been replaced with nice sealed proliferation proof nuclear batteries fueled on thorium the impact on Khan's effort would have been nil.

To recap: So far none of the countries "illegally" producing their own nuclear weapons to date have given one wit about international sanctions; none of them have leveraged their nuclear power sectors in any meaningful way; and all of them were driven by extreme geopolitical pressure in their perceived need for a N-weapon capability. As I pointed out up thread the only successful interdictions to date were by destroying the physical plants, and as far as I can see this will remain the only sure way to accomplish this end in the future. If anything proliferation proof nuclear reactors will only serve as an excuse not to monitor countries.

This whole idea that proliferation is some sort of accident waiting to happen, and that unchecked will lead to a domino effect is pure fantasy based on the overactive imaginations of Cold War strategists like Herman Kahn who were working in a vacuum. Events, real events on the ground have proven their theories short-sighted, and they should not be applied to the current situation. It is time to re-evaluate the whole foundation of proliferation risk based on historical fact rather than inductive reasoning.

DV82XL responded to an argument by "jaro":

[We could} assumes that just the availability of HEU would be an overwhelming temptation for some random Third-World nation to start fabricating N-weapons. This is just too simplistic a view of the whole issue of what motivates a country to obtain an N-weapon capability. It presumes that the nation in question is going to treat the acquisition of this capability as lightly as they would any other item of military hardware. Worse, coming from this forum, it trivializes the other technical challenges of making a reliable, deliverable, device. Much of this thinking is a product of Cold War thinking that itself was based on assumptions that events have proven to be false.

In short, no country has shown any signs of working towards making a nuclear arsenal unless they feel that their very existence is threatened, but once that determination has been made, nothing that the international community can do, short of military action can stop them from getting one.

Hand wringing inside and outside of the pronuclear power community on the issue of weapons proliferation seems to be locked in theories first put forward in the 1960's which events since that time has proven wrong. If you recall, it was assumed by those theories there would be more than a dozen new nuclear weapons States by the turn of the century - is is obviously just not so. Even if the question of suppling weapon-grade fissile material is removed, it still requires a sizable technological infrastructure and the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars to make a weapon. The costs of a more ambitious program aimed at producing a militarily significant number of weapons can easily run into the billions of dollars, and the idea that such a project could be carried out by surreptitiously stripping power reactors of their fuel belongs in pulp novels, not in any rational discussion of the issue.

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The fact remains that despite this popular view of what will happen, and a strong belief that it would in the anti-proliferation community, the truth, born out by by examining events of the last thirty years, is that it hasn't turned out that way. That's the point I have been trying to make in this thread. Proliferation myths, like most of the nuclear mythos that grew as a consequence of a mix of ignorance, inexperience and Cold War propaganda, has been shown to be false. Continuing to expect policy to follow those falsehoods is ineffectual at best and counterproductive at worst.

However you do obliquely bring up another point. Most if not all the public concern over the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations is centered on the belief that they would see that the best way to deploy them would be on ICBMs or some other long-range delivery system so as to threaten the Great Powers. However, (again looking at facts on the ground) if one examines the stated or unstated (but widely understood) nuclear doctrines of the secondary nuclear States, one finds that nuclear weapons are to be deployed as tactical weapons to meet strategic ends. These weapons are meant as defensive assets, to be used against masses of armor crossing one's border, or a fleet of warships threatening one's littoral zones. While that reduces the need for complex long-range delivery systems, it does not mean stockpiling an effective, reliable deterrent is a trivial, or inexpensive undertaking.

Again I suggest in the strongest possible terms that we do not oversimplify the issue. This will only lead to the belief that there are simple solutions, and that unfortunately is just not the case. Worse, pursuing simple solutions can only have a deleterious impact on the deployment of nuclear energy to those places most desperately in need of it, without improving security in any meaningful way.

DV82XL argued that would be proliferators have rational motives:

We have to be very careful about declaring any international player's motivations irrational.

North Korea has gained much from their program in the way of concessions that they probably wouldn't have got otherwise. Since the fall of Communism in China and Russia the attitude of all the previous stakeholders has been to starve NK into submission by neglect. By embarking on the pursuit of nuclear weapons Kim Jong Il has made his nation impossible to ignore, and has basically been paid-off after every display. Off-hand one could say it is one of the more successful uses of nuclear weapons since the Americans ended the war with Japan.

Quoting, this time verbatim, from Stuart Slade's, [i]The Nuclear Game - An Essay on Nuclear Policy Making: [/i]

"...the direct effects of nuclear weapons in a nation's hands is to make that nation extremely cautious. They spend much time studying situations, working out the implications of such situations, what the likely results of certain policy options are. ...Aha, I hear you say what about the mad dictator? Its interesting to note that mad, homicidal aggressive dictators tend to turn into tame sane cautious ones as soon as they split atoms. Whatever their motivations and intents, the mechanics of how nuclear weapons work dictate that mad dictators become sane dictators very quickly. After all its not much fun dictating if one's country is a radioactive trash pile and you're one of the ashes. China, India and Pakistan are good examples. One of the best examples of this process at work is Mao Tse Tung. Throughout the 1950s he was extraordinarily bellicose and repeatedly tried to bully, cajole or trick Khruschev and his successors into initiating a nuclear exchange with the US on the grounds that world communism would rise from the ashes. Thats what Quemoy and Matsu were all about in the late 1950s. Then China got nuclear weapons. Have you noticed how reticent they are with them? Its sunk in. They can be totally destroyed; will be totally destroyed; in the event of an exchange."

Again it is overly simplistic to think that leaders like Kim Jong Il or the Ayatollahs work in a vacuum, and if one individual doesn't understand the implications of holding nuclear weapons, others do. The fact remains we have yet to see a "madman with an A-bomb" show up outside of pulp fiction, nor are we likely to.

More to come.