Showing posts with label mPower Reactor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mPower Reactor. Show all posts

Thursday, September 29, 2011

Transporting Small Factory Built Reactors and Modular Components

Factory produced small reactors must be designed with transportation in mind. The design of the Babcock & Wilcox mPower reactor core is highly suggestive of the transportation considerations which the designers of factory manufactured reactors have in mind. In the case of the Babcock and Wilcox mPower core (illustrated to left) the core and the primary coolant loop appear designed to be shipped as a single unit. The mPower core unit appears to be intinded for shipment by rail. Width is the most significant limitation of rail transportation. A typical rail load cannot be a lot more than 9 feet wide under most circumstances. The mPower measures 75' by 15' (23m by 4.5m). That may not seem very wide but it is clear that moving the mPower core by rail is going to offer some challenges. In fact the 4.5 meeter wide package may not be the shipping unit at all. The Westinghouse SMR, a competing design measures 11.5' in diameter, and 81 feet long. The mPower steam generator is reoirtedly 3.6 metres in diameter and 22 m high. Thus the mPower steam generator unit diameter is only a few inches greater than the SMR unit diameter. Pictures of the mPower suggest that is is wider at the bottom, and the extra width can probably be accounted for by a pressure vessel slipped over the core. Thus it would appear that the mPower pressure vessel may not be shipped as a part of the core unit.
How can Westinghouse slip a reactor that is almost twice as powerful as the mPower into a core package that is similar in size. The answer is that Westinghouse uses a few tricks. For example the steam generators could be placed outside the core package, and the Westinghouse core package may not include the steam generators. The SMR containment vessel has s outer diameter: 32 ft. We are thus well beyond the rail transport point with a 32' diameter pressure vessel. The Westinghouse SMR appears to be an evolutionarily development from the earlier Westinghouse IRES SMR.
The question thus arrises how much labor will the factory manufactured Light Water SMR actually save in comparison to full size LWRs? The Westinghouse AP-1000 is constructed from factory built modules, and the B&W mPower may require more manufacturing labor input per MW of rated output than the AP-1000. Ditto for the Westinghouse SMR. Thus it would appear that Light Water SMR may not have a cost advantage over standard size LWRs, and although they may have a decreased construction time, they will still require a couple of years to construct. But since the AP-1000 is designed for manufacture within three years, this does not seem like a lot.

We have seen in the paper, A Small Mobile Molten Salt Reactor (SM-MSR) For Underdeveloped Countries and Remote Locations, that 100 MWe MSRs can be made to be easily transported by breaking down the loads into core structure and graphite components. Core assembly could be easily acomplished in a day, during the time while the underground core chamer is being dug and lined with a prefavricated concrete liner. At that point the core can be lowered into its underground chamber. Other trucked in modules for example a reactor salt cleaning moduuel, which could be housed underground, and turbine and generator moduels.

If we abandon the requirement that factory manufactured reactors be delivered by truck or rail we can focus on the economic benefits of delivery of factory manufactured reactors by barge or ship. Factory manufactured reactors Factory production can shift from moduels to major components, and indeed whole reactors. Research by Professors Larry Townsend and Larry Miller of the University of Tennessee and Professor Andy Kadak of MIT has focused on barge transportation of factory manufactured nuclear units. Professor Townsend's ANS interview is probably more approachable to the average reader than the DoE report, DESIGN AND LAYOUT CONCEPTS FOR COMPACT, FACTORY-PRODUCED, TRANSPORTABLE, GENERATION IV REACTOR SYSTEMS. The most detailed account in this study focuses on the Westinghouse IRIS SMR. The choice of the IRIS lead to a discovery, as Professor Townsend acknowledged,
Initially, we considered transport by barge, truck, or rail. But for the IRIS reactor, because of the large size of the reactor vessel itself, it quickly became clear that we were limited to barge transport. So, we de- cided to focus strictly on barge transport. The other two groups—the liquid-metal and gas reactors—focused on truck and rail transport.
The IRIS as designed by Westinghouse turned out to not be barge transportable on the entire Mississippi/Ohio River system although adjustments can be made:
Note that the 100m (328 ft) length of the plant is less than the 400 ft capacity (length) of the locks on the Mississippi/Ohio River system for barge transport. However, the 40m (144 ft) width of the plant exceeds the 110 ft width limitation for barge traffic through the Mississippi/Ohio River locks. The excess width in the plant layout arises from the width of the Westinghouse reactor building specifications. The actual width of the reactor containment and balance of plant is less than this 110ft width limitation. Therefore, barge transport is still possible if the "buildings" are redesigned or are constructed after barge arrival at the plant site.
Thus barge transport is possible for 300 MWe LWRs. Since MSRs and their potential generating systems are both lighter and more compact the barge transportation of MSRs of up to 500 MWe and even greater generating capacity is a reasonable possibility. It may not be desirable to transport complete MSR generating units by barge if the reactor core is to be located underground. The underground core component would be lowered into place and then connected to above ground components. Still if the reactor arrived onsite with in only two barge carried component loads, the actual final assembly could be performed in a few weeks at most. Considering the potential barge accesible reactor locations on the Mississippi River system, the Great Lakes, and the North American Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico and Pacific coats, a factory intended to produce barge transportable reactors should not suffer from transportation problems for its products.

We have seen that both highway and rail transport of reactor units and reactor modulare components will create problems for reactor mobilitry. At the same time it appears possible to truck transport core units for MSRs of up to 100 MWe. The SM MSR modules could be locally delivered by barge or ship, and then moved to their final locations by truck or by rail. Thus the cost savings potential of factory manufacture of reactors is an open possibility

Sunday, August 8, 2010

MSRs and IFRs, the Emergence of Future Nuclear Technology

Over the last 4 years, a new paradigm for nuclear power has emerged. One which involves the use of Molten Salt nuclear technology and the thorium fuel cycle. The paradigm also includes the factory production of small, relatively low cost, and rapidly built reactors. Proponents believe that this paradigm could would produce a rapidly deployable form of post carbon energy, that could potentially meet high levels of energy demand for millions of years to come. A reactor concept, called the Thorium Molten Salt Reactor in Europe, and the Liquid Fluoride Thorium reactor is associated with this idea, and several potential competing paper designs will potentially embody the concept. No TMSR/LFTR design has yet to emerge as as a project, but considering the fact that 4 years ago, the number of people in the world who knew about the concept, probably numbered in the few hundreds, a great deal of progress has been made towards making Thorium dreams a reality.

A second reactor concept has emerged to potentially compete with the LFTR idea. This is the Integral Fast Reactor, an advanced reactor concept that emerged from Argonne National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory between 1970 and 1990. The sociology, and business model of IFR support is different. IFR support relies heavily on the activism of old research veterans, and a small band of insiders, while LFTR support has emerged from a diverse group of scientists, engineers, and thinkers, few of whom were directly involved in Molten Salt Reactor research, prior to their LFTR activism.

There are some significant differences between the way MSR/LFTR supporters and IFR supportors argue their case. Kirk Sorensen, early on, posted a large number of Oak Ridge National Laboratory research reports, and technical papers on line in an archive, as support for his contentions. Although a similar, and indeed even larger set of technical documents could potentially be drawn on to support their contentions, they have chosen the testimony of the old research vetrans, rather than their reports as the primary documentation of their claims.

Indeed, anyone who is curious about what some of those IFR research reports have to say, might discover to their wondermont, that reviews of those reports are more likely to appear on energy from thorium, than on pro IFR web sites like Brave New Climate.

I must say that reading the IFR research literature has given me a somewhat better oppenion of the project, and although I have noted contradictions and discrepancies between the claims of the old Argonne National Laboratory vetrans and the research reports, those contradictions are explainable, especially if the research reports are understood in their political setting. In most instances, I have concluded that the contradictions probably will be settled in favor of the vetrans claims,. But there are still a number of troubling issues which cannot be settled by attempts to resolve the reports, and the claims of the vetrans. Perhaps the most troubling IFR issue yet to be resolved, is that of cost. Marketability is a second, related and troubling issue.

While it is clear that the IFR concept offers utilities many attractive features, it is far less clear that those features would attract utility purchasers to the IFR unless the maufacture could offer reactors at attractive prices. Manufactures will not be able to do that until they have assessed how much it would cost to manufacture and set up IFRs in the field. Such cost estimates are unlikely to be realistic, unless an IFR project has access to a manufacturer with experience building large, high technology projects, and construction engineers who have experience building large construction projects. Among current small reactor projects, only Babcock & Wilcox appears to have reached the organizational stage, that would permit it to begin to understand what it might charge customers for a finished product.

I have already discussed the status of the B&W mPower reactor project, in relationship to the ARC-100, a small IFR project. I have noted that the ARC-100 lacks the mPower project's maturity. The problem here raises a significant issue about the overall viability of the IFR.

General Electric has had a long term interest in the IFR concept, and a set of GE concept reactors, the S PRISMs have been developed as projected commercial implimentations of the IFR concept. All of these concepts require further investments in research and development, presumably with major US government involvement. In contrast, the ARC-100 is based on technology that is past the research and development stage. The ARC-100 technology has already been tested in a prototype, and thus can be considered mature.

If GE and its Japanese partner Tosheba were really interested in moving forward with an IFR the ARC-100 ought to be of interest to them. First because it would serve as a groundbreaker for IFR technology. Secondly, it would provide useful manufacturing and deployment experience. Thirdly, because if the ARC-100 is successful, its success would encourage public acceptance of larger and more ambitious S PRiSM projects.

From the viewpoint of the ARC-100 project, GR-Toshiba would bring many advantages to the table, including both manufacturing and construction engineering capabilities necessary for the ARC-100 project's success. Thus if GE-Toshiba is serious about the development of IRF technology, it would appear to have a stake in the ARC-100 project. Yet no evidence has yet to emerge that GE-Tosheba has the slightest interest in participating in the ARC-100.

This raises a question about how interested GE-Toshiba really is in the IFR as a potential future commercial product. I will be blunt, if GE-Toshiba is not interested in the ARC-100 project, unless another qualified candidate that could bring the necessary skills to the table, the project is likely to fail. But if GE-Toshiba is interested in developing a commercial IFR product, then it has an interest in the ARC-100's success. Therefore a lack of GE-Toshiba interest in the ARC-100 is very bad news for the prospects of the IFR.

The most likely problem would be IFR costs. If the ARC-100 is not cost competitive with small reactors such as the B&W mPower, then investments in it will carry a high risk. And if the ARC-100 is not cost competitive, investments in the IFR are unlikely to lead to big payoffs.

MSR/LFTR backers still firmly convinced that they offer a route to significantly lower nuclear and indeed post-carbon energy costs. While we don't know enough to offer a definitive view, it is likely thatr LFTR costs wiill be substantually lower than IFR costs. This judgement is based on a number of likely factors including lower materials input, simpler reactor design, lower labor costs, the possibility that a larger percentage of the finished product can be factory as opposed to field manufactured.

If I am right about this, potential serious MSR manufacturing efforts will begin to emerge within the next five years, while projects like the ARC-100 will not get past the drawing board stage, and other IFR projects will advance even less. Of course I might be wrong.

Thursday, November 26, 2009

Electrical Reliability and Wind Redundancy

I have an Internet friend, NT, who lives at the very southern tip of India. We frequently chat on line, our conversation are windows into life in India. Our conversations are frequently interrupted by power outages, which crash my friends computer. I had no idea why those outages occurred so frequently, until I recently learned that electricity for NT's community is generated by two small conventional power plants and a large wind farm. NT has electricity when the wind is blowing, but local electrical demand can overwhelm the output of the small electrical plants, in the absence of a brisk breeze. At periods of high electrical demand the result is a blackout that only is reversed when the wind starts blowing again. When NT's computer crashes because of an electrical blackout, that may be the end of our conversation for the rest of the day. According to NT outages could last for hours, and it was often impossible to predict when electrical services would resume.

People in the United States could adjust to such conditions, but would they want too? Until very recently I lived in Dallas, Texas. Summers in Dallas can be blisteringly hot. Hotter in fact than NT's home town of Kanyakumari, where the summer temperature seldom rises about 95 F. In contrast the average Dallas temperature in July and August is 96 F, with as many as 59 100 degree days having been observed. The Dallas heat can be a health hazard to older people with heart conditions. Thus air conditioning in Dallas is not a luxury, it is a matter of public health. In 2003 when Dallas like summer heat descended on Western Europe, 50,000 people died. Thus electrical reliability in Texas is not a matter of personal connivance, it is a matter of public health.

Thus when a famous energy expert claims
there is not and has never been a need for any particular plant or kind of plant to run all the time, . .
what is he really saying? Does our expert mean that reliability is not a desirable characteristic?

Our expert alleges,
All power plants fail, varying only in their failures’ size, duration, frequency, predictability, and cause. Solar cells’ and windpower’s variation with night and weather is no different from the intermittence of coal and nuclear plants, except that it affects less capacity at once, more briefly, far more predictably, and is no harder and probably easier and cheaper to manage. In short, the ability to serve steady loads is a statistical attribute of all plants on the grid, not an operational requirement for one plant. Variability (predictable failure) and intermittence (unpredictable failure) must be managed by diversifying type and location, forecasting, and integrating with other resources. Utilities do this every day, balancing diverse resources to meet fluctuating demand and offset outages. Even with a largely (or probably a wholly) renewable grid, this is not a significant problem or cost, either in theory or in practice—as illustrated by areas that are already 30-40% wind-powered.”
This is a very cleaver argument, but there is an error. What differentiates base load power from other generation sources in not a never fail reliability, but low generation cost. Base load power is low cost power, and the reason grid operators seek it out, is because it is available day in and day out at a low cost. Since the grid operator is interested in fulfilling customer demand at the lowest cost, the operator seeks to contract with the lowest cost power source for power as much time as possible. The fact that low cost power providers may be also highly reliable operators is a significant plus for the grid operators, because he or she does not does not have to contract with higher cost power providers at periods of high power demand.

The problem for the grid operator is that electricity must be provided, no matter the energy costs. Our way of life is dependent on reliable electricity, and not just for air conditioning. Consider the the great blackouts of 1965, 1977 and 2003. The August 14-15, 2003 blackout shut down many cities in the United States and Canada. Cost estimates vary, but the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association (OMA) estimated the direct costs of the blackout on Ohio manufacturers to be $1.08 billion. Numerous large manufacturing plants were shut down for a day. Ontario set asside $75 million to compensate local governments for their blackout related expenses, and lost revenue. Utilities lost between one and two billion dollars, and the total losses for the day long blackout may have been as high as $10 billion. Clearly then the electrical reliability problems which my friend NT experiences in India would not be considered acceptable in the United States.

The baseload issue then is the balance between grid reliability and low electrical cost. If the wind capacity factor were .30 and the capacity factor for nuclear is .90, at least 1000 MW wind farms would be required to produce as much electricity as one reactor 1000 MW reactor. But a wind system with three generator is not likely to be as reliable as the reactor. In Archer and Jacobson suggest that it would take at least five 1000 MW wind farms to begin to approach a reactor's reliability, and that a wind array containing seven wind farms would still not be as reliable as a single reactor. The seriousness of the redundancy problem is illustrated by Peter Hawkins' case study of German wind.
Germany’s 22,000 MW of wind, with a capital cost of about $40 billion, is really effectively a capacity of only about 4,000 MW in terms of production capability. As a result, the wind plants in Germany represent 16 per cent of the total capacity (MW), but only about 5 percent of the electricity production (MWh).
By increasing their wind capacity to 48,000 MW in 2020, the germans hope to be able to increase their wind generated electrical output to 13% of their generation total. But the added 26,000 MWs of wind capacity would cost at least $100 billion. actually it probably would cost more because in order to increase their wind capacity factor, the Germans would be required to build offshore wind generators, and German offshore wind is proving to be as expensive. The German Alpha Venture offshore project has a name plate generating capacity of 60 MW and cost $375 million to build. That is $6.25 watt, a cost that lands German wind squarely in the nuclear cost range for much less reliability and a far shorter life span. But from a carbon reduction standpoint the increase in German wind capacity will not lead to a decrease in German CO2 emissions. At least not if the German Left gets its way and shutdown all German reactors by 2020. The 26,000 MWs of German wind generators would not even begin to approach the displaced electrical generation of German reactors. No wonder German
wind integration study, which covers the period to 2020, did not project CO2 emissions beyond 2015.
The shutdown of German reactors would increase absolute amount of CO2 emitted in the generation of German electricity, That does not really matter to German Greens, whose insane hostility to nuclear power knows no bounds. The Greens would clearly prefer to destruction of human life on this planet to the toleration of nuclear power.

Renewables advocates argue that the limitations of wind can be countered by adding solar generation to the renewables mix. But given the limitations of renewables, renewable advocates have found only three methods of making renewables reliable:
1. Burn a lot of natural gas whenever renewable generated electricity is in short supply.

2. When renewable output is high, save the surplus in some form of energy storage.

3. Build transmission systems from areas where surplus generation is possible, to areas where electrical supplies would be inadequate due to the limitations of local renewable resources.
Each of these approaches has serious flaws. The first approach is unsatisfactory because it fails to eliminate carbon emissions from the electrical generation system.

The second approach is advocated by a report titled Energy Self Reliant States. The word storage is repeated over and over in this report:
Very high penetration rates will require new developments in electricity storage. . . .
establish a system of widely distributed and abundant storage that would change the very underpinnings and assumptions of an electricity system designed without storage in mind. . . .
Some renewable fuels, like sunlight and wind, are variable. Thus the estimates, especially for wind, assume a significant level of storage or on-demand distributed generation. . . .
sufficient electricity storage . . .
sufficient electricity storage . . .
These investments should be designed to allow the integration of many variable and dispersed generators as well as growing amounts of distributed storage. . . .
To achieve very high proportions of our electricity from variable renewable energy sources will require very significant amounts of storage and/or a restructuring of our electricity system to rely on more natural gas-fired distributed backup generators. The electricity storage sector has seen many technological and commercial developments. This report does not examine storage and its implications but in our analysis of variable renewable energy potential we assume sufficient storage is available. . . .
The report argues:
that a new extra high voltage inter-regional transmission network may not be needed to improve network reliability, relieve congestion and expand renewable energy. The focus should be on upgrading the transmission, subtransmission and distribution systems inside states. These investments should be designed to allow the integration of many variable and dispersed generators as well as growing amounts of distributed storage. New in-state transmission lines may well be needed but these will probably be lower voltage lines. In any event, they should be built only after maximizing energy efficiency and the use of existing transmission capacity.
Energy efficiency and demand reduction, as well as the use of distributed generation, can free up significant amounts of distribution and transmission capacity.
But what would such a storage system cost? Tom Konrad. a renewables advocate suggests that
On a national basis, such storage would cost an estimated $13 Trillion, or over 65 times the cost of the transmission investments they oppose.
Konrad argues that by connecting low renewable resource states with electricity produced in high resource states, much of the cost of storage could be avoided. Konrad argues that a $700 billion transmission system could be substituted for the $13 trillion storage system. However, Konrad's estimate is presented with out the sort of detailed analysis that would back up his claims. Before the $700 Billion estimate is accepted, it would have to be tested against a worst case scenario.

Even if we accept Konrad's cost estimate for the total transmission package, we have to weigh that against lower cost alternatives. The Babcock & Wilcox, small mPower reactor is expected to cost less than $3500 per kW. MPower reactors can be located on the grounds of old coal fired power plants. close to target electrical markets, eliminating the need to expand the current grid, or alternatively add very large and hugely expensive grid storage components. A $700 Billion investment in mPower reactors would buy half of the current generation demand. Given that practically immortal reactors now produce about 20% of our electricity, the other 30% of the electricity could be had for another reactor investment of $400 billion or less. Furthermore, reactors can be situated close to the sea coast, where their now wasted heat can be set to work producing massive amounts of fresh water. The sale of water thus would add to the nuclear revenue stream, while adding little to nuclear costs. The $400 billion reactor investment would end the necessity of investing several trillion dollars in renewable generation capacity, and the all nuclear system would be be far more reliable than either renewables plus storage or renewables plus new long distance transmission. In addition the nuclear system would offer significant new water source for areas now experiencing water shortages.

Thus the fallacy in the "base load fallacy" argument is its failure to acknowledge the relationship between electrical reliability and electrical costs. The name plate capacity costs of renewable electricity means little. What will matter in a post carbon grid is the cost of reliable electricity, and nuclear generated electricity, even conventional nuclear generated electricity would cost far less than a renewables plus storage or a renewables plus transmission approach. The only other renewables reliability approach would involve the unacceptable emissions of large amounts of CO2. Thus, nuclear power can supply reliable electricity at a far lower cost than renewables, and would not extract a carbon penalty.

Saturday, November 21, 2009

The B&W mPower and TVA

Some time ago I wrote a series of posts titled the Keys to Lowering Nuclear Costs. Although my primary focus was on lowering LFTR costs, use of many of the cost lowering approaches I suggested was not by any means limited to LFTR type reactors. Most of the ideas did not originate with me, and most of them are obvious to anyone who thinks seriously about methods of lowering nuclear costs. I would thus expect that lowering nuclear costs will become increasingly important during the next few years, and that parts of the Keys formula will be repeated over and over again in new nuclear projects. Rod Adams posted a discussion of the B&W mPower reactor yesterday.

In my estimation the mPower has a far better chance of becoming a reality than he Hyperion reactor does. Rod's post points to Babcock & Wilcox's existing production system, now engaged in the production of reactors for the Navy. Much of skepticism about the future of nuclear power has to do with supposed production bottlenecks. Those bottlenecks would not be a problem for B&W, and at any rate if orders start flooding in, B&W will have ample time to expand their production capacity. Rob also links to an article in Nuclear Engineering International that focus on the B&W reactor. We see clearly how much of B&W's thinking parallels the Keys. We have a small factory built modular reactor, intended to be sited underground. Small reactors can be built in a shortened construction time, B&W estimates as little as two years. The "m" in mPower probably stands for modular, and modules can be clustered in sets of from two to eight reactors. Building the cluster one reactor at a time means that part of a project can be producing power and thus income while other parts are under construction, and still others are in the planning stage. These features substantially lower the accrual of interest, and thus lower capital costs. That is straight out of The Keys.

The mPower can be either air or water cooled, and thus becomes the first site anywhere reactor. B&W says that the reactor will cost $500 million. For the water cooled mPower that comes to $3.70 per watt. It is not clear if this is an overnight figure, or the actual cost of ownership. The B&W mPower would save its owners around $30 million a year in coal costs. The mPower at $3.70 per watt will be price competitive with wind. It will offer a capacity factor of .90 to wind best of .30 to .40 depending on location. Wind costs $2.50 per will produce less than half of the power, and the mPower can produce power on demand.

The mPower would be an excellent investment at the $500 million price. The market would perceive an mPower based project to be low risk, because of the relatively short manufacturing time, and its affordable price. The market has a long memory of the Washington Public Power Supply System's (woops) $2.25 billion default its five reactor nuclear project. The market is likely to be far less intimidated by a project of the modest size of the mPower. At that point the mPower story will begin selling itself. B&W can point to not only the reliability and safety of the nuclear power industry, and to the reliability and safety of the thousands of reactor years of safe operation for small naval reactors it has built by B&W. The combination of small risk and a competitive rate of return is likely to ease investor fears. B&W has the deep pockets needed to make the mPower happen, and they have TVA backing. The first mPower TVA is committed to evaluating a possible site, located in Roane County near Oak Ridge, as a potential site for the lead mPower reactor. In addition, B&W states,
A Memorandum of Understanding has been signed by B&W, TVA and a consortium of regional municipal and cooperative utilities to explore the construction of a fleet of B&W mPower reactors to meet the consortium’s need to diversify its power generation assets.
This sounds like something other than direct TVA ownership for the fleet of mPower reactors might be in the works.

TVA confronts a statutory debt limit of $30 Billion with an existing debt of $25 billion. Thus TVA cannot afford more than one large reactor project, at the most. TVA is currently finishing the Watts Bar II unit, and that will add $2.5 billion to its debt. That would leave room for only one more large project, completion of the long delayed Bellefonte I project, probably for around another 2.5 billion 2009 dollars. That will leave TVA with very little wiggle room, but the Alexander-Webb 100 reactor imitative might provide TVA with an out. At the moment TVA's best large new reactor option, the Westinghouse AP-1000, is under a very silly regulatory cloud at the NRC, and may have to undergo a major containment housing redesign. No such redesign would be requited with the underground mPower reactor. If TVA gets reactor money out of Congress, without a small debt limitation revision, I would expect Bellefonte II and more mPower reactors, perhaps with some arrangement that keeps the debt off TVA's books, to be added to TVA's plans before long. The hand writing on the wall says, "carbon taxes on fossil fuel fired electrical generation are coming soon." TVA faces an utter lack of viable wind resources. and with as many as 209 cloudy days a year, solar reliability is a big joke in the Tennessee Valley. If TVA is going to go green, it will have to go Nuclear Green.

Friday, October 9, 2009

Letter to Jesse 3: Lowering nuclear costs with advanced technology

This is the third in a series of letters i am writing to Jesse Jenkins, the Director of Energy and Climate Policy of the The Breakthrough Institute, I am attempting to demonstrate to Jesse that a massive deployment of nuclear power plants is possible by 2050.

Dear Jesse, To the left is a greatly simplified depiction of a Light Water Reactor core. The core is only the beginning of Light Water reactor complexity. Chris Mowry of Babcock & Wilcox told Robert Bryce
"We estimate there would be between 500 and 1,000 jobs at the site throughout the three-year field construction period."
That gives us somewhere from 2.5 to 5 million hours of labor on site to construct the B&W mPower reactor and its facility. This is no small project and suggests something of the daunting complexity of building a large reactor will also confront the builders of small Light Water Reactors. If factory labor is several times more efficient than on site construction labor, B&W has failed to move enough labor from the reactor site to the the factory. Thus the small Light Water Reactor proves to be something of a disappointment in that it will not offer an economic advantage compared to larger reactors. Chris Mowery stated,
The B&W mPower reactor uses the best features and elements of existing Generation III+ technology. This is technology with which the NRC is familiar, and for which NRC regulatory and licensing protocol already exists. By avoiding the use of new Generation IV technology concepts, we will ensure that the NRC is reviewing designs and reactor technology that it already has the ability to license.
It would appear that B&W believed that it had a choice between Generation III+ and Generation IV nuclear technology and chosen the former because of a perceived weakness of the NRC to assess new nuclear Generation IV technologies..

The major advantage of a small reactor would be that it would allow for the transfer of labor from the reactor site to the factory. Professor Andrew Kadak,, who teaches nuclear engineering at MIT, has pointed out what happens when labor is transferred to the construction site to the factory.
Building a reactor in a factory should save construction time, says Kadak. He estimates that what takes eight hours to do in the field could be done in just one hour in a factory. Once the reactor is manufactured, it would then be shipped to the site of a power plant along with the necessary containment walls, turbines for generating electricity, control systems, and so on.
The great advantage of China and India in the construction of Generation II and Generation III reactors is that it is labor intensive and their labor costs are low. In order for European and American nuclear power to be cost competitive with the power produced in China and India, labor must be used with factory like efficiency. Thus if tasks requiring a day can be completed in on hour, all through the construction system,labor consts can be dramatically lowered.

In addition to moving reactor construction labor from the construction site to the factory, reactor design must be simplified and the production system automated. We have already noted the relative complexity of Generation II and III reactor cores. Here is the design of an extremely simple, low cost and safe Generation IV Molten Salt Reactor core. The core is basically made up of two hollow cylinders, one inside of the other. This core design is light weigh because it lacks internal structure, and because, unlike the Light Water mPower Reactor the Molten Salt Reactor operates under atmospheric pressure.



The Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) is not just simpler, it is more compact. It can be housed in a smaller structure. Compact cores mean smaller housing. The MSR cannot explode, that means a smaller containment structure is required. The late Edward Teller, proposed locating MSRs underground for safety. Underground locations also protect against terrorists attacks via truck bombs or aircraft. Underground locations mean that massive and labor intensive containment structures are not required.

Of course some features of the MSR are not as simple as this core design. But it would appear that the MSR concept holds real promise of lowering reactor labor costs, while significantly adding to nuclear safety, and offering a sustainable nuclear technology that could provide high levels of energy to human society for hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of years.

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