The Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Nuclear Green MSR Plan

Believe it or not when in 2007, I worked out the plan that lies behind all of my work on nuclear Green, I included the possibility that the United States would not be able to pay off its sovereign debt during a period of time when national goals included replacement of fossil fuel energy sources with post carbon energy sources. I assumed that new energy sources would have to be low cost tp build, and low cost to operate. In 2007 when I first attempted to think and talk through the future of American energy, I realized that the international financial situation of the United States was a precarious, and that any energy solution that was likely to work, would, at the very least, not raise energy costs. Yet in order to adopt a renewable energy approach, to fossil fuel replacement we would either be forced to build a large number of redundant renewable energy facilities, in order to provide 24 hour a day energy sources, and greatly expand the electrical transmission grid. Redundancy and expanded transmission facilities were, however not the only added expense required to make a renewable dominated grid reliable. A very large back up energy storage system would also be required. This made a future American renewablees dominated energy system very expensive, and probably not affordable, given the economic situation of the United States.

Renewables advocates suggested that energy efficiency and the continued use of fossil fuel energy backup systems backups could bridge the gap between energy supply and energy demand. But the united states government has carried on programs to encourage greater energy efficiency since the 1970's. And while these programs have meet with some success, they have not succeeded in dramatically lowering American energy demands. Much of the decline in energy United States demands during the last 30 years can be attributed to the shift of energy intense industries off shore. Energy that was once required to produce American consumed goods, is now produced off shore. Moving America manufacture to other countries may make the United States economy look more energy efficient on paper, but it does not reduce global energy demand, nor does it solve the long term problems of the American economy.

Planning for continued use of fossil fuels as an alternative to nuclear power is stupid and self defeating. Climate scientists tell us that we need to reduce global fossil fuel consumption by 80% by 2050 to avoid a drastic climate shift. Yet German Greens prefer building new coal and gas fired power plamys, to continued use of German nuclear plants. Given the problems that an 80% carbon reduction involves, continued use of fossil fuels in electrical generation may not be an option. In addition the emerging economies of India and China require very large amount's of energy, and the prospect of seeing nations such Brazil, Mexico Nigeria, Indonesia and other nations, whose economic development is expected to expand during the next 40 years. We should not expect that any energy required to power newly emerging economic activities will come from from fossil fuels. Nor can we expect renewable energy and efficiency to bridge the energy gap.

Thus leaves us with no option other than nuclear energy if we are to avoid unacceptable emission levels of carbon-dioxide. But what of the complaints that are often made against nuclear energy. I was told when I proposed the nuclear solution in 2007, that the use of nuclear power

* Was not safe and that accidents at nuclear power plants could kill thousands of people
* Produced deadly toxin waste that would be deadly for millions of years
* Lead to nuclear proliferation, and the the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists
* And at any rate was too expensive
* Plus we are running out of nuclear fuel.

I have explored akk of these problems extensively on Nuclear Green. Others including bloggers Kirk Sorensen, Barry Brook, NNadir, and Rod Adams have also offered extensive explorations of these issues. None of these problems seemed unsolvable to me, although I quickly noted that many nuclear power critics seemed singularly uninterested discussing solutions. It also struck me that the critics of nuclear power seemed to exaggerate their complaints. For example, the deadly for million years complaints, might refer to a relatively small amount of actinites from uranium fuel cycle reactors, but it is quite possible to eliminate the production of transuranium elements from Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors almost completrely, and to burn the remining TRUs completely over time. The remaining fission products produced by liftors would be no more radioactive than natural uranium ore after 300 years. There are billions of tons of uranium ore burried in the earth, and it does not seem to be killing people. Thus the dangerous for millions of years claim seems to be a huge exageration.

Much of my knowledge of the nuclear option stems from the fact that my father had worked for nearly 30 years at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. He had made a major contribution to the development of what is today the main stream reactor technology, the Light Water Reactor. He received exactly one dollar from the United States Government for the patent of his discovery, which is used in practically every civilian and military reactor in the world today.

Oak Ridge scientists, including my father, had believed that it would be possible to design and build a far better reactor than the Light Water Reactor which they developed during the 1940's.

After reviewing what scientists had written about nuclear power technology, I came to the conclusion that reactors were not unsafe by any reasonable standard, that nuclear waste did not constitute anything like the hazard that nuclear critics claimed, that civilian nuclear power plants are not useful tools for the development of nuclear weapons, that historically civilian nuclear power had not lead to nations acquiring nuclear weapons, and infacts most nations that had acquired nuclear weapons, had first done so without first developing civilian power reactors, and that almost all nations that built civilian nuclear power plants before acquiring nuclear weapons, had not gone on to acquire nuclear weapons. Thus the evidence from history is that there is at worst only a association between the prior acquisition of civilian nuclear plants, and the aquisition of nuclear weapons proceeds the acqusition of nuclear powered generating plants.

It has proven quite possible for even underdeveloped nations that lack civilian nuclear power facilities, to develop advanced nuclear weapons programs and even develop and test nuclear weapons, and that countries that acquire nuclear weapons in disregard to international treaties, almost always acquire nuclear weapons before rather after they acquire civilian nuclear power. Further nations that acquire civilian nuclear power technology first almost never go on to acquire nuclear weapons.

The traditional arguments against the use of nuclear power offer a very weak case against nuclear power, and the urgency of our need for fossil fuel replacement. Objective evaluations have repeatedly concluded that renewables and efficiency are ineffective substitutes for fossil fuels and will cost far more than nuclear power.

Marcel Coderch Collell, a distinguished Spanish technocrat, has reviewed the possibility of replacing much of the worlds fossil fuel generated electricity by 2030.

Based on United States Energy Information Agency estimates, Collell argues that the business as ususl approach to new electrical generation facilities would not work with the French nuclear generation model. But then of course, the French did not follow a business as usual model when they developed their nuclear electrical generation facilities.

In fact, the French model is to not rely very much on renewable energy, but we will allow Senior Collell latitude in making his point. He describes the French Model

One of the first options to consider would be to follow the French model and gradually increase the number of reactors to produce a good deal of the world’s electricity by 2030 or perhaps a little later. This would take the pressure off fossil fuels and, in principle, would not require technical innovations of any kind. Electricity would be produced emission-free, based either on nuclear or renewable sources. This would save enormous amounts of natural gas and coal, as well as considerable oil, thus reducing emissions and perhaps putting downward pressure on fossil fuel prices (or at least keeping them steady), while making non-renewable fuel available for a longer period.

But is the French model to gradually increase the number of reactors, Or did the French embark on a crash reactor building program during the 1970's and 80's? Historians say that the French embarked on a deliberate, reactor crash building program.

Senior Collell then suggests that in order to follow the nuclear French model by 2030,

4,740 new 1GWe reactors would have to be built and [one] put in operation every two days for the next 25 years.

Senior Collell then offers a reflection on the difficulty of this task in a business as usual world.

An optimistic estimate of construction times (five years) would mean having 950 teams of technical specialists, workers and machinery simultaneously working full time. This is hard to imagine, despite talk of standardising designs. In the previous period of nuclear construction (1963-88) only 423 reactors were built, at a rate of 17 per year.

He also argues that fuel shortages would constrict the depolyment of such a large reactor fleet.

A simple calculation suffices to show how an extension of the French model would collide with a scarcity of uranium. This is old news, given the serious doubts that already exist regarding the availability of uranium even to feed a few more reactors than now exist. In 2004, 365 GWe of nuclear capacity consumed about 67 kt of uranium (approximately 180 tons of uranium per GWe per year), of which 36 kt came from currently operating mines, while the rest came from recycled nuclear weapons and other secondary sources (that is, from prior production). Supply forecasts for the reactors currently in operation (plus foreseeable growth) put uranium mining production at 50 kt per year in 2015, with a significant shortfall developing in 2010, by which time Russia's nuclear weapons will have been dismantled and their uranium will have been consumed, . . .

If we assume linear growth from the current 365 GWe to 4,959 GWe in 2030, uranium demand would be around 400 kt in 2015 and 700 kt in 2030. This means multiplying by eight today’s estimates of production capacity in 2015, and multiplying by fifteen for 2030.

In fact, scientists have been forcasting a uranium shortage for a long time, and so far it has not happened. Nuclear Green has reviewed the evidence that vast amounts of recoverable uranium and thorium are avaliable in the earth's crust. Infact enough recoverable nuclear fuel is avaliable to make nuclear power for all practical purposes a sustainable resource. This has been known for a long time.

Alvin Weinberg recored,

“At the April 28, 1944, meeting of the New Piles Committee, Phil Morrison had reported the known reserves of uranium at workable concentration to amount to only about 20 000 tons. With so little fuel, nuclear energy based only on the 0.7 per- cent of uranium-235 in natural uranium could hardly amount to much. Morrison also pointed out at this meeting that the vastly larger amount of residual uranium in the granites could be burned with a positive energy balance—but only if used in a breeder.”

According to Weinberg, Morrison added that

more work should be done on the nuclear development of thorium because of its greater availabil- ity and also suggested experiments, . . .

Weinberg records Morrison's excitement when,

Morrison showed me his calculations . . .

What Morrison demonstrated to Weinberg was that,

if uranium (was) burned in a breeder (reactor), the energy released through fission exceeded the energy required to extract the residual 4 ppm of uranium from granitic rocks.

Despite the long standing evidence of science Senior Collell insists we will quickly run out of nuclear fuel.

Senior Collell sees these facts as casting the nuclear build out on the horns of a dilemma.

Let us suppose, however, for argument’s sake, that it were possible to achieve a production capacity of 700 kt/year by 2030. In the context of this analysis, two questions are raised: first, the CO2 emissions that would be generated in this phase of the nuclear cycle. Given the amount of uranium necessary, it would almost certainly be necessary to make use of hard rock deposits and low concentrations.

There are fortunately multiple flaws in this argument. First the rock does not have to be moved in order to be mined. Low energy mineral recovery technologies are avaliable to miners. Uranium miners are increasingly adopting a mining technique called in situ leaching. When in situ leaching is practiced on uranium ore, the primarily the uranium is extracted, and the rock is left in place. Thus contrary to Senior Collell, a low energy technology is avaliable that would permit the recovery of a huge amount of uranium with a favorable energy return for energy invested.

The problem that Senior Collell is pointing to is the limitation of the Light Water Reactor. Light Water Reactors were first developed as a means of powering American Nuclear submarines. In American Nuclear Submarines LWRs are small, they provide reliable power for 15 years, after which their cores can be replaced. Submarine reactors are expensive, but nothing can serve as a substitute . Large power reactors can be even more expensive and they are very fuel inefficient. Part of the problem has to do with the flaws in the Uranium cycle. In LWRs as little as 0.3% of the potential fuel gets burned, and the rest falls into a category called "nuclear waste." The problem is that uranium is relatively cheap, so it cost less to seperate out the good stuff, the U-235 and use it for nuclear fuel. A tiny fraction of the 95% to 97% of the fuel gets converted to fissionable Pu239, and a fraction of that gets burned as nuclear fuel. Unfortunately Pu-239 is not very good fuel in LWRs.

French Scientists from the University of Grenoble are aware of the problem. In "Scenarios with an Intensive Contribution of Nuclear Energy to the World Energy Supply," H.Nifenecker, D.Heuer, S.David, J.M.Loiseaux1, J.M.Martin, O.Meplan, and A.Nuttin, maintain that

If carried out with PWR or BWR reactors, the important nuclear power deployment will make heavy demands on natural Uranium resources. Resources are, presently, estimated to be around 20 Million tons. Assuming PWR or BWR reactors, the cumulative needs in 2050 could reach 16 million tons. This shows that breeding reactors are necessary to meet the needs or, alternately, that Uranium would have to be extracted from sea water, at a significant cost.

These considerations may, however, probably exaggerate the Uranium shortage. Certainly when the huge global thorium stock is added to recoverable uranium there will be no shortage of nuclear for a long time to come. Alvin Weinberg relates how the possibility of a future global uranium shortage was understood by the founding fathers of the Nuclear age, including Enrico Fermi, and Eugene Wigner.

At any rate I am not going to contend with the not enough uranium argument. Even if there is enough uranium, the French analysis is fairly sound for other reasons, which I have pointed out on Nuclear Green. In "Intensive Contribution," the French team reviewed two possible breeding cycles:

* The U-Pu cycle using fast reactors
* The Th-U cycle using thermal reactors

This analysis was expanded with typical French thoroughness in "worldwide deployment," if anyone is interested. Both "Intensive Contribution," and "Worldwide Deployment" came to the same conclusion, that a deployment of Light Water Reactors can only be sustained until 2030. Lets call this the conservative case. Conservative, in that it is based on very conservative estimates of global uranium resources. While far more generous Uranium resources are justifiable, they are by no means certain. A really plausible plan should make conservative assumptions. If generous assumptions do not pan out, then the plan can be altered in to reflect a better than expected resource picture.

The nuclear intensive plan would assume a nuclear build out to 3387 GWe of electrical generating capacity by 2030. This is, in itself an enormous and extremely daunting build out, and indeed suggests that a major revolution in nuclear manufacturing technology will be required. Fortunately many of the components of that revolution are already understood, and none of them represents a serious impediment to technological change. Factory production of reactor construction kits, together with on site labor saving machines, and new materials savings reactor designs can be expected to improve reactor manufacturing, labor, time and materials efficiencies during the next decade, and to be reinforced by a learning curve. Such a large build out will probably require a shift of many reactor manufacturing activities from the final manufacturing site to factories. The recycling of old steam plant locations as nuclear power stations sites, will also save money and time for the buildout.

Thus while ambitious, the 3387 GWe buildout by 2030 is still not impossible, but the goal must be set soon. Both "Intensive Contribution," and "Worldwide Distribution" then looked at the U-Pu fast reactor cycle. By 2030 an enormous amount of reactor grade plutonium will become available. This RGP can be put to use both in the production of nuclear power and in the breeding of more reactor fuel. Doing so would serve as at least a partial solution to what is commonly seen as a major problem for nuclear power, the so called nuclear waste problem. Indeed the reuse of nuclear fuel turns "nuclear waste," into an asset. "Intensive Contribution," argues that given the supply of plutonium for LWRs and fast breeders, a buildout to 9000 GWe by 2050 is possible.

"Worldwide Deployment" looks at a number of added options including burning recycled RGP in LWRs. This delays, perhaps for a hundred years, but does not prevent the eventual draw down of fissionable materials that are tied to a non-breeding nuclear economy. A better use of the RGP is

Thus the transition to some form of nuclear breeding will be inevitable, if a long term commitment to nuclear power becomes a matter of policy.

Fast sodium cooled reactors are often viewed as the preferred method of nuclear breeding, although various Molten Salt Reactor breeding options exit, and include many attractive features that are more than competitive with what liquid sodium cooled breeder reactors such as the Integral Fast Reactor. IFR backers claim higher breeding ratios, but the compatibility of those high breeding ratios with optimal safety has, as of yet to be confirmed.

"Worldwide Deployment" also reviews a gas cooled fast reactor option, but did not like it as well as the sodium cooled concept.

"Worldwide Deployment" foresaw global energy demands for the equivalent of 18 Billion tons of oil by 2050. Even with stockpiling massive amounts of RGP, and using it to start Sodium Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors, "Worldwide Deployment" concludes that there will not be enough fast breeders to meet world energy demand after 2080. Hence, we must turn to Thorium fuel cycle Molten Salt Reactors.

The argument that nuclear power was too expensive, does not seem rational because when the cost of redundancies, new transmission systems, and energy storage systems required by a renewable generated electrical system is factored into the costs of renewable generated electricity, the cost of renewables turns out to be far more expensive than the cost of nuclear generated electricity. If we are confronted with a Sovereign debt crisis, the cost of renewables would be prohibitively expensive, while the cost of advanced nuclear power systems will be low enough to pay for out of current electrical rates. In addition by adopting more advanced nuclear technology, and adopting the thorium fuel cycle, all the objections brought against nuclear power by renewable advocates can be demonstrated to be fallacious. If we want to avoid a climate disaster, we have no choice other than to commit to a massive deployment of nuclear power. Even in the face of a sovereign debt crisis, a massive deployment of LFTRs is possible.

The IPCC and Greenpeace: The Implausible Case for 80% Renewables

Renewables advocates including the anti-nuclear fanatics of Greenpeace live in a land of unreality. Brave New Climate has recently published yet another Ted Trainer critique of renewables, this one of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group 111, Mitigation of Climate Change, Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Mitigation. June, 2011. Greeenpeace actually was a major source of the IPCC Renewables report and Trainer wastes no time in demonstrating that the report is an example of the sort of problematic energy planning we have grown to expect from Greenpeace. Trainer states,

The report does not show that renewable sources can meet future energy demand, or a large fraction of it. It is not that its attempt to show this is unsatisfactory; the point is that it does not offer a case; it does not attempt to show what proportion of demand could be met by renewables. It presents much evidence relevant to the issue, but this is not put together into a case which sets out reasoning leading to the conclusion that the necessary quantities could be provided, how they could be provided, and that the difficulties could be overcome. The report merely presents the results of some studies which state conclusions about renewable energy’s potential, without attempting to assess their worth. It is argued below that the main such study, on which the WG3 report relies heavily, is deeply flawed, is of little or no value and does not establish its claims.

Trainer adds,

There is no critical examination of the 164 studies. There is no list of the studies enabling their examination. (There is a list which seems to be of 16 research groups carrying them out.) It is not explained how they were selected; it is said that they were not randomly selected. Were only optimistic studies selected? There is no reference to any of (the few) studies that I am aware of as having been published doubting the capacity of renewable energy to meet demand. (These include Hayden, 2004, Trainer, 2007, 2010a, Moriarty and Honnery, 2010.) A satisfactory review would have presented the details from an IPCC working group reporting on their thorough critical examination of all, or a representative selection of, the reports to determine whether their quantitative conclusions were sound or plausible and whether the difficulties had been dealt with. There is no analysis of this kind. In other words the IPCC has not carried out an evaluation of literature in the field; it has only summarised the conclusions of (a select number of) studies, with no apparent effort to check on their validity.

Trainer argues that the report suffers from numerous glaring flaws, and ignores significant problems for renewable energy schemes,

there is a much bigger problem, on which the report does not comment. The greatest challenges set by variability of wind and sun concerns the gaps of several days in a row when there might be no sun or wind energy available across large regions, including continents.

Trainer then documents the extent of the problem, by listing and briefly describing research studies which the IPCC renewables report ignored.

Clearly these lengthy periods of calm are not rare or of minor significance. For several days in a winter month in good wind regions there would have to be almost total reliance on some other source. The considerable capital cost implications of having a back up system capable of substituting for just about all wind capacity . . .

”reliably” in this context means 95% probable and the crucial point concerns what can happen in the remaining 5% of the time, which is 17 days of the year. As the above cases show it is very likely that what can happen is the occurrence of long periods with negligible wind. Thus the probability of a loss of load event might be very low, but if and when it happens the entire wind contribution would have to be made up by some other source, and as Lenzen notes the capital cost of this provision should be accounted to the wind system.

Trainer points out the problem of redundancy with renewables,

Optimistic claims re the potential of renewable energy (e.g., Stern, 2006, The World Wide Fund for Nature, 2010, Zero Carbon Britain, 2007, Greenpeace International and European Renewable Energy Council, 2010), typically fail to recognise the need for large scale redundancy in generating capacity, caused by the fact that often one or more component systems will not be contributing much if anything. For instance, when the availability of solar energy is low, enough wind capacity (or some other source) would have to have been built to make up that deficiency. When there is little wind there would have to be on hand sufficient solar generating capacity to meet the deficit. Thus total system capital cost might be several times what at first seemed to be required.

Trainer points to the problems posed by the non dispatchable nature of Wind and Solar. Both require large scale storage in order to be viable.

Again there is discussion of this issue, reviewing (superficially, some) options, but it does not help much in assessing the possibility of a global renewable energy supply system. Such a system would have to rely heavily on very large scale storage of electricity, which is not possible at present and is not foreseen. The report does not contradict this view. The formidable difficulties are recognised briefly (Chapter 8, p. 41), in a sentence which actually says it is questionable whether solutions will be found. Again the seriousness of the issue is not brought out; if very large scale storage of electricity is not possible (or affordable) then it is difficult to imagine how utopian renewable energy scenarios could be achieved. . . .

Solar thermal systems are planned to have 17 hr storage. If a solar thermal power station was to b e cap able of maintaining supply through four cloudy days it would need 96 hour storage. The IEA says the cost of present solar thermal storage capacity, usually c. 6-7 hours, makes up about 9% of plant cost, so a 96 hr storage capacity would add more than the cost of another 1/5 solar thermal power stations.

However the key question here is whether solar thermal heat storage capacity could enable an entire electricity supply system to continue delivering through a four day period of no wind or sun. If wind, PV and solar thermal were each delivering one-third of supply then the storage task for solar thermal would have to correspond to 3×96 hours, multiplied again by the additional capacity to deal with peak demand. In addition solar thermal power blocks would have to be three times normal size, adding to capital costs.

This should be quite enough to demonstrate that Ted Trainer's reasoning about renewable energy runs on the same track mine does. The BNC discussion of Dr. Trainer's essay is also worth reading. John Morgan pointed to a discussion of Greenpeace propagandist Sven Teske role in selecting the studies that survey as background for the critical chapter 10 of the IPCC report. Among the studies which Teske picked out for special attention was his own Energy [R]evolution. The IPCC has more than its share of enemies, including the fanatic climate science denier, Steve McIntyre who quickly picked up on the IPCC-Greenpeace connection. McIntyre has decent research skills and quickly uncovered connections between the IPCC, Greenpeace and the Renewable Energy Industry.

Left-wing, pro-nuclear environmentalist, Mark Lynas clearly saw the implications of McIntyre's attack. The press release issued by the IPCC along with the Renewbles report stated,

Close to 80 percent of the world‘s energy supply could be met by renewables by mid-century if backed by the right enabling public policies a new report shows.

Thus, the most extreme Greenpeace claims about the future effectiveness of renewables are advanced by by global headlines in stories about the IPCC report. The message that the public an policy makers are most likely to receive is that the IPCC, an august scientific organization, believes that government policies should be designed to produce 80% renewable energy by 2050, and that goal is both realistic and feasible, and is recommended by the IPCC. The implications of this impression for the OPCC are terrible. Left uncorrected they can destroy the IPCC's credibility.

Mark Lynas commented,

I don’t know about Steve McIntyre, but speaking for myself I would have been delighted had the IPCC’s Working Group 3 been able to offer a credible assessment of the potential for scaling up renewable energy – as opposed to, or in combination with, other mitigation options like nuclear, fossil fuels with CCS and so on. That Greenpeace’s “revolutionary vision” ended up headlining the whole thing is a tragedy, because – in a PR disaster any half-brained PR flack should have spotted a mile off – they have undermined the very cause they sought to promote.

Lynas is hardly an enemy of renewables and indeed goes on to state.

Personally I think that 80% of the world’s energy probably could be met by renewables by mid-century – but the IPCC’s renewables report singularly fails to demonstrate that.

Lynas is, of course, far to kind to renewables, as Dr. Trainer demonstrates.

In fact Dr. Trainer has asked important and valid questions about a high penetrations renewables dominated electrical systems. Those questions need to be answered before the credibility of a renewables dominated electrical system can be regarded as established. The IPCC to its discredit, allowed wholly implausible claims about future renewables effectiveness to be advanced in its name.

Reverse Engineering the Future of Energy: Energy Sector Needs

This post is the fourth in a series on energy plans. The first post focused on a renewable based energy plan for Australia, the Zero Carbon Australia 2020 plan. Many critics have pointed to major flaws in that plan, while plan authors have been unable or unwilling to provide comprehensive answers to their critics. A second post related the history to draft a Thorium Grand Plan. Although the Thorium Grand Plan has never been drafter in its entirety, elements of such a plan exists, and interest continues in completing the Thorium plan. The third post offered a reverse engineering approach to 2050 energy plans, and concluded that 2050 energy plan would be unlikely to succeed unless unless they included nuclear power.

Climate scientists tell us that carbon dioxide emissions from energy inputs into human activities need to decline by about 80% between now and 2050 in order to prevent dramatic shifts in global climate, with potentially catastrophic consequences. In addition as patterns of rapid industrialization are emerging in developing nations such as China and India, and their increasingly affluent populations are adopting high energy lifestyles, limits in the fossil fuel supply form a second focus of concern. It seems unlikely that global fossil fuel production will meet future energy demands. In addition, several other issues point to a need to replace fossil fuels as energy sources, to a more acceptable and sustainable energy base. These include environmental consequences, quite apart from climate change, of fossil fuel use, the consequences of fossil fuel use for human health, the economic costs of fossil fuel importation, and the opportunity costs of fossil fuel dissipation by energy sectors of the economy. The fossil fuel stocks are important resources of the chemical industry, and reserving the fossil fuel stocks for use by the chemical industry, would appear to offer a better use of what is in reality a group of limited assets.

The health consequences of fossil fuel use, frequently receive limited attention, but in fact the costs are significant. A recent report by the National Academy of Science, titled Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use, found that the hidden, health related costs of burning fossil fuel in the United States, ran about $120 Billion a year, according to Matthew Wald of The New York Times. These health related costs can be attributed to the burning of both coal and oil, yet the two industries do not bare the costs. There were significant gaps in the study. According to Matt Wald of the New york Times,

the study (did not) measure damage from burning oil for trains, ships and planes. And it did not include the environmental damage from coal mining or the pollution of rivers with chemicals that were filtered from coal plant smokestacks to keep the air clean.

The study also reported that the burning of fossil fuels cause a large number of deaths among Americans,

Nearly 20,000 people die prematurely each year from such causes, according to the study’s authors, who valued each life at $6 million based on the dollar in 2000. Those pollutants include small soot particles, which cause lung damage; nitrogen oxides, which contribute to smog; and sulfur dioxide, which causes acid rain.

Wald also noted that

Coal burning was the biggest single source of such external costs . The damages averaged 3.2 cents per kilowatt-hour, compared with 0.16 cents for gas. But the variation among coal plants was enormous.

The worst plants, generally the oldest and burning coal with the highest sulfur content, were 3.6 times worse than the average, with a cost of nearly 12 cents per kilowatt-hour (which is more than the average retail price of that amount of electricity).

What of nuclear power?

The study found that operating nuclear plants did not impose significant environmental costs, although uranium mining and processing did. But 95 percent of uranium mining takes place in other countries, the study said.

Thus advocates of Generation IV closed nuclear fuel cycle technology, can point to significant environmental benefits obtained by limiting mining requirements.

Thus even without the potential menace of climate change, there are serious reasons for switching from fossil fuel based energy sources to non-carbon emitting sources.

Thus the goal of any reverse engineered future energy plan is the replacement of some or all fossil fuel energy sources. If concerns about a postulated link between carbon emissions and potential climate change are to be taken seriously, the reduction of fossil fuel use by 2050 may equal as much as 80% of the current fossil fuel use. However, even if this goal is not immediately meet, it may be possible to make significant cuts in fossil fuel use by quickly beginning to replace the worst health and safety offenders among the fossil fuel burning plants.

Planning is important

The primary sectors this plan will address are electrical generation, transportation, industrial process heat, and space and water heating and chilling.

Industries use a great deal of energy. According to the the United States department of energy, industries use over 1/3 of American energy consumption. Most energy currently used in American Industries comes from fossil fuels. Fossil fuel use can be cut by recourse to greater efficiency, but efficiency alone will not solve all of the problems related to industrial energy use. Nor can all of those problems be solved by conversion to electricity as an energy source.

Process heating, while not the only industrial energy use, is vital to many industries. The manufacture processes of basic materials such as steel or cement are dependent on heat. Currently that heat is primarily produced by burning fossil fuels, but in a post carbon economy this would not be possible. There is a short list of alternative process heating technologies. There are only two: Solar thermal and advanced high temperature nuclear. Of those two, solar thermal is far, far more limited. First, solar thermal energy is constricted by clouds. Thus solar thermal energy facilities require environments that are almost entirely cloud free. Thus industrial facilities that require ST source heat would be restricted to the Southwestern United States, where water resources are scarce. This in itself would be a serious, probably fatal, flaw to the idea of using ST energy for process heating, but there is another devastating flaw to the idea. ST energy production varies seasonably, with far less energy available during the Fall and Winter than during the Spring and Summer. Thus industries using ST energy for process heating, would face serious shortfalls for half of the year, while encountering energy over production for the other half.

While renewable energy advocates have proposed the use of ST energy for industrial process heating, they have yet to think through its liabilities, a familiar error in renewable energy post carbon plans. A third flaw in the use of ST energy in industrial process heating, is its costs. Solar Thermal energy sources are currently over twice as expensive as conventional nuclear technology. But in addition, there are proposals for reactors intended to produce industrial process heat, either directly or indirectly, that are estimated to cost only half the cost of conventional power plants, while producing heat of 1000 C, or even higher. Thus arguments that ST designers will eventually pull a rabbit out of their hat in the form of low cost ST technology, appear to not be decisive, because paths to far lower cost high temperature, low cost nuclear technology are known.

A second proposal comes from the most recent edition of the Greenpeace energy plan, Energy [R]evolution. In addition to noting the possible use of ST energy by industries situated in the Middle East, Energy [R]evolution (2010) suggests

fossil fuels for industrial process heat generation are also phased out more quickly and replaced by electric geothermal heat pumps and hydrogen.

Indeed ground source heat pumps are excellent, highly efficient means of space and water heating or cooling buildings, but I can find no evidence that ground source heat pumps and produce the sort of temperature required to melt steel. The word hydrogen is magic

for most renewables backers. But one renewables advocate, who is trained as a scientists, Joe Romm points to the serious problems of hydrogen. According to Romm hydrogen is

* An unusually dangerous fuel
* Very leaky
* Odorless (probably unfixable)
* Invisible and burns invisibly
(“A broom has been used for locating small H2 fires”)
* Highly flammable (cell phone, or lightning can trigger fires)
* Hence: onerous codes and standards
* HYDROGEN SELF-COMBUSTS!

We will not proceed further than the leak problem. The tiny hydrogen molecule simply leaks through any container. Not only does hydrogen escape containment, but hydrogen weakens the metal walls of any container, so that eventually if hydrogen is kept under pressure, the container will burst. There are solutions to the hydrogen storage and transportation problems, but they add to expenses, and they add to the complexity of hydrogen based solution. It is also possible to manufacture hydrogen with high temperature reactors, with a significant advantage, the reactor can be located on the industrial site where the hydrogen is to be used, thus the hydrogen can be immediately used to provide industrial heating, thus solving the hydrogen storage problems. The fire related problems of hydrogen can be solved if hydrogen leaks can be prevented.

Thus the Greenpeace suggestions for renewables based solutions to the industrial process heating problem, are either not viable, or far more problematic, complex and expensive than advanced reactor based solutions appear to be. Indeed the Greenpeace "Energy [R]evolution" attempt to plan a renewables based solution to the industrial process heat problem represents a reduction ad absurdum of the Greenpeace scheme to replace nuclear energy with renewables.

I have chosen to look at the industrial process heat from a reverse engineering standpoint, because it would appear that only nuclear power can be successfully be substituted for fossil fuels as a source of industrial heat. Unless this conclusion can be shown to be wrong, this conclusion demonstrates that the development and use of advanced nuclear technology will be required in order to continue industrial civilization in a post carbon era. It further demonstrates that a renewables only approach to future energy planning may not be, and probably is not viable. Future energy plans that do not acknowledge the importance of nuclear technology are likely to be doomed to failure.

All energy plans focus a great great deal of attention on electrical generation. Yet some problems which future post-carbon electrical generation plans should addressed are partially or completely ignored by renewable plans, and even plans involving the large scale deployment of conventional nuclear power. These problems are are basically related to how variations in electrical demand are handled, and backup systems for renewable generated electricity. Peak electrical demand occurs during the day, and during days of exceptional winter cold or summer heat. During such days, electrical production units, often kept in reserve for most of the year are brought online, to fill the gap between ordinary electrical demand, and exceptional climate driven peak demands. A second problem is that of standby back up power. That is generation units that are are operated in such a way hat they can be quickly brought online if the generation units unexpectedly shut down or are forced to shut down. The operation of quickly brought on line back up generation capacity plays an important role in maintaining grid stability. Without such a reserve, sudden but inevitable problems with operating generation facilities could easily bring the whole grid down. A massive grid collapse is a highly undesirable event that can cost the economy a large amount of money, as well as create social chaos. . The August 14-15, 2003 a blackout shut down many cities in the North Eastern and Middle Western United States and Eastern Canada. Cost estimates vary, but the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association (OMA) estimated the direct costs of the blackout on Ohio manufacturers to be $1.08 billion. Numerous large manufacturing plants were shut down for a day. Ontario set asside $75 million to compensate local governments for their blackout related expenses, and lost revenue. Utilities lost between one and two billion dollars, and the total losses for the day long blackout may have been as high as $10 billion. Thus grid operators are charged with maintaining grid stability. Back up generation is part of the stability system.

Both problems at present are largely handled by gas fired generators, although some of the seasonal reserve generation capacity comes from old, inefficient coal fired power plants. Natural gas fired power plants produce less CO2 than coal fired power plants, and natural gas fired power plants are often preferred for peak demand and seasonal demand generation roles, as well as back up roles.

Renewable dominated electrical generation systems pose significant problems for meeting peak demand, and in providing system backup. A number of renewable only based post carbon energy plans, for example the Greenpeace "Energy [R]evolution" offer the continued use of natural gas in peak load, and backup roles. Although offering improvements over the carbon emissions of the current electrical generation system, whether a natural gas "bridge" system is consistent with the 80% carbon-reduction goals of our reverse engineered 2050 energy system. One of the major benefits of a reverse engineering approach is that it allows us to identify approaches that are likely to fail.

Renewables advocates argue that the limitations of wind can be countered by adding solar generation to the renewables mix. But given the limitations of renewables, renewable advocates have found only three methods of making renewables reliable:

1. Burn a lot of natural gas whenever renewable generated electricity is in short supply.

2. When renewable output is high, save the surplus in some form of energy storage.

3. Build transmission systems from areas where surplus generation is possible, to areas where electrical supplies would be inadequate due to the limitations of local renewable resources.

Each of these approaches has serious flaws. The first approach is unsatisfactory because it fails to eliminate carbon emissions from the electrical generation system.

The second approach is advocated by a report titled Energy Self Reliant States (Second Edition is available online). The word storage is repeated over and over in this report:

Very high penetration rates will require new developments in electricity storage. . . .
establish a system of widely distributed and abundant storage that would change the very underpinnings and assumptions of an electricity system designed without storage in mind. . . .
Some renewable fuels, like sunlight and wind, are variable. Thus the estimates, especially for wind, assume a significant level of storage or on-demand distributed generation. . . .
sufficient electricity storage . . .
sufficient electricity storage . . .
These investments should be designed to allow the integration of many variable and dispersed generators as well as growing amounts of distributed storage. . . .
To achieve very high proportions of our electricity from variable renewable energy sources will require very significant amounts of storage and/or a restructuring of our electricity system to rely on more natural gas-fired distributed backup generators. The electricity storage sector has seen many technological and commercial developments. This report does not examine storage and its implications but in our analysis of variable renewable energy potential we assume sufficient storage is available. . . .

The report argues:

that a new extra high voltage inter-regional transmission network may not be needed to improve network reliability, relieve congestion and expand renewable energy. The focus should be on upgrading the transmission, subtransmission and distribution systems inside states. These investments should be designed to allow the integration of many variable and dispersed generators as well as growing amounts of distributed storage. New in-state transmission lines may well be needed but these will probably be lower voltage lines. In any event, they should be built only after maximizing energy efficiency and the use of existing transmission capacity.

Energy efficiency and demand reduction, as well as the use of distributed generation, can free up significant amounts of distribution and transmission capacity.

But what would such a storage system cost? Tom Konrad. a renewables advocate suggests that

On a national basis, such storage would cost an estimated $13 Trillion, or over 65 times the cost of the transmission investments they oppose.

Konrad argues that by connecting low renewable resource states with electricity produced in high resource states, much of the cost of storage could be avoided. Konrad argues that a $700 billion transmission system could be substituted for the $13 trillion storage system. However, Konrad's estimate is presented with out the sort of detailed analysis that would back up his claims. Before the $700 Billion estimate is accepted, it would have to be tested against a worst case scenario.

The added transmission approach, which could be called, "the wind is always blowing somewhere" approach, creates additional huge expenses in the form of redundant generation capacity. We have to build redundant generation capacity where ever the wind is likely to pick up the slack part of the time. As it turns out "the wind is always blowing somewhere" requires that wind generators be multiplied by many times the required name plate capacity, in order to generate the required amount of electricity from wind most of the time. Even then there will be times when the wind is not blowing anywhere, and as a consequence the wind generated electricity on the grid will drop to a grid collapse level. The Devil is in the details, and sufficiently examined the details of renewable energy plans appear to be very ugly.

So if a plausible renewables based electrical generation plan does not seem likely, can nuclear power do better? The answer is no as long as conventional Light Water Reactors are the only available nuclear technology. Although LWR levelized costs are lower per unit of electricity generated than renewables, LWRs have significant performance gaps . Indeed no one has yet to produce a post-carbom energy plan that relies primarily on LWRs. Yet promising nuclear alternatives exist.

In a previous post, I focused on the problem of industrial process heating, because it is an urgent problem for which renewable plans offer no practical solution. In a previous post on Nuclear Green, I discussed the potential role of Molten Salt Reactors, including the LFTR in maintaining grid stability. It will be my contention in a further post, that the inclusion of Molten Salt nuclear technology will be an essential part of of any successful energy plan.

Can we afford to displace CO2 with conventional nuclear energy?

Amory Lovins is a useful foil for the supporters of nuclear power. Lovins often provides the null-hypothesis of the case they wish to make. Thus by the logic of Karl Popper's theory of science, a refutation of Lovins is an argument in favor of nuclear power.

Amory Lovins claimed in 2008,

New nuclear saves 2–20+× less carbon per dollar, ~20–40× slower, than efficiency and micropower investments, Buying new nuclear instead of efficiency results in more carbon release than if the same money had been spent buying a new coal-fired power plant

The second statement is very confused. While it is desirable to spend money on efficiency and on energy production capitalization. Energy production and efficiency are not either/or proposition. While efficient lightbulbs may lower my home lighting costs, efficiency will not generate the electricity to light my house. Thus efficiency cannot be equated to carbon free generation of electricity. Lovins' claims about the carbon savings entailed in efficiency investment has been disputed by David Bradish, Robert Bryce, Vaclav Smil, Peter W. Huber ad Mark P. Mills,

Smil states,

Historical evidence shows unequivocally that secular advances in energy efficiency have not lead to any declines of aggregate energy consumption.

Some time ago, Amory Lovins told Robert Bryce that he would produce an answer to Bryce's criticism of his (Lovins) claims about efficiency. Lovins also promised nearly two years ago to answer David Bradish's criticisms of Lovins' account of efficiency. Again the answers have never appeared. Thus the present state of the debate is that Lovins view that efficiency is more cost effective than nuclear power at displacing CO2 have been sivirly criticized. Critics have raised significant questions about the relationship between efficiency and society wide energy demands. So far Lovins has not answered his critics. Thus claims about the relative carbon displacement capacity of efficiency are at present without a plausible foundation.

We will pass back to the first statement. Since Lovins has not been able to demonstrate that efficiency displaced energy demand on a society wide, macro-economic level, the claim that New nuclear saves 2–20+× less carbon per dollar than efficiency is without foundation. We thus are left with the other half of Lovins claim, that "New nuclear saves 2–20+× less carbon per dollar" than "Micropower investments." Before we can determine if Lovins is correct, we need to decide what the word "micropower" means. The Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines "Micropower

the use of your own equipment and the sun, wind, etc to produce all the heat and power that you need.

We will quickly see that this definition is highly problematic, and that micropower as defined by Lovins has nothing to do with personal ownership. We will also presently see that the term micropower does not exclude fossil fuels, and indeed fossil fuel powered generators are and always have been a part of the definition of Micropower.

Encarta defines Micropower as,

electrical power in small amounts: electrical power generated or used in relatively small quantities, usually close to the location where it is needed.

Again nothing in this definition holds up to scruteny.

David Bradish notes that Amory Lovins defines "micropower" as

distributed turbines and generators in factories or buildings (usually cogenerating useful heat), and all renewable sources of electricity except big hydro dams

Further when Bradish looked at Lovins supplied data on micropower, he found that,

By far the largest non-nuclear source of electricity in the above chart is decentralized generation (the big orange block) which the Excel file calls “Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation.”

“Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation.” What does “Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation.” refer too? According to Lovins it refers to Gas turbines and Diesel and gas turbine generators. So micropower clearly includes the generation of electricity and heat from fossil fuel sources. Bradish also notes when he consults a source of Lovins data, that coal fired co-generation facilities are included. Thus while Lovins does not acknowledge the inclusion of coal fired energy in his definition of "micropower," he entialis it by his choice of sources,

In a second post, Bradish pointed to more problems with Lovins definition of Micropower." He quotes another Lovins' definition of Micropower.

1. onsite generation of electricity (at the customer, not at a remote utility plant)—usually cogeneration of electricity plus recovered waste heat (outside the U.S. this is usually called CHP—combined-heat-and-power): this is about half gas-fired, and saves at least half the carbon and much of the cost of the separate power plants and boilers it displaces;
2. distributed renewables—all renewable power sources except big hydro plants, which are defined here as dams larger than 10 megawatts (MW).

Bradish points out that while Lovins' definition would seem to suggest an upper cap of 10 MWe on "micropower" generators, in fact Lovins sources include data on plants of up to 300 MWe generating capacity. The 10 MWe limit only refers to hydro-electrical generators.

But there are other problems with Lovins definition. For example, definition 1 suggests that "micropower" sources are on site. But Lovins states that all renewables are included in the micropower category. Wind farm solar thermal facilities are rarely located on the site where the electricity they generate is used. Thus the first and second definitions contradict each other. Secondly, the 300 MWe limit David Bradish observed does not appear to be the upper output limit of Lovins' Micropower. Wind facilities of any sized would be included. Thus a 1000 MWe solar thermal plant or wind farm located 1000 miles away from the electrical consumer would fit Lovins definition of "micropower."

Having noted the apparent contradictions in Lovins' definitions of "Micropower" I will move on to attempt a test of Lovins assertion that Micropower is less expensive than nuclear power. Since Micropowe represents a loosely defined class of energy producing technologies, all of which Lovins claims are lower cost than nuclear, it is only necessary to demonstrate that some members of that class are do not cost less than nuclear power in order to demonstrate that Lovins' claim is false.

Since diesel electrical generation would be entailed in Lovins' "Micropower" definition, we will start with a Diesel-nuclear comparison. Diesel fuel costs would run from $0.16 to $0.23 per kWh. Excluding any other estimated cost, this would be an amount substantially greater than the estimated 2016 levelized cost of $0.12 per kWh, for new nuclear, as estimated by the United States Energy Information Agency. The EIA 2016 levelized cost of PV solar, Solar thermal, offshore wind and onshore wind would also be higher than nuclear. Lovins ignores the EIA cost findings are reports older data that suggests higher nuclear cost. No one knows what the actual cost of new energy sources in 2016 will be, but the price trend for all large engineering projects including both reactors and wind farms is up. The EIA levelized cost estimates do not include the cost of backups, grid extensions necessitated by the remote location of nenewable generation technologies, energy storage systems, and other hidden expenses related to intermittent renewable energy use.

Thus Lovins claim that nuclear power would be more expensive is built on a far from conclusive case, and indeed a good case can be made that the levelized cost of conventional nuclear before 2020 will be lower rather than higher than wind and solar.

Lovins charge that the nuclear power plants take 20 to 40 times slower to produce than efficiency and "micropower." We have already seen that the energy benefits of efficiency are at the very least debatable, and that Lovins so far has been unable to answer his critics about the ineffectiveness of energy efficiency. Thus it is far from clear what the significance of claims about fast accomplished efficiencies. Further we have seen that Lovins definition of micropower is confused and inconsistent. Lovins includes in his definition of micropower wind projects that take several years to plan, design and build. In many cases, the simple completion of wind projects is not enough to bring the electricity they produce to market, transmission lines must also be built. And in large wind producing states like Texas, the construction of transmission lines may be delayed for several years after wind projects are up and running. Thus in practice it has not even been conclusively established that less total time is required to bring electricity generated by new wind projects to market, that is required to bring electricity produced by new nuclear power sources to market.

Further discussions of off shore wind projects in the United Kingdom indicate that many projects required by EU mandates for completion by 2020 may not be completed by that date. This period falls into a similar time frame that would be required to conceive of, plan and build a NPP. Thus Lovins 20 to 40 times greater time frame for nuclear appears to be more a number thrown out to make nuclear look bad, than a reflection of well considered realities.

Let us turn now to another Lovins claim found in his essay Forget Nuclear:

[Nuclear power is] also a climate-protection loser, surpassing in carbon emissions displaced per dollar only centralized, non-cogenerating combined-cycle power plants burning natural gas29. Firmed windpower and cogeneration are at least 1.5 times more cost-effective than nuclear at displacing CO2—or about 3 times using the latest nuclear cost estimates.

Nuclear plant operations emit almost no carbon—just a little to produce the fuel under current conditions1. Nuclear power is therefore touted as the key replacement for coal-fired power plants. But this seemingly straightforward substitution could instead be done using non-nuclear technologies that are cheaper and faster, so they yield more climate solution per dollar and per year.

Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive source of electricity, so displacing it is the yardstick of carbon displacement’s effectiveness. A kilowatt-hour of nuclear power does displace nearly all the 0.9-plus kilograms of CO2 emitted by producing a kilowatt-hour from coal. But so does a kilowatt-hour from wind, a kilowatt-hour from recovered-heat industrial cogeneration, or a kilowatt-hour saved by end-use efficiency. And all of these three carbon-free resources cost at least one-third less than nuclear power per kilowatt-hour, so they save more carbon per dollar.

Combined-cycle industrial cogeneration and building-scale cogeneration typically burn natural gas, which does emit carbon (though half as much as coal), so they displace somewhat less net carbon than nuclear power could: around 0.7 kilograms of CO2 per kilowatt-hour1. Even though cogeneration displaces less carbon than nuclear does per kilowatt-hour, it displaces more carbon than nuclear does per dollar spent on delivered electricity, because it costs far less. With a net delivered cost per kilowatt-hour approximately half of nuclear’s, cogeneration delivers twice as many kilowatt-hours per dollar, and therefore displaces around 1.4 kilograms of CO2 for the same cost as displacing 0.9 kilograms of CO2 with nuclear power.

Lets deconstruct these claims. First he claims that firmed wind power is 1.5 times more cost effective than nuclear. The cost of firm wind is usually not advertised, but I calculated it, based on formulas derived from the Archer-Jacobson study of firmed wind. If we assume that in 2010 wind generators cost $2,500 per kW, and that the firm wind capacity factor is .21, the total cost of the firmed wind array, without transmission would be $11.90 per kW, but this figure does not include the cost of backups. In contrast the mid decade cost of nuclear power is estimated to be 8000 per kW. thus in absolute terms nuclear is cheaper than firm wind. But are wind and nuclear equally effective carbon mitigation tools. Ken Hawkins, noting studies from the netherlands and of data from Colorado and Texas, has recently raised questions about the effectiveness of wind as a carbon mitigation tool. After I reviewed data from the The National Renewables Energy Laboratory Eastern and Western grids renewables penetration studies, I found evidence that 20% to 30% wind penetration would basically displace relatively carbon efficient CCGTs rather than the worst carbon offenders on the grid, cola burning power plants. I concluded,

Carbon mitigation with conventional nuclear would thus appear well over 3 times more cost effective compared to carbon mitigation with wind. The true cost effectiveness advantage of nuclear cannot be gaged until we know more about the hidden costs of wind, but the hidden costs appear to extract greater cost penalties at higher levels of wind grid penetration.

Thus argument exist that contradict Lovins claims about the relative carbon mitigation effectiveness of wind. At the moment I do not need to press this case further.

Finally, what of Lovins claim that natural gas is a more cost effective carbon mitigation tool than nuclear? This would appear to be nonsense. Lovins admitts,

Combined-cycle industrial cogeneration and building-scale cogeneration typically burn natural gas, which does emit carbon (though half as much as coal), so they displace somewhat less net carbon than nuclear power could: around 0.7 kilograms of CO2 per kilowatt-hour1

but claims

Even though cogeneration displaces less carbon than nuclear does per kilowatt-hour, it displaces more carbon than nuclear does per dollar spent on delivered electricity, because it costs far less. With a net delivered cost per kilowatt-hour approximately half of nuclear’s, cogeneration delivers twice as many kilowatt-hours per dollar, and therefore displaces around 1.4 kilograms of CO2 for the same cost as displacing 0.9 kilograms of CO2 with nuclear power.

In fact while the EIA levelized cost of natural gas CCGTs is less than nuclearm it is no where near half the cost of nuclear. In fact CCGTs emit about half of what coal fired power plants, do, so the levelized cost of CCGTs must be multiplied by 2 in order to determine their carbon displacement costs. Carbon displacement with natural gas is more expensive per ton than it is with nuclear. Thus Amory Lovins has failed to establish reasonable grounds for his argument against nuclear power.

We need a carbon-mitigation cost index

We need a carbon-mitigation cost index. The index should measure the cost of eliminating the emissions of a ton of CO2, or of eliminating a ton of CO2 from the atmosphere. Without a carbon emission cost index, there is no measure of the potential effectiveness of policy options designed to prevent carbon emissions, or to decrease atmospheric carbon content.

The existence of a carbon mitigation index can serve as an effective counter to propaganda campaigns in favor of in opposition to various energy forms.

Recently a collition of anti-nuclear organizations including WECF ( Women in Europe for a Common Future), The International Forum on Globalization, WISE (World Information Service on Energy), Friends of the Earth International, and Nuclear Information & Resource Service published a statement that asserted:

Nuclear power steals “time and money” that would be better invested in energy efficiency and renewable technologies

This claim is not supported by any detailed analysis of the relative costs and benefits of carbon mitigation with nuclear and renewables. In fact the capital costs associated with renewables are higher per unit of electrical output, and since renewable tend to replace low carbon emission emitting combined cycle gas turbines, while nuclear displaces high carbon emission coal fired power units, nuclear appears to be 3.5 times more cost effective than onshore as a carbon mitigation tool, and even more cost effective than off shore wind and all forms of solar.

The effectiveness of nuclear power as a carbon mitigation tool can be illustrated with a map and two list. First the map showing the states where nuclear power plants are located:
Here is the EIA's list of Nuclear power plants by state:

U.S. Nuclear Power Plants by State	Plants
Alabama	Browns Ferry
	Farley (Joseph M. Farley)
Arizona	Palo Verde
Arkansas	Arkansas Nuclear One
California	Diablo Canyon
	San Onofre
Connecticut	Millstone
Florida	Crystal River 3
	St Lucie
	Turkey Point
Georgia	Hatch (Edwin I. Hatch)
	Vogtle
Illinois	Braidwood
	Byron
	Clinton
	Dresden
	LaSalle County
	Quad Cities
Iowa	Duane Arnold
Kansas	Wolf Creek
Louisiana	River Bend
	Waterford
Maryland	CalvertCliff
Massachusetts	Pilgrim
Michigan	Donald C. Cook
	Enrico Fermi (Fermi)
	Palisades
Minnesota	Monticello
	Prairie Island
Mississippi	Grand Gulf
Missouri	Callaway
Nebraska	Cooper
	Fort Calhoun
New Hampshire	Seabrook
New Jersey	Hope Creek
	Oyster Creek
	Salem Creek
New York	Fitzpatrick (James A. Fitzpatrick)
	Indian Point
	Nile Mile Point
	R.E. Ginna (Ginna, or Robert E. Ginna)
North Carolina	Brunswick
	McGuire
	Shearon-Harris(Harris)
Ohio	Davis-Besse
	Perry
Pennsylvania	Beaver Valley
	Limerick
	Peach Bottom
	Susquehanna
	Three Mile Island
South Carolina	Catawba
	H.B. Robinson
	Oconee
	Virgil C. Summer (Summer)
Tennessee	Sequoyah
	Watts Bar
Texas	Comanche Peak
	South Texas
Vermont	Vermont Yankee
Virginia	North Anna
	Surry
Washington	Columbia Generating Station
Wisconsin	Kewaunee
	Point Beach

The effectiveness of nuclear power in carbon mitigation can be demonstrated by comparing the map and the above state list with the states listed in Table A-2 found in "The Near-Term Impacts of Carbon Mitigation Policies on Manufacturing Industries", a 2002 study of carbon emission issues for industry:

Carbon emission per million kwh electricity generated by States (metric tons per million kwh)

We consider electricity carbon emissions from three fossil fuels -- coal, petroleum and gas. The physical quantities of coal, petroleum and gas used by states to generate electricity are obtained from Electric Power Monthly (EIA, 1993). The individual fuel quantities are converted to energy using conversion factors from Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey 1991. This energy consumption is multiplied by carbon emission coefficients (from Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States, EIA 1996) to obtain carbon emissions by state by aggregating carbonemissions from coal, petroleum and gas. Carbon emissions per unit of electricity generated (metric tons per million kWh) are calculated by dividing state carbon emissions with state net electricity generation. In Table A-2, we present the electricity carbon emissions for the US and individual states. The average carbon emission from electricity generation is about 180.9 metric tons per million kWh. The range is from 0 (Idaho) to 462 (N. Dakota). A state with a high coefficient means it uses a high share of fossil fuel to generate electricity. A smaller coefficient indicates a higher use of hydro or nuclear power.

Table A-2. Electricity Carbon Emissions by State
State	Total ElectricityCarbon Emissions (1000 metric tons)	Net Electricity Generation (Million Kwh)	Emission coeff. (Metric Tons per Million Kwh)
Alabama	10857.6	68374.0	158.8
Alaska	492.1	2980.0	165.1
Arizona	7629.8	52722.0	144.7
Arkansas	5419.2	27541.0	196.8
California	6233.6	89701.0	69.5
Colorado	6879.0	23983.0	286.8
Connecticut	1206.7	19308.0	62.5
Delaware	1103.4	4941.0	223.3
District of Columbia	29.9	74.0	403.6
Florida	17847.4	103809.0	171.9
Georgia	10379.8	68908.0	150.6
Hawaii	1161.4	5301.0	219.1
Idaho	0.0	4993.0	0.0
Illinois	11308.0	93424.0	121.0
Indiana	19893.9	71633.0	277.7
Iowa	6741.0	22219.0	303.4
Kansas	6223.3	23606.0	263.6
Kentucky	13500.7	57209.0	236.0
Louisiana	8793.1	43072.0	204.1
Maine	239.3	6021.0	39.7
Maryland	4554.5	29109.0	156.5
Massachusetts	4174.0	25254.0	165.3
Michigan	12424.0	62171.0	199.8
Minnesota	6629.7	29038.0	228.3
Mississippi	2348.9	16187.0	145.1
Missouri	10161.1	41586.0	244.3
Montana	4484.3	18521.0	242.1
Nebraska	3482.1	16510.0	210.9
Nevada	3804.0	16153.0	235.5
New Hampshire	727.3	10853.0	67.0
New Jersey	1550.5	22562.0	68.7
New Mexico	6458.8	20369.0	317.1
New York	9873.3	84002.0	117.5
North Carolina	9306.1	63030.0	147.6
North Dakota	9744.3	21060.0	462.7
Ohio	21933.0	102417.0	214.2
Oklahoma	8806.1	35114.0	250.8
Oregon	979.6	31099.0	31.5
Pennsylvania	18139.9	127446.0	142.3
Rhode Island	26.2	101.0	259.3
South Carolina	4102.6	53597.0	76.5
South Dakota	971.5	4879.0	199.1
Tennessee	9151.4	57253.0	159.8
Texas	49010.9	185738.0	263.9
Utah	5902.6	24461.0	241.3
Vermont	10.6	3365.0	3.1
Virginia	4255.3	37051.0	114.8
Washington	2637.2	63174.0	41.7
West Virginia	11867.8	53339.0	222.5
Wisconsin	7700.7	34386.0	223.9
Wyoming	10580.0	30898.0	342.4
U.S.	381737.6	2110542.0	180.9

Amory Lovins has repeatedly stated:

I do think we need to allocate capital judiciously and take opportunity costs seriously.

This statement is of course true. Lovins also states,

I do not think you can make an empirically based business case that the existing nuclear power plant fleet has been economically worthwhile (counting all externalities at zero), nor that there is any business case for building more. This is of course an empirical question.

I have provided just sort of case in my numerous analyses of the relative costs of renewables and nuclear power. But I believe that far more work needs to be done, and this work, rather than renewables advocacy should be the proper role of a Nationals Renewable Energy Laboratory. Lovins argues that nuclear power is not a cost effective carbon mitigation tool, without assessing the true cost of carbon mitigation with renewables, and without exploring the potentials for lowering nuclear costs. There is real potential for lowering cost by altering nuclear manufacturing techniques, changing siting criteria, and in other innovative approach to nuclear cost issues. In addition there is probable cause to believe that adopting alternative nuclear technologies could lower nuclear costs in a dramatic fashion, while increasing nuclear safety, resolving the issue of nuclear waste and not encouraging nuclear proliferation.

It is clear then that the claim that nuclear power does not mttigate carbon emissions can be shown to be false, and the claim that nuclear power. The question posed by Amory Lovins thus becomes, "is it cost effective to build more nuclear plants as a cost mitigation tool?" My arguments to date tend to demonstrate that it is, but we need more research, and more research tools. We need a carbon-mitigation cost index.