Showing posts with label Energy from Thorium. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Energy from Thorium. Show all posts

Thursday, August 25, 2011

Deproliferation, India and the Thorium Fuel Cycle

In the first part of this essay, I reviewed the almost inevitable rise of China and India to great power status. I pointed out that by 2050, current expectations are that by 2050, China and India will be ranked along with the United States as great powers of the first order. I noted that both China and India are committed to the development of Thorium fuel cycle nuclear technology, and the possibility that those commitments could chalenge the current course of American nonproliferation policy.

It is possible to produce fissionable U-233 from thorium from the same sort of reactors used to produce weapons grade plutonium, yet during the cold war, no one thought to do so. Frank von Hippel is a self-styled non-proliferation expert who has greatly influenced American, and even global non-proliferation policy. Other self-styled non=proliferation experts tend to advocates arms control policies suggested by von Hippel. Together with Jungmin Kanga and von Hippel, actually attempted to explore this seemingly rational step was not taken during and after the cold war in a paper titled U-232 and the Proliferation- Resistance of U-233 in Spent Fuel.

They write,
Uranium-233 is, like plutonium-239, a long-lived fissile isotope produced in reactors by single-neutron capture in a naturally-occurring abundant fertile isotope (see Figure 1). The fast critical mass of U-233 is almost identical to that for Pu-239 and the spontaneous fission rate is much lower, reducing to negligible levels the problem of a spontaneous fission neutron prematurely initiating the chain reaction -- even in a "gun-type" design such as used for the U-235 Hiroshima bomb (see Table 1). Why then has plutonium been used as the standard fissile material in the "pits" of modern nuclear weapons while U- 233 has not? This question is not just of historical interest, since there is increasing interest in U-233-thorium fuel cycles.
Kanga and von Hippel note
One of the most important reasons why plutonium was chosen over U-233 as a weapons material is that first-generation plutonium-production reactors were fueled by natural uranium, which contains almost as large a fraction of neutron-absorbing fertile material (U-238) as is possible consistent with a reactor achieving criticality. In a natural-uranium fueled reactor, such as the Canadian heavy-water-moderated (HWR) reactor type, Pu-239 is produced by neutron absorption in U-238 at a rate of about one gram of plutonium per thermal megawatt-day (MWd) of fission energy release at low U-235 "burn ups," (see Figure 2).1 Approximately one MWd is released by the fission of one gram of fissile material. After taking into account the neutron requirements for maintaining a steady chain reaction, there is about one excess neutron available per fission and virtually all of these neutrons are absorbed by U-238. Production of U-233 requires the addition of the fertile material Th-232. If the fuel is natural uranium, only a relatively small percentage of thorium can be added before it becomes impossible to sustain a chain reaction. We"estimate that about 7 percent thorium oxide can be added to HWR fuel achievable burnup is reduced from 7000 to 1000 MWd/t (thermal megawatt- days per ton-heavy metal). Because the thermal-neutron absorption cross-section of Th-232 is almost 3 times larger than that of U-238, this concentration of thorium would yield about 0.2 grams of U-233 per MWd at burnups lower than 1000 MWd/t (see Figure 3). Thus most of the fissile material produced in the core would still be plutonium.
Kanga and von Hippel also state,
For a country with uranium-enrichment capabilities, the balance between plutonium and U-233 production could be shifted almost all the way toward U-233 by fueling production reactors with highly-enriched uranium. Indeed the U.S. produced much of its weapons plutonium in the Savannah River heavy-water-moderated production reactors, using highly-enriched uranium fuel and depleted uranium targets in mixed-lattice arrangements.
But Kanga and von Hippel also noted a second problem for weaponizing U-233,

But at this point it should be noted that countries with uranium enrichment capacities to the level of highly-enriched uranium already possess the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. And the process of producing U-233 using HEU-235 to in production reactors, destroys more weapons grade fissionable material than it produces. The use of U-235 at Savannah River to produce Pu-239 was motivated by the fact that Pu-239 had useful military qualities that U-235 lacked. The military qualities of U-233 are inferior too the military qualities of U-235. Thus the choice to produce Pu-239 but not U-233 at Savannah River was rational. Kanga and von Hippel acknowledge the problem,
A second problem with U-233 as a fissile material for either weapons or reactor fuel is that it contains an admixture of U-232, whose decay chain produces penetrating gamma rays. The decay chain of U-232 is shown in Figure 4. The most important gamma emitter, accounting for about 85 percent of the total dose from U-232 after 2 years, is Tl-208, which emits a 2.6-MeV gamma ray when it decays (see Appendix C). For plutonium containing a significant admixture of 14.4-year half-life Pu-241, the most important source of gamma-ray irradiation from is its 433-year half-life decay product, Am-241, which emits low-energy (< 0.1 MeV) gamma rays. These gamma rays do not represent a significant occupational hazard for weapon-grade plutonium (0.36% Pu-241) but their dose becomes more significant for "reactor-grade" plutonium, which contains on the order of 10 percent Pu-241. Thus both U- 233 contaminated with U-232 and reactor-grade plutonium are made less desirable as weapons materials by virtue of the fact that their gamma emissions bring with them the potential for significant radiation doses or shielding requirements for workers involved in nuclear weapons production and for military personnel handling nuclear weapons.
How much less desirable? Kanga and von Hippel report that at a 1% U-232 contamination level a worker would begin to accumulate a cancer risk after working with U-233 for less than three minuits. But 1% U-232 is unusual to say the least. The problem is simple, U-233 poses problems for workers and military personel by exposure to radiation from a U-232 daughter product, while the same radiation poses problems for weapons electronics in storage.

Kanga and von Hippel report that India is researching laser isotope separation of U-233 from U-232. But does this represent a proliferation challenge? First if Indian researchers can separate U-233 from U-232 using lasers, they can also separate U-235 from U-238, and U-235 from U-238 separation is one of the two classic route to nuclear weapons. U-235 based weapons are reliable enough that they do not require tests to identify their military effect. This is not the case for U-233 based weapons. The only known test of a U-233 based weapon failed to accomplish test objectives, although it did explode with a respectable if not as large as expected bang, Thus it would appear that given routs to U-233 and U-235 based weapons, given equivalent costs and technical obstacles, but without tests, military planners will prefer the U-235 based weapons.

Now it can be argued that India should not develop laser uranium enrichment technology because such technology poses proliferation risks, but Burma, a rogue state, is also developing Laser enrichment technology, although it is very unlikely that the Burmese will master it. Burma is also attempting to master centrifuge technology, and given the track records of Pakistan and Iran, that appears to more likely.

The Indian three stage nuclear Research and Development program is well known, and despite setbacks, it has made steady progress over the last 50 years. During much of that time, the global anti-proliferation community sought to punish India for its pursuit of nuclear weapons. India, which shares common borders with two nuclear armed hostile states that are allied against it, believed that a small nuclear arms program was prudent, given the likelihood that at least one of its enemies might use nuclear weapons against it. India maintained its nuclear weapons program despite a 34 year embargo on uranium and other nuclear related trade items. The embargo somewhat handicapped the development of the Indian nuclear industry, and limited the production of nuclear power in India.

It should be pointed out that in 1974, at the beginnings of the international nuclear trade sanctions against India, that nation lacked many of the characteristics of a great power. Never the less it refused to back down on its nuclear weapons program. Today, India is rapidly becoming a great power. It is conceivable that by 2050 India will have the largest economy of any nation. At worst India will have by most estimates the second or third largest economy. India, like China is developing aircraft carriers, a standard military technology for projecting power.

If in 1974, a relatively weak India refused to subordinate itself to the nuclear policies dictated by the United States, by 2050 a very powerful Indian State will certainly not place itself under American Nuclear hegemony. The 123 agreement between India and the United States offered India recognition of its great power status.

The Indian three stage Indian Nuclear development plan directly contradicts the non-proliferation policy advocated by Frank von Hippel who opposes nuclear waste reprocessing and the use of fast reactors. Von Hipple states,
Reprocessing is enormously dangerous. The amount of radioactivity in the liquid waste stored at France's plant is more than 100 times that released by the Chernobyl accident. That is why France's government set up antiaircraft missile batteries around its reprocessing plant after the 9/11 attacks.

Even more dangerous, however, is the fact that reprocessing provides access to plutonium, a nuclear weapon material. That is why the U.S. turned against it after 1974, the year India used the first plutonium separated with U.S.-provided reprocessing for a nuclear explosion. President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger, his secretary of State, managed to intervene before France and Germany sold reprocessing plants to South Korea, Pakistan and Brazil, all of which had secret weapons programs at the time.
The heart of the Indian long range three stage nuclear program involves recycling spent fuel from conventional power reactors. Plutonium in that spent fuel becomes the the Fissile start charge for for fast breeder reactors, which produce plutonium and U-233 from thorium. That fuel is recycled and the the Plutonium is returned to the fast breeder while the thorium is used to power thorium fuel cycle thermal breeder reactors.

Von Hippel apparently has not produced a comprehensive case study of nuclear disarmament issues from the Indian perspective, but he thinks he knows what the Indians should be doing. In 2006 he co-authored a paper which offered prescriptions for demands which the United States should seek to include in any nuclear trade agreement with India. In particular von Hippel demanded that any nuclear trade agreement with India should require that before trade can begin
that India has stopped the production of fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons or else joined a multilateral fissile production cutoff agreement;
Von Hippel also called for
A determination and annual certification that U.S. civil nuclear trade does not in any way assist or encourage India's nuclear weapons program.
The Conditions which von Hippel sought to impose on India might be described as humiliating for a great power, even a great power which was content to hold a small number of nuclear weapons. India faces a possible military alliance between China and Pakistan which together hold far more nuclear weapons than India does. Thus India's nuclear arsenal may not offer India sufficient for conceivable national defense needs.

In addition von Hippel has taken a stance that nuclear fuel reprocessing is conducive to weapons use of fissile materials. Von Hippel also objects to fast reactors because a fast reactor fleet will inevitably be dependent on fuel reprocessing, and theoretically fast reactors could produce fissionable materials that could be used in nuclear weapons. Later in this essay, I will examine problems with von Hippel's belief that reprocessing and fast reactors increase the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. In Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status, a study coauthored by von Hippel, he remarks
India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), expected to be completed in 2010, will have the capacity to make 90 kg of weapon-grade plutonium per year, if only the radial blanket is reprocessed separately and 140 kg per year if both radial and axial blankets are reprocessed.15 The Nagasaki bomb contained 6 kg of weapon-grade plutonium and modern weapons designs contain less. At 5 kg per warhead, the PFBR would produce enough weapon-grade plutonium for 20–30 nuclear weapons a year, a huge increase in production capacity in the context of the South Asian nuclear arms race. were left mixed with the plutonium, however — a project that the U.S. Department of Energy abandoned when it learned that the technology was not in hand — the gamma radiation field surrounding the mix would still be less than one-hundredth the level the IAEA considers self-protecting against theft and thousands of times less than the radiation field surrounding plutonium when it is in spent fuel (figure 1.4).
It is doubtful that von Hippel favors Indian reprocessing of Thorium cycle nuclear fuel. Thus to the extent that American nonproliferation policy is influenced by von Hippel and his followers, American nonproliferation policy, it is likely to conflict with Indian nuclear policy. The Indian nuclear policy had from its inception of using nuclear power to turn India into a rich and powerful nation. Not just militarily and politically powerful, but economically powerful as well. It is unlikely that the Indian political leadership will abandone their goal of achieving great power political and economic status for India, and the prevailing view that nuclear power will play a key roal in accomplishing that goal. To understand Indian national goals is to begin to understand the realpolitik of Indian objections to American nonproliferation as interpreted by Frank von Hippel.

Much 20th century thinking about nuclear nonproliferation, sprang from ethical goals. Nuclear war, is a moral wrong, and the use of nuclear weapons is evil. These assumptions cannot be dispited. But nuclear weapons and their use exist in a morally imperfect world, where people believe that they are sometimes are forced to commit acts that are morally wrong, and even to do things which in absolute moral terms are evil. It is not necessicary to justify such behavior in order to acknowledge that it exists, and to regard the necessity of responding to the real acts of people, as imposing on us constraints on the moral aspects of our life and thought. It is desirable to bring together the real world of human thought and action, with the more lofty goals offered by moral thought. Such is the case if we wish to control the production and use of nuclear weapons.

Thus future American policy towards India nuclear developments ought to focuse on a conversion of the ethical with the realpolitik goals. American policy has no choice but to accept that India has chosen a path that will lead to a thorium based economy. as well as the Indian need for a limited stock of nuclear weapons, at least in the short run.. Once Indian goals accepted, India will willingly participate in the creation on an international order directed towards arms control.

Tuesday, August 23, 2011

Indian and Chinese Developmemt, Nonproliferation and Thorium

This is the first of a series of posts which I plan to offer that will argue that current nuclear nonproliferation schemes are at best transitory, and are likely to undergo significant changes before the middle of the 21th century.

Numerous studies projecting future global economic growth have suggested that by and in most cases well before 2050, the Chinese economy will be the largest single national economy. Some studies, however, suggest that Indian economic growth will exceed China over the next 40 years, and by 2050 the Indian economy will be the largest in the world. Views that the Indian economy will rank second or third in the global economy are generally seen as more common.

A recent Citigroup Global Markets study finds
China should overtake the US to become the largest economy in the world by 2020, then be overtaken by India by 2050.
The Chinese political-social system as well as current demographic trends are expected begin to act as a drag on its economic growth, while Indian democracy and the greater openness of Indian society is expected to lead to higher levels of competitiveness.

By 2050 Citi researchers expect both the Chinese and the Indian economies to be twice the size of the American economy. These developments have significant implications for global affairs. Globally Citi anticipates that the 10 largest economies in 2050 will be India, China, The United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, Russia, Mexico, Japan and Egypt. Key resources, including Water and electricity play a major tole in economic development, and in the long run will potentially be sources of economic problems. The Citi researchers suggest,
Many rapidly growing economies, including China and India continue to charge prices for key resources, including water, electricity and other sources of power that are far below long-run social marginal cost and even far below long-run marginal private cost (excluding environmental externalities) (see OECD (2009) and Easter and Liu (2005), World Bank (2010)). In the case of prices charged to households, there is a second-best argument that, if cash grants to address poverty are not administratively feasible, the subsidization of certain key goods and services consumed by the poor is (constrained) efficient. This argument also supports the use of subsidies on the staple foods consumed by the poor as a poverty relief measure. There is no equity or efficiency-based case, however, to subsidise (charge a price below long-run marginal social cost) the use of water, power and other resources by the industrial and agricultural sectors – by far the largest consumers of power and water.23 The over-use of both power and water this has encouraged is creating a major potential environmental problem in both India and China. Unless this issue is addressed as a matter of urgency, scarcity of clean, fresh water alone could become a binding constraint on growth in both India and China – and many other countries with large arid regions. Long-run social marginal cost prices of all key resources (or equivalent physical rationing schemes which would, however, be much less efficient in practice) is the only way to prevent further destruction of environmental capital.
Thus sources of low cost sustainable energy will play an important role in economic development, especially approaching 2050 or after. Both India and China are planning very ambitious programs of nuclear power development. Both countries are planning rapid deployment of significant numbers of traditional Light Water and Heavy Water power reactors. while projecting for further development both Fast Liquid Metal Reactors and Thorium cycle breeder reactors.

Indian nuclear plans include the construction of a large number of fast reactors that will be used to both produce electricity and breed thorium. In addition India plans currently include a large number of Thorium Fuel cycle heavy water reactors that operate at or close to one to one conversion ratios. The Chinese Academy of Science has initiated a program of Thorium cycle Molten Salt Reactor (LFTR) research and development.

Nuclear Green has argued on the basis of studies conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, that LFTR type reactors will offer safe, sustainable and efficient nuclear power at a potentially low cost. (See for example, ORNL-TM-1851 (SUMMARY OF THE OBJECTIVES, THE DESIGN, AND A PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT OF MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS) ). In contrast to the relatively simple and low cost chemical processes that would allow low cost Fluoride salt based nuclear fuel reprocessing being investigated by the Chinese, the Indian thorium cycle scheme would involve far more expensive chemical fuel reprocessing systems, and most likely more expensive reactors. All in all, the Indian thorium based energy scheme appears to be more complex and more expensive.

Several motives will undoubtedly drive India and China to develop nuclear power systems that are capable of producing sustainable energy, while at the same time facilitate rapid and mast deployment while providing low cost energy. These motives include concerns about the climate implications of burning fossil fuels, increasing scarcity of and rising prices for fossil fuels, the health and agricultural consequences of burning fossil fuels, and the ready availability of large, easily recovered thorium deposites.

Conclusions

By the middle of the 21st century the combined economic power of India and China will be so great that they can impose an international order that is consistent with their interests on the global political-economic system. Where future Indian and Chinese interest converge, the United States can expect to make little headway against them. Both India and China appear committed to developing a thorium nuclear fuel cycle, and it would appear to be rational that they both do so. It is possible that the combined interest of India and China might diverge from those of the United States, and it would appear unlikely that under such circumstances, the interest of the United States would prevail. These conclusions have significant implications for future American nonproliferation policy.

In the next post, I will review the implications of current American nonproliferation policies for the deployment of thorium based nuclear technologies.

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Third Thorium Energy Alliance marks rapid progress toward fulfillment of dreams

My health, although still not as good as I would like has been improving since my hospitalization last December. I am, however, not in good enough health to travel. This is unfortunate because I would very much have liked to attend the Third Thorium Energy AllianceConference in Washington, D.C., earlier this month. Energy from Thorium has a brief account of the Conference in Energy from Thorium. In addition the Thorium Energy Alliance has posted Power Point Presentations from the Conference on its web page. Judging from the presentations it is probably safe to say that Molten Salt Reactor technology has entered the age of entrepreneurs.

Presentations by Kirk Sorensen, DavidLe Blanc and Charles S Holden indicated that they were either currently involved in entrepreneurial activities or were seeking entrepreneurial opportunities. Kirk has left Teledyne Brown to found a company, Flibe Energy, the purpose of Flibe is to product LFTRs and perhaps uranium fueled MSRs. The relationship between Teledyne Brown and Flibe is not clear, but the money to pay Kirk's salary has to come from somewhere. The Flibe prospectus indicates that the company founders envisage going after such markets as isolated communities, and medical isotopes, as well as stable fission product sales.

Charles "Rusty" Holden probably wants to go after some of the Same Markets Kirk is targeting. Holden's company, Thorenco LLC, is planning to build a 40 MW MSR. The reactor is designed to produce about 15 MWe at maximum. Holden intends to come out of the starting gate with a full LFTR. The reactor is a pool type reactor which involves a large pool of molten coolant salts acting as a thermal sink. I am not a big fan of pool type reactors, although they are safe. This is safety at a cost. The coolant pool will contain 93,200 Liters of coolant salt which will weigh 450 tons. The function of the pool is far from clear since the reactor design includes a dump tank.

The reactor core contains no graphite, Moderation will be by Beryllium in the form of BeF2 in the salts. This is a two fluid reactor with blanket salts doubling as coolants. The core structure uses metal (no doubt Hastelloy N) tubing. With the tubes containing fuel salts surrounded by outer tubes containing coolant salts. Since there is no core core graphite, neutron speed will be relatively bast, likely falling in the Epithermal range. The core is surrounded by a thorium reflector, neutron absorption in the reflector converts some thorium into U-233. The reactor will be a converter, and will require 1600 kilograms of U-233 fissile load, which is an enormous amount given the modest amount of U-233 14 kgs per year, which the reactor will burn,

At this point I will stop, and pronounce Holden's reactor DOA. Too much material goes into it, and too little electricity will come out. Fundamental questions are left unanswered, for example startup. 1600 kgs of U-233 is probably more U-233 than exists in the whole world right now. Where is the U-233 going to come from? There are quite a few more problems and questions. As David LeBlanc noted in his Conference talk, "Softer Spectrum" means "much smaller fissile start up." David is still on the outside looking for an opportunity. In his Conference talk, David noted,
␣ Corporate interest will always be difficult to attract
␣ No lucrative fuel fabrication contracts
␣ Min 15 year return on investment a tough sell to shareholders (no matter how big the return may be)
␣ Existing nuclear players have their choices in place
Money is still the hard part, at least for now. Despite this enormous progress is being made by LFTR/MSR advocates. A month ago, Kirk Sorensen marked the fifth anniversary of Energy from Thorium. At that time a handful of people knew what thorium was. Even fewer knew about Molten Salt Reactors. Kirk set out to educate people using social media tools, and others followed his lead. What Kirk has managed to do is to start a bottom up social movement.

Where are we headed? Japanese Researcher Takashi Kamei of Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan offered some answers in the wake of the great Japanese earthquake-tsunami of 2011, not to mention the crisis related to Fukushima reactors. Takashi pictures MSRs beginning a rapid increase around 2025and with the number of LFTRs growing more slowly before 2050. He also suggests a growing number of LFTRs after 2035. Takashi estimates a total MSR output of 258 GWe to 317 GWe by 2050. My view is that much more is possible. The future will belong to the dreamers.

Sunday, March 27, 2011

The "Nuclear Energy Experts" and the Canadian Media

Norm Rubin is an expert on nuclear energy. I know this because the Mainstream Canadian media has made this assertion several times, the latest by Antonia Zerbisias, in the Canadian National Newspaper, the Toronto Stat. Zerbisias reports that Norm Rubin is
Energy Probe’s director of nuclear research and senior policy analyst.
But what does that mean? First Energy Probe is just a web page is a Canadian anti-nuclear franchise. Secondly the Energy Probe Research Foundation states that,
Norm Rubin is a highly sought-after public speaker and has more than 500 public speaking engagements under his belt. He has been with EPRF for more than 20 years, working as a researcher in the nuclear field, and is now one of Canada's leading critics of the nuclear industry. He has appeared at many hearings and court proceedings as an expert witness and has written extensively on the nuclear industry. Mr. Rubin has also made a number of appearances on radio and television shows.
Rubin is quoted by the The Star as saying,
“Thorium doesn’t eliminate the problems,” . . . “If the nuclear industry’s problem was affording uranium, then switching to thorium might solve their problem. But that’s not their problem. The fuel cost in today’s reactors is a tiny fraction of the total cost. That’s not what is giving the Ontario government sticker shock about the next two reactors at Darlington. They’re solving a non-problem by substituting a cheaper fuel for uranium. Unless they solve the big problems, they’ve got a curiosity there instead of a practical solution to anybody’s problems.”
Note that Rubin does not say what "the problem" is, or what he means by "the big problems." Rubin talks about practicle solutions, but how do we know that he has the slightest idea what he is talking about?

When I tried Googling Norm Rubin I found that he is listed as a staffer by the Energy Prob, but has only two posts to the Energy Probe pages to his credit. Two posts is not very much for someone who has carried the fancy title of Research Director for many years. Neither of Rubin's posts relate to thorium. His staff duties for the Energy Probe are not specified. He has no papers or essays on thorium or the LFTR listed on Google. The Energy Probe has not published any essays or research papers on thorium or the LFTR. He is not listed among the 950+ participants on Thorium/LFTR related discussions on Energy From Thorium. So who is this guy? A Google search has uncovered the fact that he once testified before the Ontario Energy Board's about the Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP), and reportedly he is so afraid of radiation that he has never been inside a nuclear power plant. Where is the work product that would serve as evidence of his expertise? Yet Canadian Media accepts him as an expert on Nuclear power. So much the worse for the quality of the Canadian Media.

Ok so Rubin is a talker, not a researcher. He is an anti-nuclear brand spokesperson. His title makes what he has to say seem more credible, but does not establish that there is any research at all behind Rubin's public pronouncements. The Canadian media accords Rubin expert status, because they wish to accord some balance to their stories which suggest that there is a valid scientific controversy about the safety and usefulness of nuclear power. But are we talking here about good journalism, or are we talking about journalists collaboration in a hoax that is contrary to the public interest?

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

Why the Chinese Commitment to the LFTR Matters

I changed the name of Nuclear Green to the Nuclear Green Revolution a couple of years ago. The Name Nuclear Green signified that Molten Salt/Liquid Fluoride Thorium technology had the potential to provide energy in a way that would protect the environment. The LFTR is the environmental reactor. (In fact however, nuclear power is very benign, the LFTR is just more environmentally benign than other forms of nuclear technology.)

The reason I added the word "Revolution" to the name of my blog, was that I believed that the LFTR had revolutionary potential, that it could change the lives of everyone on earth for the better. There is a huge amount of thorium in the earth, and the LFTR is up to 300 times more fuel efficient than conventional nuclear power plants. The LFTR could provide low-cost energy at the level now enjoyed in the United States to everyone on the planet, and provide it for millions of years.

During the last four years, this has all been thought about, argued about, and speculated in the Energy from Thorium Discussion pages. As of this morning, the EfT discussion has drawn over 33,600 comments on nearly 2200 topics, and no doubt those number will continue to grow. Energy from Thorium and Nuclear Green have participated in a campaign to increase public awareness. Both Energy from Thorium's Kirk Sorensen and I come from missionary religious traditions, and we have been spreading the word about thorium and the LFTR. Kirk has been especially vigorous in the use of social media. In addition to his blog, and its adjoining document archive and discussion forum, Kirk has used Facebook, YouTube videos, and Twitter to put his message across. Kirk has been to the United Kingdom twice, and has traveled several times to the Google campus to give presentations.

The consequences of our effort has been a steady increase in public awareness. Other Members of the Energy from Thorium community have reached out as well. Articles have appeared in The (UK) Guardian, The Economist, The (UK) Telegraph, and the Geek oriented, WIRED Magazine. Journal targeting scientists, engineers and technophiles including C&E News, Machine Design, American Scientist, and Mechanical Engineering have all carried thorium/LFTR related stories.

I have concentrated on spreading the word through the blog sphere. In addition to my own blogs, my posts have appeared on The Oil Drum, Daily Kos, The Energy Collective, Energy from Thorium and even the Liberal Zionist blog, Harry's Place. In addition I have posted energy related comments in dozens of other Internet sites.

If there is to be a Nuclear Green Revolution it will have worked from the bottom up, striving to create grassroots support. An energy from Thorium community has grown up, and people like David Le Blanc, Robert Steinhaus, and Robert Hargraves, and many other people have become active communicators about thorium LFTR advantages. Few of us doubt that Anthropogenic Global Warming is a major issue and perhaps the defining issue of this century. Global Climate Change is upon us:
While some hold out hope for a renewables-based approach to mitigation of climate change, critics of renewables point to daunting issues such as high costs and unreliability as lingering problems. Conventional nuclear power, while less expensive and far more reliable than renewable energy sources, is still more expensive than desirable. In addition the world supply of fissionable U-235 is far more limited than the world supply of thorium. A more advanced nuclear approach can transform Thorium into fissionable U-233, lower nuclear energy costs, while facilitating rapid global deployment of safe and clean nuclear power generating units.
The potential promise of thorium and the LFTR technology can rapidly be brought into the effort to prevent further global climate change. China, perhaps more than any other country has realized the importance of energy in increasing the wealth of its citizens, and making life for its people better. At the same time, the Chinese have paid an enormous price for their reliance on fossil fuel technology. As many as 500,000 people die every year from fossil fuel related causes. Global Warming represents another large threat to the well-being of the Chinese people, and although China has made a large commitment to renewable energy sources, the Chinese leadership is aware that renewables cannot produce anything like the amount of energy that the Chinese people need to bring their standard of living to that enjoyed by people living in advanced Industrialized and post-industrial societies. At the same time, the Chinese leadership is far more technologically oriented than the leadership of the United States or Europe.

Thus, the leadership of China is far more open to promising new technology. In addition China has a large thorium supply that comes from its rare earth mines, and so far has not found any use for thorium. The LFTR allows China to kill two birds with a single thorium stone. First it offers a potential source of vast amounts of environmentally clean and safe energy at a low cost, and secondly it allows China to take advantage of an unused resource, which can easily replace coal. LFTR technology has the potential of providing China with abundant energy at a very low cost, and might solidify Chinese economic, cultural and political dominance of the world for a long time to come. This is what the Chinese leadership sees.

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Dr. Furukawa's vision

Dr. Kazio Furukawa is 85 years old, and at an age when most people are content to enjoy a leisurely retirement, he is working hard to change the world. To that end, Dr. Furukawa participated in the founding of a new company, the "International Thorium Energy & Molten-Salt Technology Inc." (IThEMS), earlier this year. Dr. Furukawa is nothing, if not adamant in his views. According to David LeBlanc, at the Recent Thorium Alliance Conference in London, Dr. Furukawa said the same thing to everyone who was not working on a Molten Salt Reactor related project,
I know your heart is in the right place but you must know you are completely wrong so please stop wasting your time!
Dr. Furukawa's interest in Molten Salt Nuclear technology goes back some 30 years, to when he worked with a molten salt medium in an accelerator driven thorium breeding system. Accelorator driven thorium breeding remains a part of Dr. Furukawa's long range thinking. During the early 1980's Dr, Furukawa began to establish contacts with scientists in France andthe old Soviet Union who shared his interest in Molten Salt/thorium technology.

By 1983 scientists at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow were interested in building a Molten Salt Reactor and invited Dr. Furukawa to participate in the project. By 1985 Dr. Furukawa had designed a small-self sustaining molten salt reactor the Fuji reactor concept. The beauty of Fuji was the extent to which it was based on technology already tested in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Molten Salt Reactor Experiment. Thus Furukawa was able to demonstrate that self sustaining nuclear power was potentially possible without any further technological breakthroughs, or expensive prototype developments.

The full beauty of Dr. Furukawa's project can be grasped once its simplicity, reliability and economy are understood.

Dr. Furukawa must be viewed as a visionary who looks at the big picture. For Dr. Furukawa it is not enough to design nuclear power stations, the entire fuel cycle must be analyzed, and nuclear power systems designed and built to create better fuel cycle efficiency. In doing so, Dr. Furukawa would eliminate the problem of nuclear waste. As early as 1944, Eugene Wigner had favored fluid core homogenioues reactors because of their superior fuel processing potential. Initially homogenious reactors were designed to use heavy water as the carrier fluid, and uranium as either dissolved in the heavy water, or carried along by the flowing liquid in the form of a slurry. An outer liquid blanket in which heavy water carried thorium was used for breeding. However, there were numerous problems with the Aqueous Homogeneous Reactor, and a second fluid fueled reactor concept had emerged in Oak Ridge.

In 1947 Oak Ridge scientists and engineers were investigating the possibility of powering a jet bomber with a reactor. The first concept involved the use of a sodium cooled reactor, but Oak Ridge engineers including Ed Bettis thought that the sodium cooled reactor was dangerous, and suggested a reactor which used fluoride salts as a coolant and fuel carrier. During the next 30 years Oak Ridge produced 2 prototype reactors, and completed a great many molten Salt related research projects. All-in-all ORNL spent under $1 billion 2010 dollars, to develop Molten Salt Reactor technology. In contrast the United States Government has spent over $100 billion 2010 dollars on the development of Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors. If anything development of the MSR is further advanced than development of the LMFBR. So much for throwing money at a problem.

Dr Furykawa argues that Th-232-U233 are superior to U-238-Pu-239 breeding systems because they produce little or no trans-nuclear waste,

Dr. Furukawa believes that Fuji costs would be as much as 30% less than the costs of Light Water reactors, and that electricity from the Fuji can be sold for as little as $0.06 per kWh. However, given what I call the full court method of MSR cost containment, it is likely that the cost of a Fuji like reactor can be lowered significantly below Dr. Furukawa's estimate,

Much of Dr. Furukawa's ORNL talk consisted in a recitation of things he had done to bring about the implementation of the Fuji MSR concept. From 1985 onward he kept trying to reach people who might be in position to do something to move MSR technology. This determination does not come from a monitary interest, but a vision, an idea about what the future of energy can and should be. If the thorium breeding MSR concept is thought through to its full implications, the thinker becomes aware that this is a new energy paradigm. A paradigm offers safe nuclear energy that can be free of long term waste, and proliferation dangers. It the same time the Thorium breeding molten salt reactor, the LFTR, offers abundant, low cost energy for the entire human popilation of the earth. Dr. Furukawa sees the Fuji as a boon to humanity, and as his guift to the human race. He is determined that that gift not be wasted.

Dr. Furukawa sees the thorium-MSR paradigm emerging in three stages. In the first stage the Mini-Fuji emerges, to provide a small but useful energy package that can be used to tackel a variety of present and future energy problems including motive power for commercial shipping in a post carbon era. In the second stage a much larger, but still relatively small 200 MWe Fuji emerges. This Fuji can either serve as a stand alone energy/electricity source, or can be clustered. In the third stage a spallation breeder emerges. The spallation approach harnesses neutrons created by a particle accelerator, to the thorium breeding cycle. Dr. Furukawa believes that the thorium can be contained by a molten fluoride salt target, thus the breeding process is directly tied to the Fuji carrier salt/fuel cycle technology.

Dr. Furukawa also offers a three stage vision of the development of the fuel cycle, with Plutonium from weapons stockpiles and from "nuclear waste" being used to start Fuji reactors. In the second stage, as the number of Fujis grow, accelerator driven breeders produce U-233 to start and power the Fujis. In the third phase 20 to 30 chemical processing centers around the world are created to "clean" the apent fuel salts from Fuji Reactors.

By making maximum use of technology first tested by ORNL beteen 1965 and 1969, Dr. Furukawa believes that research and development costs for the Fuji system can be kept extremely low. For example he estimated the cost of R&D for the Mini-Fuji prototype to be no more that $300 million.. He believes that the Mini-Fuji project can be wrapped up in 5 or 6 years. The next stage, which entails the development of the 200 MWe Fuji is expected to cost $1.5 billion, and can be complete by 2020. The development of the accelerator breeder will take 25 years, and Dr. Furukawa believes that it will cost $20 billion. I should note that younger MSR designer developers, such as Dr. LeBlanc and Kirk Sorensen now expect the emergence of MSR breeding technology to come more slowly than they had envisioned 18 months ago. Recent MIT estimates of the global Uranium supply suggest that no Uranium shortages will devlop duruing the next century. Thus even a very large number of MSRs can be operated with from U-235 and P:u-239, without quickly running out of fuel. Still realization of Dr. Furukawa's 10,000 GWe nuclear power starions make a rapid development of some thorium breeding technology very desirable.

The use of Spallation technology in the breeding process is one of the few places where others scientists who are researching MSR technology disagree with Dr. Furukawa. Canadian physicist, and highly regarded MSR designer, Dr. David LeBlanc observed,
I personally agree with 95% of the FUJI approach due to its great simplicity but I disagree with the approach of needing to produce an external makeup of U233, especially by accelerators. I believe though I am having success in convincing more of them that using Low Enriched Uranium with thorium is a more practical and politically acceptable route (the DMSR is basically a denatured FUJI approach).
Dr. Furukawa would argue that Dr. LeBlanc fails to close the fuel cycle, and because he, Dr. Furukawa does, he offers a better solution. The good thing about this disagreement, is that it insures that the Molten Salt reactor community is not going to put all of their eggs in one basket, and indeed one of the things that is most confusing to outsiders, is the large number of baskets
competing for those eggs.

How much energy are we talking about putting in those baskets? Dr. Furukawa spoke of 10,000 1000 MWe energy coming from thorium powered MSRs. By closing the breeding cycle that 10,000 kilos of thorium, about 11,000 tons could power the entire kit and kabootal for the entire globe. if Dr. Furukawa's paradigm were to become a reality, the pessimistic visions of the neo-Malthusians could be put off for millions of years to come.

In his ORNL talk, Dr. Furukawa pointed to several advantages of his MSR-thorium fuel cycle system. They included:
* Safety
* Elimination of long term radioactive nuclear waste
* Nuclear Proliferation resistance
* Economical construction and operation
Dr. Furukawa observed,
Simple is better,
He foresees the emergence of a huge new nuclear industry based on Fuji like technology with quick low cost launches of MSR projects, factory mass production of reactors, and the rapid emergence of a MSR based infrastructure.

In Dr. Furukawa's Thorium MSR paradigm not plutonium production is needed, there will be no core melt down problem, reactors will be small, safe, efficient and economical. Such an energy order is practical, not Utopian, and is implicit in the adoption of a thorium based Molten Salt breeding cycle.

Sunday, July 11, 2010

Pro-Nuclear Bloggers Stands for Open Science

The Independent Climate Change E-mails Review July 2010 is one of the growing library of reports on the so-called Climate gate scandal. Like every other report on climate gate it exonerates the climate scientists involved from the charge of fraudulently manipulating data. The scientists were however advised of a need to change their information handling practices toward greater openness and transparency. Muir Russell the report's lead author included among the reports important findings:
First, how is science to be conducted in a new world of openness, accountability and indeed what I might term citizen involvement in public interest science? There need to be new ways of making results and data available, and we mention some aspects of current thought. There need to be ways of handling criticism and challenge, of responding to a range of different sorts of criticism and getting into a more productive relationship with critics than we have sometimes seen in this case.
The science community – and I include university managers in this – need to have in the forefront of their minds the importance of the credibility of the knowledge base they are generating and of not losing public trust in it. Their risk management in the widest sense needs to recognize this.
At the same time, science needs to find ways of expressing the uncertainties that inevitably attend its findings, and mean that so much of what it does is in a sense “work in progress”. More needs to be done to allow policy makers and the public to understand and work within this uncertainty.
We identify the need for some sort of “public space” where these issues can be aired, in an atmosphere that is at the same time unthreatening and properly challenging. If the Review has contributed to advancing discussion of these issues it will be a useful contribution in addition to addressing the questions in our remit.
I endorse these findings, especially as they apply to energy issues. Pro-nuclear bloggers are in the forefront of the movement towards openness and transparency in science. Two blogs, Kirk Sorensen's Energy from Thorium, and Barry Brook's Brave New Climate provide outstanding examples of the new culture of scientific openness and transparency.

Kirk blog is divided into three parts:
* A document archive in which documents which contain research "data" are collected via links.

* A traditional blog with posts, many of which offer histories of, reviews of, and interpretations of the background and contents of the documents.

* A discussion section, that is in large measure depended on the documents.
The Energy from Thorium discussion covers hundreds of topics, and includes nearly 30,000 comments.

In Brave New Climate, Barry Brook, and other participants, post professional quality papers on energy and climate related issues. The papers are then open for discussion by anyone. In some cases discussions on Brave New Climate have extended to 700 comments. Some times papers are rewritten in response to criticisms offered during the discussion.

I view my works on Nuclear Green as being closely aligned to both material and discussions found on Brave New Climate and Energy from Thorium. I have posted numerous comments on both blogs, and in the past Nuclear Green posts were cross posted to Energy From Thorium.

Both EfT, and BNC view Generation IV nuclear technology as an important component of post-carbon energy. BNC has also offered frequent critiques of renewable energy schemes. Because nuclear power is subject to repeated and vociferous criticisms, the open and transparent approach is highly appropriate in obtaining public trust for new nuclear technology. Indeed, EfT

In addition Barry Brook is associated with a second open science site, Oz-Energy-Analysis.org. Oz-Energy-Analysis.org focuses on an attempt to model a wind energy scheme for Southeaster Australia. It is roughly based on Kirk Sorensen's Energy from Thorium design, The data, analyzed is posted and both analysis and interpretive narratives are open for discussion.

The "Independent Review" states:
Handling the blogosphere and non traditional scientific dialogue. One of the most obvious features of the climate change debate is the influence of the blogosphere. This provides an opportunity for unmoderated comment to stand alongside peer reviewed publications; for presentations or lectures at learned conferences to be challenged without inhibition; and for highly personalized critiques of individuals and their work to be promulgated without hindrance. This is a fact of life, and it would be foolish to challenge its existence. The Review team would simply urge all scientists to learn to communicate their work in ways that the public can access and understand. That said, a key issue is how scientists should be supported to explain their position, and how a public space can be created where these debates can be conducted on appropriate terms, where what is and is not uncertain can be recognised.
The models provided by Energy from Thoirium, and Brave New Climate fully meet these requirements. Numerous other energy related Internet sites fail to do so, however. Indeed, There appear to be numerous openness gaps in the renewable energy research standards offered by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, and in various plans and reports offered by supporters of Renewable Energy. Nuclear Green has to a limited extent attempted to address some of these renewable energy openness gaps, and Brave New Climate, and masterresources.org have attempted to do so in a far more detailed and professional fashion.

If there is a lesson from the so called Climate Gate scandal, it is that 21st science needs to be open and to the extent humanly possible transparent. Scientific communications, discussions and debate should be viewed as public, rather than private. People who are involved in knowledge production and assessment need to be fully aware of the implication of the new world of knowledge we live in and not transgress its structures.

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Toward a White Paper on a Mass Global Deployment of Nuclear Power: Fuel

It is my intention to present a draft of a White Paper, which will lay out a plan for a global deployment of nuclear power plants in sufficient numbers to insure the goal of an 80% reduction of global CO2 emissions can be accomplished by 2050. The first section of this draft focused on nuclear safety. This section will focus on the role of deploying Generation IV molten salt and sodium cooled reactors in meeting the goal, and the role of Reactor Grade Plutonium drawn from nuclear waste, in starting the breeding process. In addition to the use of RGP, a drawdown of nuclear weapons grade HEU and Pu-239 to start Generation IV reactors is both possible and desirable, but this possibility is not addressed in the body of this paper.)

Finding fuel for a post-carbon energy future

Energy policy should be guided by well thought out goals, and be based on rational and realistic plans. Unfortunately, both American and International energy efforts have not bee based on well thought out goals, or rational and realistic energy plans. The problem is especially serious because of the frequent inclusion of renewable energy goals in the formulation of over all national and international energy goals. In order for goals to meet minimal standards of plausibility, it should be demonstrated that a realistic plan for the implementation of the goal must exist. A realistic plan would be one which would address objections, which could in fact be carried out to successful conclusions.

Climate scientist have argued that it is imperative to lower global Carbon Dioxide emissions by 80% before 2050. In addition, the rapid economic development of nations such as India and China suggest that Global energy demand will increase, at the very time when there appears to be an need to decrease global energy production from carbon based fuels. Shifting global energy production from fossil fuels, while at the same time filling the energy demands of several billion people from developing countries is an enormous and extremely problematic task, which must be done.

Nuclear power is a promising candidate to bridge at least part of the energy gap. However, any account of a massive global deployment of nuclear reactors as a major or the major post carbon energy source faces a number of challenges. Critics can be expected to raise issues related to the cost of nuclear power, the magnitude of the task, the time requirements for nuclear construction, the availability of sufficient nuclear fuel the proliferation issues, the problems related to the management of nuclear waste, nuclear safety issues, and the potential dangers of nuclear terrorism. A successful nuclear global deployment plan should foresee these objections and demonstrate that no single objection or set of objections points to an insurmountable problem. A goal for a nuclear deployment plan would be the inclusion of a demonstration that no set of objections could motivate rational objections to the global nuclear deployment scheme.

Of course, all renewables deployment schemes, should also face the same level of scrutiny, with questions focusing on capacity factors, cost, the use of fossil fuel powered renewable backup systems, grid stability, redundancy, and the cost and efficiency of energy storage schemes. Efficiency advocates need to explain why Jevons Paradox and/or the rebound effect would not apply to efficiency based carbon mitigation plans. Unfortunately to date, renewable/efficiency based post-carbon energy plans to date appear to be singularly lacking in candor in identifying and addressing their problems.

Senior Collell poses a problem for a uranium powered future

Marcel Coderch Collell, a distinguished Spanish technocrat, has reviewed the possibility of replacing much of the worlds fossil fuel generated electricity by 2030. He argues that the limited nuclear fuel supply mans that nuclear power cannot play a predominate role in a post carbon energy order. He is extremely critical of the French Model: Electricity from Nuclear and/or renewable power.

He describes the French Model
The French model: electricity, nuclear or renewable One of the first options to consider would be to follow the French model progressively increasing the reactor park to ensure that by 2030, or maybe a little later, much of the world's electricity is predicted to generate fossil fuels out of nuclear origin, since it does not require, in principle, some technical innovation. Thus, power generation would not produce broadcasts, because it was nuclear or renewable. This would save huge amounts natural gas and coal, and oil-well with a consequent reduction emissions, and could force down, or at least not to contribute upwards of prices of fossil fuels and expand its availability in time.
But there are, according to Senior Collell, problems with the French Model.
But leave aside the logistical difficulties (and financial) would be a nuclear construction program of this size and evaluate how much fuel would be needed to fuel a reactor park of this magnitude, and which could be another limiting factor. Surely it would be, mainly, of building thermal neutron reactors with a Third Generation quasi-cycle Open fuel (MOX fueled with uranium enriched with some plutonium). In the best case, not expected to be operational by 2030 the Fourth Generation of fast neutron reactors with closed fuel cycles (which is expected to reach 60 times the performance thereof, by the massive use of plutonium) and, therefore, in the coming decades should be the main nuclear fuel.
Senior Collell then suggests that in order to follow the nuclear French model by 2030,
4,740 new 1GWe reactors would have to be built and [one] put in operationevery two days for the next 25 years
Senior Collell then suggests that this buildout would be very difficult in a business as usual world.
An optimistic estimate of construction times (five years) would mean having 950 teams of technical specialists, workers and machinery simultaneously working full time. This is hard to imagine, despite talk of standardising designs. In the previous period of nuclear construction (1963-88) only 423 reactors were built, at a rate of 17 per year.
He also argues that fuel shortages would constrict the depolyment of such a large reactor fleet.
A simple calculation suffices to show how an extension of the French model would collide with a scarcity of uranium. This is old news, given the serious doubts that already exist regarding the availability of uranium even to feed a few more reactors than now exist. In 2004, 365 GWe of nuclear capacity consumed about 67 kt of uranium (approximately 180 tons of uranium perGWe per year), of which 36 kt came from currently operating mines, while the rest came from recycled nuclear weapons and other secondary sources (that is, from prior production). Supply forecasts for the reactors currently in operation (plus foreseeable growth) put uranium mining production at 50 kt per year in 2015, with a significant shortfall developing in 2010, by which time Russia's nuclear weapons will have been dismantled and their uranium will have been consumed, . . .
If we assume linear growth from the current 365 GWe to 4,959 GWe in 2030, uranium demand would be around 400 kt in 2015 and 700 kt in 2030. This means multiplying by eight today’s estimates of production capacity in 2015, and multiplying by fifteen for 2030
Senior Collell sees these facts as casting the nuclear build out on the horns of a dilemma.
Let us suppose, however, for argument’s sake, that it were possible to achieve a production capacity of 700 kt/year by 2030. In the context of this analysis, two questions are raised: first, the CO2 emissions that would be generated in this phase of the nuclear cycle. Given the amount of uranium necessary, it would almost certainly be necessary to make use of hard rock deposits and low concentrations ore. There are fortunately multiple flaws in this delima argument. First the rock does not have to be moved. Uranium miners are increasingly adopting a mining technique called in situ leaching. When in situ leaching is practiced on uranium ore, the primarily the uranium is extracted, and the rock is left in place. Let us ignore for the moment these problems.
The problem that Senior Collell is pointing to is the limitation of the Light Water Reactor. Light Water Reactors were first developed as a means of powering American Nuclear submarines. In American Nuclear Submarines LWRs are small, they provide reliable power for 15 years, after which their cores can be replaced. There are also expensive, but nothing can serve as a substitute. Large power reactors can be even more expensive and there are very fuel inefficient. Part of the problem has to do with the flaws in the Uranium cycle. In LWRs as little as 0.3% of the potential fuel gets burned, and the rest falls into a category called "nuclear "waste." The problem is that uranium is relatively cheap, so it cost less to separate out the good stuff, the U-235 and use it for nuclear fuel. In LWRs a tiny fraction of the fuel gets converted to fissionable Pu-239, and a fraction of that gets burned as nuclear fuel. Unfortunately Pu-239 is not very good fuel in LWRs. When enough u-235 and Pu-239 is "burned" in a :WR, the fuel ceases to sustain a chain reaction, and has to be replaced. The now used fuel, still contains a significant amount of U-235 and an even larger amount of plutonium isotopes. Many of the plutonium isotopes are not fissionable, and plutonium produced in Light Water Reactors is not of weapons quality. It is also not very good nuclear fuel in Light Water Reactors.

The new French model of the future from Grenoble

Another French Model, one not contemplated by Senior Collell, is offered by Scientists of the Reactor Physics Group at Laboratoire de Physique Subatomique et de Cosmologie, Grenoble, France, together with other associates, have made important contributions to our understanding of the fuel management problems that would be faced in a Global Nuclear Deployment. The RPG were until very recently among the handful of world scientists who understood the potential of Molten Salt Reactor technology. They are among the most important and far reaching energy thinkers in the world, yet outside of the narrow circle found in the Energy from Thorium Discussion Forum, their work is almost unknown in the United States. Scientists from the RPG wrote a number of papers examining the potential problems of a Global Nuclear Deployment. "Molten Salt Reactors and Possible Scenarios for Future Nuclear Power Deployment offers a good introduction to their work. as a means of further enhancing the intellectual legitimacy of the Energy from Thorium approach to climate change mitigation, and to further enhance American Awareness of the work of the LPSC on Molten Salt technology. LPSC researchers use the term Thorium Molten Salt Reactor. Energy annalists associated with the Energy from Thorium approach to climate change mitigation use the term Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor or LFTR. In Future Deployment they write:
The worldwide demand for primary energy is constantly increasing and, if it is to be satisfied, solutions must be thought out and the extent to which the responses are adapted to the issue must be examined. There are not so many options once it is agreed that recourse to fossil energies should be as reduced as possible in order to limit green house gas emissions. Fission based nuclear energy is, along with new renewable energies and, in the longer run, fusion based energy, one of the primary energy sources capable of contributing significantly to satisfying the demand. The scenarios studied in our group show the potential, and limitations, for a worldwide deployment of nuclear power, and demonstrate that the different reactor types are quite complementary. This study shows that fissile matter availability comes as a strong constraint if a fleet of reactors able to breed their own fuel is to be started. In addition, such breeder reactors will not be deployed industrially before the next 20 to 25 years so that any transition towards extensive and sustainable nuclear power production will have to call on second or third generation light water reactors, which will have to be built.

We have considered three main reactor types:
  • Pressurized water reactors of the second generation (PWR) and third generation (EPR - European Pressurized Reactor). These reactors do not breed their fuel. PWRs are currently in operation while EPRs will begin production in 2010 in our scenarios.
  • Fast neutron reactors with a liquid metal coolant (FNR). These are fourth generation reactors that are based on the 238U/Pu fuel cycle. Their breeding ratio varies with the scenario considered. FNRs begin production in 2025 in our scenarios.
  • Molten salt reactors (MSR). These are fourth generation reactors based on the232Th/ 233Ufuel cycle, with a neutron spectrum that can be anything from thermal to fast. These begin production in 2030 in our scenarios.
Our studies show that an intensive nuclear power deployment is feasible but that it requires careful handling of fissile matter resources and of nuclear wastes. The scenario that combines the three reactor types is by far the one that gives the most flexibility in the deployment of nuclear power; if necessary, it could accommodate more intensive production than we have set in our scenarios. The three reactor types complement each other strikingly; the use of natural fissile matter is optimized (figure 3); the volume of trans-uranians produced is minimal; the option to stop, then restart nuclear power production remains open so that decisions are not irreversible. Intermediate scenarios, with a greater or lesser contribution of FNRs as compared to MSRs can be considered in order to satisfy regional or other criteria but, with these studies, it appears that the 232Th/ 233U fuel cycle will be needed early on.

Figure 3: Evolution of natural uranium resources for the three scenarios considered.

Figure 4: Amounts of plutonium and 233U present in the fuel cycles of the reactors for the three scenarios considered.
The French Scientists from the University of Grenoble offered a more detailed analysis of the fuel management problem elsewhere. In "Scenarios with an Intensive Contribution of Nuclear Energy to the World Energy Supply," H.Nifenecker, D.Heuer, S.David, J.M.Loiseaux1, J.M.Martin, O.Meplan, and A.Nuttin, maintain that
If carried out with PWR or BWR reactors, the important nuclear power deployment will make heavy demands on natural Uranium resources. Resources are, presently, estimated to be around 20 Million tons. Assuming PWR or BWR reactors, the cumulative needs in 2050 could reach 16 million tons. This shows that breeding reactors are necessary to meet the needs or, alternately, that Uranium would have to be extracted from sea water, at a significant cost.
These considerations may, however, probably exaggerate the Uranium shortage. It is by no means certain that the cost of extracting Uranium from sea water would exceed the cost of breeding. On the other hand, there are reasons to suspect that the cost of LFTRs and other Molten Salt Reactors might be significantly lower than the cost of Light Water Reactors. Certainly when the large global thorium stock is added to recoverable uranium there will be no shortage of nuclear for a long time to come. Alvin Weinberg relates how the possibility of a future global uranium shortage was understood by the founding fathers of the Nuclear age, including Enrico Fermi, and Eugene Wigner. It was understood even then that nuclear breeding technology would have to be introduced as a part of a global deployment of nuclear power.

In "Intensive Contribution," the French team reviewed
two possible breeding cycles:
* The U-Pu cycle using fast reactors
* The Th-U cycle using thermal reactors
This analysis was expanded with typical French thoroughness in "Scenarios for a Worldwide Deployment of Nuclear Power," if anyone is interested. Both "Intensive Contribution," and "Worldwide Deployment" came to the same conclusion, that a deployment of Light Water Reactors can only be sustained until 2030. Lets call this the conservative case. Conservative, in that it is based on very conservative estimates of global uranium resources. While far more generous estimates of Uranium resources are justifiable, their actual existence is by no means certain. A really plausible plan should make conservative assumptions. If generous assumptions do not pan out, then the plan can be altered in to reflect a better than expected resource picture.

The nuclear intensive plan would assume a nuclear build out to 3387 GWe of electrical generating capacity by 2030. This is, in itself an enormous and extremely daunting build out, and indeed suggests that a major revolution in nuclear manufacturing technology will be required. Fortunately many of the components of that revolution are already understood, and none of them represents a serious impediment to technological change. Factory production of reactor construction kits, together with on site labor saving machines, and new materials savings reactor designs can be expected to improve reactor manufacturing, labor, time and materials efficiencies during the next decade, and to be reinforced by a learning curve. Such a large build out will probably require a shift of many reactor manufacturing activities from the final manufacturing site to factories. The recycling of old steam plant locations as nuclear power stations sites, will also save money and time for the buildout.

Thus while ambitious, the 3387 GWe buildout by 2030 is still not impossible, but the goal must be set soon. Both "Intensive Contribution," and "Worldwide Distribution" then looked at the U-Pu fast reactor cycle. By 2030 an enormous amount of reactor grade plutonium will become available. This RGP can be put to use both in the production of nuclear power and in the breeding of more reactor fuel. Doing so would serve as at least a partial solution to what is commonly seen as a major problem for nuclear power, the so called nuclear waste problem. Indeed the reuse of nuclear fuel turns "nuclear waste," into an asset. "Intensive Contribution," argues that given the supply of plutonium for LWRs and fast breeders, a buildout to 9000 GWe by 2050 is possible.

"Worldwide Deployment" looks at a number of added options including burning recycled RGP in LWRs. This delays, perhaps for a hundred years, but does not prevent the eventual draw down of fissionable materials that are tied to a non-breeding nuclear economy. A better use of the RGP is
Thus the transition to some form of nuclear breeding will be inevitable, if a long term commitment to nuclear power becomes a matter of policy.
Fast sodium cooled reactors are conventionally viewed as the preferred method of nuclear breeding, although various Molten Salt Reactor breeding options exit, and include many attractive features that are more than competitive with what liquid sodium cooled breeder reactors such as the Integral Fast Reactor. IFR backers claim higher breeding ratios, but there are reasons to doubt that high breeding ratios are compatible with optimal safety.

"Worldwide Deployment" also reviews a gas cooled fast reactor option, but did not like it as well as the sodium cooled concept.

There is a significant problem with the start up charge of fast breeders. Fast neutron reactors require much more fissionable material to maintain a chain reaction. If anything the French team underestimated the amount of plutonium required to maintain a high breeding ratio in a Fast Breeder Reactor. A research report from the S-PRISM design team, indicated that the RGP in 40,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel (about 400 tons of RGP) would start 22 IFRs capable of producing 33,440 MWe output. This would suggest that the IFR would be a useful way to use and with a low conversion ration, use up RGP, but not a major adjunct to fighting AGW. A higher breeding ration is possible, but report author, Allen E. Dubberley of GE Nuclear Energy, and his associates, did not discuss the safety problems related to the high breeding ratio.

The problem with the entire sodium cooled fast reactor scheme is stated simply by Lawrence M. Lidsky and Marvin M. Miller of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
The LMFBR was chosen over other breeder reactor designs because it was, in theory, capable of very short fuel doubling times, shorter than that of any competing reactor design. The doubling time is the time required to produce an excess of fuel equal to the amount originally required to fuel the reactor itself. In other words, in one doubling time there would be enough fuel available to start up another reactor. In the absence of mined uranium, only a short doubling time would, it was believed, allow nuclear power to grow fast enough to compete with alternative sources of power. Unfortunately, the theoretical advantages of the LMFBR could not be achieved in practice. A successful commercial breeder reactor must have three attributes; it must breed, it must be economical, and it must be safe. Although any one or two of these attributes can be achieved in isolation by proper design, the laws of physics apparently make it impossible to achieve all three simultaneously, no matter how clever the design.
Lidsky and Miller conclude,
Strong support for plutonium recycle, with its associated technical risks and societal costs, in the face of increasing evidence that alternative strategies are superior, is clearly counterproductive.
The Lidsky and Miller superior alternative strategies involve the the employment of Molten Salt Thorium Breeders, that is LFTRs,
Thorium fuel cycles have also been promoted on the basis of lower long-term waste toxicity and greater proliferation resistance, . . . The initial rationale for introduction of the thorium cycle was the perception that it was more abundant than uranium, and that it could be used to breed U-233, an isotope with superior properties for use in thermal reactors.
The principle safety problem with Sodium cooled breeders is the possibility that a bubble in overheated sodium would lead to an uncontrolled increase of power, which interm enlarges the size of the bubble. I should here, in the interest of fairness, note that I have this week come across papers from Argonne National Laboratory which reports findings from simulation studies which suggest that Integral Fast Reactors are safe even in configurations which produce high void worth ratios. If IFRs are in fact safe despite high void worth ratios, then they can probably be pushed to higher breeding rations, but it should also be pointed out that current ANL IFR designs emphasize low breeding ratios, and in fact appear design at a ratio that is equivalent to the anticipated breeding ratio of the LFTR.

The new Indian Fast Breeder is expected to produce new fuel at a 1.12 breeding ratio, far less than its theoretical maximum. Such conservative ratios may at least partially be motivated by safety concerns. It should be noted that a 1.12 to 1 breeding ratio is quite good by LFTR standards, and would be quite satisfactory if a fast breeder could match thermal Molten Salt Breeder's start up charge. In fact as many as 12 MSBRs can be started for every LMFBR, and if the LMFBRs could breed at its theoretical maximum, they could over time produce more fissionable materials than the MSBR, were it not for safety concerns related to higher breeding ratios.

Unlike the sodium cooled LMFBR which the laws of nature appear to frown on, the face of nature positively shines on Molten Salt Nuclear technology, which is an extremely "Green" energy source. Small breeding start up charges, mean rapid scaleability of reactor production and start up. Small start up charges mean that te availability of fissionable materials will not be a factor in determining how many and how fast future MSRs are built.

In addition, low breeding ratios may be viewed as a desirable proliferation control measures. In hugh ratio breeders, breeding surpluses can be viewed a potential proliferation tools through diversion. In a 1 on 1 converter, fuel diversion for weapons purposes will lead to reactor shut down, an undesirable consequence that would decrease the likelihood of proloferation.

Given even conservative estimates of American reactor fleet growth before 2050, the United States will have produced more than enough RGP by then starting up a fleet of breeding capable MSRs capable of supplying 80% of its energy needs. In the absence of Molten Salt reactors, LMFBRs breeding at the reported Indian Breeding ratio of 1.12 to 1 would be helpful, but would probably lead to a somewhat slower nuclear deployment of nuclear power. If the report of IFR safety at higher breeding ratios is correct then the IFR might improve the fast reactor picture. It is likely that ambitious goals such as a 80% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2050 could not be meet by use of conventional nuclear alone. Were MSRs unavailable in 2050 there would likely to be significan consequences in terms of energy prices and availability in a post carbon world. .

(I plan to include an account of the proposed Indian nuclear system as an appendix to this section of the White Paper describing the ambitious and complex long term Indian nuclear program. In addition I plan to discuss Molten salt fast breeder options in a second appendix.)

Monday, June 14, 2010

Energy from Thorium Discussion On Target.

Kirk Sorenson gave his blog, Energy From Thorium, an unusual three part organization. First, there is a document repository, which contains pdf copies of hundreds of research document, most of which originated in Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The repository documents ORNL research and thinking about a unique and until recently poorly understood Molten Salt Reactor technology that was developed in Oak Ridge over a period of a generation between 1947 and 1980. The document repository contains one of the larger energy related sets of documents accessible on the internet. The other two parts of Kirk's blog might be viewed as commentary on the documents.

The second part of the blog is conventional blog, with posts that date back from 2006 to the present. Most of the blog posts can be viewed as commentary on the document repository. Some blog Posts discuss the history of Molten Salt Reactor technology development at Oak Ridge. Some posts also describe scientists, engineers, bureaucrats and politicians whose lives at least touched on Molten Salt Reactor development. Other posts describe individual documents contained in the repository, and still other posts explore potential designs and uses of Molten Salt Reactors.

The third part of Energy from Thorium is a Discussion Forum. The EfT discussion forum contains a great deal of commentary on the documents found in the EfT archive. There are currently over 700 registered members of the EfT forum, and they are a diverse lot, including scientist, engineers, students, lay people, technophiles, geeks and bloggers. You do not have to be a nuclear scientist to read and participate in EfT discussions. No one gets put down for asking questions intended to fill gaps in their knowledge. Since Kirk Started started EFT in late 2006 over 700 people have joined the site. Those 700 + people have generated over 28,000 comments on over 1800 topics.

Although the the central focus of the discussion is on the thorium breeding version of the molten salt reactor, the Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor (LFTR), just about any matter that is energy related is fair gain for comment. Discussions are conducted on a technical, simi-technical and non technical levels. Anyone who has a passing interest in nuclear engineering, can learn all they would like to know about MSR/LFTR design. Even more exotic liquid chloride fast reactors receive attention. Water cooled, gas cooled, liquid metal, and hybrid liquid salt cooled reactors receive heir own sub-sections. Still other sections deal with Uranium Enrichment and the Uranium and Thorium supply.

The EfT forum is sometimes described as open science, but this is not quite accurate. EfT discussion at best attempts to draw plausible conclusions from reactor technology research that was conducted at ORNL between 1950 and 1980. ORNL researchers regarded their MSR research project a major success, with large implications for the future of energy, and human economic development. It is not absurd to speak of an ORNL Paradigm, which informs much of EfT the discussion. At its broadest, the EfT discussion reflects the earliest stage of a potential paradigm shift.


One goal of the EfT is the growth of public knowledge of the potential of LFTRs and of the Thorium fuel cycle. A sub-forum, Thorium in the News tracks the increase of media attention to the LFTR/thorium story.

Other forum sub-sections deal with nuclear developments in the United States, Canada, Europe, China, Japan, Korea, Europe and India. These sections allow for exploration of topics related to more conventional nuclear technology.

The discussion section format is flexible, and some of the ORNL and related papers found in the archive are reproduced and/or discussed here. Much of the discussion in the EfT discussion forum is dependent on acquaintance with documents found in the archive. EfT participants are skeptical of claims made by the renewable energy lobby. This cannot be simply due to pro, nuclear prejudice, most commenters take a fact based approach to questions about renewable reliability and cost. Critics of nuclear power get quite a pasting from EfT commenters., with well known energy writer Joe Romm standing at the head of the EfT unpopularity list.

For 2 1/2 years EfT participants have worked on a Thorium Grand Plan. Over 500 suggestions have been offered to date.

EfT is far from being a typical blog. It is a major venue for internet based energy discussion, with much attention focused on advanced forms of nuclear energy. The EfT discussion, as it explores the future potentials of nuclear energy, is beginning to effect broaded energy discussions in out society. 2010 is beginning to look like the year during which the EfT broak through to the mainstream media. A story in the January 2010 issue of Wired Magazine, featured Thorium, the LFTR and Kirk Sorensen. More attention has recently followed in science and engineering media. Thorium related stories and videos are showing up in unlikely places. There is a thorium buzz on Twitter, There is a growing interest in Congress.

All this is quite an accomplishment for a 3 1/2 year old endeavor.

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