Showing posts with label Rod Adams. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rod Adams. Show all posts

Sunday, February 27, 2011

Radioactive Radon in the home, natural gas, and the New York Times

Three years ago, Nuclear Green began a thread based on my father's research on radioactive radon in natural gas. A few months after I posted my father's account of his research on radon in natural gas, I posted a discussion of radiation on Barnett Shale titled, "The Radioactive Texans." I argued,
We know thes things:

There are undoubtedly uranium and thorium associated with Barnett Shale.

Radon is a natural daughter product of Uranium and Thorium decay.

Radon is persent in natural gas.

The half life of radon-222 is 3.8 days.
Fron these facts I concluded,
Thus radon from Barnett shale sources could easily travel up a gas well from its Barnett Shale source, travel through local pipe lines, and get consumed in cooking in heating fires within a few hours. Radon exposure is the second leading cause of lung cancer in the United States. Iowa research has shown that "cumulative radon exposure is a significant risk factor for lung cancer in women". "Radon gas is thought to be responsible for 5,000 to 20,000 lung cancer deaths per year in the United States". Thus radioactive radon gas, transported to North Texas homes, from Barnett Shale gas wells, almost next door, constitutes a significant ganger to the health of North Texans. Needless to say, this problem is being ignored gas companies, the governments of Texas, and the United States. Interestingly, it is also being ignored by critics of nuclear power who complain about the radiation dangers of nuclear power, but are unconcerned about the radiation associated with natural gas. How much is radon from natural gas effecting the health of Texans? No one knows.
I followed up posts on my father's research on natural radiation exposures associated with the use of fossil fuels, with a post on the anti-nuclear activist, John Gofman. I noted,
Now there are two curious thing about Gofman's anti nuclear crusade. First he based his commitment upon a theory about the effects of radiation on human health, but his focus was on the relatively most insignificent source of man cause radiation in our society, power reactors. Compared to living in a house with a basement, or cooking and heating with natural gas, reactors brought to surounding neighborhoods much less radiation. In the case of useing coal fired power plants, reactors, greatly deminished environmental exposure to radioisotopes, associated with power production. The second curious thing about Gofman's crusade was that Gofman didn't test his theory with data about illnesses in the neighborhood of nuclear facilities. Working in a nuclear facility is associated with with a longer lifespan, and research investigation has not produced evidence that living close to nuclear plant makes it more likely that people to get sick.

Had Gofman been more rational and consistent, he would have included in his anti-radiation campaign, household use of natural gas, and custom of building houses with basements.

But the greatest paradox is that Gofman's anti-nuclear campaign actually contributed to public exposure to radiation, and radioisotopes. Gofman never opposed the use of coal in relation to radiation dangers, despite the presence of radioactive materials in coal fly ash. Fly ash exposed the public to far more radiation that reactors would. Did Gofman, who was by all acounts a brilliant scientist, not see the wider issues? Or was he so caught up in an irrational and Quixotic opposition to nuclear generation to electrity, that he saw, but did not care?
I generally practice a division of labor approach to nuclear blogging. That I note what other bloggers write about, and focus on topics which get less attention in the nuclear blogging community. This is not the case with Energy from Thorium, with which I view Nuclear Green as offering collaboration. Yesterday the New York Times carried quite and extensive story on the presence of radioactive radium in waste water frm the fracking process. And although this was an extensive story, the word "radon" did not occur in the New York Times story even though it has been known for nearly 40 years that natural gas is a source of naturally radioactive radon in the home, and it is known that farcked gas contains radon. The presence of farcked gas wells close to large domestic natural gas markets, means that natural gas with relatively high concentrations of radioactive radon enter homes along with natural gas used for cooking, heating, and water heating. The radon lingers, enters the lungs of home residents including children, and then it produces beta radiation which can cause cancer, If you do not want to read the whole story, Rod Adams offers a summery and comments. This is vintage Rod Adams, and well worth the read. Rod comments,
The health consequences of frequent exposure radium at high enough concentrations are quite different from those of tritium. Here is another question that begs to be asked - if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's charter includes protecting the public from the hazards of radiation emitting materials, why aren't the truckloads of waste water from fracked wells subject to NRC monitoring and reporting?

This is not a new issue for the oil and gas industry. Drillers have known for a very long time that their drill bits and other gear that grinds up natural rock formation on the way to finding pockets of hydrocarbons often becomes contaminated with radioactive materials. They also figured out a long time ago that their profits would be put at risk if they had to meet the stringent requirements imposed by the NRC. Petroleum interests worked carefully to ensure that the NRC has no jurisdiction over what they branded as NORM - naturally occurring radioactive materials - associated with oil and gas drilling operations.

Health physicists understand that living tissue has no way to distinguish alpha, beta and gamma radiation into naturally occurring radiation and radiation produced by a human engineered process like operating a nuclear power plant. Legislators, however, are often motivated by wealth and power, not by science or medicine.
Natural gas pipelines offer a quick and deadly vector for radioactive radon from from fracked Pennsylvania gas wells into millions of homes where natural gas is consumed in the North East. The Michigan State University Extension Service tells us,
Radon gas is thought to be responsible for 5,000 to 20,000 lung cancer deaths per year in the United States.

The major sources of radon are: soil that contains radon-releasing material; water and natural gas that has passed through underground areas containing radon; solar-heating systems that use radon-emitting rocks to store heat; granite rock; and uranium or phosphate mine tailings.

Friday, December 31, 2010

Was Alvin Weinberg a Team Player?

I generally have high regard for Rod Adams work. Rod's blog posts are evidence driven, and Rod almost never jumps the track, but this morning he did in a comment on Nuclear Green. The comment was a response to my recent post on Alvin Weinberg's integrity. Rod wrote
I am not sure why you think Weinberg was so correct about his safety concerns with light water reactors. Certainly they are not "inherently safe" and they require care in design, manufacturing and operation, but the safety record of the machines that caused Weinberg so much worry has been extraordinary all around the world.

Sometimes I think that the real answer to why Weinberg was fired was that he was not a team player and was so sure of his own knowledge that he overlooked the fact that others were just as smart and just as concerned about the welfare of their fellow man.

I cut my nuclear teeth on light water reactors. One of the most intellectually difficult tasks I had every year was coming up with some kind of reasonable scenario for our annually required "reactor accident" drill. My down to earth technicians and I just could not figure out how those thick stainless steel pipes were supposed to suddenly burst open.
These comments were most unfortunate. Rod appears to have made this comment without being aware of a number of Nuclear Green posts that would have better established the relationship of the nuclear safety issues to Weinberg's firing. Since I have offered a number of reasonably well documented posts on Weinberg's firing, Rod seemingly has ignored the available evidence and has not offered other evidence in support of his contentions.

Since my discussion of the evidence regarding the major actors in the Weinberg firing is quite extensive, I will point to relevant posts rather than discuss the evidence at length. First I noted what is arguably the unconstitutional authority which Congressman Chet Holifield exercised over the AEC. Hiring and firing decisions are made by persons with executive authority in an organization, yet Alvin Weinberg was invited to the office of a member of the legislative branch of government to be told that he was hired. Constitutionally, Congressman Holifield had no right to fire Alvin Weinberg. I have tried to point out that the safety nuclear safety conflict that formed part of the back drop of Weinberg's firing was not between and Weinberg and the Holifield clique, it was between the community of National Laboratory scientists. I have tried to lay out the issues that motivated that conflict. In fact Rod Adam's comment sheds some light on the attitude of Milton Shaw who played a major role in the safety conflict. Rod argued,
One of the most intellectually difficult tasks I had every year was coming up with some kind of reasonable scenario for our annually required "reactor accident" drill. My down to earth technicians and I just could not figure out how those thick stainless steel pipes were supposed to suddenly burst open.
Robert Pool described the difference of attitudes between the national laboratory scientific community and ex-Navy reactor developer Milton Shaw,
Milton Shaw, the head of the AEC's Division of Reactor Development and Technology, was convinced that such safety research was reaching the point of diminishing returns. An old Rickover protege, Shaw saw light-water reactors as a mature technology. The key to the safety of commercial power plants, he thought, was the same thing that had worked so well for the navy reactor program: thick books of regulations specifying every detail of the reactors, coupled with careful oversight to make sure the regulations were followed to the letter.
In fact the Three Mile Island accident was to show that the civilian Light Water Reactor had not reached a level of maturity comparable to that of Naval Light Water Reactors which Shaw (and Rod Adams) assumed.

Post Three Mile Island the civilian Light Water Reactor did reach an outstanding level of safety, but at a considerable cost. As I have documented, Alvin Weinberg's conflict with Milton Shaw had to do with an experiment which involved deliberately destroying a reactor in order to find out what happened. The worse case that concerned the scientists was the China syndrome, a core melting through all containment. A reactor was being built in Idaho in order to conduct this experiment. Shaw decided that the reactor was not needed, and stopped further construction. Dozens of National Laboratory scientists objected to the scrapping of what was considered an important nuclear safety experiment, and testified before Congress. Weinberg agreed with them, but did not take his disagreement to the level of Congressional testimony. Eventually the Three Mile Island accident was to substitute for for the Idaho nuclear accident experiment.

Rod tells us,
Sometimes I think that the real answer to why Weinberg was fired was that he was not a team player and was so sure of his own knowledge that he overlooked the fact that others were just as smart and just as concerned about the welfare of their fellow man.
My evidence suggests that Holiway, Ramsey and Shaw failed to exercise proper leadership. Holiway, as I have indicated exercised executive authority over the AEC even though he was not entitled to by the constitution. Ramsey's appointment as an AEC Commissioner had been dictated to the Kennedy Administration by Holifield. Ramsey was in fact a member of Holifield's staff, and after his appointment continued to engage in the subordinate relationship with Holifield, continuing to report to him. Shaw improperly turned decision making about a personnel matter, Weinberg's status as a National Laboratory Director to Holifield.

Considering the misconduct of all of the key players, the alligation that Weinberg was not a team player does not hold true. There is more evidence. The Nixon administration appears to have decided to attack the power of the Hloifield clique. When Ramsey's appointment came up for renewal, he was not reappointed by Nixon. His replacement was Dixie Lee Ray, who was soon appointed AEC Chairman. Ray proceeded to outmannuver Shaw, who was forced to resign. Holifield was shorn of his power and decided to not run for reelection in 1974. Ray, now had a chance to right the wrong done by the Weinberg firing episode, and she did so, by arranging for Weinberg to come to Washing as the first Director of Energy Research. Weinberg's appointment, if I am not mistaken involved directly reporting to the President. Weinberg was not happy with his position, and left it after a year, but this appointment should be taken as evidence that Weinberg was viewed as a team player.

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

The Social Construction of Ignorance: Gloor and Adams

Social constructionism is a notion advanced by some sociologists that all human beliefs, including the beliefs of scientists, can be explained by reference to social context. Thus facts are nothing more than statements of things people have a agreed to believe. Thus at the bottom all knowledge has an irrational basis.

I find the constructionist view of science to be unsatisfactory, because it does not explain everything that needs to be explained about the power of science to change human society. At the same time the constructionist view helps to explain a lot about attempts to create doubt about views supported by well grounded scientific research.

During an exchange of comments that followed a cross posting on The Energy Collective, of my recent post, Was the Advent of the Power Reactor Premature,nuclear power critic, Stephen Gloor stated to Rod Adams
In you case you are a nuclear denier. Completely and steadfastly refusing to believe that nuclear power is incredibly expensive, cannot be rolled out fast enough to even scratch the surface of climate change, produces toxic waste that must be cleaned up by others and acts as a convenient cover for weapons making.
Gloor then went on to quote as essay by Pascal Diethelm1 and Martin McKee, titled "Denialism: what is it and how should scientists respond?"

First, let me deal with Stephen Gloor's charges against Adams. Gloor has a tendency to attribute mistakes to people who he disagrees with without documenting examples of the mistakes. In at least some cases the people involved may in fact appear to believe exactly the opposite of what Gloor says they do. Gloor alleges that Adams is
[c]ompletely and steadfastly refusing to believe that nuclear power is incredibly expensive,
Gloor ignores the fact that Adams repeatedly has discussed nuclear costs on his blog. Gloor may not agree with with what Adams says, but given the facts it is unfair to say that Adams is in denial about nuclear costs. Gloor also ignores something that has been repeatedly pointed out to him, namely that the Energy Information Administration has reported that nuclear power is less expensive per kWh than land based wind generation, Sea based wind power, solar thermal power, and photovoltaic power. When the cost of technology designed to deal with the problems of renewable intermittency and its lack of dispatch capacity is included in the cost of renewable energy, nuclear power is far less expensive than renewables.

Rod Adams was one of the pioneers of the idea lowering nuclear costs by factory construction of reactors. In 1996 Adams wrote,
one must realize that the curve is reset to a new value when a new product is introduced and that there must be competition in order to keep firms focused on lowering unit costs and unit prices. In the nuclear industry, new products in the form of bigger and bigger plants continuously were introduced, and, after the dramatic rise in the cost of fossil fuel during the 1970s, there was little competitive benefit in striving for cost reduction during plant construction.

When picking the proper size of a particular product, the experience curve should lead one to understand that high volume products will eventually cost less per unit output than low volume products and that large products inherently will have a lower volume than significantly smaller products.
Gloor claims that Adams is gnores the fact that nuclear power
cannot be rolled out fast enough to even scratch the surface of climate change, . . .
Yet Adams 14 year old proposal to build small easily transported reactors in factories offers rapid scalability of nuclear power with a potential to lower nuclear costs.

Thus far from being in denial about nuclear costs and scalibility, Rod Adams was already addressing the problem 14 years ago.

Gloor accuses Adams of denying the fact that nuclear power
produces toxic waste that must be cleaned up by others
In fact Adams has repeatedly discussed the so called nuclear waste issue, as recently as this month.

Finally Gloor accuses Adams of denying that
toxic waste that must be cleaned up by others and acts as a convenient cover for weapons making.
But John Hogan in a recent Scientific American blog post, noted that not only had Adams acknowledged proliferation concerns, but that Adams had told him that
The spread of nuclear power need not lead to nuclear weapons proliferation. Many countries that have nuclear power plants do not possess weapons. And almost every country that has nuclear weapons today acquired them before acquiring nuclear reactors. (Some commenters on Adams's blog have pointed out that India is an exception to this rule.) More importantly, nuclear power can promote peace by making nations less reliant on outside sources for energy. "You can write the history of world conflicts over the past 100 years as a battle over resources," Adams said.
Clearly then Gloor's claim that Rod Adams is in some sort of denial about nuclear power is unfounded in reality. Rod is not always right about every nuclear related issue, at least about those issues about which we have a disagreement, but Rod is a member of the reality based community. Rod can be counted on to engage in the judicious determination of facts. If there were examples of denial in the Energy Collective discussion, Adams was not the person who had provided them.

Gloor is, on the other hand, not a reliable source of information regarding the views of people with whom he disagrees.

Saturday, November 21, 2009

My Energy Collective debate is finally winding down

My debate with Stephen Gloor, an Australian pro-renewables engineer, seems finally to be winding down. I have been very ably assisted by Bill Hannahan, Rod Adams, and Nathan Wilson. This morning I wrote the following comment:
Stephen, you have in our discussion nicely illustrated the case against renewables, while offering your defense of renewable power systems. When confronted with the limitations of wind, you offered redundant dispersed wind installations as a solution. When it was pointed out that wind dispersion still left gaps in wind electrical generation, you offered solar-wind redundancy as a solution. Against the case that solar and wind both fail over wide areas, you offered another redundancy, the CO2 emitting use of natural gas as a backup to the not always reliable renewables system you call for.. Your solution also requires an enormous and expensive expansion of the electrical transmission system. I have called attention to a statement by a electrical transmission systems expert that an all renewables generation system would require 75 thousand miles of new transmission lines for California alone, in order to make the system reliable. Your solution to almost any renewable reliability problem is to build further, redundant renewable facilities, and connect them up with hundreds of thousands of miles of transmission lines.

You claim that nuclear construction it too slow, but nuclear power with its superior reliability, and its potential to be located near consumers, is far far more easily scaled to meet carbon free energy requirements, and to fulfill consumer demands than renewables are.

You never once stop to count the cost of the multiple redundancies and grid expansion you advocate. When confronted with the fact that even with the huge investments in wind, solar and natural gas facilities, there still would be uncovered problems like summer peak demand, in areas like Texas. Your response was to call for even more huge investments in energy efficiency. Thus you like other renewables advocates never stop to count the cost of your solutions, you simply recite the claim that nuclear is too expensive, while ignoring the fact that the renewables system you advocate would be far more expensive. You argue that reactors cannot perform load following, despite the fact that nuclear load following is performed as a matter of course in the French electrical system. You reject the possibility that nuclear research and a new generation of nuclear technology might lower nuclear costs.

Conclusions from our debate:
1. Renewable advocates have failed to make a convincing case that wind plus natural gas "backups" actually saves significantly more CO2, than wind alone. Money spent on wind generators is not justified unless a strong case exists that they actually save CO2.
2. Wind generators seldom operate at full capacity. Redundant wind generators are required to equal the capacity factor of reactors.
3. Even with multiple generators, natural factors such as day and night influence wind output. To achieve high renewable penetration, wind generators require daytime solar back up. The solar backup is a second form of renewables redundancy. In order to insure the availability of solar generated electricity during all daylight hours, heat storage is required, Heat storage requires redundant gathering fields, in order to insure that enough heat is collected during limited daylight hours.
3. All forms of energy storage, if used with renewables, require redundant generating capacity to service them. In addition the storage-generator unit is a further redundant electrical generator.
4. Even with significant redundancies, a high renewables penetrated grid requires significant natural gas backup. Natural gas backups thus form a further redundancy.
5. Renewables seldom can be located close to energy customers. Transmitting electricity from renewables generating facilities to customers usually requires new and expensive transmission lines. The cost of those transmission lines are a hidden cost of a renewable generation system, Using renewables output from other regions as a backup to local renewables requires still more new transmission lines. These interregional transmission lines that would not be required by an all nuclear grid, are transmission redundancies required to support a renewable power system.
6. Construction of nuclear power plants use significantly fewer materials than the construction the construction of solar and wind facilities require. The United States must compete with growing Asian economies for construction materials, and the current trade balance places the United States at a significant and growing disadvantage in this competition. Hence the cost of power generation facilities construction can be expected to rise during the next 15 years, with the cost of renewables rising more than the cost of nuclear power. The rise in materials cost, will also effect the cost of transmission lines, and this will effect the cost of an all renewables system far more than the cost of an all nuclear system.
7. Renewables advocates when confronted by the limitations of renewable energy and its high cost, fall back on a further redundancy, and that is efficiency. Efficiency advocates point to potential energy efficiencies, but seldom attempt to understand why these efficiencies are not already being adopted. Efficiency advocates often believe that naming an efficiency and describing it as a low hanging fruit is the same thing as demonstrating that it is a low cost alternative to building generation facilities. This is not in fact the case.
8. Renewables critics of nuclear power never reference renewables cost and compare the total cost of an all renewables electrical system, with the cost of an all nuclear electrical system. But judging from the current cost of renewables generation facilities, their capacity factors, and the added cost of new transmission lines needed to bring renewable generated electricity to distant customers, and the likely inflation of the cost of materials, the total cost of an all renewables system is likely to be several times higher the cos of an all nuclear system.

Monday, July 20, 2009

Keys to Lowering Reactor Costs: Economies of Scale or Serial Production?

I consider my "Keys" series to be relevant to the current debate on the cost of nuclear power.

David Walters passed on to me a 2004 study, by the University of Chicago," The Economic Future of Nuclear Power." This study looked at both nuclear construction and capital costs, and challenged some frequent assumptions and common beliefs. We should be aware that Rod Adams had already done this. Let us begin with the notion of economies of scale. As Rod Adams explained 12 years ago: "Pick up almost any book about nuclear energy and you will find that the prevailing wisdom is that nuclear plants must be very large in order to be competitive. This notion is widely accepted, but, if its roots are understood, it can be effectively challenged."

In the small worked of nuclear blogger, Rod Adams is known as a mighty smart man. Adams argues that the notions about economies of scale in the nuclear power industry was a legacy of the experience reactor manufacturers had had with fossil fuel powered generating facilities. "Experience had taught" Westinghouse, General Electric and their competitors, "that larger power stations could produce cheaper electricity and that electricity from central power stations could be effectively distributed to a large number of customers whose varying needs allowed the capital investment in the power station to be most effectively shared between all customers."

Adams continued:
"Their experience was even codified by textbook authors with a rule of thumb that said that the cost of a piece of production machinery would vary by the throughput raised to the 0.6 power. (According to this thumb rule, a pump that could pump 10 times as much fluid as another pump of similar design and function should cost only four times as much as the smaller pump.)"
But in 1996 Adams challenged the idea that economies of scale worked with nuclear power. He asserted,
"it is safe to say that there has been no predictable relationship between the size of a nuclear power plant and its cost."
It appeared that large nuclear plant size tended to increase construction time, which in turn increased capitol expenses. Hence, some studies found diseconomies of scale. that outweighed the increased economies related to parts costs.

The University of Chicago's 2004 literature review came to the same conclusion that Adams had. The Chicago study concludes, "It seems reasonable to conclude that few if any scale economies existed in nuclear plant construction in the 1970s and 1980s to confound the identification of learning effects."

Adams advocated small rather than large nuclear power plants. "If a market demand exists for 300 MW of electricity, distributed over a wide geographic area, traditional nuclear plant designers would say that the market is not yet ready for nuclear power, thus they would decide to learn nothing while waiting for the market to expand."

Adams was clearly ahead of his time.

Small size, leads for the demand of a larger number of units in order to meet electrical demand. Thus if the standard reactor size produces 100 MWs of electrical power, 10 such units would be required to produce the same amount of electricity as 1000 MW unit. The demand for ten units would lead almost inevitably to serial production. Adams notes, "Though the "economy of scale" did not work for the first nuclear age, there is some evidence that a different economic rule did apply. That rule is what is often referred to as the experience curve. According to several detailed studies, it appears that when similar plants were built by the same organization, the follow-on plants cost less to build. According to a RAND Corporation study, "a doubling in the number of reactors [built by an architect-engineer] results in a 5 percent reduction in both construction time and capital cost."

This in tern lead Adams to point to another factor, that the learning curve, facilitated by serial production, lowers cost through time. It should be noted that the University of Chicago study did not take this line of thinking as far as Adams did, but then Adams thinking about reactor design was far in advance of the thinking found in the august halls of the University of Chicago.

Adams added,
"When picking the proper size of a particular product, the experience curve should lead one to understand that high volume products will eventually cost less per unit output than low volume products and that large products inherently will have a lower volume than significantly smaller products."
Adams did not say in 1996, "Mass produce 'em in a factory, but I will wager if I asked him if that was what he was thinking, Adams would have answered, "yes."

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Small Reactors to the rescue

Every now and then I like to repost part or all of an old post that appears to have been spot on. I am usually motivated by vanity. I like showing off to my readers that I was right. Of course a lot of times I probably will have to say that someone else was right before me. Lots of times that someone was Rod Adams, but I would have to include Jim Holm as someone who has made an important contribution. A few months ago I wrote:
Some how great ideas come across as crazy when you first hear them. I thought that Jim Holm's idea of recycling coal fired power plants by converting them into nuclear power plants was crazy the first time I encountered it. I now think it is a terrific idea. I wrote about the idea in May and it recently bubbled up on the "Energy from Thorium" discussion form. I usually don't openly discuss ideas that come up on the discussion form, because I think what is said in the discussion form is a private conversation. But in the case of converting coal fired power plants into LFTR plants, this is an idea that has been floated by Holm, and which I seconded in May.
In addition to Jim I owe a good deal to Dr. Robert Hargraves. Several months ago, in an unposted note I wrote:
Dr. Robert Hargraves is a very bright fellow. He thought of some of my best ideas before I did. I did not steal Dr. Hargraves ideas, but I may have borrowed a few. I think that I actually developed my ideas for a factory build, small LFTR before I read Dr. Hargraves Blog. There are actually a few variations between Dr. Hargraves visions and mine, but that is beside the point. Both of us think along similar lines about the advantages of small reactors and how to build them quickly, in expensively and in large numbers. Our thinking is directed to slightly different technologies. Dr. Harvraves offers us some interesting insights into technological advances since the 1970's that can contribute of PBR and for that matter LFTR technology. Anyone who is interested in Reactor safety, ought to read Dr. Hargraves discussion of PBR passive safety
In addition, Kirk Sorensen, David Walters, David LeBlanc, Axil, DV82XL, Lars Jorgensen, the Sovietologist, Alex P, Dr. Buzz0, Jaro, and numerous others have deeply influenced my thinking. Lets face it, if there is a nuclear Renaissance these guys are in its intellectual forefront. it is a whole lot easier to have have good ideas if there are a lot of bright people around to steal your ideas from.

One idea that I quickly latched on to was the idea of the small reactor as the key to the rapid deployment of the enormous amount of nuclear power we need to deploy between now and 2050. I first thought of small reactors in 207, when I asked myself a simple question: How can we deploy enough rectors by 2050 to replace at least 80% of the fossil fuels we currently use. My answer was to do what you always do when you want to make a large number of modular objects. You build them in factories. But a Westinghouse AP-1100 is a little big to transport from a factory to its final destination. Westinghouse decided that if it got a large number of AP-1100 orders, it could factory build kits, and assemble the kits on site. This is going to take maybe 16 million hours of on site labor, so the AP-1100 is not a a factory built reactor.

What you need to increase the speed reactor deployment, is a factory constructed reactor that is small enough to transport by truck, railroad or barge, from he reactor factory, to its final set up site. Kitk Sorensen and a couple of his fellow UTK nuclear engineering graduate students had designed a transportable 100 MWe reactor, and so 100 kWe was the placeholder size. In fact, David LeBlanc designed a 400 MWe reactor, the core of which would be ridiculously easy to build in a factory, and be transported to its final set up site by truck. So I regard the final choice of reactor size as a matter to be decided by the people who are going to build the thing.

I picked out the Molten Salt Reactor as the best technology for the project, because of its simplicity, small size per unit of power output, and because the MSR offered solutions to virtually every problem of nuclear power. It is very safe, produces as little as 0.1% of the waste produced by conventional reactors, is up to 300 times more efficient than conventional reactors, and will never run out of fuel. A variant of the MSR, the Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor is a thorium fuel cycle reactor. Thorium is a very abundant mineral, so abundant that we will never run out of it no matter how much energy we extract from thorium. I was familiar with the MSR because my father had spent nearly 20 years of his Oak Ridge National Laboratory career involved in various research projects related to the concept. One is always fortunate or unfortunate in ones choice of parents, and I was very fortunate to get a leg up on understanding this very important nuclear technology because of my father.

At any rate by the time I launched my blog I already had developed the model which I call the Aim High Plan after Dr. Rober Hargraves' Aim High presentation which offers the important points of my model. I believe that the Aim High Plan not only should be adopted, but inevitably will be adopted. Indeed there is little choice if we are to have a high energy future for all of the people on earth.

During the 1960's and 70's ORNL reactor engineers designed several small MSRs that could be clustered to equal the power output of a large reactor. In the 1990's Argonne National Laboratory projected building small modular IFRs that could be clustered to provide a power equivalent of a large reactor. So we really are not talking about a newly invented idea. thus it comes as no great surprise that Babcock and Wilcox a long time American reactor manufacture announced plans to build a factory manufactured, transportable reactor. It is a LWR, not a LFTR, but it will offer many features of the AIM high plan. Thus it represents an important transitional step toward realization of the full Aim High Plan.

This now brings me to the old post in which I discussed the issue of economies of scale in nuclear construction, and why small is often better:

David Walters passed on to me a 2004 study, by the University of Chicago," The Economic Future of Nuclear Power." This study looked at both nuclear construction and capital costs, and challenged some frequent assumptions and common beliefs. We should be aware that Rod Adams had already done this. Let us begin with the notion of economies of scale. As Rod Adams explained 12 years ago: "Pick up almost any book about nuclear energy and you will find that the prevailing wisdom is that nuclear plants must be very large in order to be competitive. This notion is widely accepted, but, if its roots are understood, it can be effectively challenged."

In the small world of Nuclear Bloggers, Rod Adams is known as a mighty smart man. Adams argues that the notions about economies of scale in the nuclear power industry was a legacy of the experience reactor manufacturers had had with fossil fuel powered generating facilities. "Experience had taught" Westinghouse, General Electric and their competitors, "that larger power stations could produce cheaper electricity and that electricity from central power stations could be effectively distributed to a large number of customers whose varying needs allowed the capital investment in the power station to be most effectively shared between all customers."

Adams continued:
"Their experience was even codified by textbook authors with a rule of thumb that said that the cost of a piece of production machinery would vary by the throughput raised to the 0.6 power. (According to this thumb rule, a pump that could pump 10 times as much fluid as another pump of similar design and function should cost only four times as much as the smaller pump.)"

But in 1996 Adams challenged the idea that economies of scale worked with nuclear power. He asserted, "it is safe to say that there has been no predictable relationship between the size of a nuclear power plant and its cost."

It appeared that large nuclear plant size tended to increase construction time, which in turn increased capitol expenses. Hence, some studies found diseconomies of scale. that outweighed the increased economies related to parts costs.

The University of Chicago's 2004 literature review came to the same conclusion that Adams had. The Chicago study concludes, "It seems reasonable to conclude that few if any scale economies existed in nuclear plant construction in the 1970s and 1980s to confound the identification of learning effects."

Adams advocated small rather than large nuclear power plants. "If a market demand exists for 300 MW of electricity, distributed over a wide geographic area, traditional nuclear plant designers would say that the market is not yet ready for nuclear power, thus they would decide to learn nothing while waiting for the market to expand."

Adams was clearly a head of his time.

Small size, leads for the demand of a larger number of units in order to meet electrical demand. Thus if the standard reactor size produces 100 MWs of electrical power, 10 such units would be required to produce the same amount of electricity as 1000 MW unit. The demand for ten units would lead almost inevitably to serial production. Adams notes, "Though the "economy of scale" did not work for the first nuclear age, there is some evidence that a different economic rule did apply. That rule is what is often referred to as the experience curve. According to several detailed studies, it appears that when similar plants were built by the same organization, the follow-on plants cost less to build. According to a RAND Corporation study, "a doubling in the number of reactors [built by an architect-engineer] results in a 5 percent reduction in both construction time and capital cost."

This in turn lead Adams to point to another factor, that the learning curve, facilitated by serial production, lowers cost through time. It should be noted that the University of Chicago study did not take this line of thinking as far as Adams did, but then Adams thinking about reactor design was far in advance of the thinking found in the august halls of the University of Chicago.

Adams added, "When picking the proper size of a particular product, the experience curve should lead one to understand that high volume products will eventually cost less per unit output than low volume products and that large products inherently will have a lower volume than significantly smaller products."

Adams did not say in 1996, "Mass produce 'em in a factory, but I will wager if I asked him if that was what he was thinking, Adams would have answered, "yes."

Friday, April 24, 2009

My Nomination for the Next Energy Czar

Barack Obama is a great admirer of Abraham Lincoln and just as Lincoln was loosing the civil war in the early months of his presidency, Obama is loosing the energy war during the early montha of his presidency. Unlike Lincoln who witnessed generals return to Washington with their defeated armies, Mr Obama does not know that his side is loosing the war. Like Lincolm, Obama has a bunch of incompetent generals. Eventually in 1864 Mr. Lincoln figured out which general to appoint. That was of course U.S. Grant. Grant knew what he was doing, and eventually won the war. Mr. Obama needs to get rid of the idiots and appoint someone who understands the problems an knows what he is doing. Fortunately however, fortunately for Mr. Obama and the country, I am available to advise the president on energy leadership.

My advice would be brief. We need someone who understands nuclear technology, not an an anti-nuclear lawyer, of failed physics undergraduate to be Energy Czar. The Energy Czar must understand the fundamentals of engineering, and of energy systems. He must be well educated and articulate, with real communication skills. He must have had hands on experience with real energy producing devices. A little business experience in the energy business would also help, although perhaps not experience with big energy businesses.

The Energy Czar should be very intelligent but down to earth. He should possess common sense. He should be able to distinguish between people who are well grounded, idiots and gifters. Finally, he should passionately care about the future of energy. In short we need a prince among men to provide us with national energy leadership.

Fortunately such a person exists. His name is Rod Adams! My advice to the president is to seek Rod out and beg him to take the job.

Thursday, December 18, 2008

End Game: Answering the World's Energy Needs from Nuclear Waste

Lars Jorgensen is an Electrical Engineer who is Chief Technologist for Radio Products for Texas Instruments. In his spar time Lars has an unusual hobby. He is doing unpaid work on the development of the Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor, in a project that Rod Adams describes as the Nuclear equivalent of the Open Source movement in computing. The goal of the project, is to develop viable LFTR designs including the design tools that would be useful for Nuclear Engineers. In addition Lars is doing research on the use of LFTRs to solve the problem of the nuclear waste from other reactors. At the same time, Jorgensen's concept will cause produce vast amounts of electricity from the waste destroying process through the use of the LFTRs involved in the electrical generation process.

The idea of "burning" transuranium elements, the principle toxic wastes in nuclear waste, in molten salt type reactors is not new. During the 1950's my father verified that plutonium was compatible with a molten salt fuel carrier, and thus was suitable for use as a nuclear fuel in molten salt reactors. The idea of Using LFTRs to destroy nuclear weapons was pioneered by a group of nuclear scientists and Engineers at ORNL. In 1991, Uri Gat, and J. R. Engel of ORNL, and C. H. Dodds, of the University of Tennessee, proposed burning fissile fuel from dismantled nuclear weapons in LFTRs, as a means of nuclear deproliferation. That is the process of destroying the raw materials of nuclear weapons.

V. V. Ignatiev, S. A. Konakov, S. A. Subbotine, and R. Y. Zakirov of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, and K. Grebenkine proposed the use of Molten Salt Reactors as a means of disposing of nuclear waste. They noted that LFTRs had advantages over Liquid Metal reactors for nuclear waste disposal. The Russian research has lead to the development of the MOSART reactor design. The MOSART is a liquid salt fuel reactor concept intended to burn nuclear waste.
A similar proposal has come from Charles W. Forsberg of ORNL.

Forsberg noted that the development of
Brayton power cycles (rather than steam
cycles) that eliminate many of the historical challenges in building MSRs and (2) the conceptual development of several fast-spectrum MSRs that have large negative temperature and void coefficients, a unique safety characteristic not found in solid-fuel fast reactors.
Forsberg pointed to the potential of LFTRs to both produce electricity and destroy the dangerous components of nuclear waste.

In a draft paper titled. "An Improved End Game for the Non-Moderated Thorium Molten Salt Reactor", Lars Jorgensen has determined that by combining the disposal of nuclear waste and the generation of electricity in LFTRs vast amounts of electricity can be generated. Jogensen foresees a world wide demand for 7,500 GWe, nearly 20 times the current electrical consumption in the United States. With the use of electricity for water desalinization, Jorgensen further foresees electrical demand increasing to as much as 20,000 GWe.

Jorgensen, drawing on work by French nuclear scientists, H. Nifenecker, D. Heuer, J.M. Loiseaux, O. Meplan, A. Nuttin, S. David, and J.M. Martin, offers plans
to simultaneously reduce the current TRU wastes 15-fold (with onsite recycling) to 15,000 fold reduction (with the best offsite recycling), while also supplying 9000 GWe electricity for an energy-hungry world.
This is surely an ambitious undertaking.

Despite his ambition, Jorgenson's plan is simple. He reference the French Non Moderated Thorium Molten Salt Reactor, a Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor, as the his waste burning power generation reactor. By 2046 enough fissionable transuranium elements will be present in American Light Water Reactor Waste to start enough TMSRs to produce 125 billion watts of electricity. The TMSR is a breeder, that is it will produce more fuel than it burns. Other reactors will be started with U-233 from original TMSR fleet.

Jorgensen believes that his concept would work world wide to get rid of nuclear waste. As many as 1000 large TMSR could be built to use the word wide supply of 8842 tons LWR TRU waste as nuclear fuel. Each reactor would produce 1 billion watts of electricity. From that initial fleet enough U-233 would be produced to start another 8000 reactors. Enough to supply the entire wolds electrical demands 100 years from now.

Jorgensen plans for the TRUs from light water reactors to remain in TMSR cores until they are used up, a process that would take several hundred years. After 200 years more that 56% of the original LWR TRU inventory will have been used up. If there is a desire to shut down the TMSR fleet, as the amount of TRU drops inside the TMSRs, the TRUs can be withdrawn from the core by batch chemical processing of the fuel, Fission products and U-233 would of course be processed out of the fuel salts at the same time. The withdrawn TRUs would be transfered to the cores of other reactors, and the reactor whose TRUs are processed out can be shut down.

According to Jorgensen:
We can virtually eliminate the inventory TRUs in the reactor cores by gradually shutting down the reactors and fissioning the residual inventory off. The optimization goals of the shutdown procedure are:
1) minimize the final inventory of TRUs disposed as waste;
2) shut down the vast majority of reactors, as quickly as possible, consistent with the first goal.
Eventually the TRU's and U-233 involved in the process can be "burned down" to a tiny amount of waste. as much as an 11,000 fold reduction in the amount of waste. The final waste will come from two sources: a very small leak of TRU and U-233 into the fission product stream, and the TRU and U-233 inventory left over when the final, very small TMSR no longer contains enough fissionable material to maintain a chain reactor.

Jorgensen concludes:
The deployment not only provides 1,800,000 GW-yr (1.8 PW-yr) of electricity, but eliminates 90 to 99.99% of the world’s predicted transuranic waste inventory. The NM-TMSR’s fuel flexibility allows virtual elimination of the waste inventory arising from shutting down the reactor fleet. This sort of flexibility is much more difficult to achieve with any proposed solid fuel reactor. The Th-U233 cycle operates with TRU inventories only 5% of those for U238-Pu239 based breeder reactors. While much R&D needs to be funded and completed to bring this reactor to fruition, it is far less than the projected costs for Yucca Mountain, and solves both the TRU waste and energy generation challenges facing our society today.
For those concerned about nuclear proliferation, the TMSR and similar LFTRs are wonderful deproliferation tools. Uranium and plutonium from nuclear weapons and weapons available stockpiles can be used as starter charges for LFTRs and burned up by the nuclear process. LFTR can be designed to produce no more U-233 than is burned up in its chain reaction. Thus far from being a nuclear proliferation menace, the LFTR can becomes a prime tool for lowering the possibility of nuclear war.

Tuesday, July 8, 2008

A Response To Rod Adams

A few days ago, Rod Adams left an interesting comment on my discussion of the history of nuclear safety. Rod raised some issues that were both interesting and complex. I disagreed with one of Rod's arguments, that is that Nader's opposition to nuclear power power was somehow tied to the Texas oil industry.

Rod Adams asked me:
As an Historian of Ideas, did you do much work on the interplay of economics with technological development?



Answer: I have looked at the interplay of economics and technology more from a purely historic perspective. I did some study on how the development of a technology driven transportation systems in the 19th century United States was related to its economic and social developments. I have little doubt that economic demands lead to the 19th century development of steam powered technology. It retrospective we see that steam technology – rail roads and steam ships - emerging rapidly in response to economic demands, and that both economies and society were profoundly effected by that development. For example, the building of railroads on the Great Plains of the United States opened them to commercial farming, which in turn brought hundreds of thousands of European immigrants to the United States. Thus it could be argued that the 19th century development of steam technology was indirectly responsible for half of the population of Norway leaving that country and settling in the United States. From the viewpoint of the history of ideas you could trace the beginning of this immigration process back to 18th century in Glasglow, when a mechanic, James Watts applied physics to improving the efficiency of the steam engine, thus revolutionizing steam technology.

RA: Like you, I like to look at technological developments through a lens that is different from that provided by the conventional wisdom. I have always been intrigued by the strength of the movement against nuclear power led by people like Nader when there were so many obvious hazards imposed by all other energy sources.



Answer: The anti-nuclear movement had several sources. First was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the 1950s and 60s. A second source was opposition to placing power reactors in environmentally sensitive locations. A third source was the concern of nuclear safety researchers about reactor safety, and the belief that the AEC had prematurely shutdown nuclear safety research. I have pointed in Nuclear Green to the conflict over reactor safety between the AEC and the leadership and staff of several national laboratories in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. The scientist who were concerned about reactor safety were not opposed to nuclear power, and in fact had already done much to make reactors safer. It is clear from Three Mile Island that reactors were far less dangerous to the public than coal fired power plants. The issue for the scientists was whether reactors could and should be made safer. In fact the history of nuclear safety makes clear that the scientist won their case, and that new reactor designs have become progressively safer. There is a cost for making LWRs safer. Building safety into complex reactors whose fundamental design is not inherently safe is expensive. And we both know reactors can be both simpler and safer, if you take water out of the reactor. Thus both the Pebble Bed Reactor and the LFTR are safer than the LWR and their safety does not increase reactor price.

The “Ban the Bomb” movement was a source of both people and ideas for the anti-reactor crowd. My suspicion is that young Ralph Nader may not have been involved in the “Ban the Bomb” campaign but he was sympathetic to it. He still supports nuclear disarmament. The contribution that the “Ban the Bomb” people made to the anti-Nuclear movement was to spread confusion between reactors and atomic bombs. Helen Caldicott is a major example of that sin. The “Ban the Bomb” crowd have also spread considerable confusion about reactors as nuclear proliferation tools.

No doubt the South Africans looked at using reactor grade plutonium from the Koeberg nuclear power plant as bomb making material, the Helen Suzman Foundation reports

“The connection between nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations is slight, almost as slight as the connection between the lead in batteries and bullets. An atomic bomb requires either 90 per cent Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239. Since natural uranium contains only 0,7 per cent U-235, you have to enrich it, which is difficult, expensive and conspicuous. Koeberg only has enrichment to 3,5 per cent, which is why it is impossible for it to explode like a bomb. The apartheid government enriched uranium to over 90 per cent and made several atomic bombs at Valindaba near Pretoria. To say that Koeberg was a front for the bomb programme is rather like saying a nunnery is a front for a brothel: the two activities are so different it would have fooled no one.”

“The plutonium in Koeberg’s waste is next to useless for weapons, and none have ever been made from such reactors. Now that apartheid has gone and we have joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear power without nuclear weapons fits in perfectly with our new democracy, as it does in Sweden, Finland and Japan.”

Finally, the anti-nuclear wing of the environmentalist movement has an agenda, that positively ignores the public interest. Nader appears to have made common cause with the anti-consumer David Brower, Amory Lovins crowd. Thus far from bring consumers low cost electrical energy the Nader-Lovins crowd have brought California consumers in the name of anti-nuclear energy efficiency the most expensive electrical power in the country.

Rod Adams: I have pretty much convinced myself that the nuclear industry came under attack BECAUSE it was technically so much better than the competition that the people selling fossil fuels could not allow any kind of fair competition. Now, some would tell me that I am crazy to try to link Nader to the fossil fuel establishment, but here are some items for thought.



Answer: I have little doubt that Nader could, if he wished to, take a large amount of money from coal and oil interest. Nader has kept the financial operations of his non-profit “public interest” agencies secret. Thus Nader could receive large amounts of money from Coal interest and no one would know. Also Nader could be paid off through speaker fees. Recall that Nader admitted being worth nearly $4 million in 2000, despite earning only $15,000 a year during most of his career. Where did the money come from? Probably speaking fees and book sales. The $4 million is quite possibly only a small part of Nader’s wealth. I suspect that he has millions more tied up in retirement plans with Nader non-profit fronts. Saint Ralph will be well taken care of in his old age.

There would be a motivation on the side of the coal interest to “help” Ralph Nader. During most of his career Nader judged the coal producers with a very different set of standards than he judged the nuclear industry. Nader was a Johnny-come-lately to the anthropogenic global warming issue, and he has largely ignored the health and environmental issues implicit in burning coal in order to generate electricity. This is an amazing lapse for one who claimed to have the public interest at heart. Although Nader has made issues of mine safety, and tax avoidance by mine owners, he never consistently applied the criteria which he applied to the nuclear industry to the coal industry. Thus Nader was guilty of holding double standards in judging energy sources.

Rod Adams: 1. Nader grew up in an Arab-American household that owned a restaurant and served a largely Arab-American community. He has mentioned in several biographies the importance of many conversations in the restaurant to his career as a political activist.



Answer: The Nader’s were Maronite Christians. At one point Maronites were in a majority in Lebanon, but during the 19th and 20th centuries most emigrated from Lebanon. Nearly half ended up in all places, Brazil, but a quarter came to the United States. The Maronite were a minority who were repeatedly assailed and who repeatedly assailed other religious groups in Lebanese society. There were several civil wars in Lebonan during the 19th and 20th centuries. During the Civil War of 1976 to 1991 it is said that “By the end of the war, nearly every party had allied with and subsequently betrayed every other party at least once.” Thus Maronites come from a world of conflict, treachery and mistrust.

One of the most important things about Lebanese society is the extent to which mistrust hobbles the development of what we would call civil society. There is no public interest in Lebanon. For at least the last few hundred years, the Lebanese have repeatedly fallen into Civil Wars. The acquisition of power within Lebanese society is seen as a danger to everyone, because it might lead one group to dominance over other groups. Thus a standard strategy is to mistrust and create mistrust for the powerful. Mistrust of the powerful is a recurrent theme in Nader's thinking. Human power is created by centralization of control, in Nader’s world view, and he believes that the function of the states is to check the dangerous organization of centralized power that is not in “public hands.” For Nader there is a fundamental conflict between “the public interest,” and the concentration of power in business hands.

Who is dangerous in Nader’s views? It the people who small business owners fear, larger competators, businesses and industries. In addition Nader fears the power of scientist, whose language he does not understand.

Nader’s central strategy is to spread the mistrust he feels for businesses and industries, and to organize efforts to control the misconduct he suspects them of. This tracks nicely with Lovin’s desire to decentralize the production of electrical energy, by in effect making everyone his or her own power company. This is impossible with nuclear generated electricity, hence Lovins opposes the nuclear option. Curiously Loving believes that highly centralized wind farms, and solar generating facilities are examples of decentralized distributive generation. It would, of course, be a mistake to expect sanity from Lovins. Nader like Lovins ignores the big business aspects of renewable power generation, and ignore the cost to the public of renewable energy. Lovins like Nader is a small business owner. Both have built their businesses by selling bad ideas. Both have convinced the ideological Left that they are champions of human freedom. In fact neither is. Both are champions of highly subsidized business, whose operations end up costing the public lots of money in terms of their electrical expenses.

Nader, in his own life story is the little guy who takes on the powerful. His weapons are stories of the powerful’s misconduct and his plan to reign them in, plans which involves government regulation.

RA: 2. One of his earliest campaigns was against the first popular small car built by an American manufacturer. 



Nader has hardly been a genius in his perception of the global warming issue. Nader totally ignored the case for fuel efficiency and CO2 control in his attack on energy efficient cars. In addition to the economical and sporty Corvair, Nader launched an attack on a paragon of fuel economy the VW bug. Even Nader’s staff protested that the VW was not really unsafe, but Nader stuck to his guns. Truth did not matter to Nader, neither did global warming, what mattered was that the power of auto manufacturers be diminished and that Nader appear to be the Hero of the drama he had created for the media. Attacking the big guys was always a means of getting Nader’s name in the paper or on television.

Rod Adams: 3. He began his anti nuclear activities in 1970 at a time when oil cost about $3 per barrel. He was working for the University of Texas Law Review. According to "Ralph Nader: A Biography" by Patricia Cronin Marcello, "We thought the mere investment in energy efficiency would replace far more than the megawatts that could be supplied by risky nuclear power."

Answer: I am not sure what you mean by the statement, “he was working for the University of Texas Law Review.” My step-daughter studied law at the University of Texas Law School. I believe that the Texas Law Review is a student publication that is staffed by University of Texas Law School students. Nader, as far as I can tell did not publish any articles in the Texas Law Review, although several book reviews related to Nader did appear in the TLR in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. I have been able to find a reference to anything that Nader wrote for the University of Texas Law Review. University of Texas Law students and their professors are quite a liberal group collectively. The TLR is not a front for the Texas Oil Industry and would not serve as a conduit for Texas oil money.

Rod Adams: In Texas, in 1970, there was a pretty deep recession assisted by low oil and gas prices partly as a result of a growing interest in building new nuclear power plants.



Answer: There was some Texas interest in nuclear power, but coal was regarded as cheaper, and there is a lot of coal in Texas. Texas electrical producers ended up building a lot of expensive coal fired electrical generating plants, with increasingly expensive Natural Gas backups.

4. His first Critical Mass conference which turned anti-nuclear questions into a focused campaign with coordinated efforts in protests and legislative action took place in 1974, right during the height of interest in oil prices caused by the Arab Oil Embargo. When nuclear fission should have been seen as at least one of many available answers, he was hard at work to take it off of the table.



Answer: The use of oil in electrical generation was not a big deal to the oil industry. Not all that much oil was used in electrical generation to begin with, and coal was the big beneficiary of the attack on nuclear power.

5. Nader played king maker in 1976 when he threw his considerable political support - far more then than now - behind Jimmy Carter in exchange for an agreement to discourage nuclear energy, especially the breeder reactor and recycling programs. 
Nader's power came from some well connected friends who kept him in the limelight and kept him funded to conduct his high visibility campaigns. I think that part of the support came because they liked his anti-nuclear stance. Perhaps, it was the other way around and his anti-nuclear stance came because it met the interests of his supporters.

Answer: I would not disagree with that statement, except to say we need to test it. From the viewpoint of constructing history, it has to be supported by facts that demonstrate the opposite is untrue. That is that demonstrate that Nader was not befriended by interest groups, whose interests he directly or indirectly served. Let me give an example of the sort of evidence we need. Daily Kos blogger A. Siegel identified that the Chicago based Joyce Foundation was serving as a conduit for money for pro-coal propaganda activities. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/11/29/185847/96
Grants were given to a number of organizations with environmentalist and anti-nuclear credentials, including:

Great Plains Institute for Sustainable Development Inc. Minneapolis, Amount: $99,400.00
gpisd.net
To brief Midwest lawmakers and regulators about how advanced coal technologies are currently deployed in Europe and encourage their support for similar adoption here.

Clean Air Task Force Inc. Boston, MA, Amount: $55,000.00
To support a delegation of Midwest policy makers, industry representatives, and environmental groups to visit European coal gasification projects and meet with European counterparts.

Clean Air Task Force Inc. Boston, MA, Amount: $60,000.00
URL: www.catf.us
To retain local counsel and technical experts to appear in the licensing hearings for a proposed IGCC project.

Izaak Walton League of America Inc., St. Paul, MN, Amount: $350,000.00,
URL: www.IWLA.org
To continue to encourage the deployment of advanced coal generation in Minnesota and to promote policies that enable and encourage carbon capture and storage.

Great Plains Institute for Sustainable Development Inc. Minneapolis, Amount: $99,400.00

Union of Concerned Scientists Inc., Cambridge, MA, Amount: $75,000.00
URL: ww.ucsusa.or
To support its efforts to study and highlight the financial risks of future carbon dioxide emission limits.

CUB Consumer Education and Research Fund, Chicago, IL, Amount: $75,000.00
Length: 1 year
URL: cuboard.org
To promote new policies supporting coal gasification and carbon sequestration for new electric generation in Illinois.

Clean Air Task Force Inc. Boston, MA Amount: $787,500.00 Length: 21 mos.
URL: www.catf.us
To promote Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle for the next generation of coal plants in the upper Midwest.

Clean Wisconsin Inc. Madison, WI Amount: $500,000.00 Length: 1 year
URL: www.wiendecade.org
To oppose conventional coal plants proposed in Wisconsin and promoting coal gasification with sequestration as an alternative. The Wisconsin Citizens Utility Board would be a partner in the intervention and campaign.

Great Plains Institute for Sustainable Development
Minneapolis, MN Amount: $437,500.00 Length: 21 mos.
URL: gpisd.net
To support the efforts of its Coal Gasification Working Group.

National Wildlife Federation, Reston, VA Amount: $122,700.00 Length: 21 mos.
URL: www.nwf.org/
To build support in Indiana and Michigan for coal gasification as an alternative to conventional coal-burning power plants.

Indiana Wildlife Federation and Michigan United Conservation Clubs would be partners in this effort. National Resources Defense Council;
URL: www.nrdc.org
For its efforts to oppose the construction of new conventional coal plants and promote alternative plants using coal gasification with carbon sequestration.

Ohio Environmental Council, Columbus, OH, Amount: $113,750.00
Length: 21 mos.
URL: www.theoec.org To support its ongoing efforts to promote Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle in Ohio and to oppose the permitting of a conventional coal plant proposed by AMP-Ohio, a municipal utility consortium.

Resources for the Future Inc. Washington, DC, Amount: $75,000.00
To conduct a quantitative assessment of the risks to shareholders and electric utility ratepayers of investing in various coal combustion technologies.

Rockefeller Family Fund New York, NY Amount: $50,000.00
To support ongoing coal advocacy activities of the Renewable Energy Alignment Mapping Project.

University of Wisconsin-Madison Center on Wisconsin Strategy Madison, WI, Amount: $175,000.00
URL: www.cows.org
To build support among labor leaders in Wisconsin and other Midwest states for coal gasification as an alternative to conventional coal power plants.

Establishing a coal or oil connection to the anti-nuclear movement would require a great deal more such evidence. It is more likely that anti-nuclear activist have a prior animosity toward nuclear power that is fundamentally irrational. For a generation they failed to weigh the cost of using coal by the same standards they used to judge nuclear energy. Thus we find Alvin Weinberg writing in the 1970’s about the long term consequences of using coal. Thus in 1977 Weinberg wrote:
“The concentration of C02 in the atmosphere is more strongly tied to the utilization of coal than to that of oil and natural gas simply because the coal resource is so much larger than the oil and gas resource. . . . Thus even if all the oil and gas were burned, the C02 concentration would be increased only by 30 percent; whereas if coal
equivalent to the reserve base is burned, the C02 concentration would increase by 80 percent.”

Weinberg added:

"If we look at the matter in broadest terms, we find ourselves beset with a profound dilemma. The difficulties and risks of the nuclear path have been delineated often and in detail. . . . The major risk in the coal path is the possible CO catastrophic. In a way this is the coal
analogue of nuclear proliferation: it is global, uncertain, possibly catastrophic. Thus we see the dimensions of the dilemma: the two energy systems upon which we are expecting to depend, at least over the medium term, are flawed to a degree that is at present essentially impossible to fully estimate, and that indeed may never be fully possible to estimate. To those who embrace coal as a fission-free bridge to a solar future, the CO question should inject a note of prudent concern: we can turn the phrase around and ask whether fission based on reactors of current design perhaps will have to serve as a coal-free bridge to a fusion, breeder, or solar future.”

We ought to consider this. Alvin Weinberg saw something in 1977, that Ralph Nader and Amory Lovins didn’t, that a benign neglect of the problems of a coal based energy future could lead to catastrophic climate change. Nader had access to Weinberg’s thinking about the energy future, and thus has no excuse for not being aware about the threat that CO2 generated by fossil fuel use posed for global climate. Lovins was also aware of Weinberg's thinking. Weinberg was clearly trying to take into account the arguments about the energy future posed by Nader and Lovins, and if anything, Weinberg was overly concerned by the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

It goes without saying that neither Nader or Lovins were overly conserned about climate change caused by burning fossil fuels.

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