Reading the Obama Administration Tea Leaves

The Obama Administration might be accused of sending mixed signals on its attitude toward the future of nuclear power. First we have first the January 28, 2010 Obama Memo to Energy Secretary Steven Chu:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SUBJECT: Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future

Expanding our Nation’s capacity to generate clean nuclear energy is crucial to our ability to combat climate change, enhance energy security, and increase economic prosperity. My Administration is undertaking substantial steps to expand the safe, secure, and responsible use of nuclear energy. These efforts are critical to accomplishing many of my Administration’s most significant goals.

An important part of a sound, comprehensive, and long-term domestic nuclear energy strategy is a well-considered policy for managing used nuclear fuel and other aspects of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Yet the Nation’s approach, developed more than 20 years ago, to managing materials derived from nuclear activities, including nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, has not proven effective. Fortunately, over the past two decades scientists and engineers in our country and abroad have learned a great deal about effective strategies for managing nuclear material. My Administration is committed to using this advanced knowledge to meet the Government’s obligation to dispose of our Nation’s used nuclear material.

Accordingly, I request that you establish a Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (Commission) and appoint its members. Those members should include recognized representatives and experts from a range of disciplines and with a range of perspectives, and may include participation of appropriate Federal officials. The Commission’s business should be conducted in an open and transparent manner.

The Commission should conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. This review should include an evaluation of advanced fuel cycle technologies that would optimize energy recovery, resource utilization, and the minimization of materials derived from nuclear activities in a manner consistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals.

In performing its functions, the Commission should consider a broad range of technological and policy alternatives, and should analyze the scientific, environmental, budgetary, economic, financial, and management issues, among others, surrounding each alternative it considers. Where appropriate, the Commission may also identify potential statutory changes.

The Commission should provide an interim report to you within 18 months of the date of this memorandum, and that report should be made available for public comment. The Commission should provide a final report to you within 24 months of the date of this memorandum. The Department of Energy shall provide funding and administrative support for the Commission, as you determine appropriate, so that it can complete its functions within these time periods. Additionally, all executive departments and agencies shall provide such information and assistance to the Commission as you or the Commission may request for purposes of carrying out the Commission’s functions, to the extent permitted by law. Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to require the disclosure of classified, proprietary, law enforcement sensitive, or other information protected under governing law. This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

You are hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

BARACK OBAMA

The list of actual Blue Ribbon Commission appointees appears to be more calculated for political effect than for knowledge and wisdom. Although the Commission is charged with analyze the scientific, budgetary, economic, (and) financial issues involved in solutions to the used nuclear material problem. We have no economists on board, although Geologists Allison Macfarlane, believes herself to be an expert on nuclear costs. Macfarlane, however, appears to view the thorium fuel cycle in a considerably more positive light than she views the U-238 - reactor grade plutonium fuel cycle. Susan Eisenhower serves on the corporate advisory boards of Lightbridge (formerly Thorium Power), that might give her a significant knowledge of the thorium fuel cycle. The weight of the Blue Ribbon Commission lies heavily on the political/bureaucratic/expert of reference axis. The presence of two former congressmen on the commission suggests the Obama administration's desire to manage and even spin its eventual report toward politically acceptable conclusions. The last thing the Obama Administration wants is for a brilliant and charismatic scientist, like Richard Feynman to steal the show, by offering a dramatic demonstration of a politically embarrassing problem.

Thus only one real working scientist is included on the panel, that is Per Peterson. Peterson is well known to the Energy from Thorium community, and is an unabashed supporter of the use of Molten Salt nuclear technology. In addition to his expertise on Generation IV reactor design, and lowering nuclear costs, Per is also a nuclear proliferation expert, with a working knowledge of current thinking about proliferation prevention.

We know that the Yucca Mountain approach to the nuclear waste issue is off the table, and it appears quite likely that the IFR is as well. On January 15, the Defense Daily carried a story by George Lobsenz titled White House Moves To Restrict DoE Nuclear Research. That story stated:

The White House has proposed barring Energy Department research on fast reactor recycling of nuclear waste and technical support for licensing of small, modular light-water reactors, drawing protests from Energy Secretary Steven Chu that such prohibitions will have broad adverse effects, including hurting the U.S. nuclear industry's renaissance; crimping U.S. ability to influence other countries' fast reactor designs to address proliferation concerns; and taking away nuclear waste disposal options that might be considered by the administration's planned blue-ribbon panel on alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository.

The story went on to discuss what appeared to be a conflict between the Obama White House and Energy Secretary Chu over the exclusion of fast reactor research from the DoE Research program. This is very bad news for the IFR supporters, and might explain some of their recent behavior. Thus there are signs that the Blue Ribbon Commission will seriously consider Molten Salt nuclear technology, and the thorium fuel cycle as potential remedies for the fuel cycle nuclear waste issue. Above all else the panel is clearly expected to be a reliable, unimaginative, and boring extension of the Obama ego, that will reach predictable and unimaginative conclusions.

Eschew Chu: Building efficiency

His mind is so open - so open that ideas simply pass through it.
- F. H. Bradley

Energy Secretary Chu is a myth waiting to be told. Chu has jumped on board the energy efficiency bandwagon. According to the latest department of Energy PR/Green propaganda spin

Improving energy saving and energy efficiency is one of the quickest, greenest, and most cost-effective ways to address energy security and climate change, and ensure economic growth.

This line is out of the Amory Lovins book of stories. Where is the proof? Well there is none, but

Secretary Chu has challenged Department of Energy researchers to help develop building designs that are far more efficient than current designs – and wants to pursue further research partnerships through IPEEC. The International Panel on Climate Change reported in 2007 that the world could reduce projected greenhouse gas emissions from the building sector by 30 percent by 2030 while producing a net economic benefit.

So we have goals that involved the implementation of undeveloped and unproven technology on a massive scale at a vast cost by 2030. This is the same Energy Secretary Chu who recently told us how problems solved by ORNL scientists during the 1970's somehow still impede the development of the LFTR in 2009. This is the same Steven Chu who recently told Senator Alexander that we could not possibly develop the industrial infrastructure to build 100 reactors by 2030, or to train their operators by that date.

has so little confidence in American science and technology that he doubts our capacity to do anything but improve builfing efficiency.

Secretary Chu's answer and the facts

[I]t is incumbent on those in high positions to reach wise decisions, and it is reasonable and important that the public be correctly informed. It is incumbent on all of us to state the facts as forthrightly as possible.

- Hyman Rickover testifying before Congress in 1953,

QUESTION FROM SENATOR SHAHEEN

Q3. Of the six Gen IV nuclear power technologies proposed by the US in 2000, DOE Idaho National Labs have been pursuing two - (1) high temperature gas-cooled reactors for hydrogen production, and (2) sodium-cooled fast reactors for waste burning. Separately, liquid-fluoride thorium reactor research is ongoing at UC Berkeley, MIT, Redstone Arsenal, and in other countries including France, Japan, and Canada.

As the Department analyzes advanced reactor designs, can you tell me if the liquid-fluoride thorium reactors are under consideration? What are the benefits of liquid-fluoride thorium reactors? What are the drawbacks or downsides of liquid-fluoride thorium reactors? How does power generated from liquid-fluoride thorium reactors compare, on a price per kilowatt hour, with power generated from the current coal generation fleet in the United States? As we confront our nation's energy and climate challenges, what role might these types of reactors play?

Secretary Chu:

A3: The "liquid-fluoride thorium reactor," otherwise known as a molten salt reactor (MSR), where molten salts containing fissile material circulate through the reactor core, is not part of the Office of Nuclear Energy's research program at this time. Some potential features of a MSR include smaller reactor size relative to light water reactors due to the higher heat removal capabilities of the molten salts and the ability to simplify the fuel manufacturing process, since the fuel would be dissolved in the molten salt. One significant drawback of the MSR technology is the corrosive effect of the molten salts on the structural materials used in the reactor vessel and heat exchangers; this issue results in the need to develop advanced orrosion-resistant structural materials and enhanced reactor coolant chemistry control systems. In addition, operational practices would have to address the fact that the liquid salts solidify between temperatures of 300 C to 500 C, thereby requiring the use of special heating systems when the reactor is not operating. From a non-proliferation standpoint, thorium-fueled reactors present a unique set of challenges because they convert thorium-232 into uranium-233 which is nearly as efficient as plutonium-239 as a weapons material. A cost per kilowatt hour estimate has not been developed.

From ORNL/TM-6002 (J. R. Keiser, 1977):

As a result of these studies, we have found that Hastelloy N exposed in salt containing metal tellurides such as Li Te and Cr Te undergoes grain boundary embrittlement like that observed in the MSRE. The embrittlement is a function of the chemical activity of tellurium associated with the telluride. The degree of embrittlement can be reduced by alloying additions to the Hastelloy N. The addition of 1 to 2 % Nb significantly reduces embrittlement, but small additions of titanium or additions of up to 15% Cr do not affect embrittlernent. We have found that if the U(IV)/U(III) ratio in fuel salt is kept below about 60, embrittlement is essentially prevented when CrTel.266 is used as the source of tellurium.

From ORNL/TM-6415 (1979):

The nickel-based alloy Hastelloy N, which was specifically developed for use in molten-salt systems, was used in construction of the MSRE.
The material generally performed very well, but two deficiencies became
apparent: (1) the alloy was embrittled at elevated temperatures by ex-
posure to thermal neutrons and (2) it was subject to intergranular sur-
face cracking when exposed to fuel salt containing fission products.

Recent de7elopment work indicates that solutions are available for both
these problems. Details of this work are given by McCoy; a summary of
the results follows

Irradiation experiments earby in the MSR development program showed
that Hastelloy N was subject to high-temperature embrittlement by thermal
neutrons. The MSRE was designed around this limitation (stresses were
low and strain Li mi t s were not exceeded), but the development of an im-
proved alloy became a prime objective of the materials program. It was
found that a modified Hastellsy N containing 2% titanium had much im-
proved postirradiation ductility, and extensive testing of the new alloy
W ~ S under way at the close sf MSRE operations.

The second problem, intergranular surface cracking, was discovered
at the close sf the MSRE operation when surface cracks were observed
after strain testing of Hastelboy K specimens that had been exposed to
fuel salt. Research since that t i me has shown that this phenomenon is
the result of attack by tellurium, a fission product in irradiated fuel
salt, on the grain boundaries.

As a result of research from 1974 to 1976, two likely solutions to
the problem of tellurium attack have been developed. The first involves
the development of an alloy that is resistant to tellurium attack but
still retains the other required properties. This development has pro-
ceeded sufficiently to show that a modified Hastalloy N containing about 1% niobium has gosd resistance to tellurium attack and adequate resistance to thermal-neutron embrittlernent at temperatures up to 650°C. It was also found that alloys containing titanium, with or without niobium, exhibited superior neutron resistance but were not resistant to tellurium attack.

The secund likely solution involves the chemistry of the fuel salt.
Recent experiments indicate that intergranular attack on BastePloy N
is much less severe when the fuel-salt oxidation potential, as measured
by the ratio of U4+ to U3+, is less than 60, the possibility that the superior titanium-modified Hastelloy N could This discovery opens up be used for MSRs through careful control of the oxidation state of the Fuel salt.

Bath of the above solutions appear promising, but extensive testing
under reactor conditions would be required before either could be used
in the design of a future MSR.

Also from From ORNL/TM-6415 (1979)

SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DMSR
Recent reexamination of the MSK concept with special attention to
antiproliferation considerations has led to the identificatio-n Of two
preliminary design concepts for MSKs that appear to have substantially
less proliferation sensitivity without incurring unacceptable perfor-
mance penalties. tor) has been applied to both of these concepts because each would be fueled initially with 235U enriched to no more than 20% and would be
operated throughout its lifetime with denatured uranium. The designation DMSR (for denatured molten-salt reac- tor) has been applied to both of these concepts because each would be fueled initiallyith 235U enriched to no more than 20% and would be operated throughout its lifetime with denatured uranium.

The simpler of these DMSR concepts6 would completely eliminate on-
line chemical processing of the fuel salt for removal of fission products.
(Stripping of gaseous fission products would be retained, and SQIW batch-
wise treatment to control oxide contamination probably would be required.)
This reactor would require rautine additions of denatured 235U fuel, but
would not require replacement or removal of the in-plant inventory except
at the end of the 30-year plant lifetime. Adding an on-line chemical
processing facility to the 30-year9 once-through reactor provides the
second BMSR design concept. With this addition, the conversion ratio
of the reactor would reach 1.0 (:.e., break-even breeding) so that fuel
additions could be eliminated and a given fuel charge could be used in-
definitely by transferring it to a new reactor plant: at the decornission-
ing of the old unit.

The required chemical processing facility for a DMSR, shown as a pre-
liminary conceptual flowsheet in Pig. S.1, would be derived largely from
the MSBR but would contain some significant differences. In particular,
isolation and segregation of protactinium would be avoided, provisions
would be made to retain and use the plutonium produced from 738U9 and a
special step would be added for removal of fission-product zirconium.
Thus, the development of on-line chemical processing for a DNSR would
require essentially all the technology development identified for the
MSBR with additions to accommodate these differences. Howeverf,
since the DMSR offers a no-processing option, a large fraction of the repro-
cessing development, along with its associated materials development,
could be deferred or even eliminated to reduce the COS% (but probably not the time) for developing the first DMSKs. To provide an overall perspective, this development plan includes costs and schedules for developing the reprocessing capability in parallel with the reactor. Such deferral might be expected

For those of you who have read through all of the texts reported here, no futher comment is necessicary.