Reading the Obama Administration Tea Leaves

The Obama Administration might be accused of sending mixed signals on its attitude toward the future of nuclear power. First we have first the January 28, 2010 Obama Memo to Energy Secretary Steven Chu:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SUBJECT: Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future

Expanding our Nation’s capacity to generate clean nuclear energy is crucial to our ability to combat climate change, enhance energy security, and increase economic prosperity. My Administration is undertaking substantial steps to expand the safe, secure, and responsible use of nuclear energy. These efforts are critical to accomplishing many of my Administration’s most significant goals.

An important part of a sound, comprehensive, and long-term domestic nuclear energy strategy is a well-considered policy for managing used nuclear fuel and other aspects of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Yet the Nation’s approach, developed more than 20 years ago, to managing materials derived from nuclear activities, including nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, has not proven effective. Fortunately, over the past two decades scientists and engineers in our country and abroad have learned a great deal about effective strategies for managing nuclear material. My Administration is committed to using this advanced knowledge to meet the Government’s obligation to dispose of our Nation’s used nuclear material.

Accordingly, I request that you establish a Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (Commission) and appoint its members. Those members should include recognized representatives and experts from a range of disciplines and with a range of perspectives, and may include participation of appropriate Federal officials. The Commission’s business should be conducted in an open and transparent manner.

The Commission should conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. This review should include an evaluation of advanced fuel cycle technologies that would optimize energy recovery, resource utilization, and the minimization of materials derived from nuclear activities in a manner consistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals.

In performing its functions, the Commission should consider a broad range of technological and policy alternatives, and should analyze the scientific, environmental, budgetary, economic, financial, and management issues, among others, surrounding each alternative it considers. Where appropriate, the Commission may also identify potential statutory changes.

The Commission should provide an interim report to you within 18 months of the date of this memorandum, and that report should be made available for public comment. The Commission should provide a final report to you within 24 months of the date of this memorandum. The Department of Energy shall provide funding and administrative support for the Commission, as you determine appropriate, so that it can complete its functions within these time periods. Additionally, all executive departments and agencies shall provide such information and assistance to the Commission as you or the Commission may request for purposes of carrying out the Commission’s functions, to the extent permitted by law. Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to require the disclosure of classified, proprietary, law enforcement sensitive, or other information protected under governing law. This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

You are hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

BARACK OBAMA

The list of actual Blue Ribbon Commission appointees appears to be more calculated for political effect than for knowledge and wisdom. Although the Commission is charged with analyze the scientific, budgetary, economic, (and) financial issues involved in solutions to the used nuclear material problem. We have no economists on board, although Geologists Allison Macfarlane, believes herself to be an expert on nuclear costs. Macfarlane, however, appears to view the thorium fuel cycle in a considerably more positive light than she views the U-238 - reactor grade plutonium fuel cycle. Susan Eisenhower serves on the corporate advisory boards of Lightbridge (formerly Thorium Power), that might give her a significant knowledge of the thorium fuel cycle. The weight of the Blue Ribbon Commission lies heavily on the political/bureaucratic/expert of reference axis. The presence of two former congressmen on the commission suggests the Obama administration's desire to manage and even spin its eventual report toward politically acceptable conclusions. The last thing the Obama Administration wants is for a brilliant and charismatic scientist, like Richard Feynman to steal the show, by offering a dramatic demonstration of a politically embarrassing problem.

Thus only one real working scientist is included on the panel, that is Per Peterson. Peterson is well known to the Energy from Thorium community, and is an unabashed supporter of the use of Molten Salt nuclear technology. In addition to his expertise on Generation IV reactor design, and lowering nuclear costs, Per is also a nuclear proliferation expert, with a working knowledge of current thinking about proliferation prevention.

We know that the Yucca Mountain approach to the nuclear waste issue is off the table, and it appears quite likely that the IFR is as well. On January 15, the Defense Daily carried a story by George Lobsenz titled White House Moves To Restrict DoE Nuclear Research. That story stated:

The White House has proposed barring Energy Department research on fast reactor recycling of nuclear waste and technical support for licensing of small, modular light-water reactors, drawing protests from Energy Secretary Steven Chu that such prohibitions will have broad adverse effects, including hurting the U.S. nuclear industry's renaissance; crimping U.S. ability to influence other countries' fast reactor designs to address proliferation concerns; and taking away nuclear waste disposal options that might be considered by the administration's planned blue-ribbon panel on alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository.

The story went on to discuss what appeared to be a conflict between the Obama White House and Energy Secretary Chu over the exclusion of fast reactor research from the DoE Research program. This is very bad news for the IFR supporters, and might explain some of their recent behavior. Thus there are signs that the Blue Ribbon Commission will seriously consider Molten Salt nuclear technology, and the thorium fuel cycle as potential remedies for the fuel cycle nuclear waste issue. Above all else the panel is clearly expected to be a reliable, unimaginative, and boring extension of the Obama ego, that will reach predictable and unimaginative conclusions.

Not Ready for Prime Time Blue Ribbon Commission

I am not sure whether I should be discourage or encouraged by Energy Secretary Chu's Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. Blogger "uvdiv" has a negative assessment of many of the panel members, and many panel members are far less distinguished and gifted than could have been hoped. I had hoped for a energy panel chaired by Joe Biden, with members of the charisma and ability of Richard Feynman. In addition the panel reports to Secretary Chu, and not to the President. All of this suggests that the Mr. Obama does not yet know what he is doing.

In 2008, I several times suggested that a new Obama administration would need a Blue Ribbon Commission on energy. In a July 12, 2008 post titled T. Boone Pickens and a viable energy plan, After a discussion of the problem of renewables backup, and suggested that reactors would probably be the best renewables backups, i then wrote,

There is, however, a problem for renewables in the back up reactor approach. Why use reactors to back up renewables, when the very reliable reactors can do the whole job on their own? It would be cheaper, and perhaps far cheaper to build the entire system using only nuclear power. This is, I believe what a blue ribbon panel of wise people will conclude in response to President Obama's charge to come up with a solution to our energy issues shortly after January 20, next year.

I elaborated my ideas in two October 2008 posts titled, Focus I: Energy Decision Making and

Focus II: Vision. In the first post I wrote,

During the next few years our society faces basic choices on its energy future. The decisions have been long deferred. The decision making process should be finished by the end of the next administration, and implementation should be underway. The decision making process should be public, and should bring the best minds in the country to the table to share in the decision making process.

The decision making process should begin by identifying potentially valuable candidate technologies for resolution of components of the energy crisis. These technologies would include solar, wind, nuclear, geothermal and other technologies for electrical generation; electrical and liquid fuels for transportation; solar, nuclear and other sources of process heat for Industry; and solar and electrical technologies for heating and cooling, In some cases the decision might not involve exclusive use of one technology. Air transportation would be impossible without liquid fuel, and without a carbon neutral liquid fuel technology we will simply loose the ability to achieve transportation through the air.

The decisions related to electricity generation will be perhaps the most important, because potentially up to 80% of the energy in a post carbon society will be transmitted through electrical lines. Decisions cannot be left to the market. The market, while providing efficient mechanisms to determine price, and product choice, is poorly equipped to make strategic choices for the future. Decision makers have to basically anticipate future markets. That involves informed guesses, something the market regards as speculation. Markets like to gamble only if there is a great deal of money potentially to be made on bets. There is far too much at risk, and too much uncertainty about the energy future at the moment for most investors to feel comfortable about the risks involved in future energy investments. In the case of solar and wind generated electricity, this has led to the demand for government subsidies, both for the construction of generating facilities, and in tax linked support of revenue produced from energy generation.

The stake in the decision making process is such that wrong decisions could easily lead to the misspending of tens, or hundreds of billions of dollars and perhaps even trillions of dollars of tax payer, rate payer, and investor money, without the production of a satisfactory electrical system. Impossible you say. Well just pay careful attention to where the decision making process is today. Mark my word, if the decision making process is not improved, it will lead to very unsatisfactory outcome.

We cannot hope to reach a proper decision without a Judicious determination of facts, and there are at present a lot of of enemies of facts in the environment. Enemies of facts include people who are selling flawed ideas and flawed products. Fact finding needs to be turned over to people who are skilled in determining facts, and this would certainly include nobel prize winning scientists. Others who are somehow representative of the general public need to included among the fact finders, and the fact finding process needs to be open to the public. The fact finders need a first rate staff, and the ability to commission research.

The fact finders need to be aided by skilled politicians who have ascended to the rank of statesmen. My father observed one such politician while attending a hearing of Project Independence in 1974. "I was most impressed," my father wrote. "He is young, intelligent, and highly articulate." Such a figure, if he were still around 34 years later, might well prove a valuable asset to the fact finders, perhaps as chairman of a fact finding commission. And if the politician, by now an elder statesman, were to hold high political office, so much the better. The name of the young politician who so impressed my father was Joseph Biden.

Any group of fact finders would need to carefully separate fact from hype before reaching its decision. As I have demonstrated on Nuclear Green there is a lot of hype in our current discussion of energy options. In fact the hype to information ratio in any discussion of renewable electrical sources is astonishingly high.

During a discussion with wind advocate on The Oil Drum Wind advocate "Jerome a Paris"acknowledged that a basic assumption of wind advocates was an electrical grid to which a very large number of fossil fuel burning electrical generators were attached, which would pick up the slack when the wind does not blow. In this view the function of wind is to partially and temporarily defer fossil fuel burning rather than replace it.

It might be added that solar power also partially defers rather than replaces fossil fuel use. Nuclear reactors can replace fossil fuel fuel burning facilities.

Thus the choice between nuclear power and renewables is a choice between an approach designed to stop emitting CO2 in the generation of electricity, or to decrease the burning of carbon based fuels. This is a choice of fundamental importance and should be the focus of an important decision about energy.

My second post focused on what I called contagious visions, and the sort of people who can inspire them:

Focus on a resolution of the energy crisis must include a viable vision of the alternative energy future. That vision must be not only sharable but contagious. It is my assumption that the next president should and probable will set up "Blue Ribbon" fact finding commission to go about determining energy goals and steps required to accomplish preferred goals. The fact finders must possess the ability to go beyond facts and deal in the realm of human vision.

In order to motivate and coordinate the acts of millions of people over more than a generation, long range goals have to achieve a legitimacy. Such legitimate shared goals ought to be considered a vision, and the legitimacy of the vision ought to be understood to rest on a rational faith. A fact finding commission must seek "evidence of things unseen", since the future can only exist in vision, tangible reality only emerges through goal directed effort by groups of human beings. We live then in a time when the human ability to envision a future, emerges as our most important tool for the survival of the present form of American Society.

We are fortunate that we are about to install a national leader who is a gifted visionary, who possess exceptional talents for identifying viable collective goals, sharing a contagious vision of those goals, and implementing routes to the realization of those goals.

I assume that a figure of Barack Obama's astuteness would wish for a "fact finding commission" to sort out competing visions of the future. The function of the blue ribbon fact finders would be both to separate viable visions that will bring the American people to where they want to be from vision that are impractical or which would be deemed to yield unsatisfactory results.

Above all else the blue ribbon fact finders must not simply identify a vision but must begin the contagion process without which the vision will not be realized. They must also provide political leadership with political cover. There will be no doubt political opposition to the vision and the steps that will be taken to realize it. The first line of defense will be, "this is what the experts recommend". Because they are on the front line and ultimately exemplars, members of the blue ribbon commission must be selected for their courage, as well as their intelligence, capacity for rational thought, and vision. They will be exemplars for a nation and for the world, because it is anticipated that they will set a path on which all people will be traveling for the next 40 years.

It would be very nice to find a group of Richard Feynmans to set on the blue ribbon commission, people who are gifted visionaries, who have great respect for facts, and who have to the ability to ferret out the critical facts.

(In a speech which Richard Feynmen delivered on December 29th 1959, he foresaw the future:

I don't know how to do this on a small scale in a practical way, but I do know that computing machines are very large; they fill rooms. Why can't we make them very small, make them of little wires, little elements---and by little, I mean little. For instance, the wires should be 10 or 100 atoms in diameter, and the circuits should be a few thousand angstroms across. Everybody who has analyzed the logical theory of computers has come to the conclusion that the possibilities of computers are very interesting---if they could be made to be more complicated by several orders of magnitude. If they had millions of times as many elements, they could make judgments. They would have time to calculate what is the best way to make the calculation that they are about to make. They could select the method of analysis which, from their experience, is better than the one that we would give to them. And in many other ways, they would have new qualitative features. . . .

But there is plenty of room to make them smaller. There is nothing that I can see in the physical laws that says the computer elements cannot be made enormously smaller than they are now. In fact, there may be certain advantages.

This then is a man of courage, intelligence, discernment and vision.

By the standard I sat out in October 2008, Secretary Chu's Blue Ribbon Commission and its mandate falls far short, but then it is perhaps not yet the right time. We need a couple of very hot years, supper 1998's, to bring the lesson home, and we need far greater awareness of the limitations of renewables, and of the desperateness of our situation. We need a President who is aware of all this, and who has some idea how to move the country and the world toward a a successful resolution of what can only be described as a great crises that threatens both the national and human future.

Fire in Sodium cooled reactors: A Sandia Literature Review

"Metal Fire Implications for Advanced Reactors, Part 1: Literature Review," is an important report for anyone who is interested in the IFR or other fast sodium cooled reactors. The issue of fire in Sodium cooled reactors is an important one, which desirves serious attention. IFR advocates argue that the IFR is highly safe. My own review of the ABTR answered many of my questions about IFR safety, but I am not a nuclear safety expert, and my findings should not be the last word on IFR safety. The good thing about the current Sandia report is that it comes from Sandia rather than Argonne, and therefore the writers cannot be accused of IFR cheerleading. The report is well written, and it is quite approachable by none scientists, who are looking for more information about the problem of IFR/LMFBR safety. The report demonstrates that progress has been made on LMFBR safety, but does not support claims that further LMFBR safety research is unneeded. I do not intend to post all of the post, but rather to call the readers attention to some passages, in the hope that the readers interests will be ignited.

Metal Fire Implications for Advanced Reactors, Part 1: Literature Review

By Tara J. Olivier, Ross F. Radel, Steven P. Nowlen, Thomas K. Blanchat, & John C. Hewson

Abstract
Public safety and acceptance is extremely important for the nuclear power renaissance to get started. The Advanced Burner Reactor and other potential designs utilize liquid sodium as a primary coolant which provides distinct challenges to the nuclear power industry. Fire is a dominant contributor to total nuclear plant risk events for current generation nuclear power plants. Utilizing past experience to develop suitable safety systems and procedures will minimize the chance of sodium leaks and the associated consequences in the next generation. An advanced understanding of metal fire behavior in regards to the new designs will benefit both science and industry. This report presents an extensive literature review that captures past experiences, new advanced reactor designs, and the current state-of-knowledge related to liquid sodium combustion behavior.

1. INTRODUCTION
The anticipated nuclear power renaissance hinges on public acceptance and a demonstrated treatment of potential safety issues, particularly for advanced reactor designs. The Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) uses a liquid sodium primary coolant as do certain other advanced reactor concepts. In contrast to today’s Light Water Reactors (LWRs), liquid-metal- cooled reactors present a unique risk; namely, potential metal fires involving the sodium coolant.
Fire is a significant contributor to total nuclear plant risk for current generation LWRs. Given “passively safe” advanced designs, some elements of plant risk will diminish substantially. Fires could represent the dominant risk contributor, especially given the unique characteristics of metal fires such as very high temperatures and fire suppression challenges. Fast breeder reactors all over the world use liquid sodium as a coolant and there has been experimental and analytical research done related to sodium fires as early as the 1950’s. The research has included fundamental studies, work on droplet combustion, pool burning, suppression, and large-scale sodium fire experiments. However, there are gaps in our understanding of the basic combustion behavior and combustion mechanics due to the complexities involved. These gaps have led to little progress in understanding the basic combustion behaviors for sodium. (Makino 2006). Many of these same concerns were noted as far back as 1972 (Newman 1972).

New technologies have substantially improved fire computer modeling capabilities, but to apply these tools to a sodium fire will require some additional model development and validation work. Unfortunately, most of the experiments performed in the past cannot be used to support model development today. Clear definition of the experimental boundary and initial conditions are necessary to create the modeled conditions, and most of the experimental results lack this information. “Reports of precise conditions in experiments are rare in the literature,” so the heat transfer evaluations have almost been impossible (Makino 2006).

This report includes four elements. First, a comprehensive review will define the current state of knowledge for metal fires. This will include actual metals fire experience in various applications. Second, an assessment of advanced reactor concept designs and identification of the unique metal fire safety and hazards was completed. A number of potential safety scenarios exist and will be grouped as to potential importance and representative physics to prioritize the specific research directions that will maximize breadth of applicability to emerging reactor designs. Third, a detailed review of sodium combustion research and potential approaches to the design and conduct of future experiments will be presented. Fourth, Appendix A presents an annotated bibliography of relevant literature identified during extensive literature review.

2. PREVIOUSLY RECORDED SODIUM FIRE ACCIDENTS
This chapter describes past sodium fires at nuclear reactors and other sodium facilities. The incidents discussed in this chapter were chosen to highlight the most significant issues surrounding sodium fires. These issues include design defects at startup (Monju), pipe bursts (BN-600), sodium spray fires (Almeria), and sodium-concrete interactions (ILONA)1.

2.1 Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

The Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) first reached criticality in 1994. Powered operation began in 1995, and a series of power raising tests were performed, with a planned full-power test planned for June 1996. Monju is a loop-type 280 MWe sodium-cooled reactor with mixed oxide fuel (Mikami 1996). During normal operation, the inlet and outlet sodium temperatures in the primary coolant loop are 397 °C and 529 °C, respectively. Sodium temperatures in the secondary coolant loop range between 325-505 °C.

During a scheduled power rating test (40% electrical power) on December 8, 1995, a high sodium temperature alarm sounded at the outlet of the secondary side of the intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) (Mikami 1996). At the same time, smoke detectors sounded in the same area, closely followed by a sodium leak detection alarm. Operators began normal plant shut-down procedures, but after increased smoke was observed 50 minutes later, it was decided to manually trip the reactor. This shutdown occurred approximately 1.5 hours after the initial alarms sounded.

Investigations later confirmed that a sodium leak and fire had occurred, ultimately, the source of the leak was traced to a damaged temperature sensor (pictured in Figure 1). The sensor consists of thermocouple wires housed in a protective well tube. It was found that the tip of the well tube had broken off and the thermocouple was bent at an angle of 45 degrees toward the downstream flow direction.

A microscopic inspection of the flow tube was performed to determine the root cause of the leak. It was concluded that the breakage of the well tube was caused by high cycle fatigue due to flow induced vibration in the direction of sodium flow. It was found that the problems were rooted in the design of the well tube. Although designers applied ASME standards to prevent resonant vibrations, they failed to take into account the sharp taper of the Monju tube design. As a result, the vortex-induced vibration could not be prevented. The design has subsequently been re-evaluated.

In addition to replacing all similarly designed temperature sensors, aspects of sodium fire response and emergency operation procedures were also modified at the Monju site. For example, the reactor will be shut down immediately if a sodium leak is confirmed in the future. A summary of the Monju Improvement Plan is shown in Table 1 (Mikami 1996). As this event was confined to the secondary coolant loop, there was no radiological release that affected either the general public or the plant personnel. However, it has resulted in over a decade of safety reviews in order to re-establish both technical surety and public confidence in the plant. The Monju plant is scheduled to resume operation in mid-2008.

The brief discussion of the ABTR is an excellent indicator of the actual developmental status of the IFR. Once again we see clearly that the IFR is not ready for commercial implementation.

3.1.4 Advanced Breeder Test Reactor

The ABTR is a sodium-cooled, pool-type reactor based on experience gained from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (Chang 2006). It is a 95 MWe design with an estimated 38 percent plant efficiency. The ABTR was developed as a test bed for a similar commercial design-the Advanced Breeder Reactor. The ABTR design uses a 20 percent TRU, 80 percent uranium metal fuel clad with HT-9 stainless steel. A summary of plant specifications is provided in Table 8.

There are numerous objectives of the ABTR design, including demonstration of reactor- based transmutation of trans-uranics as part of an advanced fuel cycle, qualification of the trans-uranic-containing fuels and advanced structural materials needed for a full-scale ABR, and supporting the research, development and demonstration required for certification of an ABR standard design by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ABTR designers also have the following objectives:

• To incorporate and demonstrate innovative design concepts and features that may lead to significant improvements in cost, safety, efficiency, reliability, or other favorable characteristics that could promote public acceptance and future private sector investment in advanced breeder reactors;
• To demonstrate improved technologies for safeguards and security;

• To support development of the U.S. infrastructure for design, fabrication and construction,
testing and deployment of systems, structures and components for the ABR.

3.3 Sodium Fire Consequences

3.3.2 Core Voiding

A fundamental difference between water and sodium-cooled reactors is the void reactivity coefficient. If the water around the core is voided (boiled, drained) in a water-cooled (thermal) reactor during operation, the power level will automatically drop. The reactor is therefore said to have a negative void reactivity coefficient. In contrast, if sodium is voided in certain sodium-cooled fast reactors (particularly large reactors), it will cause the power level of the reactor to rapidly increase. This reactor is said to have a positive void reactivity coefficient. When the reactor power increases, it can lead to additional boiling and voiding until fuel melts. This positive feedback can lead to extremely rapid surges in reactor power, potentially damaging or melting fuel and cladding.

Multiple events can lead to core voiding during operation, and great care is taken in the proposed new reactors to ensure that these events are prevented. They include sodium boiling, loss of coolant accidents (LOCA), and gas bubble entrainment within the sodium. Sodium fires could lead to sodium boiling if an undercooling event is initiated without scram (reactor shutdown). A severe leak in the secondary system, perhaps coupled with cable fires could lead to this situation. A large leak in the primary system could also disrupt flow enough to induce sodium boiling in the core. A sodium leak in the primary system could also lead to either a LOCA or gas bubble entrainment event. A large primary leak could potentially uncover a portion of the core. If gas is pulled back into a leak in the primary system, the resulting bubbles could also reach the core.

3.3.3 Loss of Heat Sink

A loss of heat sink event can be triggered by sodium leaks in the steam generators. As stated above, the standard procedure in response to these leaks is to drain one or both sides of the steam generator. In the event that multiple steam generators are compromised, reactor cooling must be accomplished with backup safety systems. In the case of the new generation of reactors, these safety systems are generally passive in nature (i.e. they require no operator intervention). These systems ultimately rely on natural circulation driven by core decay heat, and so are also independent of cable fires or loss of site power. In addition to these engineered safety features, the inherent high heat capacity of the sodium and structural elements of the reactor will provide valuable time for operators to restore the system to normal.

3.3.4 Loss of Engineered Safety Systems

The inherent mobility of a fire can cause a fire to become a threat to an entire reactor system. Numerous examples exist of cable fires causing serious problems in a nuclear power plant. Perhaps the most famous of these is the 1975 Browns Ferry fire, where all of the normal core-cooling functions were lost due to a cable fire (Nowlen 2001). However, operators were able to maintain core cooling with a control rod drive pump not included in plant procedures. The fire at Greifswald burned for about 92 minutes causing a station blackout and the loss of all active means of cooling the core (Nowlen 2001). As a result, a pressurizer relief valve opened and failed to close. This situation persisted for at least five hours and led to depletion of the secondary and primary side coolant inventories. The plant was ultimately recovered through initiation of low pressure pumps, the recovery of off-site power, and the recovery of one auxiliary feedwater pump.

These and other incidents demonstrate the need for next-generation sodium-cooled reactors to consider the potential impact of fire on safety systems to maintain core cooling, including the passive safety systems. Every adverse situation cannot be anticipated or avoided. However, if the reactor safety systems operate independent of the plant operators and electrical systems, then these systems can likely maintain cooling until plant personnel put out fires and regain control of the situation.

There is one additional factor that is unique to metal fires that may need to be addressed. Conventional (i.e., non-metal) fires are not generally considered a threat to primary plant piping components used in a light-water reactor (Nowlen, Najafi, et al. 2005). This would include the primary piping itself and other piping equipment such as large valves, check valves, and water- filled vessels (e.g., storage tanks). However, sodium fires burn at much higher temperatures than do other types of fires. Hence, metal fires could represent a threat to components and equipment not normally considered fire-vulnerable. For metal-cooled reactors, the performance of plant safety systems and equipment under fire conditions, including the passive safety systems, should be evaluated in this context.

3.4 Summary

Of all the new reactor designs proposed in the Generation IV program, sodium fast reactors have the largest experience base. Thanks in large part to this experience, numerous engineered safety features and safety procedures have been built into the next generation of sodium-cooled reactors. These features are designed to reduce the likelihood and consequence of sodium release and fire.

The risk of sodium release and fire exist during the three stages of a reactor lifetime; startup, day-to-day operation, and refueling and maintenance. Based on past experience, design and manufacturing defects have generated the greatest risk of sodium leakage and fire at reactor startup. Pipes, welds, and steam generator tubes are the most likely components to fail during routine operation. Thermal and mechanical fatigue must be avoided to minimize the chance of these failures. Refueling and maintenance accidents are generally caused by a combination of improper procedures and human error. The experience gained in existing reactors should help to minimize the chance of these leaks.

Sodium fires at any facility can cause serious problems beyond the immediate burn area. However, a sodium fire at a nuclear reactor can have consequences beyond those possible at non- nuclear facilities. The most notable consequences of sodium fire at a nuclear power plant include smoke in the control room, core voiding, reactor under-cooling, loss of heat sink, and loss of engineered safety systems. Sodium fires burn much hotter than other types of fires and might therefore threaten plant equipment, such as piping elements that are not normally considered vulnerable to fire damage. Utilizing past experience to develop suitable safety systems and procedures will minimize the chance of sodium leaks and the associated consequences in the next generation of sodium-cooled reactors. However, some unique considerations do come into play with sodium fires.

The report conclusion will serve to demonstrate that IFR safety research still has aways to go.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This report documents the results of the initial stage of the “Metal Fire Implications for Advanced Reactors” Laboratory Directed Research and Development project. Efforts to date have included an extensive literature search to cover the sodium fire recorded accidents, the proposed LMFBR designs and safety concerns and sodium fire combustion experiments and research.

Past experiences/accidents with sodium fires at nuclear and non-nuclear sodium facilities were investigated to identify the types of hazards that must be accounted for when designing the next generation of sodium-cooled nuclear reactors. The risk of sodium release and fire exists primarily during the three stages of a reactor lifetime; startup, day-to-day operation, and refueling and maintenance. Utilizing past experience to develop suitable safety systems and procedures will minimize the chance of sodium leaks and the associated consequences in the next generation of sodium-cooled reactors.

A need also exists to improve the state-of-the-art fire modeling codes to include the sodium fire combustion phenomenon. The past experiments did not record the details of the boundary conditions for both pool and spray fire scenarios. A lot of the experiments were small scale compared to the amount of sodium that could be involved in a HCDA. There exists a need to understand the phenomenon of inter-droplet interactions in a spray fire scenario. There has not been any experimental work to address this. Fire is one of the key parameters in a NPP risk analysis. With the GNEP program making progress forward, expertise in metal fires is essential for Sandia National Laboratories.

Argonne Liquid-Metal Advanced Burner Reactor

"Argonne Liquid-Metal Advanced Burner Reactor" is another in a series of Nuclear Green postings that will focus on the developmental status of IFR technology. A secondary function of these posting is to encourage nuclear literacy. I wish people who are not afraid to investigate technology to become more familiar with such documents and to read them and judge them for themselves. The path to enlightenment requires knowledge. A further purpose is to challenge misinformation about the IFR that is currently being spread. It has been widely stated that the IFR technology is more mature than LFTR technology, and that the IFR technology is currently available for commercial development. "Argonne Liquid-Metal Advanced Burner Reactor" demonstrates that Argonne considers IFR technology to be in a prototype stage. Second some IFR advocates have argued that IFR reactors will as soon as a prototype is built, have the capacity to breed significant amounts of fuel. In fact Argonne prototype proposals suggest prototypes which are plutonium burners, not breeders, although the core of he ABTR could be modified to breed with a low positive breeding ratio. Thirdly i would like to call attention to the function of the Argonne Liquid-Metal Advanced Burner Reactor, which is to serve as a research tool for iFR" development. The reader is advised to focus of the questions which the LMABR is expected to answer, before a commercial IFR prototype can be built. I have included both the Abstract and the Introduction to this document in this post, together with a link to the full text.

Argonne Liquid-Metal Advanced Burner Reactor : components and in-vessel system thermal-hydraulic research and testing experience - pathway forward.

Authors: Kasza, K. Grandy, C. Chang, Y. Khalil, H. Argonne National Laboratory Nuclear Engineering Division

Abstract: This white paper provides an overview and status report of the thermal-hydraulic nuclear research and development, both experimental and computational, conducted predominantly at Argonne National Laboratory. Argonne from the early 1970s through the early 1990s was the Department of Energy's (DOE's) lead lab for thermal-hydraulic development of Liquid Metal Reactors (LMRs). During the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, Argonne conducted thermal-hydraulic studies and experiments on individual reactor components supporting the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II), Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR). From the mid-1980s and into the early 1990s, Argonne conducted studies on phenomena related to forced- and natural-convection thermal buoyancy in complete in-vessel models of the General Electric (GE) Prototype Reactor Inherently Safe Module (PRISM) and Rockwell International (RI) Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor (SAFR). These two reactor initiatives involved Argonne working closely with U.S. industry and DOE. This paper describes the very important impact of thermal hydraulics dominated by thermal buoyancy forces on reactor global operation and on the behavior/performance of individual components during postulated off-normal accident events with low flow. Utilizing Argonne's LMR expertise and design knowledge is vital to the further development of safe, reliable, and high-performance LMRs. Argonne believes there remains an important need for continued research and development on thermal-hydraulic design in support of DOE's and the international community's renewed thrust for developing and demonstrating the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) reactor(s) and the associated Argonne Liquid Metal-Advanced Burner Reactor (LM-ABR). This white paper highlights that further understanding is needed regarding reactor design under coolant low-flow events. These safety-related events are associated with the transition from normal high-flow operation to natural circulation. Low-flow coolant events are the most difficult to design for because they involve the most complex thermal-hydraulic behavior induced by the dominance of thermal-buoyancy forces acting on the coolants. Such behavior can cause multiple-component flow interaction phenomena, which are not adequately understood or appreciated by reactor designers as to their impact on reactor performance and safety. Since the early 1990s, when DOE canceled the U.S. Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) program, little has been done experimentally to further understand the importance of the complex thermal-buoyancy phenomena and their impact on reactor design or to improve the ability of three-dimensional (3-D) transient computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and structures codes to model the phenomena. An improved experimental data base and the associated improved validated codes would provide needed design tools to the reactor community. The improved codes would also facilitate scale-up from small-scale testing to prototype size and would facilitate comparing performance of one reactor/component design with another. The codes would also have relevance to the design and safety of water-cooled reactors. To accomplish the preceding, it is proposed to establish a national GNEP-LMR research and development center at Argonne having as its foundation state-of-art science-based infrastructure consisting of: (a) thermal-hydraulic experimental capabilities for conducting both water and sodium testing of individual reactor components and complete reactor in-vessel models and (b) a computational modeling development and validation capability that is strongly interfaced with the experimental facilities. The proposed center would greatly advance capabilities for reactor development by establishing the validity of high-fidelity (i.e., close to first principles) models and tools. Such tools could be used directly for reactor design or for qualifying/tuning of lower-fidelity models, which now require costly experimental qualification for each different type of design application. Capabilities required to establish and operate this center are found primarily in Argonne's Nuclear Engineering and Mathematics and Computer Science Divisions. Funding for the center would be sought from DOE-NE (GNEP/Advanced Burner Reactor and Generation IV programs), DOE-SC/ASCR, and the commercial nuclear industry. Having the above experimental and modeling capabilities at Argonne would constitute a national/international center of excellence for conducting the research and engineering and design tool development needed to support the DOE GNEP/ LM-ABR initiative in developing safe, high-performance reactors.

1.0 Introduction

During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. DOE sponsored a substantial effort in the development of sodium-cooled fast nuclear reactors. Initially, these fission reactors were to be breeders with the designation Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR). Later the breeding stipulation was dropped, and the name was changed to Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) or Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR). The most important feature of the earlier breeder reactor was to significantly extend the useful life of the world’s supply of fissionable uranium by implementing a system of breeder reactors with the goal of producing about 10% more fissionable material each year than consumed in producing electricity. At that time, LMFBRs had only been built in small size, and it was appropriate for DOE to sponsor the development of the commercial-scale technology because the project was too large for private industry and because it was of great national interest and potential benefit. To this end, DOE sponsored a variety of research and development programs to advance this technology.

In response to DOE during the 1970s, Argonne conducted thermal–hydraulic studies of individual LMR components supporting EBR-II, FFTF, and CRBR development. After cancellation of CRBR, DOE in order to begin transferring LMR technology developed under federally funded programs to the U.S. industry funded a design competition between General Electric (GE) and Rockwell International/Combustion Engineering (RI/CE) to design a commercially viable LMR for future deployment. The GE design was called PRISM (Prototype Reactor Inherently Safe Module) and the RI/CE design was called SAFR (Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor). In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Argonne conducted forced- and natural- convection phenomena studies on complete in-vessel system experimental test models of the GE/PRISM and RI/CE/SAFR designs. These DOE-funded studies were carried out in collaboration with GE and RI/CE. Further development of LMR expertise/design knowledge is vital to the future deployment of safe, reliable, and high-performance LMR Advanced Burner Reactors (ABRs) currently being proposed by DOE under the GNEP initiative for deployment in 2025. This near-term deployment does not involve breeder reactors.

This white paper has been written to summarize the thermal-hydraulic understanding that has been developed over the last 30 plus years, highlight important phenomena that must be factored into future reactor designs, and describe additional developmental efforts still needed. In particular, it describes the need for further LM-ABR technology development support in the form of better testing infrastructure, improved engineering knowledge, and improved/validated computational modeling tools. The paper also addresses the impact of thermal hydraulics on reactor system operation and on the behavior/performance of individual components (thermal duty and structural impact) during normal operation and postulated off-normal low-flow accident events related to safety.

Argonne has been a pioneer in the study of thermal-buoyancy-force governed flows under various important reactor transient conditions, such as the transition from forced to natural convection, instabilities generated by parallel flow paths, and structural thermal stresses caused by thermal stratification and their influence on heat-sink effectiveness.

8Argonne from the early 1970s through the early 1990s was DOE’s lead laboratory for LMR thermal-hydraulic development. During the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, Argonne conducted thermal-hydraulic studies and experiments on individual reactor components supporting EBR- II, FFTF, and CRBR. In the 1980s and into the early 1990s, Argonne conducted studies on forced- and natural-convection (thermal-buoyancy-force) phenomena in complete in-vessel models of GE/PRISM and RI/SAFR. These two reactor initiatives involved Argonne working closely with U.S. industry and the DOE. This paper describes the very important impact of thermal hydraulics on reactor global operation and on individual component behavior/performance (thermal duty, structural impact, and safe operation) during normal operation and postulated off-normal low-flow accident events related to safety. Argonne’s LMR expertise and design knowledge are vital to the further development of a safe, reliable, and high-performance LM-ABR.

In the 1980s Argonne developed/built a large water test facility called the Mixing Components Test Facility (MCTF) for performing steady and thermal-transient experimental simulations of important reactor components under a wide range of operation scenarios. (The MCTF was decommissioned in 1993.) Modeling studies were also conducted by Argonne relative to ascertaining if the thermal-buoyancy phenomena being studied could be effectively addressed through the use of water for testing of both individual LMR components and complete in-vessel system geometries. This modeling is discussed in detail in Section 4.2.1 and in Appendix 1 of this report. These modeling studies also highlighted where water testing was not adequate for addressing certain phenomena.

All of the Argonne studies involved fundamental experimental thermal-hydraulic testing and a strongly integrated component of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code development and simulation analysis. The CFD analyses were predominately performed with the Argonne COMMIX code, which was augmented by some initial effort at utilization of commercial CFD codes like STAR-CD. One of the first uses of three-dimensional CFD analysis for addressing LMR thermal-hydraulics, which used the COMMIX code, was to address buoyancy-governed reactor flows. This computational modeling was driven and guided by Argonne’s thermal- hydraulic experiments on reactor components such as piping, plenums, steam generators, and heat exchangers.

The contents of this white paper are as follows:

Section 2 briefly describes the new DOE GNEP initiative relative to the pre-conceptual design features of the Argonne proposed LM-ABR, which would be one of the GNEP building blocks. Knowing the general technical features associated with the ABR allowed us to focus on and exploit what has been learned over the last 30 plus years about LMR thermal hydraulics relative to the importance to GNEP. Finally, this section also describes, based on the 1993 GE/PRISM close-out report, what industry ideas were at that time as to what further development and testing were needed to deploy a U.S. LMR. This information helped to further focus the recommendations given in this report regarding a thermal-hydraulic pathway forward.

Section 3 describes Argonne studies and the status of our understanding of thermal buoyancy phenomena occurring in individual reactor components such as:

␣ Piping

␣ Piping/plenum interfaces and thermal plumes

␣ Heat exchangers

␣ Steam generators

␣ Multiple coolant stream thermal mixers

Section 4 describes Argonne’s past studies on reactor in-vessel thermal hydraulics, which initially addressed generic core outlet and plenum flow interactions guided by CRBR needs. These studies in their later stages investigated forced- and natural-convection (thermal- buoyancy-force) phenomena using complete in-vessel models of the GE/PRISM and RI- CE/SAFR designs. Complete in-vessel model experiments were used because the flow and thermal behavior in a given sub-region of the reactor vessel is the result of complex interactions with the rest of the reactor in-vessel components. These interactions are especially important for pool designs under low-flow conditions and the transition to natural convection. They have the potential for strongly affecting reactor:

␣ Thermal-hydraulic performance

␣ Emergency cooling

␣ Structural integrity

␣ Heat-sink effectiveness

These complete in-vessel experimental studies provided GE and RI-CE designers with information vital to the design and assessment of the workability of the various features that were being incorporated into their innovative and inherently safe reactors.

Finally, Section 5 describes a pathway forward regarding further research and development needed to support the GNEP/LM-ABR initiative.

The cost of carbon mitigation with renewables

The National Renewables Energy Laboratory appears to be doing or sponsoring some decent quality research. inadvertently some of that research seems to undercut the case for renewable energy, or at the very least provide what should be a very sobering picture for renewables advocates. Last week I pointed to the Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study which appeared to demonstrate that the cost of electricity would rise as wind penetration increased on the Eastern Interconnect. Although the Western Wind and Solar Integration Study has not been completed yet, Some preliminary findings have been reported. I recently reviewed a preliminary study, How do Wind and Solar Power Affect Grid Operations: The Western Wind and Solar Integration Study, by D. Lew and M. Milligan of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, and G. Jordan, L. Freeman, N. Miller, K. Clark, and R. Piwko GE. The WWSIS

examining the operational impact of up to 35% wind, photovoltaics, and concentrating solar power on the WestConnect grid in Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming.

I was particularly interested in the operational analysis, which was based on a computer simulation by GE. The simulation looked at 5 scenarios. In the first no wind was assumed and all electricity was generated by four generation sources, Nuclear, Coal, Combined cycle gas turbines, and hydroelectric generation. The second simulation assumed 11% renewables, 10% wind, and 1% solar. The third simulation assumed 20% wind and 3% solar, and the 4th simulation assumed 30% wind and 5% solar. Finally a simulation was run with the same 35% penetration, but using data from a week in July 2006, rather than the week in April 2006 assumed by the other studies. Peter Hawkins has argued that renewables penetration tends to displace Combined Cycles 'gas turbines, rather than coal fired steam plants, and that Open cycle Gas Turbines would be preferred to backup wind, because they would respond more quickly to sudden loss of generation or increased electrical demands. The GE simulations offer a chance to test Hawkins thesis, and the data suggests that indeed the GE simulations supported Hawkins hypothesis. At 11% penetration, only CCGT were displaced, but coal use was completely unaffected. At the 23% penetration level, most of the displacement effected CCGTs, but a small amount of coal displacement began to emerge. At the 35% penetration level for the week in April 2006, a considerable amount of coal generation was displaced, while CCGT use disappeared completely.. Finally the July 2006 simulation suggested that the summer wind problem was adversely impacting wind performance, at the same time electrical demand increased. The shortfall in wind performance had to be made up with CCGTs, and there was no coal displacement.

Estimates of CO2 emissions from CCGTs indicate that they produce about 0.8 pounds of CO2 per kWh of electricity generated. in contrast coal burning generators produce about 2 pounds of CO2 per kWh. Thus when CCGTs are displaced by renewables about 800 pounds or 0,4 tons of CO2 emissions are prevented per MW of electricity generated. When coal is displaced, about 1 ton of CO2 emissions are eliminated. Clearly then it is far more desirable from he viewpoint of carbon mitigation to displace coal burning plants, rather than CCGTs.

As with all National Renewables Energy Laboratory reports, the WWSIS made no attempt to compare renewables costs and performance with nuclear power. But a relatively simple thought experiment can yield some very telling results. First we can assume that nuclear power will displace coal rather than CCGT. The Energy Information Agency estimates that the levelized cost of Advanced Nuclear will be 119.0, or about 12 cents per kWh. If nuclear displaces coal at that cost, the cost of displacing one ton of CO2 would be $119. Now let us take the 11% renewables case. The 2016 levelized cost of wind is 149.3, while the levelized cost of solar thermal is 256.6. Thus the average levelized cost of the 11% renewables is 159.08, and the cost of displacing a ton of CO2 with renewables is $159.0 + transmission costs and other hidden cost of wind generation systems, and the added CO2 emissions of fossil fuel wind backups kept spinning. plus the added CO2 efficiencies of fossil fuel generators used in load leveling and load following roles. Since wind is displacing relatively carbon efficient CCGTs rather than carbon inefficient coal fired generating plants. each MW of CCGT power displaced would produce 800 pounds of CO2, rather than a ton of CO2 produced by the equivalent electrical output of a coal fired power plant. Thus carbon mitigation with the 11% wind April scenario will cost about $400 + hidden costs or over three times as much as nuclear power would costs.

In the April 35% penetration case, wind becomes the predominate source of electricity on most days, and it displaces 2/3rds of coal generation capacity and all the CCGTs. Yet for the July 35% penetration case, wind failed to displace most CCGTs and no coal. Thus the WWSIS study data reported provided in sufficient information for understanding the the potential carbon mitigation costs . However it should be noted that the DoE study, Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study(EWITS) found that the cost of total system electrical output increased
dramatically as wind penetration rose to 30%. (Note scenario 4 in figure 8,2)

Note that the cost of electricity is about 13% higher in the 20% penetration scenario 2, but 40% higher in the 30% Scenario 4.

Clearly then increasing wind penetration in the west will increase the level of carbon mitigation as well as its costs. It is also clear that wind displaces CCGTs before it displaces coal, and this increases the cost of carbon mitigation by wind significantly. Carbon mitigation with conventional nuclear would thus appear well over 3 times more cost effective compared to carbon mitigation with wind. The true cost effectiveness advantage of nuclear cannot be gaged until we know more about the hidden costs of wind, but the hidden costs appear to extract greater cost penalties at higher levels of wind grid penetration.

Bill Hannahan's on his difficulties getting his Archer-Jacobson review published

As I indicated in the introduction of Bill Hannahan's critical review of the Jacobson & Archer claims about Wind baseload power, Bill went through quite a struggle to get his paper published, both by the The Journal of Applied Meteorology & Climatology (JAMC) and by the Internet site the Oil Drum. Bill's efforts were frustrated by both. This is especially disturbing in the case of the JAMC, because it was obliged by the standards of science and its own publication rules to publish Bill's second round paper. The failure of the JAMC publish Bill's second round paper should be itself reviewed as a potential ethical lapse. The Oil Drum simply passed up a good opportunity, and I suspect that was at least as much a matter of style as of substance. Bill's current account is long, but it concludes with an important point about the effect of the internet on the speed of human knowledge growth.

Can interconnected windfarms replace baseload power plants, Part II

By Bill Hannahan

The Journal of Applied Meteorology & Climatology (JAMC) published a peer reviewed paper by Stanford professor Mark Jacobson and Cristina Archer called

“Supplying Baseload Power and Reducing Transmission Requirements by Interconnecting Wind Farms”

A first round review comment on the electrical engineering portion of the analysis was submitted in accordance with the published procedure which calls for two rounds of comment/author response, with publication of the second round. The authors submitted a response to the first round comment. The final comment was submitted.

SUMMARY

The response to the review comment revealed the following facts.

1… Author Mark Jacobson did not identify any errors in the final review comment.

2… Interconnected windfarms cannot meet the reliability standards required to replace any fraction of baseload power plant capacity.

3… Stanford President John Hennessey has a B.E. in Electrical Engineering and a PhD in computer science. He did not identify any errors in the final comment, yet he refused to take any action to diminish the damage being done by the flawed Stanford paper which is still on the Stanford web site.

4… The Journal of Applied Meteorology & Climatology (JAMC) violated its published policy by refusing to publish the final review comment and by repeatedly trying to publish the first round comment without the author’s permission.

5… Peer review does not guarantee high quality or accuracy. Quality and accuracy depend entirely on the quality of the people involved.

6… Peer reviewed journals are an inefficient out of date mechanism for reviewing scientific papers. The internet makes possible faster more detailed and more accurate reviews that are transparent.

7… Nate Hagens, Kyle Saunders, Gail Tverberg and five more editors at The Oil Drum found no errors in the review comment yet they refused to publish the facts.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The editor informed me that the authors refused to respond to my final comment and insisted on publishing the first round comment/response, in violation of published AMS policy.

I sent the following letter to members of the AMS in a position of leadership.

[WARNING, it is a long and disjointed letter, reflecting the process.]

I received the following note from the JAMC editor.

Dear Mr. Hannahan,

I have been informed by the authors of the original manuscript that, after receiving your revised version of the Comments, they have no time, nor are they interested in, revising their reply to match the new version. Although your revision has followed the instructions that the comments need to be standing alone, the number of comments have now doubled compared from the original version and, as a result, the comments and replies are now out of sequence, making it impossible to publish the pair. This leaves me no choice but to go with the initial pair of Comments/Reply. I have carefully compared the new and old version of your comments and I feel that publishing the original version won't lose all the major points that you are trying to make in your revised version…

I recognize and appreciate the work that you have put into the revision, but in the interest of moving the process forward and getting the comments published, I have to accept the original Comments/Reply pair (April 2008).

I responded to the editor with the following note:

“This is the second time you have tried to publish my first round comment without my permission. Why are you trying so hard to publish my weakest comment?

My first round review comment was written and submitted in compliance with the AMS procedure, which calls for two rounds, of which only the second round will be published. Only my final comment is approved for publication.

You wrote;

“I have been informed by the authors of the original manuscript that, after receiving your revised version of the Comments, they have no time, nor are they interested in, revising their reply …. This leaves me no choice but to go with the initial pair of Comments/Reply.”

It is interesting that the authors would rather go with the first round comment that they found objectionable than to address my final comment that lacks the offensive material.

The AMS procedure does not require an author response, it is optional. In fact the AMS procedure specifies the author’s right to respond at a later time. There is no reason to revert to my first round comment. Why do you want to publish the inferior comment when the final comment is so much better?

The AMS procedure gives the authors the last word which is normally a huge advantage. If the authors forgo that privilege in an effort to suppress the superior comment, why should they be rewarded for that strategy? Why should the readers be denied the best argument? Are the authors practicing science or playing chess.

You wrote;

“I have carefully compared the new and old version of your comments and I feel that publishing the original version won't lose all the major points that you are trying to make in your revised version.”

So it is OK to delete half or more of my points, especially the most important ones, because the authors do not want to address them? I don’t think so.

The final comment is much improved over the first round comment. It clearly documents the defects and omissions in the reports analysis and it lacks the controversial content of the first round comment that the authors and you found objectionable.

Clearly the authors do not want my final comment published because it contains devastating points that they cannot answer. The authors must not be allowed to hide the facts by simply refusing to respond to them.

You wrote;

“I recognize and appreciate the work that you have put into the revision, but in the interest of moving the process forward and getting the comments published, I have to accept the original Comments/Reply pair (April 2008).”

To recognize my work, and to allow others to appreciate it, and to complete your obligation in this matter, simply forward my final comment for publication.

Stanford received thousands of dollars to create this deeply flawed report. The authors received thousands of dollars to write this deeply flawed report. JMAC and the reviewers were well paid to publish this deeply flawed report.

I spent many precious hours of my time researching and composing my final comment. While that time was unpaid, my final comment more accurately reflects the unreliability of wind power than does the deeply flawed Stanford report, and it deserves to be published.

The nineteen points in my final comment should have been raised by the peer reviewers. Had they done so, the deeply flawed conclusions of this report would not be spread across the internet and other publications, and the many hours I dedicated to this effort could have been put to other use. Publishing my final comment will not un-ring the bell, it will not undo all the damage caused by this report, but it will be a start.

Since the authors have given up their right to respond in a timely manner, I request that you publish my final comment now with a note that the authors choose not to respond. Or publish all three comments with a note that the authors choose not to respond to the final comment. They have the right to respond at a later time. Your readers are intelligent well educated adults. They will understand.

The length of my final comment will be similar to that of both first round comments combined. Given the length of the deeply flawed Stanford report, the length of my comment should not be an issue. Energy and climate change are the two biggest problems faced by mankind.

The Stanford paper plays a role in delaying the implementation of the best possible energy policy. As a result billions of people around the world will experience more pain and suffering needlessly, and many lives will be shortened over the next several decades. It is the people on the lowest rung of the economic ladder who will suffer the most for this.

This comment process is now in its 14th month. The ball has been in my court a small fraction of that time. The U.S. is about to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on energy policy. The truth needs to come out soon.

The JAMC editor ignored the points made in this response and violated the published AMS policy for correspondence, page 14 of the authors guide pdf, at least 7 times.

1… The editor withheld the author’s first round comment from me for six weeks, (June 12, 2008- July 20, 2008).

2… The editor tried to publish my first round comment without my permission, (June 25, 2008).

3… The editor allowed the authors to introduce diversionary issues not contained in my review comment or in the original paper (July 20, 2008).

4… The editor tried to publish my first round comment without my permission a second time, (March 5, 2009).

5… The editor claims that the final comment is too long, (March 12, 2009). The editor did not identify any points that were wrong, irrelevant, insignificant or otherwise appropriate for deletion. AMS procedure does not limit the length of comments.

6… The editor refused to have any of my comments reviewed by an electrical engineer with experience in the generation and distribution of electric power.

7… The editor refused to publish the final comment while agreeing that it is of high quality, (March 12, 2009).

MY REQUEST

There is a lot of material here. There are two key points to keep in mind while evaluating this material.

1… The first sentence of the introduction to the AMS author guide.

“The constitution of the American Meteorological Society lists as its objectives

“the development and dissemination of knowledge of the atmospheric and related oceanic and hydrologic sciences and the advancement of their professional applications.””

2… The fact that my final comment is the best comment. None of the authors, editors or reviewers have identified any fault with it.

Do you believe that it is in the best interests of science to have an unobstructed debate of the best ideas? Do you believe that theories and analyses should be subject to thorough independent examination? Do you believe that science should not be “Pay to Play”? Do you believe that scientists should not be able to hide the flaws of their work behind institutional and procedural barriers? Do you believe that the points in the final review comment have merit and deserve a full airing?

If these are your beliefs I ask that you explain them to JAMC chief editor Rob Rauber,

rauber@atmos.uiuc.edu and ask him to publish the final comment without the author’s response, as provided for by the AMS procedure, or publish all of the comments.

I also ask that you copy your remarks to AMS president Thomas R. Karl,

Thomas.R.Karl@noaa.gov

and to me at mc2essay@yahoo.com .

[THIS LETTER TO AMS LEADERSHIP CONTINUES WITH AN EXAMPLE]

Postscript: A Contrasting Example and a Recommendation

In his first round response and in his other energy papers, author, Dr. Jacobson references the work of Dr. Benjamin Sovacool. Sovacool claims that the lifecycle CO2 emissions from nuclear power are 66 gms/kWh.

http://www.nirs.org/climate/background/sovacool_nuclear_ghg.pdf

Unlike Dr. Jacobson, Dr. Sovacool engages in public discussion of his work. Consider the following exchange:

Hannahan… Is you goal to produce a paper on; (A) The world’s historical emissions of CO2 from nuclear power plants, or (B) CO2 emissions from future Gen III reactors built in the U.S.?

Your calculation of capacity factor is consistent with A. To make the cost estimate consistent with A, average the actual construction cost of all plants built so far. I would expect a number around $1.00/watt.

Your use of U.S. Gen III construction cost estimates, the highest in the world, makes me believe that your objective is a paper that will be useful to policy makers deciding the future of nuclear power in the U.S., therefore your goal should be B.

To be consistent you should estimate the capacity factor of future Gen III reactors in the U.S.. Gen II reactors in the U.S. have ramped up from 50% in the 70’s to about 90% in recent years

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec9_5.pdf

in spite of the fact that Gen II plants are handicapped by an old decaying grid that experiences occasional outages requiring nuclear plants to throttle back or shutdown. Experts agree that we need to overhaul the grid to increase capacity and reliability, regardless of the energy source mix.

Gen III plants are Gen II plants that incorporate the lessons learned over the last 40 years. They have reduced complexity, inherently safe design features and vastly improved instrumentation and control systems, making them more reliable. With these improvements the most probable capacity factor for U.S. Gen III reactors is well over 90%, not 81 %.

Sovacool… Point well taken. Really the paper was not meant to be either A or B—I just wanted to see what the literature said about GHG emissions from nuclear plants—but in the end I suppose it ended mixing A and B up. This is because many of the studies analyzed mixed them up, with some looking at historical emissions in places like the US, and others looking at future emissions in places like Japan or Sweden. I think a more careful paper that does either A or B would be very useful, and if it did B, it would need to account for the high capacity factor of US nuclear plants that you point out.

Hannahan… U.S. Gen II plants were designed for 40 year lifetimes. Almost half have received license extensions to 60 years.

http://neinuclearnotes.blogspot.com/2008/12/shearon-harris-plant-receives-license.html

Gen III plants are designed for 60 years with possible extension to 80 or more years. The assumption of 30-40 year lifespan for future Gen III reactors is not appropriate.

You would not evaluate the future performance of wind and solar based on 1950-1980 windmill and solar cell designs. Nuclear power plant design has been frozen at an immature level for several decades, roughly equivalent to the DC-3 in aviation, but the DC-3 had the advantage of being factory mass produced. There is enormous room for evolution in nuclear power plant design and construction.

Sovacool… The 40-60 year lifetime for newer plants is also a good point, and this is the first I’ve heard of it (much of the literature I’ve read says 20-40 years). Naturally, the longer nuclear plants operate, the lower their emissions per kWh from construction and decommissioning will be. Scarcer supplies of uranium could offset this improvement if more GHG are emitted to mine and enrich the uranium, but your point is valid.

Hannahan… By far the biggest problem is the assumption that the energy mix does not change over the life of the plant. Most wind and solar emissions come before the first watt hour is produced, whereas half of the nuclear emissions are released after 20-40 years of operation. What are the odds that coal will be generating 50% of our electricity 20, 40, 60, 80 years from now? There is rapidly growing resistance to more coal in the U.S. and many existing plants are nearing end of life. Dr Hansen (NASA) believes we must get off coal soon. Of course in 80 years global cooling might be the big issue, but for now the up front CO2 loading of wind and solar is a disadvantage nobody is talking about.

The transportation mix is going to shift away from oil into natural gas, electric and biofuel, reducing fossil carbon/ton mile substantially. Do you distinguish between fossil carbon and recycled atmospheric carbon?

Accounting for these changes over the life of the plant will dramatically reduce average fossil CO2/kWh for nuclear plants, less so for other options with shorter life spans and higher up front emissions.

An easier method, yet still reasonable for comparison purposes, would be to assume that all electrical inputs are from the technology being evaluated.

Underground uranium mines are largely electric, open pit mines will shift toward natural gas, electric and biofuel, sea water uranium can eliminate mining.

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/4558#comment-413193

Milling and enrichment are electric, cold war diffusion enrichment plants are going away. The U.S. is building two centrifuge enrichment plants and two more are in planning.

Sovacool… I hope you’re right about coal, and as I’ve told many others on this website nuclear plants are far superior from coal plants for a variety of reasons. The amazing thing is that electric utilities in the US are still talking about adding huge amounts of coal and natural gas capacity in the coming years. Both the EIA and IEA, for example, project that by 2030 and 2040 fossil fuels will provide the SAME mix of energy services that they do today, if not more. So while I agree many of the shifts you talk about would indeed be welcome (and more efficient), I’m sceptical that they will occur.

Hannahan… Gen 4 reactors will reduce uranium requirements / kWh by a factor of 60-100. Gen 4 plants using sea water cooling could extract all their fuel directly from the condenser cooling water.

Sovacool… [no comment]

Hannahan… An alternative viewpoint is to see each study as the correct answer to a different question, depending on the boundary conditions and assumptions it is based on.

From this perspective, the first step is to decide which question we want to answer. The most important question is the one your paper is most often claimed to have answered.

“If we build new Generation III nuclear power plants in large numbers, how much CO2 / kWh will that release?”

Each of the calculations in your study should be evaluated to see if it answers this question. For example, do they account for;

A… The fact that the fossil carbon content of electricity will go down dramatically over the next 60-80 years. Over 70% of our electricity comes from fossil fuel now. If we replace the fossil plants with a large number of Gen III nuclear plants, the CO2 per kWh will drop by a huge factor, and that will feedback into a further reduction of nuclear CO2 per kWh. If we do not build large numbers of nuclear plants the CO2 content of nuclear kWh's is irrelevant because it will have a minor impact on our problems.

B… Capacity factors above 0.9

C… 60+ year lifetimes.

D… Continuing modest improvements in fuel design with gradually increasing energy yield per ton.

E… Continuing modest improvement in decommissioning techniques including the use of advanced robotic technology likely to be available in 60-80 years when Gen III plants begin reaching end of life.

F… The fact that cold war diffusion enrichment is going away soon and centrifuge technology will continue to improve at a modest rate over the next 60 years. Laser enrichment may reduce enrichment cost further but need not be considered at this stage.

G… A rational approach to spent fuel. Recycling into Generation IV reactors or a simple, safe, easy, low energy consumption solution like deep seabed disposal.

http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96oct/seabed/seabed.htm

After weeding out all the studies that do not meet these criteria you will be left with a small number of studies with results that are clustered within a narrow range of the correct number. Average those numbers and you will have a valuable result. I would expect it to be near the low end of the results you reviewed.

Sovacool… I don’t think the correct question to answer is “If we build Generation III nuclear plants …” Those plants may never be built, given the recent increases in the capital cost for nuclear power plant construction, public resistance towards siting and the transportation of nuclear waste, and the risk of proliferation and accident (and no matter how many times we go back and forth about these issues in Scitizen, people will still believe what they want to believe). The better question, for me, is “what are the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the current lifecycle,” the plants that will be operating for the next few years, the ones that are competing against existing generators. And here, I see a number of advantages in favor of wind, solar, etc.

Hannahan… True or False. If we stopped burning fossil fuel completely, the fossil CO2 per kWh of nuclear power would be near zero.

Sovacool… If we stopped burning fossil fuels completely, and even used nuclear power plants or renewable power plants to create the electricity needed to enrich uranium etc., I do agree the c02 per kWh for nuclear would decline. But I suspect it would still be much higher than the c02 per kWh from other sources such as energy efficiency or renewables.

Hannahan… Vattenfall generates electricity in Sweden. It gets 37.5 % of its electricity from hydro and 61.7 % from nuclear. Only about 1/4 % comes from fossil fuel. The very low fossil carbon content of Vattenfall’s electricity makes the fossil content of its nuclear kWh's very low.

The lifecycle CO2 emissions of Vattenfall nuclear power is only 3.5 gms CO2 per kWh, 5% of your reports number. The lifecycle CO2 emissions of Vattenfall wind power is 10.5 gms CO2 per kWh, three times higher than nuclear.

http://www.vattenfall.com/www/vf_com/vf_com/Gemeinsame_Inhalte/DOCUMENT/360168vatt/386246envi/2005-LifeCycleAssessment.pdf

If the U.S., or any country, replaces its fossil power plants with Gen III nuclear plants, the fossil carbon content of its kWh's will also be very low. Combine that with the effects of longer life, higher capacity factor, improved construction techniques and more efficient enrichment capacity, and the CO2 per kWh of nuclear power will be lower than it is in Sweden now.

Sovacool… No Comment.

Hannahan… Consider these two questions.

A… What are the CO2 emissions associated with the current lifecycle of existing Gen II nuclear plants?

B… If we replace our fossil power plants with Gen III nuclear plants, what are the CO2 emissions / kWh associated with the lifecycle of those new plants.

Which of these questions is most important to the future of the human race? Our Gen II reactors were designed in the 60’s and built in the 70’s – 80’s. We are not going to build more of these reactors, or more Titanics or more Model T Fords. Do you compare the performance of 60’s reactor technology with the performance of 60’s model windmills, solar energy systems, geothermal and biomass technology? Almost none of them are still working, and the comparison would be meaningless for the future.

Sovacool… No Comment.

Hannahan… … Benjamin, you have candidly acknowledged that A is the, “better question, for me”. For those of us looking for the answer to B, will you acknowledge that your report does not answer question B?

Sovacool… No Comment.

Hannahan… Why is Vattenfall wind power CO2 per kWh three times higher than nuclear? Windmills use much more steel and concrete per kWh than nuclear, and those emissions are almost all up front, before the first kWh is generated.

Sovacool… No Comment.

Hannahan… Vattenfall has already gone a long way towards this goal. If we leave the fossil carbon atoms in the ground in the form of coal, oil and natural gas deposits, the fossil CO2 emissions of nuclear power, and any other surviving energy source, would be approximately zero. If necessary we can even make nuclear power carbon negative by using some of the energy to extract CO2 from the atmosphere.

http://www.lanl.gov/news/newsbulletin/pdf/Green_Freedom_Overview.pdf

Sovacool… No Comment.

Hannahan… Extracting uranium from seawater using ships anchored in the Gulf Stream and Black Current, powered by water turbines in the current, can provide fossil carbon free uranium for hundreds of years using Gen III reactors, and billions of years with Gen IV reactors.

http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/4558#comment-413193

Sovacool… No Comment.

These and many more interesting exchanges are available here;

http://www.scitizen.com/screens/blogPage/viewBlog/sw_viewBlog.php?idTheme=14&idContribution=2136

CONCLUSION

In the span of a few weeks this discussion has teased out important points regarding CO2 emissions from future nuclear power plants that I have not seen in any papers on this subject. The debate was cordial, respectful and even humorous at times.

Contrast that with the 16 month ordeal at JAMC resulting in zero comments published and procedurally limited to two rounds with only the last round published, had the editor followed the AMS procedure. Think how much would have been lost if the Scitizen site limited debate to one or two rounds, or less if an author was intimidated by a comment.

Although I disagree with Dr. Sovacool on some points, my respect for him is infinitely higher than for Dr. Jacobson, because Sovacool VOLUNTARILY discusses his work in a public forum.

If Dr. Jacobson posted his wind reliability paper on Scitizen it would be ripped apart like a piece of meat in a tank of hungry piranhas. He would be forced to improve the quality of his work dramatically, and to stick to the subjects for which he has expertise. More importantly, his conclusions would not be posted all over the internet and other publications misleading people and political leaders, distorting energy policy, resulting in needless suffering in the decades to come.

Limiting comments to one round may have made sense before the electronic age when comments were hand written and type was handset but we can do much better now. I urge AMS to take the lead by setting up a site like Scitizen on AMS’s computer system where issues can be fully aired out.

For the record;

My degrees are in electrical and nuclear engineering. I support nuclear power, but my energy recommendation is neutral. Conduct R&D on every technology, build prototypes of everything, publish the results, level the playing field, pick the best technology.

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/4961#comment-459021

If this recommendation is implemented the best solution will emerge, whatever it is. I believe wind power will be stopped dead in its tracks.

My energy paper is here;

http://coal2nuclear.com/energy_facts.htm

The supporting calculations, assumptions and references are here.

http://coal2nuclear.com/ENERGY%20CALCS%20REV%207.xls

I thank you in advance for your help in getting my final review comment published.

Regards,

Bill Hannahan

[THIS IS THE END OF MY LETTER TO AMS LEADERSHIP]

They did not respond to any of the points raised and continue to refuse to publish the final comment.

A slightly revised version was sent to Stanford president John Hennessey. Here are the revised sections.

“President Hennessy, do you believe that it is in the best interests of science to have an unobstructed debate of the best ideas. Do you believe that theories and analyses should be subject to thorough independent examination? Do you believe that science should not be “Pay to Play”? Do you believe that scientists should not be able to hide their work behind institutional and procedural barriers? Do you believe that the points in the final review comment have merit and deserve a full and accurate response?

If these are your beliefs please explain them to author Dr. Mark Jacobson. He takes the opposite point of view. If he responds to the final review comment, the Journal will publish both documents.

If he still refuses to provide a response, I ask that you contact AMS president Thomas R. Karl, and ask him to publish the final comment without the author’s response, as provided for by the AMS procedure. I also ask that you remove the paper from your website or post my review comment with it.

Since this paper was published Dr. Jacobson has produced at least one more deeply flawed paper.

http://www.rsc.org/delivery/_ArticleLinking/DisplayHTMLArticleforfree.cfm?JournalCode=EE&Year=2009&ManuscriptID=b809990c&Iss=Advance_Article%20l/#tab1

It assigns the effects of nuclear war to commercial nuclear power plants. It assigns the emissions from fossil fueled power plants to imaginary nuclear plants that have not been built. The author claims that windmills can replace baseload power plants, citing his wind reliability paper, which he knows is deeply flawed, having read my comments…

The journals are becoming an anachronism due to their failure to use the best technology to accelerate the progress of science. I urge you to take the lead by setting up a site like Scitizen on Stanford’s computer system and requiring Stanford personal to defend their work in an open environment. That is not to say they would have to respond to every crackpot with a dumb remark, but they would ignore thoughtful substantive comments at their peril.”

I receive the following response 2 weeks later.

“Of course, I have no right to interfere with the processes of the JAMC. Furthermore, Professor Jacobson's decision on how he wants to respond is well within his prerogative as a faculty member.

I am sorry I cannot be of further help in resolving your issue.

Best wishes,

John L. Hennessy
President”

FINAL COMMENTS

1… When I wrote the first round comment I had not reviewed IEEE Std. 762-2006 or the data from the North American Electric Reliability Council. The first round comment did not contain items 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16. These are fact based points that cannot be refuted.

2… I am not allowed to publish the author’s response to the first round comment. It is short, shallow, error filled and illogical on some points. It did not address all points in the first round comment. It also includes new issues not found in the paper or my comment including an attack on nuclear power claiming high CO2 emissions for nuclear power.

That attack triggered the idea of using the Sovacool discussion as an example of how a back and forth discussion can develop important points.

3… I am sure that Charles Barton will welcome and post a full uncensored response from the authors, president Hennessey or the editors. I hope they take advantage of that opportunity.

CONCLUSIONS

1… Stanford President Hennessey has a B.E. in Electrical Engineering and a PhD in computer science. He did not identify any errors in the final comment, yet he would not lift a finger to diminish the damage being done by the flawed Stanford paper.

There is a growing religious belief that renewable energy can replace fossil fuel with little or no reduction in quality of life or increase in human suffering. Science is not a religion.

Consider the history of the Big Bang Theory.

1916 … Einstein’s theory of relativity published.

1927 … Georges Lemaître proposes theory of an expanding universe. Einstein claims the universe is fixed.

1929 … Hubble studies red shift, finding that galaxies are moving away from our galaxy at a speed proportional to our distance from those galaxies.

1945 … George Gamow proposes neutron reactions that could explain the formation of light atoms in a big bang environment, and he proposes the existence of background radiation from that event.

1965 … Penzias and Wilson, Bell Lab engineers, detect the background radiation.

1970 … The Big Bang theory attains scientific consensus and enters school textbooks.

1970-present … Cracks appear in the theory. The distribution of matter in the universe is not uniform. Galaxies rotate too fast for the known mass in them. Expansion seems to be accelerating.

In the future the big bang theory will be modified or removed from the textbooks altogether if something else attains greater scientific consensus.

Contrast that with supporters of creation theory who want to put it in the school science books first and create a generation of supporting scientists later.

The worrisome thing about renewable energy true believers is that they include people with parchment claiming expertise in science and engineering, like president Hennessey, the authors and the leaders at AMS. They are willing and determined to use their standing in the world of science and engineering to promote renewables at all cost and to suppress opposing information.

Somehow they obtained degrees in science and technology without learning the fundamental principles by which scientific knowledge expands and improves in quality. The free exchange of ideas subject to continuous testing against the reality of nature is essential for the progress of science and technology.

2. In academia the rule is publish or perish. Some Journals have become engines that convert money into paper without respect to quality. In the worst case they suppress documents of high quality if they do not bring in revenue or if they conflict with high dollar customers.

3. My attempt to publish a single comment at JAMC lasted 16 months. The ball was in their court most of that time. The discussion with Dr. Sovacool lasted a few weeks and provided important insight on the issue in a friendly and respectful environment. In the words of a famous song, I have never received “so much resistance from behind.”

If the journals continue to operate as they did in the nineteenth century they will become irrelevant. Internet sites like Scitizen and Nuclear Green are accelerating the pace at which knowledge is critically reviewed and distributed.

3. Peer review does not guarantee accuracy. None of the authors or reviewers of this paper are electrical engineers in the power industry. Authors are asked to suggest reviewers for their work. Are the students at Stanford allowed to suggest fellow students to grade their term papers? This is a sign of laziness.

The editors should do the leg work to find independent reviewers. Any senior grid manager, of which there are hundreds, could have done an excellent job.

Two civil engineers published a deeply flawed electrical engineering paper in a journal for meteorology and climatology. The paper is being used to mislead the public and political leaders. It has been referenced repeatedly on numerous blogs and publications.

4. A comment does not have to be perfect to have value. Even flawed comments can improve the quality of science by revealing new insights. In the discussion with Sovocool there may be errors on both sides of the discussion, but the overall conclusions are still valuable.

5. The authors, editors and Stanford president did not identify any errors in the final comment. Even if they did find errors, that does not justify suppressing the comment unless all points were flawed. The leaders of the AMS have yet to explain why they violated their published policy and suppressed this comment.