Toward a White Paper on a Mass Global Deployment of Nuclear Power: Safety

Nuclear energy poses the well known risk of proliferation and of catastrophic accidents of the scale of Chernobyl whose consequences would last far into the future, afflicting generations who will not have experienced the benefit of the energy. Hence four criteria must be considered in proceeding to a low or zero-CO2 future:

• Cost
• The speed with which the transition can be made (since the climate change problem is now widely recognized to be urgent)
• Potential new severe burdens or risks on future generations not deriving from CO2 emissions
• The problems of security associated with a re-organized energy system. - Annie and Arjun Makhijan

In this statement, the Makhijanis set out in digest form the substance of the anti-nuclear argument. It is the purpose of this White Paper to set out arguments that contradict the four Makhijani anti-nuclear contentions, and to argue that a speedy and relatively low cost mass global deployment of nuclear power generating facilities is possible without "Severely burdens or risks on future generations," and while lowering rather than increasing security problems associated with nuclear weapons.

The Makhijanis presented their list in an essay titled, "Low-Carbon Diet without Nukes in France." This essay was intended to demonstrate that France could transition to a post-carbon and post-nuclear energy system, without paying an unacceptable cost. There are several reasons why the Makhijani transition would in all likelihood be a failure. First it relies to a very large extent on energy efficiency, without enquiring into the potential obstacles the transition to a high efficiency energy system would face, and without any attempt to assess the cost of of that transition. For example, the Makhijanis' favor heating with ground source heat pumps, but they also favor co-generation. This is an either/or choice, however. Ground source heat pumps while energy efficient entail high capital and repair costs, making their widespread adoption by home owners unlikely. One of the more astonishing aspects of the Makhijanis' post-nuclear, post carbon-plan, is the extent to which it is not really post carbon. Rather that simply eliminating the use of carbon based fuels, the Makhijanis would attempt to use them more efficiently. Most Danish power plants are either wind turbines or co-generation facilities, and Denmark has a much higher per-capata carbon emission rate than France. Thus, the assumption that co-generation can be substituted for nuclear power, without carbon penalties is questionable at best.

The cost to French electrical consumers under the Makhijani system is also open to question. The environmentally correct electricity in Denmark is over twice as expensive as the nuclear generated electricity is in France. Danish electricity is the most expensive in Europe, and the effect on the French economy of high priced energy would require further investigation.

If the cost of French electricity does not rise in the Makhijani system, then we have to ask if the consequence of greater efficiency would not be a rebound in electrical demand, or even an overall demand growth. Amory Lovins has suggested that efficiency would curb consumer demand for electricity, but this Lovins idea has meet with withering criticisms by Robert Bryce and David Bradish as well as many other critics. Critics argue that Lovins' appeal to energy efficiency is confounded by Jevons Paradox, a well established economic principle that sates that on a macroeconomic level, energy efficiency triggers a rise rather than a decline in energy use. In addition on a microeconomic level, economist have observed a rebound in energy use following the adoption of an energy efficient technology. Despite statements that he would answer Bryce and Bradish's criticisms two years ago, Lovins has never done so. Thus, at the very least the Makhijanis need to demonstrate that the critics of Lovins overestimates of the benefits of energy efficiency would not also make a valid case against his claims about the benefits of energy efficiency for French society.

It should be noted then that in a plan which calls for filling the gaps in efficiency and renewable energy generation by the use of fossil fueled generating facilities, any short falls would have to be filled with carbon-emitting energy sources. Thus to the extent the Makhijani plan proves defective in practice, it will produce rather than eliminate unacceptable levels of CO2 emissions. Similar problems would effect non-nuclear carbon mitigation schemes proposed by Amory Lovins.

Amory Lovins claims:

The nuclear industry is eager that the public does not understand this argument . . . Amory Lovins

But what does Amory Lovins mean by the term "the Nuclear Industry?"

There is no such thing as "The Nuclear Industry". There are several businesses that produce reactor designs, and in some cases, build reactors. There are parts suppliers, and construction companies, many of which build many other things besides reactors. There are uranium mines, uranium enrichment facilities, and fuel fabricators. There are reactor owners. But arguably in many cases business that do these things, do many other things as well. Reactor manufacturers may also manufacture wind generators, steam generators for coal fired power plants, and natural gas fired gas turbines. Uranium miners may also mine other materials at the same mine, and may operate mines from which no uranium is produce. Uranium enrichment facilities may be own by national governments. Power reactors may be owned by agencies of national governments. Thus the term "the nuclear Industry" reifies complex, and diverse realities.

In so far as nuclear energy must play an important role in sustaining modern, materials oriented civilization, the challenges which confront nuclear power, are challenges which confront human society. There are those who question the value of the continued existence of a high energy, wealthy civilization. I am not one. I will only say, that there are moral penalties for not sustaining a high energy, wealthy civilization, and for not making the benefits of that civilization inclusive to all of the people on earth, and I find the moral costs unacceptable. In addition, I would argue that the means exist by which, if we choose to use them, a civilization with access to high levels of energy can be sustained on earth for millions of years. The challenges which confront nuclear power then, are the challenges which must be meet, if a high energy, wealthy civilization, encompassing all the people on earth, is to be created and sustained.

The challenges confronting nuclear power are:

* assured nuclear safety

* An assured nuclear fuel supply throuh the efficient use of nuclear fuel

* the recycling of fission products into industrial use

* making energy produced through nuclear power available at a low cost

* developing the technology that will makes meeting the first four goals possible

* Achieving the first five goals rapidly, and deploying the technology world wide as quickly as possible

* Severing potential links between massive use of civilian power reactors and the spread of nuclear weapons.

Assured Nuclear Safety

Ralph Nader tells claims that in 1964 he attended a conference at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Over lunch Nader claims that he began asking nuclear engineers some questions. "They couldn't answer them, or the answers weren't satisfactory," Nader claims. "'What could happen if a system goes wrong?' Nader asked. They avoided any such descriptions or said, 'we've got defense in depth' -- and other jargon." "Defense in Depth" was the name of a very successful but expensive approach to nuclear safety that was proven to be effective when, at Three Mile Island, safety systems designed to implement the "defense in depth" safety philosophy prevented a single human casualty. By describing a discussion of things things that he did not understand as jargon, Nader revealed his lack of willingness to understand nuclear safety. As Gomer Pile use to say, "surprise, surprise surprise."

There were of course, other people at ORNL who could have the answered Nader's 1964 questions, had he been willing to listen. If Ralph Nader wanted to talk to people who could answer his questions about what could go wrong in reactors and under what conditions, he could have talked tp George Parker, or he could have talked to my father. Needless to say, Nader did not seek out nuclear safety experts to answers to his questions. Certainly Alvin Weinberg, who was a friend to Ralph Nader's sister, Clair, would and could have answered Nader's questions about nuclear safety, and would have made himself available to Ralph if Claire had indicated to Weinberg that Ralph wanted information on nuclear safety. It is quite possible that Nader talked to someone in Oak Ridge who did not answer his question, but English, but Narder was not interested in what he had to say. alternatively Nader's informant, that day gave him lucid information in plain and simple information, Had Nader sought out answers to his nuclear safety questions in 1964, he would have found them, but Nader wanted answers that made nuclear scientist look bad, not reliable and accurate information.

There is logic, which is the science of right reasoning, and then there is green logic, which makes relies on crazy arguments about energy. According to green logic, if energy source A kills thousands of people, it is safe, but if energy source B has kills only a handful of people during its history, it is too dangerous to use. Furthermore, according to green logic, energy source B should be shut down because it is too dangerous, and replaced by safe energy source A.

Energy source A is the use of natural gas as an energy source, which Source B, is nuclear reactor generated power. Comparative Assessment of Natural Gas Accident Risks, is a study of risks related to natural gas use by Paul Scherrer Institute. The study authors consulted no less than 23 comprehensive accident databases, most world wide. Major accidents identified in these data bases and identified from several other sources, were aggregated into a single database that included 18,400 accidents.

A total of 6404 energy-related accidents correspond to 34.8% of all accidents or 49.5% of man-made accidents. Among the energy-related accidents 3117 (48.7%) are severe, of which 2078 have 5 or more fatalities.

The data base recorded over 100,000 energy related casualties in all energy sectors excluding nuclear, and 31 energy related casualties in the nuclear sector. Of the non-nuclear casualties, 2043 were due to natural gas related accidents. An objective observer from another planet might conclude that of all energy sources listed in the study, that people who valued risk avoidance would chose nuclear power. Yet Greenpeace, green energy maven Amory Lovins, and Green advocate Joe Romm all call for the replacement of nuclear with natural gas fired energy sources. Greens site the alleged danger of nuclear power as a principle reason for the switch from nuclear to natural gas.

Nuclear power technology is by far the safest of energy technologies. Based on experience, based on actuarial evidence, fatality risks for nuclear power plants in OECD nations is far lower than for fossil fuels. According to the report "Sustainability of Electricity Supply Technologies under German Conditions: A Comparative Evaluation published by the Paul Scherrer Institute

representative PSA-based results obtained for nuclear power plants in Switzerland and in USA show latent fatality rates typically of the order of 0.01 per GWe year. The corresponding immediate fatality rates are practically negligible.

Even the latent PSI risk estimates are controversial because they are based on assumptions for which inconsistent data sets are available. The latent casualties from nuclear plant operation is predicted on the basis of he so called linear no-threshold hypothesis (LNT) which suggests that adverse health effects can occur the LNT hypothesis predicts that variations in background radiation levels would effect human health. But assessments of the health of people who live in high background radiation areas fail to support the conclusion. Health Physicist Bernand Cohen, found evidence that increasing levels of background radiation from naturally occuring radon, were associated with decreasing cancer rates. Thus the LNT hypothesis appears to have been falsified, Yet it remains politically correct. Even if we assume. If the LNT hypothesis is not assumed, the fatality rate from the operation of nuclear plants in OECD countries drops to 0.0.

Despite powerful evidence of the safety of the previous generation of nuclear technology. reactor manufactures have continued to develop even safer reactor designs. The probability of a casualty producing nuclear accident occurring with Generation III+ reactors approaches once during the life of the universe. To expect greater safety, is to take an excursion into the realm of the absurd. The high levels of nuclear safety achieved by current reactor designs, comes at a high cost. Extremely safe Light Water Reactors are expensive to build. The challenge for future nuclear safety developments is to continue providing the current high level of nuclear safety, while dramatically lowering nuclear construction costs.

Nuclear safety operates at many levels. Reactor safety is the primary level of nuclear safety, and the defenses against accidents in a reactor may feature both redundancy and a many leveled safety defense system. The current generation of Light Water Reactors have high levels of safety built in to their designs. Nuclear safety engineers have calculated that the General Electric Evolutionary Simple Boiling Water Reactir is so safe, that it would experience a core meltdown once every 29 million years. In contrast the Yellowstone Super volcano, which is capable of killing milllons of people with an erruption, erupts every 600,000 to 800,000 years. It has been 640,000 years since the last erruption of the Yellowstone super volcano. Thus the likelihood of a major reactor accident and its consequnces, ought to be placed in the context of far more likely natural disasters.

Steps that can be taken to prevent reactor accidents include:

A. good design based on an up to date understanding of reactor safety,
B. An exhaustive follow through of all safety related reactor features in the procurement of manufactureing materials and replace ment oarts, The actual manufacture and maintence of the reactor, and reactor operations
C. systematic faults detected in procurement, manufacture and operationals, with a prompt and complete follow up.
D. Redundant or fall back systems in the event of the failure of a reactor system.
E. Automatic system response that rely ion the laws of nature, rarher thn opeartor intervention.
F. Reactor siting consistent with reactor safety issues. Experimental reactors placed in remote locations.
G. Reactor staff should be both well trained and highly motivated to follow all safety guidelines.

The second level of nuclear safety is accident mitigation. These would include those elements of reactor design that would tend to diminish the effects of a nuclear accident on the public. Mitigation would include both internal reactor design features, and design features of the reactor facility that would tend to mitigate the effects of a major nuclear accident. Mitigation defenses can be in depth. Hence in the event of a core meltdown in a light water reactor, the reactor pressure vessal would pose a significant defense against the escape of solid fission products. The reactor containment dome would form another layer of defense against fission product release, while the isolation of the reactor would lead to the dissipation of radioactive gases, and the precipitation of solid radioactive particles escaping the reactor containment facility prior to contacts with human communities.

Accident mitigation would include, the automatic shutdown of a reactor after a partial system failure, the automatic initiation of back up cooling and/or emergency cooling in the event of a primary cooling syetem failure. The design of reactor monitoring panels and system alerts to give clear and concise information about what is happening, without creating an overwelming flow of information. Staff training in accident management. Well defined accident response procedures to be included in staff training. The management of initial recovery after accident related shut down, Well defined accident cleanup and recovery procedures.

A third level of defense would be the management of public consequences after a nuclear accident. These wouldinclude the notification of the NRC, as well as Federal, State and Local officials. Steps which might be taken to manage the consequences of a serious accident include evacuations, bans on the use of potentually contaminated food and.or water. Provisions for safe sheltering of at risk populations, andthe distribution of KI pills, as well as other pre-planed interventions by the federal, state and local governments.

Normal accounts of nuclear safety defense in depth stop at this point. There are however other levels of nuclear safety, A forth level would be a well informed public. Nuclear safety is a genuine matter for public concern. The public should demand the safest nuclear technology possible, and both support nuclear safety research and for monitoring of observance of safety rules and procedures by demanding that reactor operators comply with them, and that the NRC vigorously enforce them.

One of the great flaws of the anti-nuclear movement has been to disimpower the public on nuclear safety issues. Figures like Ralph Nader, failed to avail themselves of opportunities to learn more about nuclear safety. Had Ralph Nader really wanted to understand the safety concerns that Alvin Weinberg discussed with Claire Nader and with Ralph himself, had Ralph Nader tried to understand what the ORNL nuclear safety engineer was telling him about defense in depth, the history of the first nuclear era might have ended differently. Had there have been a public outcry for nuclear safety in the 1970's rather than an anti-nuclear movement, the owners of the Three Mile Island reactor, would not havebeen allowed to get away with the safety errors they committed. Had there been a public outcry for safety research, staff safety training, and safe design of reactor control panels, there would have been no Three Mile Island accident. By convincing the public of the ill intentions of safety advocates within the nuclear community, and by convincing the public that nuclear safety was impossible, and therefore it had no stake in the development of nuclear safety improvements, the anti nuclear movement, disempowered the public on nuclear safety issues. It is up to the public to take its power back from the anti-nuclear movement, and assert its right to demand the highest levels of nuclear safety possible. Such a public demand would be a fourth level of nuclear safety defense.

The fifth level of of nuclear safety defense is nuclear safety research, and safe reactor design coupled with the actual replacement with reactors designed to current safety standards by reactors designed with even higher levels of safety. Nuclear safety is something that happens in time. Nuclear safety has a history. It has evolved during its history, and can be expected to continue to do so. It is perhaps unfortunate that the Light Water Reactior emerged early on as the predominant power reactor type. Light Water Reactors have inherent safety flaws. Those flaws can be largely worked around, by engineering reactor modifications, but those modifications are expensive. To much of the history of nuclear safety has been the history of increasingly expensive safety developments for the light water reactor.

Reactor scientist have known since the 1940's that it is possible to eliminate the very possibility of the most serious of reactor accident, the core melt down. Reactors designs developed over 50 years ago posses inherent safety feature that far surpass those of light water reactors. Furthermore one of those two advanced reactor designs, the Liquid Flouride Thorium Reactor,relies on an abundant nuclear fuel, Thorium, which it uses so efficiently that it will provide sustainable nuclear power for millions of years to come. Because of its efficient use of the Thorium fuel cycle, the LFTR also virtually eleminates the long term nuclear waste. Developing and implementing the LFTR reactor designs would not be inordinately expensive, or require an extensive period of time. The development cost for either reactor design would cost less than the cost of two light water reactors, or less than the cost of the imported oil the United States consumes in one week. The manufacturing cost for the LFTR would also be lower that the current cost of building Light Water Reactors. Thus at a relatively small cost the United States could acquire a fifth level of nuclear defense, one which would make the most serious reactor accident impossible, and solve other problems related to the use of nuclear energy in the generation of electrical power.

Nuclear researcher Ralph Moir and famed nuclear physicist Edward Teller reviewed the safety features of Molten Salt Reactor technology. They concluded that Molten Salt Reactors had outstanding safety characteristic. Some time ago I wrote an essay on LFTR/Molten Salt Reactor safety from the prospective of a system of barriers to radiation release. My agenda was to argue that LFTR safety could be achieved through a system of barriers to the release of radioactive materials. This argument assumed that a fuel spill was the over riding safety issue. However, the classic texts on MSR safety (Gat and Dodds) do not examine MSR safety primarily in terms of a system of barriers. Gat and Dodds believed that

The Ultimate Safe Reactor (USR) is a special concept of a molten-salt reactor with prime and complete emphasis on safety. The USR uses a processing frequency, yet to be developed, that is about an order of magnitude higher from that contemplated for the molten salt breeder reactor (MSBR). The MSBR had a ten-day inventory turn around in the fuel processing. The USR uses a one day or less of turnaround of the fuel inventory. This rather fast turnaround reduces the build up of all fission products with half-lives of a few days or longer. The reactor is an epithermal spectrum reactor and uses no moderator per se in the core. The clean core consists solely of a low-pressure vessel. Freeze valves are used throughout. The prime circulating pump is sized to assure no critical cold slug accident can occur. Furthermore, the USR uses the Th-U fuel cycle with a breeding ratio of exactly one. Thus, the USR has all the safety benefits that are passive, inherent and non-tamperable and, in addition, has proliferation-resistant attributes and simplified waste that is free of fissile material, which can be transported in any arbitrary size or quantity from the processing part of the plant.

Beyond the ultimate safe reactor Gat and Dodd argued that there could be an absolute and ultimate safe reactor:

The absolute and ultimate safe reactor (A+USR) is a special concept of the USR which utilizes natural convection to transfer the heat from the core to the heat exchanger. The A+USR has no safety-related mechanical operating parts nor any externally-actuated controls, it becomes the ultimate in PINT-safety. The reactor responds internally and inherently to a change in power demand via its temperature response.

Frequent processing of the fuel increases the fuel inventory in the processing part and puts high demand on the performance of the processing units. The removal of the fission products from the fuel stream occurs at low concentrations, which requires precision and sophistication. In an actual plant, an optimization between performance, inventory and safety is needed.Thus Gat and Dodd saw MSR (and LFTR) safety in terms of reactor design features, that prevented accidents from happening, and prevented bad things from happening in the rare event of an accident. Gar and Dodds, argue, in effect that absolute and ultimate safety can be manufactured into Molten Salt Reactors, and can be implemented through low cost mass production manufacturing methods.

As a consequence of the Gat and Dodds argument is that an elaborate and costly system of barriers is not required. to assure absolute and ultimate nuclear safety. Mass produced, factory manufactured features can in most cases be low priced. Thus from the Gat and Dodds perspective LFTRs can be more safe at trivial costs than LWRs can be with the massive expenditure of money on safety features. This leads us to consider drastic, cost lowering changes in the way reactors are built.

Even the worst sort of reactor disaster, say an aircraft attack on a reactor, would not cause a massive release of radioisotopes, because the nuclear fuel would be continuously cleaned of radioisotopes. Since an attack on a reactor no longer poses great danger for a civilian population, the reactor holds little value as a target for terrorist. Furthermore, Moir and Teller suggest the underground siting of Molten Salt Reactors. This underground reactor could not be damaged by aircraft attacks or even massive truck bombs.

It would appear then if Molten Salt Reactors could be brought to market, there would appear to be little doubt about its safety. The Molten Salt Reactor is capable of producing power at a safety level that will satisfy any rational person.

Interview with Ralph Moir: Part III,

Questions on Edward Teller

1. Edward Teller remained a controversial figure at the time of his death. Since you worked with Teller, what do you think the public should know, in order to better understand him?

He was brilliant, multi-dimentional and focussed. He promoted action via the political process that gave him fame and infamy but most importantly gave results. His writing and that written about him tells the story. It is most inspiring and I recommend its reading to anyone interested.

2. My own understanding of Teller was that he was a complex person. Can you give us some insights?

Yes he was complex but getting to know him told you he was in depth on many axis. He focussed on one topic at a time. Sequentially he could switch to another topic but preferred to stay on the topic at hand and work it hard. He treated science as having fun. It was a joy to him to discuss ideas.

3. Teller appears to have had a long time interest in the molten salt reactor. How important did Teller think the development of the Molten Salt Reactor was?

Teller had a long term interest in seeing fission reactors built for man kind's benefit. His interest was to encourage that end rather than work directly in pursuit of reactor development. He strongly favored thorium and thermal reactors and undergrounding them. He periodically over the past 25 years of his life would call on me to review the characteristics of various reactor types. I always treated all of them but ended by saying I preferred the molten salt reactor. He finally agreed with me and we wrote the paper together. In other words he was not a strong advocate of the molten salt reactor over a lot of years. He thought the program must have been terminated for good reasons. After examining the reasons for terminating the program he came up with the phrase, "it was an excusable mistake." He believed building a small molten salt reactor to get the development going and get deployment going was most urgent because our energy options are running out (especially natural gas).

4. Did Teller have any time frame in which he anticipated to molten salt reactor development?

At a spending level of $100 M per year for R&D and $100 M per year for construction, such a program could have a ~10 MWe unit operating in a decade and be well on the way towards a large scale power plan.

5. Teller was interested in setting up reactors underground. Why did he prefer underground placement, rather than using conventional containment structures?

He used the word "obvious" safety. Bomb tests conducted underground contained the radioactive products very well. It was this fact and the fact that waste are to be stored underground both suggest building the reactors themselves underground. I repeatedly brought up the point that under grounding increases the cost and if the cost increase is too much, perhaps over 20% the reactor will most likely not be built. He accepted the idea that 10 m underground was a good compromise between the safety benefits of undergrounding while keeping the cost add on small enough to not preclude the deployment.

My web site (www.geocities.com/rmoir2003) gives links to downloading my paper with Teller on the Thorium fueled underground power plant based on molten salt technology. Also there are papers on cost of electricity compared to other reactors and recommendations for a aresatart of molten salt reactor development.

Edward Teller, Global Warming, and Molten Salt Reactors

Edward Teller listens as Eugene Wigner explain a theoretical physics problem in Hungarian

Truth can come from people we don't like.  Edward Teller achieved a form of immortality in Peter Sellers satiric portrail of a Teller like figure in the movie Dr. Stranglove.  Teller who was in reality a flawed, complex, and compelling figure, was no Dr. Strangelove, bent on a nuclear war. Teller worried about nuclear winter, and even his most questionable idea, the Star Wars scheme he sold to Ronald Reagan, was intended to prevent the disasterous effects of nuclear war.   Teller shared with Alvin Weinberg concerns about nuclear safety, the problems of carbon-dioxide and global warming, and future sources of energy.

In December 1957 Edward Teller was invited to address the Annual meeting of the American Chemical Society. Teller was at the height of his fame. He was an honest to God celebrity, with reporters at his side, jotting down his comments, photographers snapping his picture, and as disgusting as it might seem now, women volunteering to sleep with him on the basis of his fame. (I know this because a beautify but wayward woman once describe an encounter with Teller to me.  She would have slept with Teller had he consented to the arrangement.)  He was referred to in the press as the Father of the "H-Bomb." He was also a darling of the American right-wing. No doubt the ACS thought by getting Teller to speak, they had achieved some coup. They must have been a little bit bewildered then when Teller started to talk about carbon dioxide and global climate. Teller told the assembled chemists that continued burning of carbon based fuels would increase the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, eventually warming the planet to the extent that the polar ice caps would melt, and the resulting rise in sea level would submerge costal cities under water.

When Teller talked about destroying the Russians with H-Bombs, the press, Congress, presidents listened, and beautiful women contemplated sleeping with him. But Teller's warnings about CO2 and global warming received little attention that day. Teller, for all his fame was a pariah within the nuclear research community.

In Oak Ridge, where I grew up, Teller was intensely disliked by the scientific community. The problem stemmed from a 28 April 1954, hearing by an AEC board, in which Teller was asked to testify about J. Robert Oppenheimer's Security Clearance. Oppenheimer had opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb, and Teller had suggested to the AEC before the hearing that the charges against Oppenheimer to include his opposition to the the development of the hydrogen bomb. For Teller that was even more personal. Oppenheimer had chosen Hans Bethe, rather than Teller, to head the theoretical division at Los Alomos during World War 2. After that, the enraged Teller refused to cooperate with work on the atomic bomb, so Oppenheimer assigned to the research task of figuring out the more distant H-Bomb. 

During the AEC security hearing, Teller questioned Oppenheimer's "wisdom and judgment, . ." No doubt his doubt about Oppenheimer "wisdom and judgment" was based on Oppenheimer's choice of Bethe rather than Teller. Teller was also enraged by Oppenheimer's opposition to the H Bomb. Thus when asked about his view on the security risk posed by Oppenheimer, Teller responded that he had often seen Teller act "in a way which for me was exceedingly hard to understand ... To this extent I feel that I would like to see the vital interests of this country in hands which I understand better, and therefore trust more." Teller added that it "would be wiser not to grant clearance."

In a crowning act of infamy, as he left the room, Teller offered his hand to Oppenheimer and muttered the words, "I'm sorry." Teller was in the view of many Oak Ridge scientist, nothing short of a Judas Iscariot. No one was going to pay attention to what Teller had to say in 1957, but by 1971, Teller's 1957 ACS speech had been forgotten, and the story about global warming brought about by CO2 emissions was spreading through ORNL until it came to Weinberg's attention.

Teller's reputation was at its height somewhat exaggerated. There is no doubt that he was wrong more often than he was right. During the development of the H-Bomb Teller barked up every wrong tree on the block. The successful concept did not come from Teller, it came from Stanislaw Ulam, a Polish mathematician. Teller worked out the details and took the credit. As late as 1999, Teller told Scientific American:

"I contributed; Ulam did not. I'm sorry I had to answer it in this abrupt way. Ulam was rightly dissatisfied with an old approach. He came to me with a part of an idea which I already had worked out and difficulty getting people to listen to. He was willing to sign a paper. When it then came to defending that paper and really putting work into it, he refused. He said, 'I don't believe in it.'

Teller was a scientist who solved problems by dint of persistence. No one should doubt Teller's brilliance, but he usually made several bad guesses before he came up with a good solution to the problem he was working on. Ronald Reagan bought into Teller's Star Wars concept, even though it was somewhat less than half baked. The Technology for the Star Wars concepts was years away from maturity, the research was extremely expensive and much was likely to lead to no good end, implementation, would have been exceedingly expensive, and the cold war was to end far before the project had any hope of achieving success. It is a singular evidence of what a bad idea Star Wars was, that George W, Bush trued to revive the idea during his second administration. Never the less on that day in December 1957 when he spoke to the ACS about CO2 and global warming, Edward Teller, was undoubtedly right.   It was almost fifteen years before Teller's message got to Oak Ridge. 

Teller also had early and significant concerns about reactor safety.  He participated in the development of American reactor safety standards while chairing the AEC Reactor Safeguard Committee in the late 1940s. His interest in the development of a safe, meltdown proof reactor lead to the creation of General Atomics in the 1950's.

Teller was a scientific radical in that he tried to solve every problem by seeking its root.    Livermore physicist Neal Snyderman commented, “Edward sought to understand everything from a fundamental level.” Teller had an early interest in the molten salt reactor, before he left Los Alomos he encouraged its development there. No doubt the radical Teller understood the elegant simplicity of the molten salt concept, and appreciated its significant safety features.

When he died, Edward Teller was working with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory physicist Ralph Moir, on one last paper titled "Thorium-Fueled Underground Power Plant Based on Molten Salt Technology." Teller died before the paper was completed but it was his last project, and Moir brought it faithfully to conclusion after Teller's death.

The abstract to the Teller Moir paper stated:

"This paper addresses the problems posed by running out of oil and gas supplies and the environmental problems that are due to greenhouse gases by suggesting the use of the energy available in the resource thorium, which is much more plentiful than the conventional nuclear fuel uranium. We propose the burning of this thorium dissolved as afluoride in molten salt in the minimum viscosity mixture ofLiF and BeF[2] together with a small amount of [235]U or plutonium fluoride to initiate the process to be located at least 10 m underground. The fission products could be stored at the same underground location. With graphite replacement or new cores and with the liquid fuel transferred to the new cores periodically, the power plant could operate for up to 200 yr with no transport of fissile material to the reactor or of wastes from the reactor during this period. Advantages that include utilization of,an abundant fuel, inaccessibility of that fuel to terrorists or for diversion to weapons use, together with good economics and safety features such as an underground location will diminish public concerns. We call for the construction of a small prototype thorium-burning reactor."