Showing posts with label Fast Reactors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fast Reactors. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 2, 2010

Understanding Molten Salt Reactors: 1. How are MSRs Different from LFTRs?

The name Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) is more inclusive than the name Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor (LFTR). The LFTR is a type of Molten Salt Reactor that features the use fluoride salts and a thorium fuel cycle. Strictly speaking a LFTR need not be designed to produce fuel in a breeding range, but breeding is an important justification for the use of the thorium rather than the uranium fuel cycle.

In chemistry a salt is an ionic compound that is produced when acid undergoes a neutralizing reaction with a base. Some salts are compounds of metallic and non-metallic elements. Salts become molten (or liquid) when heated. Different salts have very different melting temperatures. Some salts may melt at relatively low temperatures, while other salts require several hundred degrees centigrade of heat before they melt. Mixed combinations of salts may melt at a lower temperature than individual salts will melt.

Some molten salts are very good conductors of heat, and some molten salts may not boil until they reach 1400 degrees centigrade, or even higher. These qualities make molten salts potentially excellent coolants for high temperature reactors. Research on high temperature fluoride salt cooled reactors continues at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).

Two families of salts have been identified as potentially excellent reactor coolants. They are Fluoride and Chloride salts. Of these two salt families, ORNL scientists quickly chose the former, as presenting fewer developmental challenges while offering greater opportunities for commercial reactor use. Liquid chloride salts were identified as presenting more problems for reactor developers. Chlorine was, in particular, less useful as a neutron moderator than fluorine. However, Chloride salts were suitable for fast reactors, and a Molten Chloride Fast Breeder Reactor was both possible, and probably technologically less challenging than the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor, as a uranium fuel cycle breeder. In addition, the MCFBR would have offered far fewer safety problems than the LMFBR, while offering a route to technologically superior and lower cost fuel reprocessing.

ORNL Scientists however, also noted that liquid fluoride salt offered a superior performance precisely because of their neutron moderating performance. Moderation removes energy from neutrons. Heavily moderated neutrons are called thermal neutrons, and reactors that are built with large amounts of neutrons moderating materials such as graphite or heavy water are called thermal reactors. Neutron moderation decreases the amount of fissionable material required to sustain a chain reaction, and graphite and heavy water moderated reactors can produce chain reactions with natural uranium. While graphite and heavy water moderated reactors are useful tools for the production of plutonium, they are not particularly efficient tools for burning Pu-239 or even U-235 as nuclear fuels. However, it is possible to breed thorium in thermal reactors. Thermal reactor breeding of thorium offers significant advantages over fast reactor breeding of U-238. Thermal Reactors can operate with 10% perhaps as little as 3% of the fissionable material required to operate fast reactors. Thus thermal reactors can potentially be started at a far more rapid rate than fast reactors.

Fast reactor advocates claim that it is possible for fast reactors to breed at a much more rapid rate, but there appear to be safety problems involved in more rapid fast reactor breeding, and current documented advanced fast reactor designs appear to breed at a similar rate to thermal thorium breeding molten salt reactors.

The term breeding refers to the production more nuclear fuel than is used in a nuclear reactor. If a fertile material, either uranium 238 or thorium 232, is included with the fissionable material placed inside a reactor core along, the result will almost inevitably be the conversion of some of that fertile material into a fissionable material. In the case of thorium, a thorium 232 atom inside the reactor can absorb a neutron, and then becomes a thorium 233 atom. The nucleus, that is the center, of a thorium 233 atom is unstable. A neutron in the unstable Th 233 atom will eventually emit an electron, changing the neutron to a proton, the new proton in turn converts the atom to protactinium 233, and Pa 233 is also unstable. After a few days, a Pa neutron emits an electron, and as a consequence converts to a proton. The added proton makes the atom uranium 233. U 233 is fissionable, and can be used as reactor fuel.

The uranium fuel cycle is similar. If an U-238 atom absorbs a neutron a process that is similar to the process we find with thorium 233 occurs, and the U-239 atom is converted into plutonium 239.

Most reactors produce added nuclear fuel by converting U-238 into Pu-239. The amount of plutonium produced usually equals somewhere in the neighborhood of 60% of the amount of U-235 burned in a conventional reactor. Neither U-235 nor Pu-239 are ideal nuclear fuels at conventional neutron speed. WASH-1097 states
From a nuclear standpoint, the use of U-233 in a thermal reactor makes it possible to achieve higher fuel conversion ratios and longer fuel burnups than is practical with either U-235 or Pu-239. . .

The higher conversion ratios which can be obtained in thermal-spectrum reactors when using U- 233 instead of Pu-239 can result in a significantly better utilization of natural uranium fuel resources with thorium-fueled reactors than with the low-enrichment, light-water cooled uranium-fueled reactors . . .
WASH-1097 defines the fuel conversion ratio,
The fuel conversion ratio (CR) is the ratio of the amount of fissile fuel produced per unit of fissile fuel destroyed. . .
Breeding takes place when the conversion ration is greater than 1 to 1. While plutonium theoretically produces more neutrons and therefore faster breeding in fast reactors,
A higher breeding ratio can be obtained with Pu-239 than with U-233 in a very high-energy, fast- neutron spectrum reactor. On the other hand, in a degraded (10 to 100 keV) fast spectrum, U-233 would probably be as good as, or better than, Pu-239. Also, the variation of U-233 and Pu-239 cross sections with energy are such that improved reactivity coefficients would be obtained with the use of U-233 in a large sodium-cooled FBR. This leads to improved nuclear safety characteristics. . . .

The energy dependence of the fast-fission cross sections of Th-232 and U-238 is such that the use of Th-232 would produce an improved reactivity coefficient in a liquid-metal-cooled FBR. The fast fission cross-section of Th-232 is much lower than that of U-238 so that use of the latter leads to much larger conversion ratios in fast-spectrum reactors.
Thus not only is thorium breeding attractive in molten salt reactors, thorium breeding in fast reactors enhances their safety, and increases their conversion ratios. This point has not been lost on Indian reactor scientists who plan large scale production of thorium-uranium fast reactor breeding hybrids. Breeding thorium as a nuclear fuel in fast reactors would produce a large amount of fissionable U-233 that can be used as nuclear fuel in conventional reactors. This point has not been lost on Indian nuclear scientists, who plan to use the extra U-233 in Advanced Heavy Water Reactors. U-233 fueled non-breeder or converter Molten Salt Reactors offer attractive, safer and lower cost alternatives to conventional water cooled reactors, while reducing but not eliminating the nuclear waste problem. Thus, a modified Indian system could be developed, that would feature thorium breeding in IFRs, with U-233 burning MSRs. The rub for such a system would be that LFTRs would be cheaper to develop, cheaper to build, safer and cheaper to operate, and would virtually eliminate the nuclear waste problem.

The LFTR then is a thorium breeding MSR, that offers what may well be the simplest and best solution to the problem of producing sustainable nuclear power.

Wednesday, April 14, 2010

Indian Light Water Reactor Costs


Business Daily of THE HINDU group of publications in a recent article, titled $1600/kW is benchmark cost for light water reactor imports sheds new light on Indian present and future LWR costs and plans. The article that the two Russian VVER-1000 reactors nearing completion at Koodankulam have a
total construction cost was estimated at $2.6 billion.

At current exchange rates, it translates to around Rs 6.5 crore per MW.

The Russian Government had provided India with long-term credit, which covers almost half of the cost of the first two units.
Indian sources rarely provide much information on financing or credit costs for nuclear capital financing. I suspect that the other 50% for the Koodankulam reactors come directly or indirectly from the Indian government. According to the story,
NPCIL expects the first Koodankulam unit, when operational, to be able to sell power at less than Rs 2.50 a unit (kilowatt hour).
When completed, the two VVER-1000 will increase Indian rated nuclear capacity by 50%. Most locally designed Indian reactors are small and have a rated power output of about 1/5th that of the Russian designed WWERs. Reactor manufactures often see reactor sales as loss leaders, and plan to recoup discounts by long term contracts for nuclear fuel. This fits in well with long term Indian nuclear plans. The Indians intend to use the "spent nuclear fuel" often wrongly called "nuclear waste," to fuel their future fast breeder reactors. The prototype Indian Fast Breeder reactor is expected to come on line next year, and the Indians plan to build 4 more by 2020. By 2050, the Indians would like to have more than 300 fast breeders online. Thus the Russian interest in selling uranium motivates their willingness to sell the Indians reactors on favorable terms, while the Indian desire to recycle used nuclear fuel in fast reactors, motivates their desire to obtain Russian uranium.
Russia has offered a sweetener in the form of a 30 per cent discount on the $2-billion price tag for each of its new nuclear reactors under discussions for sale to India. The Russians have offered the discount based on plans to start serial production of reactors for the Indian nuclear industry, with much of the equipment and components proposed to be manufactured in India, thereby bringing down costs.

After factoring in the discount, the cost of construction for a mega watt (MW) for each new reactor comes to roughly Rs 7 crore (at current exchange rates, without including decommissioning costs).
The Indians appear to be making the Russian deal the standard for negotiating costs with other reactor manufacturers. Indian industries have announced plans for the construction of $50 billion in industrial infrastructure.
The costing aspect gains significance as the Government's plans to scale up India's nuclear capacity nearly ten-fold over the next decade is underway, with the Centre according ‘in principle' approval to over 38,000 MWe (mega watt electrical) of new reactor capacity.

Imported LWR units ranging from 1,000 MWe to 1,650 MWe from Russia, France and the US would make for over 80 per cent of the envisaged capacity, with indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors of 700 MWe accounting for the rest.
The Indian preference for foreign LWRs, does not reflect negatively on the local nuclear technology. Rather the Indians are interested in access to the uranium that is part of the Light Water Reactor business plan.

The planned new Russian reactor will be a slightly larger version of the Russian WWER-1000s now under construction in India.

Sunday, January 31, 2010

Reading the Obama Administration Tea Leaves

The Obama Administration might be accused of sending mixed signals on its attitude toward the future of nuclear power. First we have first the January 28, 2010 Obama Memo to Energy Secretary Steven Chu:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SUBJECT: Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future

Expanding our Nation’s capacity to generate clean nuclear energy is crucial to our ability to combat climate change, enhance energy security, and increase economic prosperity. My Administration is undertaking substantial steps to expand the safe, secure, and responsible use of nuclear energy. These efforts are critical to accomplishing many of my Administration’s most significant goals.

An important part of a sound, comprehensive, and long-term domestic nuclear energy strategy is a well-considered policy for managing used nuclear fuel and other aspects of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Yet the Nation’s approach, developed more than 20 years ago, to managing materials derived from nuclear activities, including nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, has not proven effective. Fortunately, over the past two decades scientists and engineers in our country and abroad have learned a great deal about effective strategies for managing nuclear material. My Administration is committed to using this advanced knowledge to meet the Government’s obligation to dispose of our Nation’s used nuclear material.

Accordingly, I request that you establish a Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (Commission) and appoint its members. Those members should include recognized representatives and experts from a range of disciplines and with a range of perspectives, and may include participation of appropriate Federal officials. The Commission’s business should be conducted in an open and transparent manner.

The Commission should conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. This review should include an evaluation of advanced fuel cycle technologies that would optimize energy recovery, resource utilization, and the minimization of materials derived from nuclear activities in a manner consistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals.

In performing its functions, the Commission should consider a broad range of technological and policy alternatives, and should analyze the scientific, environmental, budgetary, economic, financial, and management issues, among others, surrounding each alternative it considers. Where appropriate, the Commission may also identify potential statutory changes.

The Commission should provide an interim report to you within 18 months of the date of this memorandum, and that report should be made available for public comment. The Commission should provide a final report to you within 24 months of the date of this memorandum. The Department of Energy shall provide funding and administrative support for the Commission, as you determine appropriate, so that it can complete its functions within these time periods. Additionally, all executive departments and agencies shall provide such information and assistance to the Commission as you or the Commission may request for purposes of carrying out the Commission’s functions, to the extent permitted by law. Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to require the disclosure of classified, proprietary, law enforcement sensitive, or other information protected under governing law. This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

You are hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

BARACK OBAMA
The list of actual Blue Ribbon Commission appointees appears to be more calculated for political effect than for knowledge and wisdom. Although the Commission is charged with analyze the scientific, budgetary, economic, (and) financial issues involved in solutions to the used nuclear material problem. We have no economists on board, although Geologists Allison Macfarlane, believes herself to be an expert on nuclear costs. Macfarlane, however, appears to view the thorium fuel cycle in a considerably more positive light than she views the U-238 - reactor grade plutonium fuel cycle. Susan Eisenhower serves on the corporate advisory boards of Lightbridge (formerly Thorium Power), that might give her a significant knowledge of the thorium fuel cycle. The weight of the Blue Ribbon Commission lies heavily on the political/bureaucratic/expert of reference axis. The presence of two former congressmen on the commission suggests the Obama administration's desire to manage and even spin its eventual report toward politically acceptable conclusions. The last thing the Obama Administration wants is for a brilliant and charismatic scientist, like Richard Feynman to steal the show, by offering a dramatic demonstration of a politically embarrassing problem.

Thus only one real working scientist is included on the panel, that is Per Peterson. Peterson is well known to the Energy from Thorium community, and is an unabashed supporter of the use of Molten Salt nuclear technology. In addition to his expertise on Generation IV reactor design, and lowering nuclear costs, Per is also a nuclear proliferation expert, with a working knowledge of current thinking about proliferation prevention.

We know that the Yucca Mountain approach to the nuclear waste issue is off the table, and it appears quite likely that the IFR is as well. On January 15, the Defense Daily carried a story by George Lobsenz titled White House Moves To Restrict DoE Nuclear Research. That story stated:
The White House has proposed barring Energy Department research on fast reactor recycling of nuclear waste and technical support for licensing of small, modular light-water reactors, drawing protests from Energy Secretary Steven Chu that such prohibitions will have broad adverse effects, including hurting the U.S. nuclear industry's renaissance; crimping U.S. ability to influence other countries' fast reactor designs to address proliferation concerns; and taking away nuclear waste disposal options that might be considered by the administration's planned blue-ribbon panel on alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository.
The story went on to discuss what appeared to be a conflict between the Obama White House and Energy Secretary Chu over the exclusion of fast reactor research from the DoE Research program. This is very bad news for the IFR supporters, and might explain some of their recent behavior. Thus there are signs that the Blue Ribbon Commission will seriously consider Molten Salt nuclear technology, and the thorium fuel cycle as potential remedies for the fuel cycle nuclear waste issue. Above all else the panel is clearly expected to be a reliable, unimaginative, and boring extension of the Obama ego, that will reach predictable and unimaginative conclusions.

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