MSR/LFTR development and Chinese Economic Growth.

Note: This is the third part of an three part essay on the the the future non proliferation policies of India and China with respect to the thorium related technologies. The second part of this essay discussed the role of Thorium in India's nuclear development program, and Indian past, present and possible future attitudes towards nonproliferation.

Despite the current extremely robust growth of the Chinese economy during the last decade, some economists, looking ahead see clouds on the horizon. Michael Pettis is a professor at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, and author of the well received book, The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economics and the Threat of Financial Collapse. Pettis is a pessimist about the stability of the international finance order, and sees international boom and bust monitary cycles effecting the economies of developing countries even more than the econmies of developed countries. In a recent article in China Financial Markets, Professor Pettis argues that

we are at the end of one of the six or so major globalization cycles that have occurred in the past two centuries. If I am right, this means that there still is a pretty significant set of major adjustments globally that have to take place before we will have reversed the most important of the many global debt and payments imbalances that have been created during the last two decades. These will be driven overall by a contraction in global liquidity, a sharply rising risk premium, substantial deleveraging, and a sharp contraction in international trade and capital imbalances.

Professor Pettis predicts:

* BRICS and other developing countries have not decoupled in any meaningful sense, and once the current liquidity-driven investment boom subsides the developing world will be hit hard by the global crisis.
* Over the next two years Chinese household consumption will continue declining as a share of GDP.
* Chinese debt levels will continue to rise quickly over the rest of this year and next.
* Chinese growth will begin to slow sharply by 2013-14 and will hit an average of 3% well before the end of the decade.
* Any decline in GDP growth will disproportionately affect investment and so the demand for non-food commodities.
* If the PBoC resists interest rate cuts as inflation declines, China may even begin slowing in 2012.
* Much slower growth in China will not lead to social unrest if China meaningfully rebalances.
* Within three years Beijing will be seriously examining large-scale privatization as part of its adjustment policy.
* European politics will continue to deteriorate rapidly and the major political parties will either become increasingly radicalized or marginalized.
* Spain and several countries, perhaps even Italy (but probably not France) will be forced to leave the euro and restructure their debt with significant debt forgiveness.
* Germany will stubbornly (and foolishly) refuse to bear its share of the burden of the European adjustment, and the subsequent retaliation by the deficit countries will cause German growth to drop to zero or negative for many years.
* Trade protection sentiment in the US will rise inexorably and unemployment stays high for a few more years.

The rest of Professor Pettis's article fleshes out his predictions about the course likely followed by the Chinese economy for the rest of the decade, and the implications of that course for Chines society, and political system. (Hat tip to Brian Wang for his recent post on Professor Pettis's economic forecast.)

It is my view that even if this socio-economic and political crisis strikes China, Global awareness of the grave implications of continued reliance of carbon based energy sources will rise rise rapidly. Thus at the same time China may faces an economic crisis. Even if more conventional estimates of the developmental course of turn out to be correct, China will be faced with the problem of shifting its energy system to post-carbon energy technologies.

Thus what ever the course of the Chinese economy, the need to replace energy from fossil fuel sources, with energy from post carbon sources will start to become acute within the next ten years. Thus what ever its economic situation, China will require rapidly scalable energy technologies that can replace coal and other fossil fuels. At the moment, China appears committed to developing LFTR technology. On February 2, in the wake of the Chinese LFTR announcement I stated on Nuclear Green, I stated:

The potential promise of thorium and the LFTR technology can rapidly be brought into the effort to prevent further global climate change. China, perhaps more than any other country has realized the importance of energy in increasing the wealth of its citizens, and making life for its people better. At the same time, the Chinese have paid an enormous price for their reliance on fossil fuel technology. As many as 500,000 people die every year from fossil fuel related causes. Global Warming represents another large threat to the well-being of the Chinese people, and although China has made a large commitment to renewable energy sources, the Chinese leadership is aware that renewables cannot produce anything like the amount of energy that the Chinese people need to bring their standard of living to that enjoyed by people living in advanced Industrialized and post-industrial societies. At the same time, the Chinese leadership is far more technologically oriented than the leadership of the United States or Europe.

Thus, the leadership of China is far more open to promising new technology. In addition China has a large thorium supply that comes from its rare earth mines, and so far has not found any use for thorium. The LFTR allows China to kill two birds with a single thorium stone. First it offers a potential source of vast amounts of environmentally clean and safe energy at a low cost, and secondly it allows China to take advantage of an unused resource, which can easily replace coal. LFTR technology has the potential of providing China with abundant energy at a very low cost, and might solidify Chinese economic, cultural and political dominance of the world for a long time to come.

What will appeal to Chinese leadership about MSR/LFTR technology during the next decade is its potential for rapid production in large numbers and at a low cost. Uranium fueled MSRs offer a technology that is almost ready for mas production today.

The MSR core is very simple, requires few materials, and can be built with a tiny fraction of the labor required by conventional reactor cores, Other optional parts of the MSR may be more complex, but this is in no small measure because radioactive fission products can be continuously cleaned from the MSR core. The added cost of fuel salt cleaning can be balanced by a diminished cost of other safety features. Both fuel cleaning and reprocessing can be included in the MSR package. Thus the MSR can eliminate the necessity for building a separate large and complex fuel reprocessing facility. Molten Salt Reactor researchers world wide have repeatedly touted their safety. Low cost underground placement would further enhance their safety.

One the other hand the low cost of MSRs, their scalability and the sustainability of of LFTR technology would make LFTR technology an extremely valuable source of post-carbon energy, and quite possibly the dominate energy technology on earth asa soon as 2050. The paths to LFTR development were charted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory during the 1970's and are well understood. In terms of the potential cost savings that could be achieved through the adoption of LFTR technology the cost of its development would be extremely small, and indeed a number of large American companies could afford to finance LFTR development without government assistance, if they chose to do so.

Nor would MSR/LFTR development take long, if a business as usual approach were abandoned in favor if a more intensive approach. My estimate that if MSR/LFTR development were commenced in China this year, MSRs could be ready to start rolling off production lines by 2020. With factory based mass production, the replacement of carbon based electrical generation could be accomplished in a short time. In addition, to use in electrical generation, LFTRs and be used as an industrial process heat source. They can be used to produce hydrogen, and carbon based liquid fuels from atmospheric CO2 and water. They can also be used to power ships.

The principle obstacle to MSR/LFTR development is ignorance and human incredulity. Until recently Molten Salt Reactor technology was not even be mentioned is the training of reactor physicists and nuclear engineers. Past statements about Molten Salt Reactor technology form the Department of Energy are filled with misinformation While Secretary of Energy Chu recently made statements about the LFTR that suggest he had been given the same misinformation. Even when informed about the potential some people are incredulous, or insist that it would take to long to develop to be a practical solution, or that it is too technologically challenging. The Chinese have a significant advantage, because its technologically sophisticated national leadership is aware of the potential that the LFTR offers.

The LFTR approach to world energy issues amounts to a paradigm shift. What will be required for the success of a LFTR based approach is the spread of knowledge about the LFTR and of a vision of LFTR potential. Knowledge and vision cannot simply be spread by policy, and indeed in the United States policy has been an impediment to its spread, until the policy makers themselves are educated, and catch a little of the vision. Once that knowledge and the vision are discovered by enough people, as appears to be the case in China, a tsunami of change will follow that will rapidly sweep us forward into the post carbon age.

Thus by continuing its commitment to develop LFTR technology, Chinese leadership, either Communist or democratic, will almost certainly assure continued Chinese economic development, whatever short run national economic problems emerge in China.

No accurate estimate of China's Thorium reserve is available, but thorium is a common mineral in rare earth mining tilings, and China's rare earth mining industry is by far the largest in the world. My guess is that China holds enough thorium above ground now, to power the entire Chinese economy for hundreds if not thousands of years. The energy potential of this internal, low cost energy source is attractive to China, which like India is dependent on foreign uranium sources for a uranium powered economy, would prefer to have total control of its energy resources.

Historically China has been economically self contained, and although Chinese economic development has focused on international trade, Professor Pettis offers the view that future Chinese economic development will focuse on the growth of internal markets. In addition the Chinese government is under great though largely hidden pressures to clean up environmental problems. Shifting from coal to Thorium would solve serveral environmental problems at the same time. A shife from trade to internal economic grown and increasingf environmental concerns thus point to a rational for thorium energy use as a matter of national policy.

The historic foreign policy of China has usually been to exercise hegemony over its neighbors but to not incorporate them into its empire. In addition, the Chines state has usually defended its territory rather than sought expansion. The present Communist government has acted to insure that traditional Chinese imperial territory remain part of China. The 1949 invasion of Tibet, and the continued Chinese insistence that Taiwan is part of China are evidence of that poi icy, The Chinese Government is also concerned about border defenses, and the 1962 war between China and India was motivated by Chinese desires to obtain defensible southern borders.

Finally China has cooperated with American Nonproliferation policies only when it is in Chinese interests to do so. China has in the past been willing to transfer of nuclear weapons technology and even weapons grade nuclear materials, when the development of nuclear weapons by other states furthered what Chinese leaders viewed as China's national interest. China has viewed India as a potential enemy, and thus its allied itself with another enemy of India Pakistan. China reportedly provided both nuclear weapons design and U-235.

Thus China appears wholly unwilling to adopt nonproliferation goals, that run contrary to its national interests, or the national interests of Allies that it might wish to see possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore China is unlikely to prefer nonproliferation over national economic or energy policies. To the extent that American policy toward the thorium cycle as a proliferation issue runs contrary to Chinese trade or energy goals, China will be unwilling to give preference to American goals over its own.

Thus if American thorium related nonproliferation policies are contrary to Chinese interest, China can be expected to oppose and even undermine them. China may well regard its own internally developed LFTR as a legitimate trade item, even without proliferation controls preferred by the United States. The United States will have no choice except to adapt its nonproliferation policy to the sort of nonproliferation order that China is willing to accept. China, like India will most likely be willing to support a nonproliferation agreement that embraces thorium, but that order may be quite contrary to current US nonproliferation policy.

Thus both India and China have in the past been notably independent from American nonproliferation policies and goals, and can be expected to maintain that independence. There growing economic power will make that opposition increasingly difficult for the United States to impose its nonproliferation goals on the international community. Both India and China have interests in developing a Thorium cycle nuclear power technology, and it is very likely that any future nonproliferation order will conform to Chinese and Indian policy goals with respect to thorium fuel cycle technology.

What are the problems with LFTR technology?

What are the problems with MSR/LFTR technology? This turns out to be a hard question to answer. Since there are a large number of LFTR design options, however, it is difficult to identify a set of problems that shared all of the options. Rather we should talk about elective choices, and the problems that a MSR/LFTR designer would face if a certain option were chosen.

Protactinium would seemingly pose a problem for thorium breeding. The Protactinium nucleus is a very big target for neutrons in a LFTR core. Kirk Sorensen discussed the problems posed by Pa-233 and U-233 in MSR blanket salts:

From these cross-sections, you can see that thorium-232 has a moderate cross-section for absorption, but there’s so much of it in the blanket that it does almost all the neutron-absorbing (as we would want).

After absorbing a neutron, the Th-232 becomes Th-233, which has a monster absorption cross-section (almost 200x that of Th-232) but its half-life is so short (22 min) that it isn’t around very long to absorb a neutron.

Once it turns into Pa-233, the absorption cross-section is still over 5 times greater than the Th-232. That is one of the basic reasons why it’s so important to isolate the Pa-233 from the blanket–in order to prevent another neutron absorption. This is a key step that you just can’t do in a solid-core reactor that’s trying to “burn” thorium (and achieve a conversion ratio of > 1.0).

Finally, the Pa-233 decays to U-233 in 27 days. The U-233 has a huge cross-section, mostly for fission (531 barns) but with a lot of absorption (45 barns). Thus, uranium-233 left in the blanket will really want to gobble up blanket neutrons and cause fission. That leads to even more trouble, because that will deposit fission products in the blanket, complicating reprocessing and making the blanket “hot” with radiation from fission products.

All of these factors argue for getting protactinium of out the blanket and letting it decay to U-233 outside of the neutron flux. The U-233 can then be removed by fluorination to UF6 and adding it back to the core salt by reduction to UF4. Continuous refueling of the core means that excess reactivity in the core can be held to almost nothing, an extremely important consideration for safe operation that is very difficult to achieve in a solid-core reactor.

This problem would seem to be compounded in a single fluid LFTR, in which thorium breeding takes place in the same fluid that carries the fissionable nuclear fuel. protactinium is not easy to remove from molten salts. It turns out that it is a lot easier to wait until the Pa-233 is transformed by a gamma particle emission into U-233. There is, however, a proliferation related disadvantage to Protactinium separation in addition to the problem posed by the need to separate Protactinium out of its carrier salts. Dr Buzzo points out,

U-233 is perfectly suitable for use in a nuclear weapon, at least in theory. The thing which makes it difficult is that there would be some U-232 as well. This does not preclude the use in a weapon, but the short halflife of U-232 makes it much more radioactive and therefore difficult to handle. . . . .

it's really the U-232 which is going to make the uranium recovered less suited for weapons use.

However looking at the aspects of protactinium separation, I'm wondering if this could be a hole in the process which would allow for much lower U-232. U-232 is the daughter product of Pa-232 just as U-233 is the daugher of Pa-233. Pa-233 has a half-life of 26.9 days but Pa-232 is only 1.3 days.

This seems as if it could cause a problem. Basically if you separate the protactinium and let it decay for about eleven days, for example, you've gone through eight half-lives of Pa-232 but less one half of a halflife cycle of Pa-233. Thus you still retain about three quarters of the Pa-233 you started out with but the Pa-232 has been diminished to less than half a percent of what you started with. You could do it for even longer before you start to loose a lot of the Pa-233.

Thus, at this point you could do the process over again, removing the uranium and retaining the protactinium and you would have a very high concentration of Pa-233 and very little Pa-232, which is where the U-232 would come from. This is not very difficult and could easily be done with what is available. The result is basically an easy source of weapons grade U-233.

Therefore, according to Dr. Buzzo, it is undesirable to to separate Protactinium from its carrier salts, if you are worried about proliferation. In response to Dr. Buzzo's proliferation related concern, David LeBlanc commented,

Many of us on this site strongly favor the 2 Fluid design of having one salt with the U233 (and maybe a little thorium) and a separate salt for the thorium. The Single Fluid design however has been what most researchers have focused on since the late 1960s.

In a Single Fluid design it is much more difficult to try to skip Pa removal and still break even. The way to lower the neutron losses to Pa is to lower the average neutron flux it experiences (especially thermal neutrons). You can do this by simply having a much larger core or by having excess salt that you cycle in and out of the reactor loop. However, in a Single Fluid design, having more fuel salt means having much more fissile material to start. This is not a deal breaker but a serious impediment nonetheless.

In a 2 Fluid design we can lower losses to Pa down to almost nothing by simply increasing the volume of blanket salt. This means paying for more thorium and carrier salt but thorium is very inexpensive (the true potential cost of mass produced Flibe salt is unfortunately one of the big unknowns). For example, 1960s 2 Fluid designs had about 260 tonnes of thorium in the blanket salt versus about 70 tonnes in the later Single Fluid design.

In another thread, Dr. LeBlanc commented,

in a 2 fluid reactor you can have more blanket salt cycled in and out of your reactor to really lower the loses to Pa. Here are some numbers to give you an idea of losses (remember you can almost double the values since you often lose a second neutron to U234):

Single Fluid design with a 3 day Pa removal time, Pa losses are 0.0017 out of 2.23 neutrons

Single Fluid design WITHOUT Pa removal, Pa losses are 0.05 out of 2.23

2 Fluid design with lots of blanket salt, NO Pa removal (ORNL 1467) 0.0079 out of 2.22 (0.36%)

2 Fluid design with less blanket salt but Pa removal (ORNL 4528) 0.0002 out of 2.22.

The neutron losses for all designs noted by Dr. LeBlanc are acceptable for breeding purposes. Thus a LFTR designer has a number of potions to chose from, in creating a design that best meets breeding goals. As it turns out, according to Dr. LeBlanc, none of the options pose serious barriers to breeding goals, although one option - Single fluid design with no Pa removal - offers the most disadvantages.

There are a number of number of problems associated with core graphite in thermal MSRs. Graphite cores breeders offer huge scalability advantages, because they can be started with a small charge of fissionable material. It takes about 10 times more fissionable material to start a Fast Breeder reactor, than a graphite moderated thermal breeder requires. This makes an enormous difference in the number of reactors that can be started quickly. Well over a year ago I posted a comment on Brave New Climate,

By 2050 if not sooner, we will begin to need breeder technology in order to keep up with world energy demand. The question is which Generation IV technology will have the advantage. I have argued that LFTRs will, because they are far more scaleable, can be manufactured more rapidly, are more flexible, and will be perceived as safer, and less of a proliferation danger. (I am not arguing the last two are the case, I am now satisfied of IFR safety, and proliferation is an anti-nuclear canard,.) Claims of high IFR breeding ratios are not confirmed from IFR design plans. The only IFR designs I was able to locate on the Information Bridge, had a maximum breeding ration of 1 to 1.07, the same as 1970′s ORNL MSBR designs. Statements by IFR advocates indicate no higher breeding ration can be expected in the near term. Since as many as 12 LFTRs of equivalent power output can be started for every IFR, if the IFR has no breeding ratio improvement, it cannot be seen as the most likely LWR replacement. Never-the-less world wide we will see LMFBRs. I believe that the Indians are considering plans to build as many as 300 500 MW LMFBRs, and I fully expect Russia, China and Japan to enter the LMFBR race.

However, it turns out that the reactor grade plutonium from spent light water reactor fuel becomes a chocking point for Generation IV reactors. The world supply of unused reactor fuel now is sufficient to now start a very large number of LFTRs, but not of IFRs. Given that current IFRs designs have no breeding advantage over the LFTR, allotment of RGP to start LFTRs offers some enormous scale advantages. Given that LFTRs are likely to cost less to build, can be built more rapidly, and are likely to have less political and public opposition, it seems to me that IFR advocates are backing the wrong horse in the Generation IV breeder race.

Needless to say, IFR advocates were not pleased by this comment, but they have not been able to show that I was wrong. However, in order to wrap the thermal scalability LFTR advantage, we have to find ways to solve the graphite problems. The two major graphite problems, are

* graphite deterioration in a high neutron flux environment

* And a positive coefficient of reactivity associated with core graphite.

If we want to build a large number of LFTRs quickly then we have to find a workaround. On solution to the graphite deterioration problem is to replace the core graphite every few years. One way to accomplish this is by using graphite pebbles rather than a graphite core structure. The pebbles can be replaced as they reach a point where their deterioration become unacceptable. "Cyril R" points out,

Graphite pebbles have a lot of potential advantages. In one two fluid design, the pebbles are filled with blanket salt. This means every pebble is a barrier, and so barrier maintenance is potentially easier. However, circulating pebbles turns out to be a bit tricky, and with a lot of pebbles all containing liquid blanket salt, broken pebbles seem like a big risk in a true two fluid design. . . .

However, if solid graphite pebbles were to be used in a two fluid design like David's tube in shell, things would be easier. The pebbles wouldn't circulate, but act as fairly static moderator. The simple graphite pebbles would last longer and be easy to replace. Because pebbles have a high void fraction, the traditional MSR graphite density could not be achieved (probably at least half the graphite density).

Lars commented,

Graphite in the blanket would serve to slow the neutrons down. The slower spectrum will make all cross-sections larger so less blanket salt is required to absorb the neutrons. However, the cross-section of the fissile will grow dramatically faster than anything else - which is not good in the blanket. It means that we have to keep the u233/th232 ratio much lower to keep fission in the blanket rare. So one result is that we have to process the blanket faster to keep the u233 concentration down. I'm not sure how big an issue this is - the original 2-fluid ORNL designs were thermal and so they faced this issue and did not identify it as the reason to stop work on the 2-fluid design. But they also generally assumed they could process things at a pretty high rate.

Another effect of graphite in the blanket would be that any neutrons that hit the exterior wall would be slow so they are much easier to absorb and stop and are easier on that wall.

Another effect is that it becomes more cost effective to absorb a higher percentage of the neutrons in the blanket since the thorium in the salt is more effective at absorbing slower neutrons.

One BIG concern is that if there is a big break in the plumbing for the blanket salt you will drain the neutron absorber from the blanket. With the graphite present it will slow down and reflect many neutrons back toward the core. In normal operations the blanket salt will absorb most of them. With the blanket salt drained they will go back to the core. In other words, if you get a dramatic break in the blanket plumbing and drain the blanket salt the reactivity of the core will go up. This can not be allowed. The design would need to somehow guarantee that no matter what the reactivity of the core does not go up in any accident scenario.

David LeBlanc described his position.

your don't want graphite or other good neutron reflecting material in the blanket zone or you end up with reactivity problems if the blanket salt drains or even just gets hotter and less dense.

For the core, using graphite is always a serious option and pebbles certainly have some big advantages but they don`t really help with the core to blanket barrier issue. Even a core with graphite moderator you still need some sort of physical barrier to the separate the fuel and blanket salts (any Two Fluid or 1 and 1/2 Fluid needs barrier material). A graphite core of logs might make things a little easier because we could have a simple metal cladding wrapped around it that would need no structural strength of its own). My google tech talk also shows a method to use individual graphite logs bunched together as the barrier but too complicated to describe here.

So in general, pebbles versus logs is always going to be an interesting trade off of pros and cons. In terms of radiation damage, I still don`t know if anyone has a good idea of how long a pebble would be last. The expansion beyond original size is no longer of structural concern for the core (like it would be for logs) but it the pebble starts to crack due to expansion then we do have a big problem. ORNL seemed to be on the fence regarding this in their early studies with pebbles (which seemed always to be a Plan B that never got too deep a look).

In most cases, comments are or can be referenced back to ORNL MSR research. I could quote more of the graphite pebbles discussion which illuminates a number of problems, but this is enough to suggest that MSRs problems exist, but that solutions and work arounds are available. Each solution or work around may have its cost, so any MSR/LFTR design is going to offer a compromise. The question facing the LFTR designer is, which set of compromises works best given design goals. Because the graphite moderated LFTR is highly scalable even without a high breeding ratio, designing the LFTR to produce just one U-233 atom for every fissionable atom burned. Not only does this decrease proliferation risks, but it allows for more breeding ratio lowering compromises in the LFTR design.

There would be a set of problems for every MSR/LFTR design, but there appear to be an acceptable set of compromises for the problems we have looked at. At least some of the compromises I have reviewed, seem to have secondary benefits that are consistent with probable design goals. In the nearly 40,000 comments of the Energy from Thorium discussion section, no one single killer problem has yet popped up. This most likely means that development of various MSR designs including LFTRs will not involve serious development challenges, and we can be reasonably but not entirely certain that serious problems will not impede MSR/LFTR developmental progress.

Thus it can be asserted with reasonable certainty that the LFTR offers a potential long term solution to human energy needs, that is consistent with a high energy lifestyle, and which will not create the sort of safety, waste, proliferation and capitol cost problems associated with LWR power technology.

Honesty and the Green Case against Nuclear Power

Greens accounts of nuclear power and nuclear power safety and proliferation related issues are riddled with quite obvious mistakes and misrepresentations of well documented facts. Many of those deliberate misrepresentations and errors are intended to creat doubts and fear in the minds of the readers and listeners.

In December 2006 by the Canadian Pembina Institute published a report (titled Nuclear Power in Canada: an Examination of Risks, Impacts and Sustainability), that was harshly critical of nuclear power. The Report Summary stated:

Any life-cycle analysis of an energy source is likely to identify previously unrecognized or un-quantified impacts. However, the range and scale of impacts and risks associated with nuclear power production make it unique among energy sources.

While the greenhouse gas emissions associated with nuclear power are less than those that would be associated with conventional fossil fuel energy use, no other energy source combines the generation of a range of conventional pollutants and waste streams – including heavy metals, smog and acid rain precursors, and water contaminants – with the generation of extremely large volumes of radioactive wastes that will require care and management over hundreds of thousands of years. The combination of these envi- ronmental challenges, along with security, accident and weapons proliferation risks that are simply not shared by any other energy source, place nuclear energy in a unique category relative to all other energy supply options. In essence, reliance on nuclear power as a response to climate change would involve trading one problem – greenhouse gas emissions – for which a wide range of other solutions exist, for a series of other complex and difficult problems for which solutions are generally more costly and difficult and for which the outcomes are much less certain.

This report is still available online today at the Pembina Institute web site. It has not been altered from its 2006 form, despite the numous errors in the report that have been pointed out by its critics. Pembina Institute has not undertaken a response to its critics, even though they= Institute and its board of directors must be aware of the criticisms.

The Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) prepared a response to Nuclear Power in Canada, titled Nuclear Power in Canada: A Review of a Critique. The Introduction to that Review states,

The Pembina Institute released a report in December 2006, entitled Nuclear Power in Canada: an Examination of Risks, Impacts and Sustainability (hereafter referred to as the Pembina report). The report addressed the suitability of nuclear power as an energy source in modern society. It focused on six major issues that surround nuclear power: safety, reliability, cleanliness, greenhouse gases, sustainability, and cost-effectiveness. The Institute found nuclear wanting on all of these counts.
The purpose of this study is to review and assess the Pembina report and its relevance to the application by the Sierra Legal Defence Fund (name subsequently changed to Ecojustice) for a complaint filed with the Competition Bureau. The current work reviews the Pembina report with the normal standards of scientific inquiry in mind. These standards are discussed in a limited fashion, although adequately for the purpose at hand, in Appendix 1. The Appendix essentially states that when providing commentary such as that in the Pembina report, a measure of objectivity must be adopted in order to avoid the kind of bias associated with extreme political views — views that may unfairly influence the obvious conclusions and lead to faulty advice with respect to policy. We do not address everything in the report, but we do identify numerous cases where the conclusions seemed unsupported by evidence or where other analytical deficiencies were identified. Our review concludes that the Pembina report exhibits a bias against the nuclear sector that a critical analysis would suggest is not warranted. The report, in our view, is of very limited use as a means to understanding the role and place of nuclear energy in the modern world and the appropriate policies that should condition that use.

The strength of the conclusion warrants some comment. We recognize the authors of this work may not represent the views of the Pembina Institute as a corporate entity. It is not our intent to criticize the Institute itself, rather the specific study under review. Pembina acknowledges some bias in favour of protecting the environment, and CERI accepts that there is a range of views on the broader subject of environmental policy that can be supported by legitimate scientific enquiry. Therefore, in the spirit of candid discourse, it is reasonable to provide diverse views on subjects of academic and policy interest. That was the spirit in which we undertook the study. However, when our work was completed, it was the unanimous conclusion of all our review team that there appears to be an unusually strong bias against nuclear energy in the Pembina report; in our judgment, that bias cannot be supported by the facts or the arguments presented.

We note that Sierra Legal, in an application to the Competition Bureau dated 18 December 2006, used the Pembina report to support a charge that the nuclear industry, through its high-level advertising, misrepresents the economic and environmental implications of using nuclear power. While those charges are not the subject of this review, we are obligated to note that, to the extent that they rely on the report at issue, the charges are likely unwarranted.

The Pembina report provides a significant amount of information on the nuclear industry, its operation and history. That information, much of which provides accurate descriptive background, is then interspersed with comments or conclusions that we found questionable; either because they are susceptible to further analysis which would lead to different conclusions, or because they are limited to Canada, when relevant information from other countries should have been incorporated. It was somewhat surprising to find that all of the authors’ interpretations tended to result in negative conclusions. That led our review to focus on those negative conclusions to see whether or not they are reliable.

The CERI response is extremeky well thought out, and engages in considered reflection on the employment of objective research method in research on energy issues. The CERI response points to the role of biase in the Pembina Selection of data:

The Pembina report contains extensive descriptions of the various phases of the nuclear cycle and underscores the negative aspects of nuclear power in Canada. However, as the emphasis on painting a negative picture is apparent, the report initiates inevitable questions as to the reasonableness of its own statements and conclusions.

The Pembina report is, according to its authors, “intended to inform public debate over the future role of nuclear energy in Canada and to facilitate comparisons of nuclear energy with other potential energy sources” (p. 3.) The study falls short of this objective for a number of reasons that will be addressed in detail in the remainder of this review. . . .

Major flaws are identified

Perhaps the most important limitation stems from the failure to compare the results to other alternatives. However, other concerns include the fact that although the report covers several time periods, it does not properly identify trends. Rather it presents a snapshot-like picture of nuclear power instead of acknowledging the dynamic aspect of past developments and likely future evolution. The snapshot neglects comparisons with alternatives, positive aspects of nuclear energy, the need for diversification of energy supplies, and the increasingly important uses for nuclear technology in medicine and other fields.

Moreover, the report does not feature appropriate comparisons because it does not identify emissions that can be legitimately tied to domestic electricity generation rather than exports or non-electric uses. The occasional exclusion of some emissions as being not relevant to domestic generation, as in Tables 3.3 and 4.18, tend to disguise this problem, raising suspicions about possible bias.

It is unfortunate that the report does not provide quantitative analysis that supports its conclusions. While the nuclear life cycle is discussed in great scientific detail (VOCs, Tritium Oxides, Iodine-131 etc.), there is little analysis. The report is essentially a literature review, relaying data and information regarding the risks and impacts of nuclear power through its entire life cycle, often relying on outdated stereotypes and perceptions of nuclear energy. It appears, on occasion, to be selective in the research it cites. In Chapter 6, for example, it provides little empirical evidence, simply noting cost overruns related to certain nuclear facilities and increasing prices of uranium. Notwithstanding the lack of evidence, the report’s conclusions that nuclear is neither cost-effective nor sustainable are emphatic.

The literature review the authors rely on is itself limited. While the report examines risks and impacts in Canada, it would be useful to compare and review the experience of other nations with regard to nuclear power operation and spent fuel management. This is especially true for the second phase, in which the Pembina report begins by stating that “available information on the impacts of uranium refining, conversion and fuel fabrication is limited” (p. 43). The authors do not cite the nuclear experiences of nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, whose experiences could have enhanced the scope of the report, yet were ignored. Despite the lack of thorough review, the authors are willing to conclude that, “the environmental impacts of uranium mining and milling are severe” (p. 23). This is inconsistent with effective scientific inquiry.

The Pembina report offers a menu of policy conclusions that address the emotional rather than the logical consciousness of decision makers and the public. Advice for policy making should be based on concrete evidence that leads to confidence in findings and conclusions.

Because both evidence and credible presumption stemming from reasoned argument are lacking, the report is of limited usefulness.

As a scholarly assessment of the work of other scholars, this is utterly damming. Yet it is clear that Pembina does not care. It still posts the unaltered" Nuclear Power in Canada" on the PI web page. Nor does it appear that Penbina has not posted a defense of the shoddy practices which the CERI critique pointed out. Such practices dare to say the least, all too characteristic of the Green Industry.

The Problem is illustrated by Review of the Greenpeace report:“Tritium Hazard Report: Pollution and Radiation Risk from Canadian Nuclear Facilities” by R.V. Osborne. Osborne finds that,

The report has been written in two main parts. Part 1 discusses the basic properties of tritium and the levels of tritium in the Canadian environment. It is based largely on the data in a document prepared for the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission in 2002. In that document, the exposures to tritium of individual members of the public were estimated for three environments; one representative of the tritium levels distant (~ 40 km or more) from nuclear facilities, another representative of the area around a nuclear facility where tritium is produced or handled and the diet is of locally produced foods, and a third area, very close to a nuclear facility with a diet that includes some fruit and vegetables from a garden adjacent to the facility. Although it is clear from the text that some of the aspects of behavior of tritium in the environment and of the biokinetics of tritium are misunderstood by the author of the Greenpeace report, the analysis yields similar values for the exposures except for the environment with the highest levels. Here, the quite unrealistic assumption was made that the complete diet could be provided by the local garden; an assumption that more than doubled the estimated exposure. Nevertheless, the Greenpeace report notes that based on the current understanding of the dosimetric implications of these levels of tritium, even with the unrealistically high value calculated in this report, the doses to the general public “are miniscule”, and are not a health concern. However, the report claims that the current understanding of the dosimetry and biological effects of tritium is wrong, that the doses from tritium are much more significant than currently acknowledged (by a factor of ten at least, which is supposedly shown in Part 2 of the report and its appendices), and that there are real implications for health. The analysis in Part 2 and the appendices does not support this contention. There are misinterpretations and misunderstandings of the scientific literature and no new points are made. The text is largely based on a paper prepared by a European NGO for a review by a UK committee in 2003; a review that found the analysis unpersuasive. The additional material presented in this Greenpeace version is a review of Canadian epidemiological studies but it has misinterpretations of the various studies and provides no evidence for the observation of any effects on health from tritium.

Osborne noted unwarranted recommendations growing out of the Greenpeace misrepresentation of the environmental hazards posed by tritium from Canadian reactors,

Based on the claimed hazard from tritium near nuclear facilities in Canada, Greenpeace make six recommendations. Two in particular are completely unjustified; namely that pregnant women and young children should not live near nuclear facilities and that food from gardens near nuclear facilities should not be consumed. This is unwarranted fear-mongering. Even if the doses from tritium were to be ten times those that could conceivably be the maximum, such recommendations would be unnecessary.

Osborne reports a number of misrepresentations and/or mistakes in the Greenpeace report. For example,

There is a suggestion in the Greenpeace report that “few tritium emissions” from nuclear facilities in Canada are by way of a stack or chimney and that “tritiated water vapour literally oozes out of practically every surface, nook and cranny of the reactor building”. No reference is cited. The suggestion is plain nonsense. For a start, reactor buildings are operated at negative pressure with respect to the ambient atmospheric pressure and have to meet stringent leakage tests. Further, any tritiated water in the liquid phase that does escape from reactor systems within the reactor buildings is collected in tanks and is monitored and handled as liquid waste.

And

There is also the implication by Greenpeace that increasing concentrations of tritium (in the moderator and coolant of CANDU reactors) have caused radiation degeneration of seals, resins and filters, without any reference being cited. Again, this claim is wrong.

Osborne points to evidence that the Greenpeace report simply invents facts,

in commenting on the processing of heavy water moderator and coolant from the nuclear power plants at Pickering and Bruce, the author refers to the “problem of the estimated 4,000 truckloads per year” estimated to be needed to transport the heavy water to the Darlington facility. There are not 4000 truckloads per year. The estimate is high by at least an order of magnitude even if all the heavy water going to the Darlington facility had to be trucked there, but of course it does not since the Darlington reactors are on the same site.

In addition the Greenpeace text uses vague language to create impressions that may not be factually true,

Throughout the text the qualifiers “large”, “very large”, “extremely large” and “surprisingly large” are applied to tritium releases without any indication of the criterion on which this characterization is based. Indeed the whole chapter and the recommendation at the end to reduce tritium emissions are written without any indication of the dosimetric implications of the releases. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, these doses are low, even for the most highly exposed, relative to regulatory standards and to the magnitude of fluctuations experienced by the public from natural sources of radioactivity.

The Greenpeace report substitutes games with words, for fact based characterizations of real problems.

The Greenpeace author notes that the emissions from CANDU NPPs are way below the release limits that are derived from the Canadian regulatory limit of one mSv/a to a member of the public. The author then argues that the regulatory agency (the CNSC) therefore does not “restrict” the amounts of radioactive materials that are being released, as is claimed by that agency. This argument by Greenpeace is just playing with words and, in effect, completely ignores the application of the well-established ALARA1 principle, reflected in the conditions in site licences and the imposition of action levels.

The Greenpeace report is either confused or is deliberately attempting to introduce confusion.

The limits on tritium in drinking water are discussed. In the discussion there is confusion between the different approaches taken to setting drinking water guides for chemicals and for radionuclides. There is even the implication that detection limits would be appropriate for setting the guides. Given the sensitivity with which radionuclides can be detected, and in particular that for tritium in water (~one part per million million million), such a criterion would lead to an absurd standard that corresponded to a dose rate less than 2 nSv/a from continuous ingestion of water with this concentration; the dose rate is less than one millionth of the dose rate from the natural radiation background. Even the level of naturally-produced tritium in drinking water is greater than this.

Osborn points out that the Greenpeace report claims an increase in tritium concentration in the Great Lakes, when in fact just the opposite was the case. From the 1960's until the time of the Greenpeace report, the concentration of tritium in the Great Lakes had actually dropped.

Tritium concentrations measured during 1997/1998 in the Great Lakes are summarized. The values given are the same as those quoted in Osborne [2002]—the reference papers are the same—but the Greenpeace report does not include the values for earlier years. These show that the concentrations in the Great Lakes have been decreasing since the mid-sixties when fallout from nuclear weapons tests was at a maximum—even those in Lake Huron and Lake Ontario— despite the emissions from the nuclear facilities. For example, the value measured in Lake Ontario in 1965 was 43 Bq/L; by 1997 it was 7 Bq/L [King and Workman 1997].

Despite these clear data, the Greenpeace author contends that there is a “continued rise in tritium levels in most Great Lakes” and add that they are a “matter of concern”. Greenpeace also list incidents in which there have been transient tritium releases and contends that these too are matters of concern.

Osborne points out many other examples of mistakes or deliberate misrepresentations of facts If we assume mistakes we must assume that the Greenpeace authors are deliberately careless to the point of making up facts without checking. Thus the claim to represent truthful knowledge is in fact a misrepresentation.

In addition to the erroneous representations of fact, Osborn notes,

Tritium concentrations measured during 1997/1998 in the Great Lakes are summarized. The values given are the same as those quoted in Osborne [2002]—the reference papers are the same—but the Greenpeace report does not include the values for earlier years. These show that the concentrations in the Great Lakes have been decreasing since the mid-sixties when fallout from nuclear weapons tests was at a maximum—even those in Lake Huron and Lake Ontario— despite the emissions from the nuclear facilities. For example, the value measured in Lake Ontario in 1965 was 43 Bq/L; by 1997 it was 7 Bq/L [King and Workman 1997].
Despite these clear data, the Greenpeace author contends that there is a “continued rise in tritium levels in most Great Lakes” and add that they are a “matter of concern”. Greenpeace also list incidents in which there have been transient tritium releases and contends that these too are matters of concern.

There is plenty of reason for concern about the honesty and altruism of Greenpeace.

Greenpeace is a wealthy and powerful business. Greenpeace does not make anything, and despite its commitment to "green" values, does not cultivate any environmentally friendly plants, non genetically modified plants. Instead, when Greenpeace wishes to make money, it raises hell. This never ceases to impress the mainstream media, which can peddle the titillating story of Greanpeace's latest hell raising campaign to sensation hungry readers and viewers.

Some of Greenpeace's escapades seem to be motivated by a sort of legal blackmail. Greenpeace, is at the very least, guilty of fear mongeringg and pushing the limits of truth in many of its publicity campaigns. Among Greenpeace claims:

* that it is dangerous to drink Budweiser beer because of the use of a small amount of genetically modified rice in the brewing process.

* That food grown by American farmers should be boycotted, because it is legal to grow genetically modified crops in the United States.

* That Genetically modified crops are a disaster waiting to happen

* That animals fed genetically modified foods show serious side effects.

* Thar bromine detected in the Apple iPhone were environmentally harmful, even though none of the bromine compounds detected were seen as harmful by European Union environmental standards covering toxic substances in electronics. ,

Needless to say, Greenpeace lacks scientific evidence to back up these absurd claims. Greenpeace makes money by telling lies that misrepresent facts.

A Greenpeace media story began with the headline,

Cracks in nuclear power plant.

But were the cracks flaws in the power plant's structure? No! The Greenpeace story tells us,

Thirty Greenpeace activists entered the Borssele nuclear power plant in Zeeland, Netherlands. On top of the nuclear reactor, a crack has been painted to demonstrate the fact that the power plant is old and not safe and should be closed by 2013, as agreed previously. The Dutch government is reconsidering to keep the nuclear plant open after 2013.

Greenpeace always lies. There were no structural cracks in the Zeeland power plant, rather cracks painted by Greenpeace, and there were no serious indicators that the Zeeland plant was actually not safe due to its age.

The Greenpeace story pulls out all the stops as it tells us about the Nuclear Bogeyman, that oh so dangerous and oh so evil enemy of human well being.

The reality of nuclear power is no different now than it was in the 20th Century - it is inherently dangerous.

Time and time again the industry has demonstrated that safety and nuclear power is a contradiction in terms.

Safe reactors are a myth. An accident can occur in any nuclear reactor, causing the release of large quantities of deadly radiation into the environment. Even during normal operations radioactive materials are regularly discharged into the air and water. The policy of secrecy,which surrounded the development of the bomb, was transferred to civil nuclear power projects after World War II and lives on today. . . .

Aging of nuclear reactors, in particular the effect of prolonged operation on materials and large components, is endemic throughout the world's nuclear industry. At the same time nuclear operators are continually trying to reduce costs due to both greater competition in the electricity market and the need to meet shareholder expectations.

Are civilian power reactors as "inherently dangerous" as Greenpeace claims?

Cyril a regulat contributor to the Energy from Thorium Discussion commented:

I don't get the whole quest for inherently safe reactors. LWRs have negative reactivity due to the coolant also being the moderator that keeps the chain reaction going. If something drastic happens the coolant will be lost and the chain reaction will stop. In fact the chain reaction will stop even without breaking primary circuit, the negative feedback is very powerful.

This is an inherent safety mechanism. It means LWRs cannot go Chernobyl. They can still damage themselves from fission product afterheat. This damage is limited to the plant. It is the difference between having 7% heat load or 10000% (the latter caused Chernobyl). The negative feedback prevents Chernobyl completely. It is physics.

I don't like it when people talk about gen4 as inherently safe because it suggests there is no inherent safety with current designs. As we can see above this is not correct. If we define inherently safe as being completely safe to the general public, then LWRs already do this.

Cyril is quite correct that the LWR has some inherent safety features, and in particular a negative coefficient of reactivity in the event of coolant loss. The Three Mile Island accident established a LWR core meltdown would not trigger a China syndrome situation. That is the reactor pressure vessel would contain the molten core at least in most situations. in the TMI accident the core actually only partly melted, and the TMI accident was the worst loss of coolant accident that could reasonably be expected. The TMI accident left two significant containment barriers intact, demonstrating that even in the worst nuclear accident, the public would be safe. Nuclear power plants proven by TMI to not just be safe "by the skin of our teeth," but to be safe by a wide margin.

Radioactive gasses did escape from the TMI reactor during the incident, but they did not pose biological dangers, and were quickly dispersed. No one died as a consequence of escaping gasses at TMI, and no one got sick. And TMI was the worst accident that can reasonably be expected. Far from being inherently dangerous, the LIght Water Reactor was proven to be quite safe, not safe in the sense that LWRs will never have accidents or mishaps, but that accidents or mishaps involving the reactor core will not kill or injure people. Nuclear power plants turn out to be safer than gas fired power plants, far safer than coal fired power plants, far safer than wind turbines, and far safer than solar photovoltaic generating systems, when it comes to human safety. The one thing you will never find Greenpeace doing is publishing objective accounts of renewable energy related accidents or publishing objective data on deaths and injuries tied to renewable energy related accidents. On the other hand Greenpeace unceasingly exaggerates the death total from the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The Greenpeace account of Chernobyl casualties keeps rising. Ten years after the accident Greenpeace claimed that it had produced 2500 casualties. Radiations exposures from the Chernobyl accident as well as their effect have been wildly exagerated by the Greenpeace influenced media. A recent Greenpeace report, which Greenpeace conned the New York Academy of Sciences into publishing claimed that the Chernobyl death total was approaching one million people. What of Reports of respected agencies like the world Health Agency which pegged the Chernobyl death toll at 4000. According to Greenpeace the WHO is lying. Well someone is probably lying, but do you really believe that it is the WHO?

I have a long standing interest in the sociology and social psychology of public issues. Why do people put up with this crap? Modernity is marked by the use of political and social issues to define personal identity and the identity of social groups. Although disinterested individuals may come to see certain issues as being of great importance to society and chose to devote time and energy to those issues out of purely altruistic concerns, this is far from always the case. Some of the leading critics of nuclear power have tied their hostility to nuclear power to personal business interests. This would include figures like Ralph Nader, Amory Lovins, and organizations like Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace.

It is often assumed that non-profit status, implies a lack of financial motivation, but such beliefs would not be held by people who have worked in the non=profit economic sector. Often non-profits are set up in such a way that great economic benefits may flow to a single manager or to a small numbers of managers, while most of the agencies employees may be underpaid. I't is not unusual for agencies to violate their own rules, by denying fair compensation to some employees, while overcompensating others. Boards of directors may turn out to be the personal friends of the executive director, or alternatively the board may never meet, and decisions are reached by phone calls between the chairman of the board and the executive director. The income from the agency may come in the form of grants and contracts that are subtly at variance with the public purposes of the organization. Thus an environmental organization known for its anti-nuclear stance may be taking money from a foundation to promote the idea of clean coal. The foundation may in turn receive funding from coal mining interests. The organizations leadership may understand all of this, but the reality may not be appreciated by the organizations rank and file or a large numbers of people who identify with the cause and support it by making small or even large contributions to what they regard as a good cause.

Leaders in popular, issues related social movements may be more conceerned about managing followers social identities than in the accuracy of information they offer the public, Thus leaders and other individuals who have tied themselves to the anti-nuclear movement may spend a great deal of time motivating followers to oppose nuclear power without concern about the truthfulness of statements made to increase the motivation of followers.

Even those who are aware of the inconsistency between high minded purpose and cynical manipulative and dishonest means are loath to publicly point to the conflict. I would by no means confine the scope of these remarks to the anti-nuclear movement. The leadership of many allegedly high minded organizations conduct their business in dishonest fashion. And even with organizations whose overall commitment to high minded goals is unquestionable, lying and deception still may be an informal part of the organizations method of doing business.

I am not suggestion that all or even most cause oriented organizations are corrupt, only that the high minded should not ignore evidence of deception on the part of their leadership. Those who do so are enablers of wrong doing, either by playing the role of mark or chump, or by cynically becoming a party to the deception. We should not assume that Harvey Wasserman, Amory Lovins, Helen Caldicott, or Ralph Nader are unaware of the extent to which they engage in deception while promoting their anti-nuclear cause, or the compromises that figures like journalist Ellen Goodman make while facilitating the communication of these deception.

It is my contention then that anti-nuclear leaders and organizations knowingly repeat false or inaccurate information as part of their anti-nuclear campaigns, and that among their motivations for doing so, are financial rewards. I further maintain that there is an anti-nuclear business, and that among the services it provides, is the manipulation of adherents identities. The motivation of adherents has been explored by Eric Hoffer, who wrote in The Ordeal of Change

"Faith, enthusiasm, and passionate intensity in general are substitutes for the self-confidence born of experience and the possession of skill. ... The substitute for self-confidence is faith ... the substitute for self-esteem is pride; and the substitute for individual balance is fusion with others in a compact group. ... In the chemistry of the soul, a substitute is almost always explosive if for no other reason than that we can never have enough of it. We can never have enough of that which we really do not want. What we want is justified self-confidence and self-esteem. .... We can be satisfied with moderate confidence in ourselves and with a moderately good opinion of ourselves, but the faith we have in a holy cause has to be extravagant and uncompromising, and the pride we derive form an identification with a nation, race, leader, or party [religion] is extreme and overbearing."

Nuclear supporters may at present be protected from corruption, not by any moral superiority that might fall to us because of the rightness and justice of our cause, but by the lack of motive for corruption. Despite the charge by our critics that we are shills for the nuclear industry, in fact the nuclear industry for the most part a distant reality from which we receive no benefits, nor do we expect too. But were bribes available would we be incorruptable?

DA Ryan, spiraling down

DA Ryan just sinks lower and lower. Here is one of his most recent posts. I do not believe that I need to repond.

daryan12 commented on A critical analysis of current and proposed future nuclear reactors designs.

in response to a comment by daryan12:

Once upon a time I used to be a fan of nuclear energy. As far as I saw it, nuclear energy was the silver bullet solution to all of our energy problems and more. However, the more I’ve learned about the industry the more critical I’ve become. Notably the fact that most of the economic [...]

Another rant / rave / character assassination can be found here: http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011/08/da-ryan.html
Yet again “Rank Amateur” Charles Barton demonstrates all the standard methods employed by the LFTR cargo cult in dealing with opponents, i.e. quote mining, misrepresentation of their statements, deliberate straw man building and Gish Galloping galore. http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Gish_Gallop

Again my views are completely misrepresented and taken out of context by CB. As anyone who reads what I actually say in my link below and compares it to what he claims I say (by quote mining) you will see a distinct difference. For example I acknowledged the new evidence that has emerged from the investigations into Windscale (showing minimal core burning) and even post a link to it on my page, although I also give several other counter points, as anyone doing a balanced critique would do, of course a fanatic like CB doesn’t see it that way. http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-6_htgr/6-4-3-fire-risk-and-mitigation/

I would also note that CB asks where’s my evidence? I’ve pointed out to him much evidence in the link above, including several peer reviewed papers (both for and against) and the official NEA Chernobyl accident report, plus several more in comments exchanges. I have done these repeatedly, but he just doesn’t listen.
http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/#comment-161 http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/#comment-135 http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/#comment-120 http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/#comment-141 http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/#comment-160

Furthermore, as even BH has noted, some degree of containment of a MSR reactor would be necessary. Be careful there sir, CB maybe about to call you a heretic against his “precious” too! http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011/08/d-ryan-msrlftr-critique-not-ready-for.html

Consider the following, BH and CB have now devoted as best I can tell 11,000 odd words to they’re 3 “Gish Gallops” plus a further 3-4,000 odd words here (out of a total comments page length of 22,000, 90% of it run up by LFTR fans or the rebuttals to their points). All together they have written comments double the length of the original MSR article, and most of that has been directed at two small pieces (the fire risk sections) of at most 1,000 words length! The irony is, some LFTR fans have complained about my article being too long! Naturally such insane antics does much damage to their cause.

I think they doth protest too much! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_lady_doth_protest_too_much,_methinks

Deproliferation, India and the Thorium Fuel Cycle

In the first part of this essay, I reviewed the almost inevitable rise of China and India to great power status. I pointed out that by 2050, current expectations are that by 2050, China and India will be ranked along with the United States as great powers of the first order. I noted that both China and India are committed to the development of Thorium fuel cycle nuclear technology, and the possibility that those commitments could chalenge the current course of American nonproliferation policy.

It is possible to produce fissionable U-233 from thorium from the same sort of reactors used to produce weapons grade plutonium, yet during the cold war, no one thought to do so. Frank von Hippel is a self-styled non-proliferation expert who has greatly influenced American, and even global non-proliferation policy. Other self-styled non=proliferation experts tend to advocates arms control policies suggested by von Hippel. Together with Jungmin Kanga and von Hippel, actually attempted to explore this seemingly rational step was not taken during and after the cold war in a paper titled U-232 and the Proliferation- Resistance of U-233 in Spent Fuel.

They write,

Uranium-233 is, like plutonium-239, a long-lived fissile isotope produced in reactors by single-neutron capture in a naturally-occurring abundant fertile isotope (see Figure 1). The fast critical mass of U-233 is almost identical to that for Pu-239 and the spontaneous fission rate is much lower, reducing to negligible levels the problem of a spontaneous fission neutron prematurely initiating the chain reaction -- even in a "gun-type" design such as used for the U-235 Hiroshima bomb (see Table 1). Why then has plutonium been used as the standard fissile material in the "pits" of modern nuclear weapons while U- 233 has not? This question is not just of historical interest, since there is increasing interest in U-233-thorium fuel cycles.

Kanga and von Hippel note

One of the most important reasons why plutonium was chosen over U-233 as a weapons material is that first-generation plutonium-production reactors were fueled by natural uranium, which contains almost as large a fraction of neutron-absorbing fertile material (U-238) as is possible consistent with a reactor achieving criticality. In a natural-uranium fueled reactor, such as the Canadian heavy-water-moderated (HWR) reactor type, Pu-239 is produced by neutron absorption in U-238 at a rate of about one gram of plutonium per thermal megawatt-day (MWd) of fission energy release at low U-235 "burn ups," (see Figure 2).1 Approximately one MWd is released by the fission of one gram of fissile material. After taking into account the neutron requirements for maintaining a steady chain reaction, there is about one excess neutron available per fission and virtually all of these neutrons are absorbed by U-238. Production of U-233 requires the addition of the fertile material Th-232. If the fuel is natural uranium, only a relatively small percentage of thorium can be added before it becomes impossible to sustain a chain reaction. We"estimate that about 7 percent thorium oxide can be added to HWR fuel achievable burnup is reduced from 7000 to 1000 MWd/t (thermal megawatt- days per ton-heavy metal). Because the thermal-neutron absorption cross-section of Th-232 is almost 3 times larger than that of U-238, this concentration of thorium would yield about 0.2 grams of U-233 per MWd at burnups lower than 1000 MWd/t (see Figure 3). Thus most of the fissile material produced in the core would still be plutonium.

Kanga and von Hippel also state,

For a country with uranium-enrichment capabilities, the balance between plutonium and U-233 production could be shifted almost all the way toward U-233 by fueling production reactors with highly-enriched uranium. Indeed the U.S. produced much of its weapons plutonium in the Savannah River heavy-water-moderated production reactors, using highly-enriched uranium fuel and depleted uranium targets in mixed-lattice arrangements.

But Kanga and von Hippel also noted a second problem for weaponizing U-233,

But at this point it should be noted that countries with uranium enrichment capacities to the level of highly-enriched uranium already possess the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. And the process of producing U-233 using HEU-235 to in production reactors, destroys more weapons grade fissionable material than it produces. The use of U-235 at Savannah River to produce Pu-239 was motivated by the fact that Pu-239 had useful military qualities that U-235 lacked. The military qualities of U-233 are inferior too the military qualities of U-235. Thus the choice to produce Pu-239 but not U-233 at Savannah River was rational. Kanga and von Hippel acknowledge the problem,

A second problem with U-233 as a fissile material for either weapons or reactor fuel is that it contains an admixture of U-232, whose decay chain produces penetrating gamma rays. The decay chain of U-232 is shown in Figure 4. The most important gamma emitter, accounting for about 85 percent of the total dose from U-232 after 2 years, is Tl-208, which emits a 2.6-MeV gamma ray when it decays (see Appendix C). For plutonium containing a significant admixture of 14.4-year half-life Pu-241, the most important source of gamma-ray irradiation from is its 433-year half-life decay product, Am-241, which emits low-energy (< 0.1 MeV) gamma rays. These gamma rays do not represent a significant occupational hazard for weapon-grade plutonium (0.36% Pu-241) but their dose becomes more significant for "reactor-grade" plutonium, which contains on the order of 10 percent Pu-241. Thus both U- 233 contaminated with U-232 and reactor-grade plutonium are made less desirable as weapons materials by virtue of the fact that their gamma emissions bring with them the potential for significant radiation doses or shielding requirements for workers involved in nuclear weapons production and for military personnel handling nuclear weapons.

How much less desirable? Kanga and von Hippel report that at a 1% U-232 contamination level a worker would begin to accumulate a cancer risk after working with U-233 for less than three minuits. But 1% U-232 is unusual to say the least. The problem is simple, U-233 poses problems for workers and military personel by exposure to radiation from a U-232 daughter product, while the same radiation poses problems for weapons electronics in storage.

Kanga and von Hippel report that India is researching laser isotope separation of U-233 from U-232. But does this represent a proliferation challenge? First if Indian researchers can separate U-233 from U-232 using lasers, they can also separate U-235 from U-238, and U-235 from U-238 separation is one of the two classic route to nuclear weapons. U-235 based weapons are reliable enough that they do not require tests to identify their military effect. This is not the case for U-233 based weapons. The only known test of a U-233 based weapon failed to accomplish test objectives, although it did explode with a respectable if not as large as expected bang, Thus it would appear that given routs to U-233 and U-235 based weapons, given equivalent costs and technical obstacles, but without tests, military planners will prefer the U-235 based weapons.

Now it can be argued that India should not develop laser uranium enrichment technology because such technology poses proliferation risks, but Burma, a rogue state, is also developing Laser enrichment technology, although it is very unlikely that the Burmese will master it. Burma is also attempting to master centrifuge technology, and given the track records of Pakistan and Iran, that appears to more likely.

The Indian three stage nuclear Research and Development program is well known, and despite setbacks, it has made steady progress over the last 50 years. During much of that time, the global anti-proliferation community sought to punish India for its pursuit of nuclear weapons. India, which shares common borders with two nuclear armed hostile states that are allied against it, believed that a small nuclear arms program was prudent, given the likelihood that at least one of its enemies might use nuclear weapons against it. India maintained its nuclear weapons program despite a 34 year embargo on uranium and other nuclear related trade items. The embargo somewhat handicapped the development of the Indian nuclear industry, and limited the production of nuclear power in India.

It should be pointed out that in 1974, at the beginnings of the international nuclear trade sanctions against India, that nation lacked many of the characteristics of a great power. Never the less it refused to back down on its nuclear weapons program. Today, India is rapidly becoming a great power. It is conceivable that by 2050 India will have the largest economy of any nation. At worst India will have by most estimates the second or third largest economy. India, like China is developing aircraft carriers, a standard military technology for projecting power.

If in 1974, a relatively weak India refused to subordinate itself to the nuclear policies dictated by the United States, by 2050 a very powerful Indian State will certainly not place itself under American Nuclear hegemony. The 123 agreement between India and the United States offered India recognition of its great power status.

The Indian three stage Indian Nuclear development plan directly contradicts the non-proliferation policy advocated by Frank von Hippel who opposes nuclear waste reprocessing and the use of fast reactors. Von Hipple states,

Reprocessing is enormously dangerous. The amount of radioactivity in the liquid waste stored at France's plant is more than 100 times that released by the Chernobyl accident. That is why France's government set up antiaircraft missile batteries around its reprocessing plant after the 9/11 attacks.

Even more dangerous, however, is the fact that reprocessing provides access to plutonium, a nuclear weapon material. That is why the U.S. turned against it after 1974, the year India used the first plutonium separated with U.S.-provided reprocessing for a nuclear explosion. President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger, his secretary of State, managed to intervene before France and Germany sold reprocessing plants to South Korea, Pakistan and Brazil, all of which had secret weapons programs at the time.

The heart of the Indian long range three stage nuclear program involves recycling spent fuel from conventional power reactors. Plutonium in that spent fuel becomes the the Fissile start charge for for fast breeder reactors, which produce plutonium and U-233 from thorium. That fuel is recycled and the the Plutonium is returned to the fast breeder while the thorium is used to power thorium fuel cycle thermal breeder reactors.

Von Hippel apparently has not produced a comprehensive case study of nuclear disarmament issues from the Indian perspective, but he thinks he knows what the Indians should be doing. In 2006 he co-authored a paper which offered prescriptions for demands which the United States should seek to include in any nuclear trade agreement with India. In particular von Hippel demanded that any nuclear trade agreement with India should require that before trade can begin

that India has stopped the production of fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons or else joined a multilateral fissile production cutoff agreement;

Von Hippel also called for

A determination and annual certification that U.S. civil nuclear trade does not in any way assist or encourage India's nuclear weapons program.

The Conditions which von Hippel sought to impose on India might be described as humiliating for a great power, even a great power which was content to hold a small number of nuclear weapons. India faces a possible military alliance between China and Pakistan which together hold far more nuclear weapons than India does. Thus India's nuclear arsenal may not offer India sufficient for conceivable national defense needs.

In addition von Hippel has taken a stance that nuclear fuel reprocessing is conducive to weapons use of fissile materials. Von Hippel also objects to fast reactors because a fast reactor fleet will inevitably be dependent on fuel reprocessing, and theoretically fast reactors could produce fissionable materials that could be used in nuclear weapons. Later in this essay, I will examine problems with von Hippel's belief that reprocessing and fast reactors increase the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. In Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status, a study coauthored by von Hippel, he remarks

India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), expected to be completed in 2010, will have the capacity to make 90 kg of weapon-grade plutonium per year, if only the radial blanket is reprocessed separately and 140 kg per year if both radial and axial blankets are reprocessed.15 The Nagasaki bomb contained 6 kg of weapon-grade plutonium and modern weapons designs contain less. At 5 kg per warhead, the PFBR would produce enough weapon-grade plutonium for 20–30 nuclear weapons a year, a huge increase in production capacity in the context of the South Asian nuclear arms race. were left mixed with the plutonium, however — a project that the U.S. Department of Energy abandoned when it learned that the technology was not in hand — the gamma radiation field surrounding the mix would still be less than one-hundredth the level the IAEA considers self-protecting against theft and thousands of times less than the radiation field surrounding plutonium when it is in spent fuel (figure 1.4).

It is doubtful that von Hippel favors Indian reprocessing of Thorium cycle nuclear fuel. Thus to the extent that American nonproliferation policy is influenced by von Hippel and his followers, American nonproliferation policy, it is likely to conflict with Indian nuclear policy. The Indian nuclear policy had from its inception of using nuclear power to turn India into a rich and powerful nation. Not just militarily and politically powerful, but economically powerful as well. It is unlikely that the Indian political leadership will abandone their goal of achieving great power political and economic status for India, and the prevailing view that nuclear power will play a key roal in accomplishing that goal. To understand Indian national goals is to begin to understand the realpolitik of Indian objections to American nonproliferation as interpreted by Frank von Hippel.

Much 20th century thinking about nuclear nonproliferation, sprang from ethical goals. Nuclear war, is a moral wrong, and the use of nuclear weapons is evil. These assumptions cannot be dispited. But nuclear weapons and their use exist in a morally imperfect world, where people believe that they are sometimes are forced to commit acts that are morally wrong, and even to do things which in absolute moral terms are evil. It is not necessicary to justify such behavior in order to acknowledge that it exists, and to regard the necessity of responding to the real acts of people, as imposing on us constraints on the moral aspects of our life and thought. It is desirable to bring together the real world of human thought and action, with the more lofty goals offered by moral thought. Such is the case if we wish to control the production and use of nuclear weapons.

Thus future American policy towards India nuclear developments ought to focuse on a conversion of the ethical with the realpolitik goals. American policy has no choice but to accept that India has chosen a path that will lead to a thorium based economy. as well as the Indian need for a limited stock of nuclear weapons, at least in the short run.. Once Indian goals accepted, India will willingly participate in the creation on an international order directed towards arms control.

Indian and Chinese Developmemt, Nonproliferation and Thorium

This is the first of a series of posts which I plan to offer that will argue that current nuclear nonproliferation schemes are at best transitory, and are likely to undergo significant changes before the middle of the 21th century.

Numerous studies projecting future global economic growth have suggested that by and in most cases well before 2050, the Chinese economy will be the largest single national economy. Some studies, however, suggest that Indian economic growth will exceed China over the next 40 years, and by 2050 the Indian economy will be the largest in the world. Views that the Indian economy will rank second or third in the global economy are generally seen as more common.

A recent Citigroup Global Markets study finds

China should overtake the US to become the largest economy in the world by 2020, then be overtaken by India by 2050.

The Chinese political-social system as well as current demographic trends are expected begin to act as a drag on its economic growth, while Indian democracy and the greater openness of Indian society is expected to lead to higher levels of competitiveness.

By 2050 Citi researchers expect both the Chinese and the Indian economies to be twice the size of the American economy. These developments have significant implications for global affairs. Globally Citi anticipates that the 10 largest economies in 2050 will be India, China, The United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, Russia, Mexico, Japan and Egypt. Key resources, including Water and electricity play a major tole in economic development, and in the long run will potentially be sources of economic problems. The Citi researchers suggest,

Many rapidly growing economies, including China and India continue to charge prices for key resources, including water, electricity and other sources of power that are far below long-run social marginal cost and even far below long-run marginal private cost (excluding environmental externalities) (see OECD (2009) and Easter and Liu (2005), World Bank (2010)). In the case of prices charged to households, there is a second-best argument that, if cash grants to address poverty are not administratively feasible, the subsidization of certain key goods and services consumed by the poor is (constrained) efficient. This argument also supports the use of subsidies on the staple foods consumed by the poor as a poverty relief measure. There is no equity or efficiency-based case, however, to subsidise (charge a price below long-run marginal social cost) the use of water, power and other resources by the industrial and agricultural sectors – by far the largest consumers of power and water.23 The over-use of both power and water this has encouraged is creating a major potential environmental problem in both India and China. Unless this issue is addressed as a matter of urgency, scarcity of clean, fresh water alone could become a binding constraint on growth in both India and China – and many other countries with large arid regions. Long-run social marginal cost prices of all key resources (or equivalent physical rationing schemes which would, however, be much less efficient in practice) is the only way to prevent further destruction of environmental capital.

Thus sources of low cost sustainable energy will play an important role in economic development, especially approaching 2050 or after. Both India and China are planning very ambitious programs of nuclear power development. Both countries are planning rapid deployment of significant numbers of traditional Light Water and Heavy Water power reactors. while projecting for further development both Fast Liquid Metal Reactors and Thorium cycle breeder reactors.

Indian nuclear plans include the construction of a large number of fast reactors that will be used to both produce electricity and breed thorium. In addition India plans currently include a large number of Thorium Fuel cycle heavy water reactors that operate at or close to one to one conversion ratios. The Chinese Academy of Science has initiated a program of Thorium cycle Molten Salt Reactor (LFTR) research and development.

Nuclear Green has argued on the basis of studies conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, that LFTR type reactors will offer safe, sustainable and efficient nuclear power at a potentially low cost. (See for example, ORNL-TM-1851 (SUMMARY OF THE OBJECTIVES, THE DESIGN, AND A PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT OF MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS) ). In contrast to the relatively simple and low cost chemical processes that would allow low cost Fluoride salt based nuclear fuel reprocessing being investigated by the Chinese, the Indian thorium cycle scheme would involve far more expensive chemical fuel reprocessing systems, and most likely more expensive reactors. All in all, the Indian thorium based energy scheme appears to be more complex and more expensive.

Several motives will undoubtedly drive India and China to develop nuclear power systems that are capable of producing sustainable energy, while at the same time facilitate rapid and mast deployment while providing low cost energy. These motives include concerns about the climate implications of burning fossil fuels, increasing scarcity of and rising prices for fossil fuels, the health and agricultural consequences of burning fossil fuels, and the ready availability of large, easily recovered thorium deposites.

Conclusions

By the middle of the 21st century the combined economic power of India and China will be so great that they can impose an international order that is consistent with their interests on the global political-economic system. Where future Indian and Chinese interest converge, the United States can expect to make little headway against them. Both India and China appear committed to developing a thorium nuclear fuel cycle, and it would appear to be rational that they both do so. It is possible that the combined interest of India and China might diverge from those of the United States, and it would appear unlikely that under such circumstances, the interest of the United States would prevail. These conclusions have significant implications for future American nonproliferation policy.

In the next post, I will review the implications of current American nonproliferation policies for the deployment of thorium based nuclear technologies.