Energy from Thorium's Recent LFTR Cost Thread

A recent Energy fromThorium discussion has once again brought to the fore questions about MSR/LFTR costs. "Zeropoint" kicked off the discussion:

I’m a LFTR n00b so forgive me if this topic has been addressed many times. Also please point me to any threads that already talk about this. I did a search for the other threads but I didn’t see the information I wanted.

I am trying to understand the economics of LFTR.

I am taking my data from the OECD/IEA “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity” report 2010 edition.

Using that data I wanted to know estimate LFTR overnight costs (not taking into account the time value of money) and operating costs.

For the current costs of nuclear, coal and gas plants I went to tables 3.7a, 3.7b, 3.7c in the report. I dropped the two highest and lowest plants as well as any others that looked out of place. I then use the extremely scientific method of averaging them. My results are in the attachment below.

(I cannot reproduce Zeropoint's attachment. Readers will jave to look at the original comment.)

Overnight Costs of LFTR

I figure the theoretical lowest cost for LFTR is the overnight cost of a gas plant since LFTR could be interpreted as a nuclear heat powered gas turbine. Since coal and nuclear have a less efficient conversion efficiency and higher capital costs due to the steam cycle, I am going to make another scientific assumption and assume that the difference between the costs for Coal and Gas is due to the capital cost of the water condenser system, the more efficient conversion, and the efficiency of having the gas turbine factory made which you drop in place. That is a different of $1475. The cost going from the coal plant to the nuclear plant is then the cost of the containment, the nuclear reactor and the redundant systems. That is a difference of $1875. Assuming that the containment is only a third of the 1875, it means that LFTR could be built for

LFTR_Overnight_Cost = 1028 + 1875 * 2/3 = 2258 USD/kWe

I am surprised it is so close the cost of a coal plant. I thought it would be a little higher.

Fuel Cycle

I am going to assume 0.1

Operation & Maintenance

You may be able to have less operators at a LFTR plant than a traditional nuclear plant but the maintenance costs will be higher due to the replacement of the graphite core. I am going to assume that O&M is the same as traditional nuclear, 13.6 MWh.

Construction Time

If LFTR components are factory made and then plumbed up on site then you can probably get the same construction time as a coal plant. Not sure how long the regulatory piece takes. Assume 4-5 years with one of those years being regulatory.

Plant Lifetime

This I have no clue on this. Any guesses?

Decommissioning Costs

Will probably be the same as traditional nuclear at 15%.

Any thoughts?

At this point I would note that Nuclear Green makes a number of assumptions that differ from those offered by "zeropoint". Nuclear Green substitute assumptions are intended too lower MSRs/LFTRs costs, to decrease MSRs/LFTRs construction time, and to increase the speed and number of MSRs/LFTRs deployed before 2050. Thus from the viewpoint of Nuclear Green, Zeropoint makes very conservative assumptions.

"Lars" responded to "Zeropoint,"

It is tough to get a good cost on current nuclear power plants - just look at the variance in actual costs to build existing reactors. The estimates have generally been even to 30% cheaper than LWRs but the estimates are very old.

If LFTR takes off like I think it should then there will be a substantial learning curve advantage to factor in - especially in the all critical time to build.

Here are the reasons we think it should cost significantly less.

Compared to the old LWRs new ones have increased in price dramatically due in large part to redundant engineered safety systems and schedule delaying tactics by opposition intended to drive up the cost. LFTR has its safety due to physics so it is reasonable to hope that the cost will not go up.

There is no high pressure system in LFTR so we don't need the super thick, 600 ton pressure vessel that can only be made in Japan today. In fact, there is reason to think that most of LFTR could be factory assembled and shipped by barge, or truck to the site reducing construction time (similar things are being done for future LWRs too).

Dry or Wet/Dry cooling could allow placing the reactors away from rivers/lakes/oceans generating less opposition and less unique environmental impact reports.

Counter to these nice things is that the reactor is fundamentally different and regulators won't know what to do with it. These days they tend to over-regulate. Some things that were allowed and have been grandfathered in for LWRs likely won't be tolerated for LFTRs.

But - the majority of LFTRs won't be installed in the US or EU so our over-regulation will matter less.

For plant life-time, I'd guess this doesn't matter too much but the general target for modern power plants is 60 years.

Lindsey commented,

(My) gut feel says 2,000 - 3,000/kW for a 400 MW+ sized plant, but my capital cost estimates say for a simple graphite free tank type core $1,350/kWe all in, and that sounds too cheap to me.

Lindsey's too cheap comment is all too familiar to be. Three years ago, I attempted to estimate LFTR costs, using the small factory manufactured LFTR mode; and a number of different assumptions, and kept getting estimates that struck me as far too low.

Lindsey also offered construction time estimates that were far more conservative than those which I believe are both desirable and obtainable.

For standardized designs the equipment manufacture if made to order would be about 10 -18 months depending on hardware used, on-site construction time could be 12 - 18 months, followed by 6 - 12 months commissioning and testing, so all of that together get's you out to 4 years approx from financial investment decision (FID)

Lindsey is thinking in terms of traditional reactor construction methods, but I have reason to believe that research aimed that drastically shortening small reactor field set up times may be underway.

"Ida-Russkie" commented,

The NRC hearing process for the AREVA eagle rock plant is set to last two years by law. Is a reactor going to be easier to get approval? So, this is one area where there should be some relief after you prove one can be built. the hearing process is to stop the design changes which bankrupted some nuclear plant builds in the past. The environmental impact study took one year to submit.

"Ida-Russkie's" comment clearly assumes a businesses as usual operation for the NRC, however, the potential inherent safety of MSRs may lead to big changes in the regulatory process, and the recycling of coal fired steam plant locations, may drastically change the state permit situation, since permits have already been issued for coal fired power plant sites.

"Cyril R" pointed out one of the reasons for low MSR costs,

different reactor builders are using different numbers of loops. Westinghouse seems to prefer a few big loops for the AP1000. Areva likes to use one more loop. 4 for the EPR, this is 1600/4= 400 MWe per loop compared to 550 MWe for the AP1000. It seems plausible that the loops should be as big as possible for economics. But the LFTR has a remote maintenance requirement. Multiple smaller loops could allow easy modular replacement. The LFTR has less pumping power than a PWR. On the order of 7-8x less I believe, based on the AHTR pumping power requirement of 1.46 kW/MWth and 8 kW/MWth for the EPR, combined with better turbine efficiency, gives around 7-8x less pumping power per kWe. It could be even smaller than that, as the temp drop is larger for LFTR, and this likely more than compensates the heavier fuel salt pumping requirement.

Pumps are important and usually expensive components of reactor design. The EfT discussion makes clear that Westinghouse has chosen to lowe its pump costs by decreasing their number, with each of 2 pumps moving half of the AP-1000 reactor coolant.

"Zeropoint" calls attention to the cost of regulation,

Sorry to dwell on the subject of the NRC which I know all of you love. I wanted to understand the approval process a little better since I didn't have it in my cost estimates.

I just listened to Atomic Rod's podcast #154 "Atomic Round-up With Five Experts" where he mentions that for new nuclear plant designs you have to pay the NRC $200+ an hour for them to analyze and authorize new designs.

Wow! That is going to be a drain on any startup especially for a LFTR based design where the NRC has to be educated on the technology. Is this still the case (the podcast was done a year ago)?

At $250 an hour, one man year costs $500,000 ($250*40hrs*50weeks/yr). Does anyone know how large an NRC team would be to analyze new designs? If the team was 10 people for 10 years, then that is $50mm to get a design approved. That is a pretty good size chunk of change.

Lars estimates that the cost of NRC regulatory approval runs about $50,000,000. With the Cost of LFTR design runint to $500,000,000. Of course in Energy circles $500,000,000 does not amount to a lot. Solyndra, a Solar PV systems manufacturer, has just filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Solyndra received over $500,000,000 in Federal loan guarantees in 2009 in addition to nearly One Billion Bucks from venture capital firms. Well, the chumps who just parted with one and a half billion bucks were warned. Warned by Nuclear Green, and Brave New Climate.

Cyril R, comments

The purpose of the NRC is to maintain the status quo on nuclear. Molten fuel reactors could potentially break the status quo, so the NRC won't license it in our lifetimes. However, they will gladly take all your money to research it to death, and laugh all the way to the bank.

Its like, asking the king to help start a revolution for democracy.

http://ergosphere.blogspot.com/2011/07/quote-without-comment.html

MSRs have the real potential to work, and work much better than LWRs, so the NRC won't help you.

Cyril's link points to a quote from Ugo Bardi

Bureaucracy is a tool to keep the world as it is, not to change it. So, in perfect Tainter-style, the system works hard to avoid innovation, not to promote it. It is almost impossible to be financed to study resource depletion; that would highlight problems that would require changes and that's a no-no. Instead, it is still possible to obtain research grants as long as there is no risk that the results will threaten the status quo. Hydrogen as a fuel is a good example. It is high-tech, fashionable, sophisticated, popular, environmentally friendly, and it doesn't work. This last characteristic makes sure that its development will bring no changes whatsoever.

Several issues touched on in the LFTR cost thread invite Nuclear Green posts, but one by Chemical Engineer Kim L Johnson is down right pregnant. Johnson writes,

I'm a chemical engineer who has been working to develop industrial Fluorides for many years and have assembled lots of online documentation for the benefit of Lftr and the like.

If you have any significant interest in Fluorides, structural materials for Fs and in which forms of whatever elements are best for the Lftr bath & containment, I would be happy to send you lots of link.

Sadly however, I can no longer post important details Freely. Serious Foreign competition could very well, in a few years' time, leave the US so far behind in our own Fluoride-Energy tech we'd never recover economically.
Fortunately, the very successful efforts of TEA & other "T Com" leaders -- fruit we shall soon see in the Senate & elsewhere -- should shortly enable guys like you, (hopefully) Lars, and many others to develop Thorium-enabled technologies full time (*just* getting off the phone with this effort's champion) !

MSR/LFTR endeavors are being launched. Some are so clouded in secrecy that their very existence may be unknown to me at this point. Lots of things are going on that I can only guess at. Part of this secrecy is due to the entry of the Chinese into the MSR/LFTR field, and part is due to proprietary concerns.

The EfT discussion suggested that the Nuclear Green view that MSR/LFTR technology can lower nuclear costs, is shared by engineers and scientists who are aware of that technology. It also suggests that other members of the EfT community may be more wed to business as usual assumption than Nuclear Green is. However, the discussion points to concerns about Federal regulation as an barrier to technological advancement that require further attention.

The EfT LFTR cost thread makes conservative assumptions, but still suggest that LFTR costs may be so low that at least one discussion used the words too low to make sure we knew he is sane. At the very least, it can be concluded from the EfT discussion that MSR and LFTR technologies may be a road to lowering the cost of nuclear power.

A response to Peter Lang on Coal and Nuclear Costs

In a discussion of Integral Fast Reactor costs on Brave New Climate, Australian Engineer Peter Lang, a frequent poster/commenter on Brave New Climate has posted a challenge to nuclear power supporters. Lang, who is a AGW skeptic, argues, argues,

If we cannot have nuclear cheaper than coal we should wait until we can. We should not embark on unilateral action to stop climate change. We should not impose a carbon price in Australia.

In response, I argued:

Both IFRs and MSRs are possible with 10 years, provided we are willing to leave out all the bells and whistles and go with existing and proven technology. The resulting reactors will not be breeders, and the number of IFRs (ARC-100) possible is likely to be limited, although the sky is the limit as far as the number of MSRs is concerned.

Is it possible to build these reactors cheaper than coal? There is not enough evidence for ARC-100 type reactors to even hazard a guess, but there is probable cause to believe that SMR MSRs can be produced in factories at a cost that is at least competitive with coal. How is that possible? MSRs can be built with very compact cores, and operate at one atmosphere pressure. That means that they require less material in core and building construction. Secondly MSRs do not require
explosive or flammable materials in their core, thus they also require fewer safety features. MSRs are simpler than LWRs and IFrs, and require fewer parts. MSRs can be air cooled and located entirely underground. Hence many factors which contribute to reactor expenses, cost significantly less with MSRs.

MSRs operate at higher thermal efficiency than either LWRs or IFRs, and greater efficiency plus compact core size are factors in lower reactor costs. MSRs are capable of performing multiple missions, and for some electrical generation missions including load following and electrical back up, lower cost materials can be substituted, for the more expensive materials required by base load MSR power plants.

MSRs are simpler and require fewer parts than IFRs and LWRs. MSRs can be rapidly built in large numbers in factories. Labor saving machines can be employed in factory based MSR construction. Factory workers employed in MSR construction require fewer skills that construction workers who build LWRs. Factory employed workers compute to work from their homes, while LWR construction workers live in temporary housing close to their work site. These factors raise LWR labor costs as well as labor cost associated with coal fired power plants.

In addition, traditional coal fired power have hidden social and environmental costs, including the environmental consequences of acid rain, and the health consequences of breathing polluted coal smoke. The cost of health care related too coal smoke caused illnesses, and the cost to agriculture caused by acid rain caused crop damage is added to the cost of coal generated electricity, that cost rises significantly, and the cost of pollution control equipment adds significantly to the cost of electrical generation from coal fired plants.

All of these considerations support the argument that MSRs are potentially cost competitive with coal fired power plants. This evidence, although not yet conclusive, is sufficiently strong to require further investigation.

Peter's comment are no doubt troubling to IFR backers such as BNC's Barry Brook, and Lang's views on AGW are no doubt wrong headed. Even if Lang were right about AGW, two recent report from Synapse Energy Economics, inc., for the Civil Society Institute document hidden cost associated with coal fired power plants. The Reports are titled Beyond Business as Usual: Investigating a Future Without Coal Power, – Focusing on the Midwestern U.S., and Benefits of Beyond BAU - Human, Social, and Environmental Damages Avoided through the Retirement of the US Coal Fleet. These reports are not without flaws, especially with respect to their attitude toward nuclear power. There comments on water use by thermal power plants also appear to draw highly exaggerated implications. But their observation on the impact of coal fired power plants on human and environmental health appears appears to be sound. Benefits Beyond BAU states,

The external costs of burning coal are real and substantial. The extraordinary social cost of the annual 8,000 – 34,000 premature deaths, when valued by federal standards, imparts a cost on society of $64 to $272 billion; this cost is up to four times as expensive as the cost of electricity from coal.

These estimates are supported by numerous sources, and only refers to coal related fatalities in the United States, the cost of coal related deaths in China runs from a third to a half million a year. Benefits Beyond BAU adds,

It is likely that the cost of investments to adequately address all of the damages from coal combustion would greatly exceed the marginal costs of transitioning to a clean energy economy. A comprehensive re-engineering of the way we use and generate electricity may very well be the most economically prudent choice. For every unit of coal which is phased from the US electricity economy, we avoid both extensive social damages as well as the requirement to remediate those damages through high-cost patchwork environmental controls.

"Benefits Beyond BAU" takes a highly exaggerated view of the social and environmental problems associated with nuclear power, and fails to compare the cost of renewables with the cost of conventional nuclear and alternative nuclear generated power. Were the costs of conventional and alternative nuclear generating sources to receive fair treatment, the cost advantages of reactors, especially MSRs would be obvious. I plan to offer a further review and assessment of the treatment accorded nuclear power by Civil Society Institute documents.

Update:

Peter Lang Responded to me on BNC:

Thank you for your thoughts on what Gen IV might cost and when they could be commercially available.

I have to admit I am very sceptical about what you say.

Firstly, I have asked before on BNC for links to some cost estimates that have been done properly by properly qualified estimators. It appears they have not been done. They cannot be done without proper detailed, final designs.

Secondly, It takes decades to progress a technology from R&D to commercially viable. It took five decades to progress nuclear to where it is now. It takes many years to make slight improvements to gas turbine generators and coal power technologies. It takes decades to make bigger ships.

So my smell test as Barry sometimes calls it, doesn’t accept the times scale or the cost for Gen IV. I can be persuaded to change my mind, but only by properly prepared cost estimates by engineering organisations nd estimators that I would trust to be doing the estimates impartially and competently.

About 5 years ago Ziggy Switkowski said “dont expect to see Gen IV commercially viable before about 2030″. I suspect he is correct.

So, I believe we need to focus on getting acceptance for Gen III (or Gen II if is will have lower LCOE). And we need to focus on the politics of how to win acceptance. For many (perhaps most) that means show us that nuclear can be cheaper than coal."

I responded to Peter,

There are numerous points upon which I would disagree with you. First, although we cannot say withe certainty what Generation UV costs would be, but we do have some evidence. We have identified factors that lead to building expenses for conventional reactors and can determine if those factors are likely to produce higher or lower costs in Generation IV reactors. In the case of the MSR, those factors all seem to point to lower costs. In addition ORNL researchers pointed out a number of MSR cost lowering options, and further cost lowering options have been identified during the last year. Clearly then while not conclusive, the weight of existing evidence seems to be on the side of cost lowering. Critics of the cost lowering argument offer little evidence against ir, thus given the state of evidence the cost lowering argument cannot be dismissed.

Your argument that "It takes decades to progress a technology from R&D to commercially viable." Does it really? First I should note that the Molten Salt Reactor, is mature technology that is past the R&D stage. It is possible to design and build commercial MSRs to day based on technology which ORNL developed, and tested during the successful ORNL MSRE.

Does the historic record require decades for commercial development to reach fruition? The first experimental gasoline powered auto was built in 1889. Between 1890 and 1903 around 2500 gasoline powered autos were built in the United States. By 1910 auto production in the United States had reached 100,000 cars a year, and by 1915 Ford was building 500,000 cars a year.

The first aircraft flight took place in 1903, The second decade of flight (1913 to 1923) saw the manufacture of over 200,000 aircraft.

The first long distance (34 miles) radio broadcast took place in 1897. By 1920 commercial radio broadcasting had begun in the United States, and by 1922 there were over 500 stations in the US making radio broadcasts.

In the case of conventional nuclear technology, the light water reactor was invented about 1945, and by 1950 Alvin Weinberg had proposed to Hyman Rickover that the Navy adopt light Water Reactor powered submarines. The first LWR sub went to sea in 1954, and by 1960 LWR powered subs were in serial production. The first experimental nuclear power plant emerged by 1960, and by 1970, nuclear power plants were in large scale production.

Finally let me address the issue of coal related generation costs. Dammages done by the coal fired electrical generation industry should not be ignored, and while you deny the damages due to AGW, there are other costs which you cannot deny. These are damages to human health in the United States alone coal related illnesses lead to billions of dollars of health insurance claims every year. Illnesses attributed to coal smoke include,

Respiratory Effects: Air pollutants produced by coal combustion act on the respiratory system, contributing to serious health effects including asthma, lung disease and lung cancer, and adversely affect normal lung development in children.

Cardiovascular Effects: Pollutants produced by coal combustion lead to cardiovascular disease, such as arterial occlusion (artery blockages, leading to heart attacks) and infarct formation (tissue death due to oxygen deprivation, leading to permanent heart damage), as well as cardiac arrhythmias and congestive heart failure. Exposure to chronic air pollution over many years increases cardiovascular mortality.

Nervous System Effects: Studies show a correlation between coal-related air pollutants and stroke. Coal pollutants also act on the nervous system to cause loss of intellectual capacity, primarily through mercury. Researchers estimate that between 317,000 and 631,000 children are born in the U.S. each year with blood mercury levels high enough to reduce IQ scores and cause lifelong loss of intelligence.

Coal smoke in China leads to some where between a third and a half million deaths every year. in the UK the number is estimated to be as high as 10,000 annual deaths, while American estimates run from 8000 to 34,000 coal related deaths a year.

in addition to the human health and mortality damage, coal smoke and coal related air pollution damages crops and forrest. The estimated social cost of coal related pollution in the united States is estimated to run between $64 to $272 billion a year.

Even excluding the economic benefits of AGW mitigation, the economic benefits of transitioning from coal to conventional nuclear power would probably outweigh the cost of the transition. In addition to the currently unpaid social cost of coal use in electrical generation, the cost of producing and transporting coal for generation use is quite significant, and is rising. Thus the economic case for transitioning from coal to nuclear is strong.

The Road Not Taken

The idea of a fluid fueled thorium breeder was first proposed by Nobel Laureate Eugene Wigner, together with Wigner's protégé Alvin Weinberg, and highly regarded engineer Gale Young in 1945. Between 1945 and 1958 Wigner and Weinberg who rose to be director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory had focused on a heavy water fluid fuel reactor the aqueous homogeneous reactor. But in 1948, an young Oak Ridge engineer, Ed Bettis, invented a second type of fluid fueled reactor, the Molten Salt Reactor, which was to demonstrate far greater potential as a thorium breeder and power production reactor.

Between 1950 and 1976 Oak Ridge National Laboratory developed the revolutionary Molten Salt Reactor concept. R. C. Briant and Alvin Weinberg explained in 1958 that there were

Two very different schools of reactor design have emerged since the first reactors were built. One approach, exemplified by solid fuel reactors, holds that a reactor is basically a mechanical plant; the ultimate rationalization is to be sought in simplifying the heat transfer machinery. The other approach, exemplified by liquid fuel reactors, holds that a reactor is basically a chemical plant; the ultimate rationalization is to be sought in simplifying the handling and reprocessing of fuel.

Briant and Weinberg added:

At the Oak Ridge National Laboratory we have chosen to explore the second approach to reactor development. . . . it has long been recognized that a liquid fuel which did not require high pressure, in which thorium or its compounds could dissolve, and which did not decompose under radiation would indeed be a major invention for the reactor art. . . .

we have been investigating another class of fluids which satisfies all three of the requirements for a desirable fluid fuel: large range of uranium and thorium solubility, low pressure, and no radiolytic gas production. These fluids, first suggested by R. C. Briant, are molten mixtures of UF4 and ThF4 with fluorides of the alkali metals, . . .

Many scientists are still convinced that

intrinsic [Molten Salt] reactor characteristics address current concerns about waste management, fissile resources, safety, and economics.

Scientists have pointed to the ability of the MSR to not only largely eliminate the problem of nuclear waste from its on spent fuel, but to make the nuclear waste of other reactors, largely harmless. In addition the use of MSRs to destroyed plutonium extracted from dismantled nuclear weapons has been proposed by scientists in Russia and the United States.

The Molten Salt Reactor was developed

During the 1960's, scientists and engineers built and tested an experimental Molten Salt Reactor that served as a proof of concept. They also worked on the design and development of a 1000 MWe MSR, and more briefly on a 250 MWe MSR design. At that time the estimated cost of a MSR was roughly equal to the cost of a light water reactor. Beginning about 1970 the cost of Light water reactors began a dramatic price rise that far exceeded the rate of inflation. Among the factors driving the price increase were increases in reactor size and complexity, as well as added safety features. The design of the MSR actually shifted toward greater simplicity in the late 1960's and remained relatively fixed in the 1970's. The safety issues that plagued the Light Water Reactor in the 1970's were not problems with the MSR, because many of the LWR safety problems were simply not present in the MSR design. Although an AEC document WASH-1222 complained that the MSR was a less mature technology than either the Light Water Reactor or the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor. In fact the LWR suffered from such serious design instabilities that last minute design alterations cost LWR purchasers tens of billions of dollars. Oak Ridge MSR designers reported that highly detailed $700 million development program - $2.4 Billion in 2009 dollars - would produce a viable commercial reactor - while the supposedly mature Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor ended up costing over the United States government over $20 billion in 2009 dollars without ever producing a viable commercial prototype.

Thus in 2009 the 1970's to 1980's 1 GWe MSR would have cost about half the current cost of LWRs, while offering superior technology, and decreased operating expenses. The MSR would have cost less, because it was simpler, required less materials and fewer labor hours to build. The MSR had many inherent safety features that were absent from LWRs. Thus money does not have to be spent compensating for inherent safety defects in MSR design.

In addition to the savings from shifting from LWRs to MSRs, shifting from large reactors, to small, modular, factory built reactors offered an opportunity for significant construction savings. Researchers found that work disorganization was a significant cause of conventional reactor costs. Over 25 percent of workers time in reactor construction projects was wasted by work disorganization. Shifting labor from a construction site to a factory would help to solve the work flow problem. in addition building a large numbers of of small reactors in a factory, increases the rational for the use of labor savings devices on assembly lines. A rapid construction cycle, means less money would be spent on accrued interest. The small rapidly manufactured, low cost MSR is called a LFTR, Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor, In addition to the cost saving options already mentioned, other options are possible. It is at least conceivable that LFTR costs as low as 1 Billion Dollars per GW are possible. This is a very preliminary conclusion, but I believe that much more research should be undertaken. However, It is safe to say that some tentative evidence suggests that LFTR capital costs may run as low as $1 billion per GW, and that is a fair likelihood that LFTR costs will run below $2 Billion per GWe. Furthermore, LFTR research that would be preliminary to building pre-production prototype could run as low as $2.4 billion, and we could say that $5 billion is a not unreasonable estimate of the required research investment. Again further research would be desirable and would probably add to our certainty about cost estimates.

LFTR Cost may run as low as 1 Billion per GWe of generating capacity

Yesterday I argued that a klawed 1970s computer model for Light Water Reactor costs had mislead the ORNL staff members who fail to see the competitive cost advantage of MSR technology over LWR technology. I argued that the technological advantage of the MSR still held. ORNL-TM-7207 assumed that the cost relationship between MSRs and LWRs assumed by ORNL-4541 (1971) was still valid, but the estimated cost of LWRs offered by ORNL-TM-7207 is far lower than what was actually the case in the index year of 1978. ORNL-TM-7207 stated that its cost estimates were based on computer modeling of reactor costs, rather than actual construction costs. However, it retrospective it is obvious that computer models of 1970's reactor costs used by ORNL was seriously flawed, and failed to capture reactor price increases between 1970 and 1980. The MSR design indexed for the DMSR was based on the the 1970 MSBR, and unlike LWRs had not undergone significant evolution. Such was not the case for the LWRs of the 1970's. And indeed in 1980 when ORNL-TM-7207 was published, the design of LWRs was continuing to evolve as the result of the Three Mile Island accident.

Thus the comparable price of LWRs and MSBRs ca. 1970 could not and should not be assumed for 1978 and even less so for the post Three Mile Island environment. The reason for this lack of evolution in MSR design can nor be fully explained by a lack of MSR design research. At least one major MSR design study emerged after the publication of ORNL-4541. But it should be noted that the MABR design had been relatively fixed at ORNL during the 1970's. There were obvious reasons why this was the case. Compared to the LWRs of 1970, 1978 or for that matter 2009, the MSBR arguably represented a significantly better form of nuclear technology. The evolution of the LWR since 1970 represents an unsatisfactory attempt to bring the LWR up with the potential of the MSBR. The MSBR was under no pressure to evolve, because it set a mark which the LWR could not equal at any price.

I believe that the case I make about the post 1978 relationship between MSBR and LWR costs requires more proof. As I noted the cost relationship between the two, set out in ORNL-TM-7207, is based on a data set found in ORNL-4541. An alternative approach to verifying the cost relationship I suggested yesterday, would be to reprice the ORNL-4541 cost estimates by determining 2009 prices. This would be a serious project, and would require much more that my once over lightly approach, but it would yield a far more definitive estimate of 2009 LFTR costs.

I believe that it is this cost advantage that lies at the heart of the case for a LFTR based energy future, I believe that this argument can and should be subjected to further tests. In particular fairly detailed design studies of two and one fluid MSR designs published by ORNL in 1979 and 71 contained fairly detailed cost information.

Until 1967 ORNL had envisioned a two fluid commercial MSR design. However, that year ORNL Reactor chemist discovered the Bismuth Protactinium recovery process which allowed thorium breeding in a single fluid core reactor. The single core reactor approach was considered advantageous By ORNL because it eased core graphite problems. The improvement in graphite performance was considered desirable enough to justify a switch from a one fluid 1 GWe commercial design.

ORNL MSBR had considered the possibility of both 1 GWe and 250 MWe modular two fluid designs. Both contain data that is relevant to LFTR costs. ORNL-4528 is especially interesting because it describes a facility powered by 4 250 MWe MSRs. In addition we have the 1962 Sargent & Lundy Report CAPITAL COST EVALUATION, 1000 MWe MOLTEN SALT CONVERTER REACTOR POWER PLANTS. This study was prepared under contract from ORNL. Unfortunately the Sargent & Lundy report was the most detailed, and it was perpared when thinking about large MSR power generation projects was thew least evolved. I am pointing these studies out because they serve as good starting points for determining LFTR costs.

Sargent & Lundy estimated the construction cost of the MSR to have been $65,481,000 1962 dollars, say 460 million 2009. No one who knows about power generation capitol cost would take that figure seriously. ORNL-3996 suggested 103 million in direct construct costs and another 30 million in indirect costs, and $110 million in interest, all in 1966 dollars. ORNL-3996 appears to have attempted to find a more realistic picture of commercial MSR costs., and we get a total cost of $243 Million 1966 dollars, or 1.6 billion 2009 dollars.

ORNL-4528 estimated facility costs to run to $146 million, about the equivalent estimate for a 1 GWe LWR facility was estimated to cost in 1967. ORNL-4541 estimated capitol costs for a 1 GWe MSR was 202 Million 1970 dollars, including 30 million accumulated interest during construction. Assuming another 200 million in interest we get a total price tag of 400 million to tax payers. That translates to 2.64 billion 2009 dollars. I take note of the fact that my Thursday calculation of MSR cost were off by a billion dollars or so, no doubt because the DMSR study did not include the cost of interest in their calculations. So we have a little reason for confidence in our ORNL-4541 cost estimate. There is also egg on my face as a consequence of my little calculation error of Thursday. I don't suppose you would believe me if i said that it was the first time I had ever made a mistake? The second time? Oh well.

ORNL-4528 looks like it calculated contingencies too low, way too low probably and underestimated interest accumulated during construction. That gets us a figure that is about 10% less that the ORNL-4541 cost estimate. There are other ample opportunities for fudging on the 1967 cost estimate, thus ORNL-4528 and ORNL-4541 are assuming the same universe of capital costs. This is not terrribly shocking since Roy C. Robertsons name went on the front cover of ORNL-3996, ORNL-4528, and ORNL-4541, and Ed Bettis's name went on the front cover of the first two.

I realize that I am pushing my analysis to a level of obtuseness that has long sent me readers packing, but there is a point here, and one that would make a nice master's thesis for a nuclear engineering student. That point is that in the 1962 to 1970 ORNL cost estimates for MSR power plants were not just off the top of the head guesses, and thus would be serious starting points for for attempts to better determine LFTR costs.

Lets go back to the 2.64 billion calculation, the inflation adjusted costs of the 1970 ORNL-4541 cost estimate. Let us assume that factor production decreases overall cost by 20% and that the rapid manufacture decreases accumulated interest by 2/3rds. Further let us assume that by recycling old power plant sites we are able to save 5% on capital costs. Finally assume a 30% cost savings due to the learning curve enjoyed by serial manufacturing of hundreds of LFTRs. That brings our capitol costs down to the neighborhood of 1.2 Billion dollars. This is lmost too good to be true, and needs more work,

I do see my goal, however. Lets see what we can reasonably say. First that ORNL made a realistic study of commercial MSR and noted that MSR costs at that time would have been similar to LWR costs. That during the 1970;s LWRs underwent design changes that made them more expensive, but there was no similar design change for the MSR. That given inflation in 2009 the cost of MSRs would probably run about half what LWRs cost if the LFTRs were built in the same way LWRs are built. However factory built LFTRs would cost significantly less than custom built MSRs because of the labor cost advantage of factory manufacture, the decrease of accumulated interest because ofrapid manufacture, the cost savings of recycling old power plants and the finally the learning related cost savings related to serial manufacture. Taken all together, we have a potential power generating product that appears may cost less than 2 Billion dollars per GWe of generation capacity, and it is not impossible that factory built LFTRs might cost as little as one billion dollars per GW of generating capacity.

There is a well documented data set derived from research don at ORNL in the 1960's. Further research using the ORNL data set and recent materials and manufacturing cost data, might refine the potential LFTR cost picture.

I intend to clean up my analysis, and make it a little easier to read, and present the repackaged text very soon.