The Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Nuclear Green MSR Plan

Believe it or not when in 2007, I worked out the plan that lies behind all of my work on nuclear Green, I included the possibility that the United States would not be able to pay off its sovereign debt during a period of time when national goals included replacement of fossil fuel energy sources with post carbon energy sources. I assumed that new energy sources would have to be low cost tp build, and low cost to operate. In 2007 when I first attempted to think and talk through the future of American energy, I realized that the international financial situation of the United States was a precarious, and that any energy solution that was likely to work, would, at the very least, not raise energy costs. Yet in order to adopt a renewable energy approach, to fossil fuel replacement we would either be forced to build a large number of redundant renewable energy facilities, in order to provide 24 hour a day energy sources, and greatly expand the electrical transmission grid. Redundancy and expanded transmission facilities were, however not the only added expense required to make a renewable dominated grid reliable. A very large back up energy storage system would also be required. This made a future American renewablees dominated energy system very expensive, and probably not affordable, given the economic situation of the United States.

Renewables advocates suggested that energy efficiency and the continued use of fossil fuel energy backup systems backups could bridge the gap between energy supply and energy demand. But the united states government has carried on programs to encourage greater energy efficiency since the 1970's. And while these programs have meet with some success, they have not succeeded in dramatically lowering American energy demands. Much of the decline in energy United States demands during the last 30 years can be attributed to the shift of energy intense industries off shore. Energy that was once required to produce American consumed goods, is now produced off shore. Moving America manufacture to other countries may make the United States economy look more energy efficient on paper, but it does not reduce global energy demand, nor does it solve the long term problems of the American economy.

Planning for continued use of fossil fuels as an alternative to nuclear power is stupid and self defeating. Climate scientists tell us that we need to reduce global fossil fuel consumption by 80% by 2050 to avoid a drastic climate shift. Yet German Greens prefer building new coal and gas fired power plamys, to continued use of German nuclear plants. Given the problems that an 80% carbon reduction involves, continued use of fossil fuels in electrical generation may not be an option. In addition the emerging economies of India and China require very large amount's of energy, and the prospect of seeing nations such Brazil, Mexico Nigeria, Indonesia and other nations, whose economic development is expected to expand during the next 40 years. We should not expect that any energy required to power newly emerging economic activities will come from from fossil fuels. Nor can we expect renewable energy and efficiency to bridge the energy gap.

Thus leaves us with no option other than nuclear energy if we are to avoid unacceptable emission levels of carbon-dioxide. But what of the complaints that are often made against nuclear energy. I was told when I proposed the nuclear solution in 2007, that the use of nuclear power

* Was not safe and that accidents at nuclear power plants could kill thousands of people
* Produced deadly toxin waste that would be deadly for millions of years
* Lead to nuclear proliferation, and the the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists
* And at any rate was too expensive
* Plus we are running out of nuclear fuel.

I have explored akk of these problems extensively on Nuclear Green. Others including bloggers Kirk Sorensen, Barry Brook, NNadir, and Rod Adams have also offered extensive explorations of these issues. None of these problems seemed unsolvable to me, although I quickly noted that many nuclear power critics seemed singularly uninterested discussing solutions. It also struck me that the critics of nuclear power seemed to exaggerate their complaints. For example, the deadly for million years complaints, might refer to a relatively small amount of actinites from uranium fuel cycle reactors, but it is quite possible to eliminate the production of transuranium elements from Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors almost completrely, and to burn the remining TRUs completely over time. The remaining fission products produced by liftors would be no more radioactive than natural uranium ore after 300 years. There are billions of tons of uranium ore burried in the earth, and it does not seem to be killing people. Thus the dangerous for millions of years claim seems to be a huge exageration.

Much of my knowledge of the nuclear option stems from the fact that my father had worked for nearly 30 years at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. He had made a major contribution to the development of what is today the main stream reactor technology, the Light Water Reactor. He received exactly one dollar from the United States Government for the patent of his discovery, which is used in practically every civilian and military reactor in the world today.

Oak Ridge scientists, including my father, had believed that it would be possible to design and build a far better reactor than the Light Water Reactor which they developed during the 1940's.

After reviewing what scientists had written about nuclear power technology, I came to the conclusion that reactors were not unsafe by any reasonable standard, that nuclear waste did not constitute anything like the hazard that nuclear critics claimed, that civilian nuclear power plants are not useful tools for the development of nuclear weapons, that historically civilian nuclear power had not lead to nations acquiring nuclear weapons, and infacts most nations that had acquired nuclear weapons, had first done so without first developing civilian power reactors, and that almost all nations that built civilian nuclear power plants before acquiring nuclear weapons, had not gone on to acquire nuclear weapons. Thus the evidence from history is that there is at worst only a association between the prior acquisition of civilian nuclear plants, and the aquisition of nuclear weapons proceeds the acqusition of nuclear powered generating plants.

It has proven quite possible for even underdeveloped nations that lack civilian nuclear power facilities, to develop advanced nuclear weapons programs and even develop and test nuclear weapons, and that countries that acquire nuclear weapons in disregard to international treaties, almost always acquire nuclear weapons before rather after they acquire civilian nuclear power. Further nations that acquire civilian nuclear power technology first almost never go on to acquire nuclear weapons.

The traditional arguments against the use of nuclear power offer a very weak case against nuclear power, and the urgency of our need for fossil fuel replacement. Objective evaluations have repeatedly concluded that renewables and efficiency are ineffective substitutes for fossil fuels and will cost far more than nuclear power.

Marcel Coderch Collell, a distinguished Spanish technocrat, has reviewed the possibility of replacing much of the worlds fossil fuel generated electricity by 2030.

Based on United States Energy Information Agency estimates, Collell argues that the business as ususl approach to new electrical generation facilities would not work with the French nuclear generation model. But then of course, the French did not follow a business as usual model when they developed their nuclear electrical generation facilities.

In fact, the French model is to not rely very much on renewable energy, but we will allow Senior Collell latitude in making his point. He describes the French Model

One of the first options to consider would be to follow the French model and gradually increase the number of reactors to produce a good deal of the world’s electricity by 2030 or perhaps a little later. This would take the pressure off fossil fuels and, in principle, would not require technical innovations of any kind. Electricity would be produced emission-free, based either on nuclear or renewable sources. This would save enormous amounts of natural gas and coal, as well as considerable oil, thus reducing emissions and perhaps putting downward pressure on fossil fuel prices (or at least keeping them steady), while making non-renewable fuel available for a longer period.

But is the French model to gradually increase the number of reactors, Or did the French embark on a crash reactor building program during the 1970's and 80's? Historians say that the French embarked on a deliberate, reactor crash building program.

Senior Collell then suggests that in order to follow the nuclear French model by 2030,

4,740 new 1GWe reactors would have to be built and [one] put in operation every two days for the next 25 years.

Senior Collell then offers a reflection on the difficulty of this task in a business as usual world.

An optimistic estimate of construction times (five years) would mean having 950 teams of technical specialists, workers and machinery simultaneously working full time. This is hard to imagine, despite talk of standardising designs. In the previous period of nuclear construction (1963-88) only 423 reactors were built, at a rate of 17 per year.

He also argues that fuel shortages would constrict the depolyment of such a large reactor fleet.

A simple calculation suffices to show how an extension of the French model would collide with a scarcity of uranium. This is old news, given the serious doubts that already exist regarding the availability of uranium even to feed a few more reactors than now exist. In 2004, 365 GWe of nuclear capacity consumed about 67 kt of uranium (approximately 180 tons of uranium per GWe per year), of which 36 kt came from currently operating mines, while the rest came from recycled nuclear weapons and other secondary sources (that is, from prior production). Supply forecasts for the reactors currently in operation (plus foreseeable growth) put uranium mining production at 50 kt per year in 2015, with a significant shortfall developing in 2010, by which time Russia's nuclear weapons will have been dismantled and their uranium will have been consumed, . . .

If we assume linear growth from the current 365 GWe to 4,959 GWe in 2030, uranium demand would be around 400 kt in 2015 and 700 kt in 2030. This means multiplying by eight today’s estimates of production capacity in 2015, and multiplying by fifteen for 2030.

In fact, scientists have been forcasting a uranium shortage for a long time, and so far it has not happened. Nuclear Green has reviewed the evidence that vast amounts of recoverable uranium and thorium are avaliable in the earth's crust. Infact enough recoverable nuclear fuel is avaliable to make nuclear power for all practical purposes a sustainable resource. This has been known for a long time.

Alvin Weinberg recored,

“At the April 28, 1944, meeting of the New Piles Committee, Phil Morrison had reported the known reserves of uranium at workable concentration to amount to only about 20 000 tons. With so little fuel, nuclear energy based only on the 0.7 per- cent of uranium-235 in natural uranium could hardly amount to much. Morrison also pointed out at this meeting that the vastly larger amount of residual uranium in the granites could be burned with a positive energy balance—but only if used in a breeder.”

According to Weinberg, Morrison added that

more work should be done on the nuclear development of thorium because of its greater availabil- ity and also suggested experiments, . . .

Weinberg records Morrison's excitement when,

Morrison showed me his calculations . . .

What Morrison demonstrated to Weinberg was that,

if uranium (was) burned in a breeder (reactor), the energy released through fission exceeded the energy required to extract the residual 4 ppm of uranium from granitic rocks.

Despite the long standing evidence of science Senior Collell insists we will quickly run out of nuclear fuel.

Senior Collell sees these facts as casting the nuclear build out on the horns of a dilemma.

Let us suppose, however, for argument’s sake, that it were possible to achieve a production capacity of 700 kt/year by 2030. In the context of this analysis, two questions are raised: first, the CO2 emissions that would be generated in this phase of the nuclear cycle. Given the amount of uranium necessary, it would almost certainly be necessary to make use of hard rock deposits and low concentrations.

There are fortunately multiple flaws in this argument. First the rock does not have to be moved in order to be mined. Low energy mineral recovery technologies are avaliable to miners. Uranium miners are increasingly adopting a mining technique called in situ leaching. When in situ leaching is practiced on uranium ore, the primarily the uranium is extracted, and the rock is left in place. Thus contrary to Senior Collell, a low energy technology is avaliable that would permit the recovery of a huge amount of uranium with a favorable energy return for energy invested.

The problem that Senior Collell is pointing to is the limitation of the Light Water Reactor. Light Water Reactors were first developed as a means of powering American Nuclear submarines. In American Nuclear Submarines LWRs are small, they provide reliable power for 15 years, after which their cores can be replaced. Submarine reactors are expensive, but nothing can serve as a substitute . Large power reactors can be even more expensive and they are very fuel inefficient. Part of the problem has to do with the flaws in the Uranium cycle. In LWRs as little as 0.3% of the potential fuel gets burned, and the rest falls into a category called "nuclear waste." The problem is that uranium is relatively cheap, so it cost less to seperate out the good stuff, the U-235 and use it for nuclear fuel. A tiny fraction of the 95% to 97% of the fuel gets converted to fissionable Pu239, and a fraction of that gets burned as nuclear fuel. Unfortunately Pu-239 is not very good fuel in LWRs.

French Scientists from the University of Grenoble are aware of the problem. In "Scenarios with an Intensive Contribution of Nuclear Energy to the World Energy Supply," H.Nifenecker, D.Heuer, S.David, J.M.Loiseaux1, J.M.Martin, O.Meplan, and A.Nuttin, maintain that

If carried out with PWR or BWR reactors, the important nuclear power deployment will make heavy demands on natural Uranium resources. Resources are, presently, estimated to be around 20 Million tons. Assuming PWR or BWR reactors, the cumulative needs in 2050 could reach 16 million tons. This shows that breeding reactors are necessary to meet the needs or, alternately, that Uranium would have to be extracted from sea water, at a significant cost.

These considerations may, however, probably exaggerate the Uranium shortage. Certainly when the huge global thorium stock is added to recoverable uranium there will be no shortage of nuclear for a long time to come. Alvin Weinberg relates how the possibility of a future global uranium shortage was understood by the founding fathers of the Nuclear age, including Enrico Fermi, and Eugene Wigner.

At any rate I am not going to contend with the not enough uranium argument. Even if there is enough uranium, the French analysis is fairly sound for other reasons, which I have pointed out on Nuclear Green. In "Intensive Contribution," the French team reviewed two possible breeding cycles:

* The U-Pu cycle using fast reactors
* The Th-U cycle using thermal reactors

This analysis was expanded with typical French thoroughness in "worldwide deployment," if anyone is interested. Both "Intensive Contribution," and "Worldwide Deployment" came to the same conclusion, that a deployment of Light Water Reactors can only be sustained until 2030. Lets call this the conservative case. Conservative, in that it is based on very conservative estimates of global uranium resources. While far more generous Uranium resources are justifiable, they are by no means certain. A really plausible plan should make conservative assumptions. If generous assumptions do not pan out, then the plan can be altered in to reflect a better than expected resource picture.

The nuclear intensive plan would assume a nuclear build out to 3387 GWe of electrical generating capacity by 2030. This is, in itself an enormous and extremely daunting build out, and indeed suggests that a major revolution in nuclear manufacturing technology will be required. Fortunately many of the components of that revolution are already understood, and none of them represents a serious impediment to technological change. Factory production of reactor construction kits, together with on site labor saving machines, and new materials savings reactor designs can be expected to improve reactor manufacturing, labor, time and materials efficiencies during the next decade, and to be reinforced by a learning curve. Such a large build out will probably require a shift of many reactor manufacturing activities from the final manufacturing site to factories. The recycling of old steam plant locations as nuclear power stations sites, will also save money and time for the buildout.

Thus while ambitious, the 3387 GWe buildout by 2030 is still not impossible, but the goal must be set soon. Both "Intensive Contribution," and "Worldwide Distribution" then looked at the U-Pu fast reactor cycle. By 2030 an enormous amount of reactor grade plutonium will become available. This RGP can be put to use both in the production of nuclear power and in the breeding of more reactor fuel. Doing so would serve as at least a partial solution to what is commonly seen as a major problem for nuclear power, the so called nuclear waste problem. Indeed the reuse of nuclear fuel turns "nuclear waste," into an asset. "Intensive Contribution," argues that given the supply of plutonium for LWRs and fast breeders, a buildout to 9000 GWe by 2050 is possible.

"Worldwide Deployment" looks at a number of added options including burning recycled RGP in LWRs. This delays, perhaps for a hundred years, but does not prevent the eventual draw down of fissionable materials that are tied to a non-breeding nuclear economy. A better use of the RGP is

Thus the transition to some form of nuclear breeding will be inevitable, if a long term commitment to nuclear power becomes a matter of policy.

Fast sodium cooled reactors are often viewed as the preferred method of nuclear breeding, although various Molten Salt Reactor breeding options exit, and include many attractive features that are more than competitive with what liquid sodium cooled breeder reactors such as the Integral Fast Reactor. IFR backers claim higher breeding ratios, but the compatibility of those high breeding ratios with optimal safety has, as of yet to be confirmed.

"Worldwide Deployment" also reviews a gas cooled fast reactor option, but did not like it as well as the sodium cooled concept.

"Worldwide Deployment" foresaw global energy demands for the equivalent of 18 Billion tons of oil by 2050. Even with stockpiling massive amounts of RGP, and using it to start Sodium Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors, "Worldwide Deployment" concludes that there will not be enough fast breeders to meet world energy demand after 2080. Hence, we must turn to Thorium fuel cycle Molten Salt Reactors.

The argument that nuclear power was too expensive, does not seem rational because when the cost of redundancies, new transmission systems, and energy storage systems required by a renewable generated electrical system is factored into the costs of renewable generated electricity, the cost of renewables turns out to be far more expensive than the cost of nuclear generated electricity. If we are confronted with a Sovereign debt crisis, the cost of renewables would be prohibitively expensive, while the cost of advanced nuclear power systems will be low enough to pay for out of current electrical rates. In addition by adopting more advanced nuclear technology, and adopting the thorium fuel cycle, all the objections brought against nuclear power by renewable advocates can be demonstrated to be fallacious. If we want to avoid a climate disaster, we have no choice other than to commit to a massive deployment of nuclear power. Even in the face of a sovereign debt crisis, a massive deployment of LFTRs is possible.

More from The Thorium Alliance Conference

There were a number of other interesting presentations at the Third Thorium Energy Alliance Conference. In particular Edward Kee and Colonel Paul E. Roege offered what amounted too complimentary talks.

Edward Kee offered a talk titled, Global Nuclear Power Developments - Asia Leads The Way. Kee noted

Big stories here:
•China’s nuclear build programme is huge – has the potential to shape world nuclear industry for many decades
•Russia internal build of VVER designs will build credibility for export market
•India’s potential buy of imported LWR designs may change the competitive picture, if EPR, ESBWR, or ABWR (or all of these) get orders
•As new nuclear countries make selections, the aggregate world league table will be important
– countries will look for proven designs with real experience and low costs
– will seek a range of support from vendors (government vendors have edge)

Kee also noted that South Korea, China and India were all planning to sell reactors on the global market. Asian reactors cost less than European or American reactors with the Korean APR-1400 costing only 40% of the cost of the French EPR.

Kee notede the effects of the learning curve on reactor costs.

As more units are built, the costs will be lower (some data show that the 5th or 6th unit of a kind are 40% less expensive than the first unit). As many units are built, the low costs become more certain and buyers will face lower project risk.

Reactor users are often reluctant to be the first purchaser of a new reactor design, because it will typically be the most expensive, and carries the greatest perceived risk. Kee stated,

When buyers share (or take) the risk of early unit costs and delays, shouldn’t these buyers also share some of the upside in future units?

Hard to do this in a commercial arrangement.

The difficulty is also convincing a buyer to be a first mover, taking high costs and risks for early units, when the learning from these early units may well benefit other buyers who move later (or perhaps vendors who keep prices higher).

However, when the units are all in one government build programme, the learning curve benefits and capability building may be more fully captured.

Investing in FOAK units provides benefits in lower costs for the fleet build.

The earlier French nuclear build programme is a model for the current government nuclear build strategy.

This is the capacity (in MWe) of new LWR nuclear plants that were placed into commercial operation in France from 1958 to 2002.

The French linked the nuclear power plant build programme to an internal nuclear industrial development strategy.

Kee noted the problems of the American nuclear industry. Lower demand leads to greater risk and higher costs, which in turn leads to lower demand, and suggests that the solution is to be found in Government involvement in nuclear fleet construction.

When a government is able to build its own integrated nuclear supply industry around a government-ordered large nuclear fleet build, it is possible to achieve significant cost reductions. Also possible are reductions in risk and in schedule, as the integrated supply chain is managed as a single economic entity.

Kee, who is known to be researching the effects of small modular reactors (SMRs) on the nuclear market dod not offer observations on that topic.

Colonel Paul E. Roege of the U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center offered an interesting analysis of the logistic problems confronting the modern U.S. Army and the potential economic benefits of SMRs.

Energy alternatives to produce 50 MW of power in theater
• 3600 gal/hr diesel fuel
• 5 million sq ft of solar array (~100 acres)
• 35t/hr biomass (switchgrass)
• 50 t nuclear reactor

Clearly the Army is interested in the Nuclear choice. Roege pointed some economic advantages of SMRs,

* Total project cost
␣ Smaller plants should be cheaper
␣ Improves financing options and lowers financing cost ␣ May be the driving consideration in some circumstances
* Cost of electricity
␣ Economy-of-scale (EOS) works against smaller plants but can be mitigated by other
economic factors
␣ Accelerated learning, shared infrastructure, design simplification, modular, factory producible,
␣ Cost/KWH- ~ 30-50% less
* Investment risk
␣ Maximum cash outlay is lower and more predictable
␣ Maximum cash outlay can be lower even for the same generating capacity
* Operational Flexibility
␣ Site Selection
␣ Load Demand
␣ Grid Stability
␣ Demand Growth

At the moment, according to Col Roege there are too many competing SMR designs, and many other obstacles to the emergence of of commercial SMRs, but the DoD could emerge as a leader in SMR development. There are clearly national security issues in play, both in terms of energy input into military operations, and in terms of the economic implications of energy technology.

Future Ship Propulsion

Ship propulsion poses one of the more troubling post-carbon problems. It should be noted that ships were once powered by wind energy, sometimes supplemented by oars rowed by slaves. This form of propulsion was very unsatisfactory and renewable energy was replaced by fossil fuel derived energy during the 19th century. There were a variety of motives for phasing out renewable energy.

* Sailing ships required large crews
* Winds were unreliable, making schedules impossible to keep
* Ship size was limited by the limitations of wind power
* Sailing ships were more vulnerable to loss during storms than powered ships
* Wind powered ships had more limited speed
* Wind powered ships were less useful for shipping perishable agricultural products
* Long range travel by wind powered ships was uncomfortable and could take months

Given these factors, it is unlikely that wind energy will successfully replace fossil fuel power in ocean commerce. Solar energy also seems impractical as a means of powering ships. There appears, at present, no serious effort to develop a renewables powered solution to the post carbon shipping problem. The United States Navy is examining expanding the use of nuclear power in its fleet (a tip of the hat to Rod Adams is in order). The Congressional Budget Office has examined the cost effectiveness of conventional nuclear power by the United States Navy. The Navy has fewer costs constraints imposed on it, than commercial shippers do. Thus if something is too costly for the Navy, it is totally impractical for commercial shippers.

The current Naval objection to building nuclear powered surface ships focuses on reactor costs. Conventional nuclear reactors are too expensive.

Estimates of the relative costs of using nuclear power versus conventional fuels for ships depend in large part on the projected path of oil prices, which determine how much the Navy must pay for fuel in the future. The initial costs for building and fueling a nuclear-powered ship are greater than those for building a conventionally powered ship. However, once the Navy has acquired a nuclear ship, it incurs no further costs for fuel. If oil prices rose substantially in the future, the estimated savings in fuel costs from using nuclear power over a ship's lifetime could offset the higher initial costs to procure the ship. In recent years, oil prices have shown considerable volatility; for example, the average price of all crude oil delivered to U.S. refiners peaked at about $130 per barrel in June and July 2008, then declined substantially, and has risen significantly again, to more than $100 per barrel in March of this year.

CBO regularly projects oil prices for 10-year periods as part of the macroeconomic forecast that underlies the baseline budget projections that the agency publishes each year. In its January 2011 macroeconomic projections, CBO estimated that oil prices would average $86 per barrel in 2011 and over the next decade would grow at an average rate of about 1 percentage point per year above the rate of general inflation, reaching $95 per barrel (in 2011 dollars) by 2021. After 2021, CBO assumes, the price will continue to grow at a rate of 1 percentage point above inflation, reaching $114 per barrel (in 2011 dollars) by 2040. If oil prices followed that trajectory, total life-cycle costs for a nuclear fleet would be 19 percent higher than those for a conventional fleet, in CBO's estimation. Specifically, total life-cycle costs would be 19 percent higher for a fleet of nuclear destroyers, 4 percent higher for a fleet of nuclear LH(X) amphibious assault ships, and 33 percent higher for a fleet of nuclear LSD(X) amphibious dock landing ships.

The CBO's cost estimate may be flawed by an overly optimist estimate of the cost of oil, but this is enough to establish that it will be expensive to build a future nuclear powered Navy. We can conclude from this that the cost of conventional nuclear power will impact sea based commerce, and may make the cost of conventional nuclear power impractical.

There are several possible alternative nuclear options which hold the possibility of lowering nuclear costs. These include liquid metal cooled fast reactors, Molten Salt Reactors, Molten Salt cooled solid fuel reactors, and pebble bed reactors. There is some history of liquid metal reactor use for naval purposes. It is not at all clear that liquid metal nuclear technology offers a cost advantage when compared to conventional reactors. In addition the history of liquid metal fast reactor use at sea, suggests reliability problems. In addition there are safety questions about fast reactors. Finally, fast reactors require large inventories of fissionable materials. Large inventories of fissionable materials may limit the number of ships that might be equipped with fast reactors. Thus fast metal cooled reactors may not be the best choice for commercial shipping motive power.

A second alternative nuclear option would involve the use of pebble bed nuclear technology. Gas cooled Pebble Bed Reactors are considered highly safe. However, gas cooled Pebble Bed Reactors have a large core. Large cores increase reactor manufacturing costs. In addition large cores occupy space that could be occupied by cargo or passengers. Liquid salt cooled Pebble Bed Reactors can have far mor compact cores, and manufacturing them would seem to potentially cost less than gas cooled PBRs. Liquid salt cooled PBRs can be refueled with few problems, and require small inventories of fissionable materials compared to fast reactors.

Like Pebble Bed Reactors, Molten Salt Reactors are very safe. They are simple and compact, lowering manufacturing costs. The principal difference between the MSR and the molten salt cooled PBR is that the fuel is disolved in the coolant salt of MSRs, while in molten salt cooled PBRs he fuel in embedded in graphite pebbles. It is easier and probably less expensive to process fission products out of a carrier salt than out of graphite pebbles. Graphite in the MSR core lowers fissionable inventory requirements as it does in PBRs. Thus it would appear that molten salt cooled reactors offer a potentially economical solution to the post-carbon ship propulsion problem.

21st Century Nuclear Challenges: 1 Mass Deployment, A. Coal Replacement

21st Century Nuclear Challenges: 1 Mass Deployment, A. Coal Replacement

The challenge to nuclear energy in the 21st century include:

1. Mass deployment reactors

2. Offering sustainable energy from nuclear sources

3. Offering energy at a low cost

4. Offering safe energy

5. Insuring that the byproducts of nuclear energy production do not cause harm to future generation

6. Insuring that the large scale deployment of nuclear energy does not become contributing factor to the use of nuclear weapons in some future conflict

The problem posed by mass deployment of reactors is primarily one of shifting production technologies. Climate scientists warn us that that continued use of fossil fuels as energy sources, will lead to climate changes that will produce undesirable consequences. Yet even if the climate scientists are wrong about the climate effects of CO2 as a greenhouse gas, Coal fired power plants are waring out, and will have to be replaced all over the world during the next 40 years. Even if climate concerns could be dismissed as climate change skeptics claim, other strong motives exist for the replacement of coal fired power plants, by nuclear powered generation facilities. First, the cost of constructing new coal fired power plants increased rapidly during the next decade, and by the end of the decade no longer offered a competitive price advantage over the cost of conventional nuclear generation facilities. Secondly the cost of coal as a fuel, also rose significantly during the last decade. Price stability for the construction of new coal electrical generation facilities is unlikely, and the cost of coal will probably see further increases making further dramatic rises in the cost of coal generated electricity likely.

In addition the waste problem with coal is far more serious than the waste problem with nuclear power. Coal waste contains far more radioactive materials, and poses more serious management problems than nuclear waste. Coal waste contains massive amounts of radioactive materials, that are not subject to nearly as stringent. The coal waste problem is significant because efforts to remove pollutants from coal smoke, will lead to an increase the amount of toxic waste problem associated with coal fired electricity production.

Thus it is at the very least credible that nuclear power offers significant advantages over fossil fuels to justify the deployment of nuclear powered electrical generation facilities as replacements for old and worn out coal fired generators during the next 40 years. But beyond that arguments in favor of AGW skepticism lacks scientific validity. In response to a paper titled, "450 Peer-Reviewed Papers Supporting Skepticism of "Man-Made" Global Warming," (Now titled 850 Peer-Reviewed Papers Supporting Skepticism of "Man-Made" Global Warming (AGW) Alarmism) Roger Pielke, Jr., wrote,

My attention has just be called to a list of "450 Peer-Reviewed Papers Supporting Skepticism of "Man-Made" Global Warming." A quick count shows that they have 21 papers on the list by me and/or my father. Assuming that these are Hypothesis 1 type bloggers they'd better change that to 429 papers, as their list doesn't represent what they think it does.

What is perhaps amazing is that "Andrew" the author of the 450 9or 850) paper and a number of Andrew's skeptical supporters had the presumption to argue with Roger Pielke, Jr about Andrew's inclusion of Pielke's papers in the list. Piekke responded to "Andrew's" argument by stating,

I always tell my students to define key terms when making an argument. I suggest taking a closer look at that first sentence. Using your logic, you'll find that my papers are also skeptical of the tooth fairy and Santa Claus.

The Pielkes support the view that the determinants of global climate are complex, and for example Greenhouse gases are not the only vector by which people may influence climate. AGW skeptics offer many different positions, contradict each other at key points, and jave not worked through their differences. Many skeptics deny the powerful scientific arguments for the existence of greenhouse gases, and for their role in global climate, while others acknowledge the existence of Greenhouse gases, but argue that the atmospheric concentration of CO2 is too small to effect global climate, while others argue that CO2 can force climate, but other feed back mechanisms triggered by the effects of CO2 increases, counteract ÇO2 related climate forcing. till other "skeptics" argue that while CO2 climate forcing is real, it is unlikely to have a significant effect of the global economy and thus can be ignored.

In the absence of a coherent "skeptical" position, the argument that AGW skepticism is science based appears weak. Finally even if one form of AGW skepticism is shown to be more science acceptable than conflicting versions of AGW skepticism, it is not at all clear that that view is so probable that the mainstream AGW view can be excluded with certainty. Most AGW skeptics appear to assert there views with claims to apodictic certainly, and thus until conflicts between various AGW skeptical positions can be resolved, the probability of AGW skepticism cannot be determined, and thus the likelihood that AGW skeptics are mistaken cannot be ignored.

Thus given the current state of the argument "AGW skeptics" have not presented a definitive case that the so called alarmists are undoubtedly mistake. Thus the AGW skeptics have not presented a case that no risk of AGW exists, and thus that the so called climate alarmists, the people who are concerned about the risk of AGW are beyond all doubt wrong .

The risk of AGW, even if regarded as not a certainty constitutes a sufficient reason for a switch from coal to nuclear power within a prudent time frame. Given other economic, social, and environmental motives discussed in this post, a powerful case can be made that a switch from coal to nuclear power is both prudent and justified. While this switch can be justified by referencing conventional nuclear power technology, I intend to show in later posts in this series that more advanced nuclear technology can offer a number of significant cost advantages over conventional nuclear technology.

About 50% of American electricity is generated by coal fired power plants. While nuclear power plants typically operate 24 hours a day, coal fired power plants typically operate 16 hours a day or so. Some coal fired power plants are shut down on weekend. Electrical demand typically rises during the day time, and stays high into the evening. Many coal fired plants operate on schedules that match day time consumer demands. A power plant that operates 16 hours a day is typically described as providing intermediate level load. 24 hour a day plants provide base load electricity. Nuclear power plants typically operate on a 24 hour a day schedule. But if nuclear power plants are deployed to replace coal fired power plants, we have a problem of economic match. Many estimates place the price of nuclear generated power at a cost that is higher than coal generated electricity. But the cost difference is not huge, and the price of coal is likely to increase substantially between now and 2050.

In addition, the capital cost of new nuclear plants has risen significantly during the last decade and they can be expected to rise even more as government regulations require new coal fired power plant designs to take responsibility for social costs. Thus the cost of design modifications that remove NOx, SOx, and fine particulates from coal smoke will significantly raise coal generated electrical costs and this does not include the cost of carbon sequestration. Markets which consider the risks of nuclear investments without considering the risks of alternative power investments are making large mistakes.

Further we need to consider the cost of renewable alternatives. It should be noted that the cost of wind generated electricity is estimated to be higher than the cost of nuclear generated electricity. But the big flaw in such a comparison is that wind may not blow when it is needed, and often doesn't. Thus wind without storage. The Electrical Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) estimates that only 8.7% of wind capacity can be counted on to fill electrical consumer demand. Thus the real cost of wind generated electricity may be much higher that conventional estimates report, because such estimates do not take into account the cost of providing electricity upon consumer demand.

The costs of solar thermal and solar photovoltaic electricity is significantly higher than nuclear, and PV neither solar thermal or solar PV generating systems can be currently considered as viable candidates for replacing coal generated electricity. Thus among the coal replacement options, only nuclear is a viable candidate. This is not to say tat nuclear power is the best choice but for the moment among the carbon free coal replacement choices, only nuclear power could perform the same grid functions as coal burning electrical plants.

We will need a further alternative, which is to consider the use of natural gas powered generation plants, as coal fired power generator replacements. i will examine two plans, a natural gas and wind plan, and a simple natural gas plan, in a future post.

Finally, we must examine whether a nuclear5replacement of a coal fired electrical generation facilities is possible before 2050. In 1974 the French Government reached the decision to supply the bulk of French electricity from nuclear sources. 54 reactors were completed between 1977 and 1992. The French completed a further 4 reactors between 1996 and 2000.

The cost of the first 54 reactors was reported to be 400 billion Francs or about 105 Billion 2009 dollars. Thus the French created a nuclear powered electrical system that provided between 70% and 80% of their electricity within 18 years of deciding to do so. The population of France at the time was under 60,000,000 or no more that 1/5th the current population of the United States. The United States would have to do no more than match the French nuclear effort between 1974 and 1992 in order to replace its coal fired power plants with nuclear power plants within a 20 year time span. Thus even if the replacement of coal fired power plants is accomplished by the use of conventional nuclear power plants, it can easily be accomplished 20 years before 2050.

The deployment of so many reactors so rapidly, would actually offer a considerable production advantage. Reactor manufacture can be modularized, with factories building parts that can easily be transported to the final construction site, and then assembled with labor savings machinery. The Westinghouse AP-1000 reactor was designed to be built with such a plan. It is designed to be constructed in three years, and thus AP-1000 unit construction will be, if anything, more rapid than French reactor construction between 1974 and 19992.

According to Westinghouse,

The AP1000 was designed to reduce capital costs and to be economically competitive with contemporary fossil-fueled plants. The amount of safety-grade equipment required is greatly reduced by using the passive safety system design. Consequently, less Seismic Category I building volume is required to house the safety equipment (approximately 45 percent less than a typical reactor). Modular construction design further reduces cost and shortens the construction schedule. Using advanced computer modeling capabilities, Westinghouse is able to optimize, choreograph and simulate the construction plan. The result is very high confidence in the construction schedule.

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A rapid build and other economies facilitated by large scale serial production would enable to produce AP-1000 reactors in the united States at a cosy that would be similar too or less than coal fired power plants, with NOx, SOx, and fine particulate controls, and certainly less than coal fired power plants with carbon capture and storage. The cost of these plants would also be less than renewable generating capacity that could produce similar amounts of electricity with similar consumer demand response characteristics.

Peter Braford Slays the Nuclear Straw Man

Peter A Bradford, the author of Honey, I Shrunk the Renaissance: Nuclear Revival, Climate Change & Reality is an anti-nuclear activist, who was early in his career a Carter era NRC commissioner. Bedford is by training a lawyer, and his understanding of nuclear power issues cannot be said to be deep. Like all ideologues, his views are faith based. It is thus a great irony that Bedford introduces an essay by quoting Ron Suskind's famous statement attributed to a Bush aide,

When we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality . . . we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors…and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.

The irony of Suskind's quote was the extent to which the aide had over estimated American power, and had used that over estimate to justify policies which further undermined America's ability to act in the unilateral way the quote envisioned. First of all, there is a Nuclear Renaissance. it is a reality, and it is growing, but not yet in the United States. The Nuclear Renaissance is taking place in Asia, where China and India accept that nuclear power will play a large role in their energy futures, South Korea plans to make the building nuclear power plants for foreigners will be a corner stone for their economy, and the nuclear power industry is also play an important role in the future of Japan. The Nuclear Renaissance is not occurring yet in the United States, but we have to ask, if this is die to some inherent defect in the nuclear power paradigm, or is the tardiness of the Renaissance yet another sign of the rapid decline of the United States as an economic, and political power.

Perhaps the reason Bedford quotes Suskind, is because he is singularly short of quotes which illustrate his claims. For example, Bradford claims,

For the second time in a generation, the nuclear industry is undergoing a breathtaking transit from overblown hope to crushing disappointment.

Yet no where does he offer a quote which illustrates his claim about the nuclear industry's supposed expectation of a breath taking transit. Indeed, had Bradford been energetic enough to google his subject, he would have found the official voice of the American Nuclear Industry, the NEI Nuclear Notes stating,

Here at the Nuclear Energy Institute, we’ve always tried to create reasoned expectations about new nuclear plant construction. We believe the renaissance of nuclear power in the United States will unfold over time, relatively slowly at first, particularly given the inputs to the project development process (not the least of which is limited availability of high-quality construction management expertise). We believe that we’ll see 4-8 new plants in the first wave – in commercial operation by 2015-2016. We also know the rate of construction depends on a range of factors (most beyond our control), including electricity market conditions, the capital costs of nuclear and other baseload technologies, commodity costs, environmental compliance costs for fossil-fueled generating capacity, natural gas prices, customer growth, and availability of federal and state support for financing and investment recovery.

Clearly Eric McErlain of the NEI Nuclear Notes had a very different expectation than Peter Bedford, claims the nuclear Industry had.

So why is Bradford's claim about the expectations of the American Nuclear Industry so far off? The answer is that Bedford has not the slightest interest in the actual views of the nuclear industry. Bradford is interested in creating a straw man, and then setting about bashing his straw man while pretending that he is bashing the nuclear industry. Bradford makes a number of unsubstantiated claims

The good news is that this time reality has set in before hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent to build plants fated eventually to be canceled or to come on line at costs far above the costs of providing the same energy services in other ways.

But he does not offer claims about what energy sources would cost less than NPPs. The NEI Nuclear Notes observes,

These are tough times in the electric power business. The power industry must invest approximately $1 trillion by 2020 to upgrade and expand our electricity infrastructure – new power plants, efficiency programs, transmission and distribution, environmental control technology – at a time when input costs are increasing dramatically.

A recent assessment by the Brattle Group, a well-regarded consulting firm, shows that between 2004 and January 2007, the cost of steam generation plants, transmission projects and distribution equipment rose by 25-35 percent, compared to an 8 percent increase in the GDP deflator. The cost of gas turbines: Up by 17 percent in 2006 alone. Prices for wind turbines: Up by more than $400/kWe between 2002 and 2006. Prices for iron ore up by 60 percent between 2003 and 2006, and for steel scrap up by 150 percent. Aluminum prices doubled between 2003 and 2006, and copper prices almost quadrupled. Much of this is driven by double-digit economic growth in China and India.

These cost increases hit all new power plants – nuclear, coal-fired, gas-fired and renewables. Small wonder that companies are holding back, waiting to see if input costs moderate, before making billion-dollar investment decisions.

Bradford ignores these realities, as well as the conclusions of yours truly, and numerous better qualified researchers, that the cost of renewables will be higher, not lower than the cost of new nuclear power. It is not by accident that Bradford quotes his Vermont Law School colleague, Mark Cooper, on nuclear costs. Cooper, of course, failed to offer a realistic comparison between nuclear and renewable costs.

The reality, as compared to Bradford's faith based hostility to nuclear power, renewables are not cost effective carbon mitigation tools, when compared to the carbon mitigation potential of NPPs. NPPs generate electricity at a lower cost per kWh than renewables do. The only reason renewable power facilities are being built is the ideologically based scam which Bedford and Mark Cooper are peddling to the faithful.

This is not to say that Bradford is completely wrong. The NEI has never claimed that conventional nuclear power offers a comprehensive solution to our post carbon energy woes. Their limitations is also the limitation of the conventional nuclear industry. Bedford observes,

Even within the industry, some innovators are pushing forward next-generation designs for small reactors, for traveling wave reactors, for thorium-based fuel cycles, for converter reactors running on nuclear waste.

Indeed the innovations that will create a true Nuclear Renaissance in the United States are not going to come from GE and Westinghouse, although Babcock and Wilcox seems to understand the need to innovate in order to move forward with nuclear developments.

Bedford makes numerous questionable claims. For example,

The industry must first prove that it can deliver cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

In fact numerous studies have concluded that nuclear power is the most cost effective means of carbon mitigation among proposed generation sources. While conventional nuclear power is clearly more cost effective than renewables as a carbon mitigation tool, it is still not a highly attractive option. The problem is not that nuclear power is a far more attractive option than Bedford suggests, but that renewables are a far less attractive option than he is willing to acknowledge. The truth is that the United States can only begin to restore its status as a world power once it solves the problem of 21st century energy. I have repeatedly pointed to Molten Salt nuclear technology, and in particular the Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor as offering by far the best hope for a future American energy solution. The failure of a Nuclear Renaissance over the next 40 years would be a great tragedy for the American people.

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NUCLEAR ENERGY: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE

My father, C.J. Barton, Sr., and his long time friend and associate, George Parker, were both experts on nuclear safety. My father was also something of an expert on the health effects of nuclear power. He even was loaned for a while by the ORNL Reactor Chemistry Devision to the Health Physics division while he investigated the likely health consequences of nuclear stimulation of Natural Gas. Late in his ORNL career by father took up permeate residence in the ORNL Environmental Studies Division. This article must have been among the last things my father participated in writing prior to his retirement from ORNL. The authors of this 1977 essay have noted global warming as one of the serious consequences from the choice of coal ranter than nuclear power as a choice for the source of energy American electrical generation. One point, that is often overlooked now, is the value of coal as a industrial resource. As I read this article, I had a feeling that a tremendous opportunity had been wasted when we as a nation chose coal over nuclear power 30 years ago. I post this as evidence that nuclear scientists were aware, over 30 years ago of the dangers of Global Warming. Unfortunately their insight was drowned out by coal loving anti nuclear activists like Amory Lovins, and we are still stuck with the problems this essay pointed out in 1977.

From Aviation Medical Bulletin
February 1977

NUCLEAR ENERGY: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE

J.E. Till, C.J. Barton, G. W. Parker Environmental Sciences Division Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830

In your July issue, Dr. H. Curtis Wood, Jr., M.D., a retired obstetrician and gynecologist, published an article in which he classified nuclear energy as "the greatest threat to the human species that has yet evolved" and nuclear radiation as "our greatest health hazard." Here we have a representative of the pro fession which was quick to recognize the usefulness of x-rays and radium for dealing with human health problems - labeling nuclear radiation as our greatest health problem after he discussed nutrition, cancer, heart disease, and arthritis in earlier issues of the Bulletin. It must be assumed that Dr. Wood was referring to potential radiation exposures associated with nuclear energy production and, in our opinion, Dr. Wood has not presented an accurate picture of the risks involved in this growing industry. As scientists who are engaged in both nuclear and non-nuclear research, we would like to address the health effects of the principal energy alternatives available for production of electricity (coal and uranium) and some of the hazards of the element plutonium that were misrepresented in Dr. Wood's article.

Energy, like food and water, is an essential commodity for the survival of modern man. Ultimate selection of the best source of energy involves an evaluation of technological feasibility, economics, availability, and environmental compatibility. Man must determine the sources of energy that most satisfactorily meet these criteria. It is possible to live with less energy and to learn to use energy more efficiently, but we cannot live without it.

Studies have been made of projected energy needs of the U.S. during the remaining years of this century and of the resources that we have available to meet those needs. Potential energy sources include solar wind, and geothermal; however, investigations by Well-informed scientists have shown that coal and uranium are the only feasible solutions to this near term energy problem. From an economic standpoint, nuclear energy costs approximately 30% less to produce than energy from coal.

Coal IS an abundant natural resource in the U.S., and our supplies may last more than 250 years, but the suppress are not inexhaustible. Nuclear energy represents a virtually exhaustible supply of energy if plutonium IS recycled and if breeder reactors are successful. By utilizing nuclear energy to the greatest extent possible, we can preserve valuable and irreplaceable coal supplies, and use them as a source of hydrocarbons for liquid fuel and the manufacture of synthetic maternal.

It is interesting to compare the health and environmental impacts of these important energy sources since we must rely so heavily on them for the next 25 years and perhaps longer. A 1000-megawatt fossil fuel power plant requires approximately 2,000,000 tons of coal per year at the normal use rate (100 train car loads daily), while a similar capacity nuclear plant requires about 140 tons of uranium annually. The environmental impacts associated with mining 2,000,000 tons of coal are more severe than those associated with mining 140 tons of uranium. During the combustion of this coal, approximately 230,000 tons of solid wastes must be disposed of and 50,000 tons of pollutants in the form of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and heavy metals may be released into the atmosphere.

Of primary importance to humans are the sulfur and Nitrogen oxides which are known to cause bronchitis and respiratory infections. Very little is known about the harmful effects of some of the other gases and particulates emitted from coal burning plants. For instance, great concern has been expressed by scientists that the projected release of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion may lead to severe changes in global climate by the end of this century or shortly thereafter. On the other hand, the nuclear fuel cycle may release significant quantities of radioactive gases to the atmosphere and radioactive liquids to the hydrosphere. However, technology is available to contain most of these gases if it becomes necessary, and the potential effects of these radioactive gases and liquids are minimal in comparison to the biological harm associated with emissions from burning coal (variously estimated to be 3 to 125 excess deaths per year from a 1000-MWe coal burning plant).

The philosophy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is to keep radiation exposures to the public from nuclear facilities as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account the state of technology and the economics of reducing exposures in relation to the benefits.

Sold wastes produced at nuclear plants, a matter of public concern, consist of highly concentrated radioactive maternal that must be stored until they have decayed to non-radioactive isotopes. Some of the radio-nuclides will require millions of years to become. completely inert. The long-term storage of radioactive wastes has not yet been demonstrated on a large scale, however, exponential tests have indicated that solid nuclear wastes can be buried deep

underground in salt or in some suitable geological formation. According to Eisenbud (Environmental Radioactivity), the volume of nuclear wastes generated by the entire U.S. nuclear power industry from now until the year 2000 would fit into a cube 84 feet on a side. Although it involves tremendous quantities of radioactive waste products, this relatively small volume of waste products simplifies the disposal problem. In contrast, waste from coal combustion requires large land areas for disposal and toxic chemicals may be leached from the waste and pollute water supplies for years after they have been stored.

Operating experience with a number of nuclear plants has shown that the radiation exposure from radioactivity, which escapes into the environment, is small. Regulations proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency require that the maximum radiation exposure to a member of the public not exceed 25 millirems per year from facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle - which is about 25% of the 102 millirems exposure that the average U.S. citizen receives from naturally occurring background radiation emitted from rocks, soil, and cosmic rays, or 50% of the exposure one receives during an average chest x-ray.

Pilots flying at 35,000 feet between 0-30° latitude for 700 hours each year, for example, receive an addition al 130 millirems of exposure from cosmic radiation because the intensity of cosmic radiation increases with altitude.

The risks attributed to hypothetical nuclear acci dents that could result in irreversible health effects such as genetic injuries or cancer - are much less than the risks man encounters in everyday life. A compre hensive report known as the Reactor Safety Study was published last year in which the risks of death from 100 nuclear power plants producing more than 25 million megawatt-days of electricity annually were compared to other risks in our society. The indivi dual annual probability of death by automobiles in the United States is 1 in 4,000, by air travel 1 in 100,000, by lightening 1 in 2,000,000, and from a nuclear plant accident 1 in 3,000,000,000. Thus the benefits from a nuclear power far outweigh the risks involved, and, from an environmental health point of view, nuclear energy may be more acceptable than burning coal.

Plutonium will be produced as a byproduct in nuclear reactors; however, large scale processing and separation of plutonium from nuclear wastes may occur only if this element is used in reactors as a nuclear fuel. The chemical, environmental, and toxi cological properties of plutonium have been studied thoroughly and are well documented in scientific publications. Since the hazard of plutonium is from alpha radioactivity, which cannot penetrate the skin except when it is punctured - a comparatively rare occupational hazard -plutonium is primarily a hazard if it is swallowed or inhaled. The hazard from inhaled plutonium is approximately 8000 times greater than the hazard from ingested plutonium. And, it is this inhalation hazard that nuclear critics usually refer to when discussing the toxicity of plutonium. However, no known deaths have ever been caused by over ex posure of a nuclear worker to plutonium, and it seems certain that if plutonium were as toxic as critics claim it to be. there would have been some adverse health effects attributed to plutonium intake by workers in the nuclear industry.

Because of its potential in the development of nuclear weapons, stringent controls have been placed on the availability of plutonium. Sensors at nuclear plants can detect as little as 0.5 grams of plutonium. Therefore, it would be difficult to steal enough plu tonium to construct a bomb. Taylor and Willrich in Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards have shown how difficult it is to get plutonium and to make a bomb out of it. More stringent safeguards adopted recently make the theft of plutonium less likely than when the book was published in 1974.

The majority of scientists seem to agree among themselves about nuclear energy and see it as the cleanest, safest, and most economical energy source. We heartily agree with Dr. Wood that responsible citizens should learn enough about nuclear energy to form an opinion. However, this opinion should be based upon information that is factual and lacks emotionalism and sensationalism. As a start, we recom mend the following publications:

H. A. Bethe, "The Necessity of Fission Power," Scientific American, January 1976.

Stanford University Institute for Energy Studies, The California Nuclear Initiative, - Analysis and discussion of the issues, April 1976. Write: Nuclear Analysis, Institute for Energy Studies, 5ODA, Stanford, California 94305 ($3.50).

Jean Briggs, "Don't Confuse Us With the Facts," Forbes (June, 1975).

Nuclear Power and the Environment, Interna tional Atomic Energy Agency. Write: Unipub, Inc., P. O. Box 443, New York, N.Y. 10016.
_________________________________________________
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Operated by Union Carbide Corporation for the Energy Research and Development Administration. Publication number 941, Environmental Sciences Division.

Can we afford to displace CO2 with conventional nuclear energy?

Amory Lovins is a useful foil for the supporters of nuclear power. Lovins often provides the null-hypothesis of the case they wish to make. Thus by the logic of Karl Popper's theory of science, a refutation of Lovins is an argument in favor of nuclear power.

Amory Lovins claimed in 2008,

New nuclear saves 2–20+× less carbon per dollar, ~20–40× slower, than efficiency and micropower investments, Buying new nuclear instead of efficiency results in more carbon release than if the same money had been spent buying a new coal-fired power plant

The second statement is very confused. While it is desirable to spend money on efficiency and on energy production capitalization. Energy production and efficiency are not either/or proposition. While efficient lightbulbs may lower my home lighting costs, efficiency will not generate the electricity to light my house. Thus efficiency cannot be equated to carbon free generation of electricity. Lovins' claims about the carbon savings entailed in efficiency investment has been disputed by David Bradish, Robert Bryce, Vaclav Smil, Peter W. Huber ad Mark P. Mills,

Smil states,

Historical evidence shows unequivocally that secular advances in energy efficiency have not lead to any declines of aggregate energy consumption.

Some time ago, Amory Lovins told Robert Bryce that he would produce an answer to Bryce's criticism of his (Lovins) claims about efficiency. Lovins also promised nearly two years ago to answer David Bradish's criticisms of Lovins' account of efficiency. Again the answers have never appeared. Thus the present state of the debate is that Lovins view that efficiency is more cost effective than nuclear power at displacing CO2 have been sivirly criticized. Critics have raised significant questions about the relationship between efficiency and society wide energy demands. So far Lovins has not answered his critics. Thus claims about the relative carbon displacement capacity of efficiency are at present without a plausible foundation.

We will pass back to the first statement. Since Lovins has not been able to demonstrate that efficiency displaced energy demand on a society wide, macro-economic level, the claim that New nuclear saves 2–20+× less carbon per dollar than efficiency is without foundation. We thus are left with the other half of Lovins claim, that "New nuclear saves 2–20+× less carbon per dollar" than "Micropower investments." Before we can determine if Lovins is correct, we need to decide what the word "micropower" means. The Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines "Micropower

the use of your own equipment and the sun, wind, etc to produce all the heat and power that you need.

We will quickly see that this definition is highly problematic, and that micropower as defined by Lovins has nothing to do with personal ownership. We will also presently see that the term micropower does not exclude fossil fuels, and indeed fossil fuel powered generators are and always have been a part of the definition of Micropower.

Encarta defines Micropower as,

electrical power in small amounts: electrical power generated or used in relatively small quantities, usually close to the location where it is needed.

Again nothing in this definition holds up to scruteny.

David Bradish notes that Amory Lovins defines "micropower" as

distributed turbines and generators in factories or buildings (usually cogenerating useful heat), and all renewable sources of electricity except big hydro dams

Further when Bradish looked at Lovins supplied data on micropower, he found that,

By far the largest non-nuclear source of electricity in the above chart is decentralized generation (the big orange block) which the Excel file calls “Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation.”

“Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation.” What does “Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation.” refer too? According to Lovins it refers to Gas turbines and Diesel and gas turbine generators. So micropower clearly includes the generation of electricity and heat from fossil fuel sources. Bradish also notes when he consults a source of Lovins data, that coal fired co-generation facilities are included. Thus while Lovins does not acknowledge the inclusion of coal fired energy in his definition of "micropower," he entialis it by his choice of sources,

In a second post, Bradish pointed to more problems with Lovins definition of Micropower." He quotes another Lovins' definition of Micropower.

1. onsite generation of electricity (at the customer, not at a remote utility plant)—usually cogeneration of electricity plus recovered waste heat (outside the U.S. this is usually called CHP—combined-heat-and-power): this is about half gas-fired, and saves at least half the carbon and much of the cost of the separate power plants and boilers it displaces;
2. distributed renewables—all renewable power sources except big hydro plants, which are defined here as dams larger than 10 megawatts (MW).

Bradish points out that while Lovins' definition would seem to suggest an upper cap of 10 MWe on "micropower" generators, in fact Lovins sources include data on plants of up to 300 MWe generating capacity. The 10 MWe limit only refers to hydro-electrical generators.

But there are other problems with Lovins definition. For example, definition 1 suggests that "micropower" sources are on site. But Lovins states that all renewables are included in the micropower category. Wind farm solar thermal facilities are rarely located on the site where the electricity they generate is used. Thus the first and second definitions contradict each other. Secondly, the 300 MWe limit David Bradish observed does not appear to be the upper output limit of Lovins' Micropower. Wind facilities of any sized would be included. Thus a 1000 MWe solar thermal plant or wind farm located 1000 miles away from the electrical consumer would fit Lovins definition of "micropower."

Having noted the apparent contradictions in Lovins' definitions of "Micropower" I will move on to attempt a test of Lovins assertion that Micropower is less expensive than nuclear power. Since Micropowe represents a loosely defined class of energy producing technologies, all of which Lovins claims are lower cost than nuclear, it is only necessary to demonstrate that some members of that class are do not cost less than nuclear power in order to demonstrate that Lovins' claim is false.

Since diesel electrical generation would be entailed in Lovins' "Micropower" definition, we will start with a Diesel-nuclear comparison. Diesel fuel costs would run from $0.16 to $0.23 per kWh. Excluding any other estimated cost, this would be an amount substantially greater than the estimated 2016 levelized cost of $0.12 per kWh, for new nuclear, as estimated by the United States Energy Information Agency. The EIA 2016 levelized cost of PV solar, Solar thermal, offshore wind and onshore wind would also be higher than nuclear. Lovins ignores the EIA cost findings are reports older data that suggests higher nuclear cost. No one knows what the actual cost of new energy sources in 2016 will be, but the price trend for all large engineering projects including both reactors and wind farms is up. The EIA levelized cost estimates do not include the cost of backups, grid extensions necessitated by the remote location of nenewable generation technologies, energy storage systems, and other hidden expenses related to intermittent renewable energy use.

Thus Lovins claim that nuclear power would be more expensive is built on a far from conclusive case, and indeed a good case can be made that the levelized cost of conventional nuclear before 2020 will be lower rather than higher than wind and solar.

Lovins charge that the nuclear power plants take 20 to 40 times slower to produce than efficiency and "micropower." We have already seen that the energy benefits of efficiency are at the very least debatable, and that Lovins so far has been unable to answer his critics about the ineffectiveness of energy efficiency. Thus it is far from clear what the significance of claims about fast accomplished efficiencies. Further we have seen that Lovins definition of micropower is confused and inconsistent. Lovins includes in his definition of micropower wind projects that take several years to plan, design and build. In many cases, the simple completion of wind projects is not enough to bring the electricity they produce to market, transmission lines must also be built. And in large wind producing states like Texas, the construction of transmission lines may be delayed for several years after wind projects are up and running. Thus in practice it has not even been conclusively established that less total time is required to bring electricity generated by new wind projects to market, that is required to bring electricity produced by new nuclear power sources to market.

Further discussions of off shore wind projects in the United Kingdom indicate that many projects required by EU mandates for completion by 2020 may not be completed by that date. This period falls into a similar time frame that would be required to conceive of, plan and build a NPP. Thus Lovins 20 to 40 times greater time frame for nuclear appears to be more a number thrown out to make nuclear look bad, than a reflection of well considered realities.

Let us turn now to another Lovins claim found in his essay Forget Nuclear:

[Nuclear power is] also a climate-protection loser, surpassing in carbon emissions displaced per dollar only centralized, non-cogenerating combined-cycle power plants burning natural gas29. Firmed windpower and cogeneration are at least 1.5 times more cost-effective than nuclear at displacing CO2—or about 3 times using the latest nuclear cost estimates.

Nuclear plant operations emit almost no carbon—just a little to produce the fuel under current conditions1. Nuclear power is therefore touted as the key replacement for coal-fired power plants. But this seemingly straightforward substitution could instead be done using non-nuclear technologies that are cheaper and faster, so they yield more climate solution per dollar and per year.

Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive source of electricity, so displacing it is the yardstick of carbon displacement’s effectiveness. A kilowatt-hour of nuclear power does displace nearly all the 0.9-plus kilograms of CO2 emitted by producing a kilowatt-hour from coal. But so does a kilowatt-hour from wind, a kilowatt-hour from recovered-heat industrial cogeneration, or a kilowatt-hour saved by end-use efficiency. And all of these three carbon-free resources cost at least one-third less than nuclear power per kilowatt-hour, so they save more carbon per dollar.

Combined-cycle industrial cogeneration and building-scale cogeneration typically burn natural gas, which does emit carbon (though half as much as coal), so they displace somewhat less net carbon than nuclear power could: around 0.7 kilograms of CO2 per kilowatt-hour1. Even though cogeneration displaces less carbon than nuclear does per kilowatt-hour, it displaces more carbon than nuclear does per dollar spent on delivered electricity, because it costs far less. With a net delivered cost per kilowatt-hour approximately half of nuclear’s, cogeneration delivers twice as many kilowatt-hours per dollar, and therefore displaces around 1.4 kilograms of CO2 for the same cost as displacing 0.9 kilograms of CO2 with nuclear power.

Lets deconstruct these claims. First he claims that firmed wind power is 1.5 times more cost effective than nuclear. The cost of firm wind is usually not advertised, but I calculated it, based on formulas derived from the Archer-Jacobson study of firmed wind. If we assume that in 2010 wind generators cost $2,500 per kW, and that the firm wind capacity factor is .21, the total cost of the firmed wind array, without transmission would be $11.90 per kW, but this figure does not include the cost of backups. In contrast the mid decade cost of nuclear power is estimated to be 8000 per kW. thus in absolute terms nuclear is cheaper than firm wind. But are wind and nuclear equally effective carbon mitigation tools. Ken Hawkins, noting studies from the netherlands and of data from Colorado and Texas, has recently raised questions about the effectiveness of wind as a carbon mitigation tool. After I reviewed data from the The National Renewables Energy Laboratory Eastern and Western grids renewables penetration studies, I found evidence that 20% to 30% wind penetration would basically displace relatively carbon efficient CCGTs rather than the worst carbon offenders on the grid, cola burning power plants. I concluded,

Carbon mitigation with conventional nuclear would thus appear well over 3 times more cost effective compared to carbon mitigation with wind. The true cost effectiveness advantage of nuclear cannot be gaged until we know more about the hidden costs of wind, but the hidden costs appear to extract greater cost penalties at higher levels of wind grid penetration.

Thus argument exist that contradict Lovins claims about the relative carbon mitigation effectiveness of wind. At the moment I do not need to press this case further.

Finally, what of Lovins claim that natural gas is a more cost effective carbon mitigation tool than nuclear? This would appear to be nonsense. Lovins admitts,

Combined-cycle industrial cogeneration and building-scale cogeneration typically burn natural gas, which does emit carbon (though half as much as coal), so they displace somewhat less net carbon than nuclear power could: around 0.7 kilograms of CO2 per kilowatt-hour1

but claims

Even though cogeneration displaces less carbon than nuclear does per kilowatt-hour, it displaces more carbon than nuclear does per dollar spent on delivered electricity, because it costs far less. With a net delivered cost per kilowatt-hour approximately half of nuclear’s, cogeneration delivers twice as many kilowatt-hours per dollar, and therefore displaces around 1.4 kilograms of CO2 for the same cost as displacing 0.9 kilograms of CO2 with nuclear power.

In fact while the EIA levelized cost of natural gas CCGTs is less than nuclearm it is no where near half the cost of nuclear. In fact CCGTs emit about half of what coal fired power plants, do, so the levelized cost of CCGTs must be multiplied by 2 in order to determine their carbon displacement costs. Carbon displacement with natural gas is more expensive per ton than it is with nuclear. Thus Amory Lovins has failed to establish reasonable grounds for his argument against nuclear power.

Nuclear Green in a Nut Shell

I among others have been challenged for taking advocacy positions instead of offering analyses, and listening to people who disagree with my views. Yet I and others, for example Barry Brook, are simply advocating positions we arrived at by analysis after talking to people who hold different views. I came to the conclusion that I advocate by asking how a post carbon grid would operate. I assumed that everything was on the table, but what the climate scientists were telling us we needed to get rid of 80% of our CO2 emissions. I did a brief sector by sector analysis of the energy economy, and determined that the most obvious place to start was the generation of electricity for the grid, the sources of space heat, and hot water, and the replacement of fossil fuels in transportation. Since I was not sure about the elimination of fossil fuels in other sectors. i decided that it would not be wise to assume that the sectors I was ignoring were good candidates for an 80% fossil fuel reduction. This included agriculture, the military, and air and water born transportation.

I concluded that the electrification of rail transportation was practical, and that electrical rail had good potential to replace long range trucking. I further concluded that solar systems could provide hot water in many parts of the country, and that there was good potential to use solar for space heating in some areas. I also noted that in much of the country, air conditioning was the rule in homes, offices and businesses. Although ground source heat pumps are efficient, they are expensive and also expensive to service. Air source hear pumps rely on a technology that is very similar to air conditioning, Replacement cycles for air conditioning systems are such that most of the cost of air source space heating conversion would be covered by the cost of replacing worn out air conditioning systems.

I had some doubts about biofuel replacements for fossil fuels, but I came to the conclusion that batteries and capacitors technology was evolving rapidly enough to replace fossil fuels in non rail surface transportation by 2050. Thus electrification offered a significant part of the solution, and thus it was very important that the decarbinization of the grid would approach 100% by 2050.

I then looked at efficiency, of which much was expected. I quickly discovered that there was a serious conceptual problem with the efficiency solution. Economists have known for 150 years about Jevons Paradox. Jevons a 19th century resource economists, had discovered that greater efficiency in the use of coal lead to more demand for coal. Other economists have noted that if efficiency does not always lead to an increase in energy demand, a rebound effect is quite robust. And thus in the absence of energy price increases efficiency cannot be counted on for big carbon use savings.

I noted that some other people were advocating a simplified lifestyle. Most people, i thought, would prefer to not adopt such a lifestyle. I concluded that the simple lifestyle was likely to lead to greater social conflict, a diminished quality of life, and a lower life expectancy. Some people were pointing to Cuba as a model for a low energy simplified society, but i felt that such a choice came with the cost of political and human rights for the Cuban people, and that most of the people of Cuba would prefer a high energy lifestyle if they could choose. The evidence for this was obvious, Cuba was a dictatorship. The communist party of Cuba maintained control of political power, and was prepared to use violence against anyone who objected.

Thus I felt that there was no alternative to replacing CO2 emitting electrical generation capacity with post carbon electrical sources. I had not ruled out renewables, but I felt that intermittency was a problem to be solved. I looked at the problem of intermittency, and asked renewable advocates what they would do when sun and wind failed. Use the grid for backup they answered. But I asked, I thought we wanted to get rid of carbon sources on the Grid. After they discovered I was not going to accept the Grid answer, they offered efficiency. When i brought up Jevons and rebounds, they turned to backups like batteries, pump storage, and Compressed air storage. I investigated all of these proposed back up technologies and found that they were all expensive and were inefficient to boot. Compressed air storage, required the of natural gas. A further renewable strategy is to create redundant solar and wind facilities, and link them with an expanded grid. The linked system is more likely to provide reliable electricity, than stand alone solar or wind units. However like energy storage backups, the redundancy plan turns out to be more expensive than conventional nuclear power systems. I did offer one novel renewable back up plan. Molten Salt Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors can be built with low prices and have attractive features that makes them useful in peak power.back up roles. LFTRs thus could provide reliable, relatively low cost backups for renewables. But, the LFTRs would be capable of operating full time. Thus it would be cheaper to remove the renewable electrical sources from the system and simply operate the LFTRs full time.

When I calculated the cost of renewables with backup, and compared it to the cost of nuclear power I reached the conclusion that nuclear power was cheaper. Renewable advocates rejected this conclusion. Nuclear has to be more expensive, they said. They complained about how unsafe reactors are. They pointed to the so called "problem of nuclear waste." They raised the issue of nuclear proliferation. They argued that we were running out of uranium.

But i was aware of a Generation IV nuclear technology that could answer all these issues. it was Molten Salt technology, and i knew about it, because my father had worked on it for 20 years. So I reviewed the evidence accumulated in Oak Ridge between 1950 and 1980. i reviewed the ORNL research, and looked at recent discussions. There seemed to be a strong case. Another Generation IV technology, the Integral Fast Reactor appear to also offer viable solutions to many unclear power issues, but is likely to be more expensive and more technologically challenging than MSRs, and objections may be raised on grounds of nuclear proliferation dangers. Generation III and even Generation II nuclear technology appear to be an acceptable bridge, but conventional nuclear technology does not solve all the problems that MSRs and IFRs will solve.

All of my conclusions have come by analysis. I have listened to the advocates of other viewpoints. My analysis points to the following conclusions:

1. Fossil Fuel are on their way out as energy sources.

2. Fossil fuel energy technology will have to be replaced.

3. Efficiency cannot be counted on to replace fossil fuels use.

4. Renewables require back up.

5. Renewables with fossil fuel back up will not meet 2050 carbon emission goals.

6. Renewables with energy storage back ups will be more expensive than nuclear.

7. Renewables with redundancy will be more expensive than nuclear.

8. Nuclear power is a less expensive and more reliable source of post carbon electricity than renewables.

9. Generation IV nuclear technology offers many attractive features, and could solve some or all of the objections now raised to nuclear power.

Since I first completed this analysis, I have reviewed its components on a number of occasions. My reviews continue to demonstrate that my analysis remains sound. During the last 3 years numerous studies related to components of my analysis have been published. These studies point to the same conclusions. Further, these studies have not received effective contradiction. This is the case for my original analysis. There is a growing body of evidence that the renewables paradigm has failed.

My advocacy is primarily based on reports of the findings of my analyses and the analyses offered by others. I believe that those who disagree with us need to offer strong reasons for doing so, or loose credibility. So far they have not done so,